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Summary 
   
Scholars have regularly presented the EU as a ‘normative power’ that 
promotes human rights as a legitimate standard of international behaviour. Yet, the 
legitimacy of EU normative power within enlargement has not been well-defined or 
investigated. The overarching issue that this thesis aims to address concerns the 
legitimacy of EU human rights promotion to Turkey. It aims to provide an answer 
to a politically and intellectually challenging question: How should the European 
Union promote human rights to Turkey, if the country’s human rights progress is to 
be understood not simply as a result of domestic dynamics, but as dependent on the 
legitimacy of EU human rights promotion? The central aim of the thesis is to 
explore ideas and practices that contribute to improving the EU policy of human 
rights towards its non-European partners. The theoretical focus offers a fresh 
perspective to the study of Turkey-EU relations that relates to ‘normative power 
Europe’ and the legitimacy of human rights promotion. The empirical focus of the 
thesis explores legitimacy as being a highly significant issue which affects the long-
term success or failure of EU human rights policies. It assesses the prospects and 
implications of EU policy and determines what is required in terms of external 
incitements for optimal outcomes. The original contribution of the thesis lies in its 
argument that EU normative power within enlargement is not intrinsic to the EU, 
but ought to be recognised as such through its interaction with non-European 
‘others’. 
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                     Introduction 
 
 
1. Overview and original contribution 
 
The overarching issue that this thesis aims to address is one concerning EU 
human rights promotion and legitimacy. It aims to provide an answer to a politically 
and intellectually challenging question: How should the European Union promote 
human rights to Turkey, if the country’s human rights progress is to be understood 
not simply as a result of domestic dynamics, but as dependent on the legitimacy of 
EU human rights promotion? The central aim of the thesis is to explore ideas and 
practices that contribute to improving the EU policy of human rights to Turkey as a 
candidate state. The theoretical focus offers an alternative perspective to the study 
of the relationship between Turkey and the EU that relates to ‘normative power 
Europe’ and the legitimacy of human rights promotion. The empirical focus of the 
thesis explores legitimacy as being a highly significant issue which affects the long-
term success or failure of EU human rights policies, and determines what is 
required in terms of external incitements for positive outcomes. 
 
   
Theoretically, the thesis will question the assumption that human rights 
promotion to Turkey is legitimate on its own terms. It will emphasise that what EU, 
as a ‘normative power’, promotes as ‘normal’ in international political behaviour, 
might not be normal for everybody else, including Turkey. Accordingly, the thesis 
will search for alternative sources of legitimacy that can justify EU human rights 
promotion to Turkey as an allegedly non-European ‘other’, which also has an 
entrenched state doctrine and important human rights problems on the ground. 
Thus, human rights promotion within enlargement will be discussed in relation to 
sources of legitimacy that are external to the concept of EU normative power itself, 
but which connect the normative base of human rights with established values in 
policymaking. Empirically, the thesis will apply in detail two sources of legitimacy: 
legitimacy as procedural propriety for human rights policies (procedural 
legitimacy), and legitimacy as recognition of EU normative power by the non-
European ‘other’ (substantive legitimacy). It will be argued that a process of EU 
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human rights promotion without underlying legitimacy will be fragile and only 
partially effective, as well as heavily dependent on the EU’s external constraints 
and governmental/political control within Turkey. 
 
 
The empirical examination of EU legitimacy will have a dual nature, 
relating both to policy performance and to attitudes in Turkey. Concerning the 
former, the empirical focus will explore specific EU human rights policies with 
instruments of financial and technical assistance as cases in point: the Instrument of 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Instrument of Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR), and human rights consultations. The qualitative analysis 
of the policy documents and projects stemming from these instruments will show 
that they have been instituted according to European human rights norms and in 
solidarity with vulnerable citizens. Yet, their function presents a challenge for 
prospects of human rights protection in terms of their pertinence to Turkey’s 
particular human rights issues, their inclusiveness, and their outcomes for 
vulnerable citizens. EU stakeholders’ norm-laden visions frequently juxtapose with 
the function and outcomes of the aforementioned instruments and with those who 
stand to benefit from them most. 
 
 
Concerning EU legitimacy in terms of domestic attitudes, the thesis will 
demonstrate that unless EU human rights promotion and accession membership are 
regarded as ‘values as such’ by Turkish political and societal actors, then norm 
diffusion will be superficial and EU-related reforms will be dependent on cost-
benefit analyses. It will be shown that the success of the EU as a ‘normative power’ 
in Turkey largely depends on compatibility between the EU ‘standard of legitimacy’ 
(liberal conceptions of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law) and Turkey’s 
accepted ‘standards of legitimacy’ (dimensions of nationalism and secularism). It is 
worth noting that domestically accepted standards of legitimacy differ between 
different actors in Turkey. The empirical exploration is not delimited to official 
policy only, e.g. policy emanating from Turkish governmental authorities. It 
includes goals expressed by the major opposition party and non-governmental 
human rights organisations. Therefore, even if EU human rights promotion is 
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recognised as a powerful resource of change by some political actors, it still 
encounters resistance by opposing interests. On the basis of the qualitative analysis 
of domestic attitudes, it is found to be hardly the case that EU human rights 
promotion within enlargement can be accepted uncritically by Turkey as a ‘force 
for good’. 
 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing literature about the EU’s norm-
shaping role in the world with specific reference to human rights promotion within 
enlargement. The choice of human rights promotion to Turkey as a main unit of 
analysis results from the multifaceted relationship between the two actors, and the 
challenges this creates for the theory and practice of EU normative power. Many 
countries seek political and economic ties with the EU through membership or 
other association. Yet, Turkey’s EU accession process becomes a source of 
contestation for the EU’s norm-diffusing role. Turkey has been and continues to 
serve as a key ‘other’ in the definition of the EU’s normative agenda (human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law). This renders its legitimation of the EU agenda 
even more significant, given that recent normative power scholarship argues that 
the EU cannot be considered a ‘normative power’ unless it is recognised as such by 
‘others’ through the context of their interaction. In addition, Turkey’s interaction 
with Europe has played a critical role in shaping the EU’s normative power and 
European identity. In this setting of mutual identity-shaping, it is not accurate to 
assume that normative power manifests as an intrinsic property of the EU, nor that 
Turkey will accept it at face value. 
  
 
This study, therefore, is an attempt to address the question of what happens 
when Europe attempts to reshape a powerful actor whose political behaviour is also 
embedded in normative standards and value-based judgments, albeit distinct from 
those of the EU. In order to address this question, the thesis will develop an 
alternative ‘normative power Europe’ analysis, questioning how NPE should be 
applied to countries which also have an idiosyncratic strategic culture that frames 
their international interactions and the way they practice policymaking. 
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2. Why study EU human rights promotion to Turkey from a perspective of 
legitimacy? 
 
 
As highlighted previously, this thesis seeks to analyse the European Union’s 
human rights promotion to Turkey as a candidate state. Contrary to the dominant 
literature on Turkey-EU relations, the analysis here takes as its starting point ideas 
of legitimacy in international policy-making and human rights promotion in 
particular. This is a somewhat unusual exercise, for the EU’s mechanisms of human 
rights promotion within enlargement, let alone Turkey’s accession process, have 
rarely been analysed from a legitimacy perspective. This is despite the proliferation 
of ‘legitimacy analyses’ in the study of EU enlargement and external relations, and 
many interesting insights into the EU’s tools in particular country-cases. It is argued 
here that applying a legitimacy perspective in examining human rights policies with 
enlargement is a fruitful exercise. This is because such a perspective, despite its 
imprecisions, seeks to highlight the contradictions between actual EU human rights 
promotion (what it is doing) and its better potential (what it could do). The usage of 
legitimacy transforms the analysis of human rights promotion from a situation 
describing an intergovernmental bargaining exercise between EU-Turkey elites, to 
an analytical framework in which human rights actions on the ground and local 
socio-political dynamics (including civil society organisations) can be studied 
jointly. This fits into the agenda of EU normative power analyses which argue that 
the EU cannot be a normative power without an external recognition of its 
legitimacy. 
 
 
Based on these guiding assumptions, the main objective of the thesis is to 
develop a legitimacy-oriented analysis of the EU’s human rights promotion within 
enlargement, and to operationalise it in the case of Turkey. The choice of Turkey 
amongst other candidate states seemed particularly suited for the purpose of this 
study. Firstly, Turkey as an alleged ‘non-European other’, as adopted in public 
5 
 
debates and segments of the literature on European self-definition,
1
 supports the 
legitimacy study of a top-down human rights policy and its fit/misfit with the target 
country. Secondly, the extent of Turkey’s human rights problems justifies a study 
that is inspired, at bottom, by perceptions of significance of human rights norms. 
Although Turkey is not the first candidate state with a weak human rights record 
(Greece, Spain, and Portugal are several examples discussed in Chapter One), it is 
the only one that has been criticised for human rights violations that are 
‘inadmissible and under no circumstances tolerable’. 2  Thirdly, Turkey’s human 
rights problems are embedded in the country’s established state doctrine and 
political/administrative values, as discussed in Chapter Three. The Turkish state is 
sufficiently consolidated to prevent the EU’s human rights policy from having a 
free hand, which, in turn, is likely to obstruct human rights support from being 
optimally effective. Fourthly, the selection of Turkey is justified by temporal 
reasons. At the time of writing, Turkey is a key member of the next group in line for 
EU membership, alongside Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). These specific features make Turkey a particularly good choice for the 
purposes of the present study. 
 
 
3. Research design  
 
As the research problem and aim of the thesis have now been presented, this 
section will specify the research design and the application of the methodological 
tools. This section concentrates on those research methods which interpret the 
                                                 
1 Neumann, I.B. and Welsh, J. ‘The Other in European Self-Definition: an Addendum to the 
Literature on International Society’. Review of International Studies, vol.17 no: 4 (1991) p.327-348; 
Neumann, I.B. Uses of the Other: the ‘East’ in European Identity Formation (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999); Muftuler-Bac, M. ‘Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in 
Europe’. Turkish Studies, vol.1 no: 1 (2000) p.21-35; Mayer, F.C. and Palmowski, J. ‘European 
Identities and the EU – The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe’. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol.42 no: 3 (2004) p.573-598; Diez, T. ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others’. 
Millennium- Journal of International Studies, vol.33 no: 3 (2005) p.613-636; Casanova, J. ‘The 
Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European 
Civilisation’. Constellations, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.234-247; Tekin, B.C. Representations and 
Othering in Discourse: the Construction of Turkey in the EU Context (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing, 2010); Oner, S. Turkey and the European Union: the Question of European Identity 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011) 
2
European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ (Brussels: 
13 October 1999) p.8. 
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underlying meanings, causes, and implications of legitimacy in EU human rights 
promotion, and which discern and justify the selection of the three EU instruments 
in the empirical part of the thesis. Additionally, it outlines and explains the 
methodologies of the individual chapters, both conceptual and empirical. These are 
outlined below so as to provide greater clarity and comprehensibility to the data and 
arguments. 
 
 
  Research design for the EU’s human rights promotion as a distinct field 
of enquiry has frequently emerged in the context of the study of how the EU acts in 
activities directed towards non-EU members and third countries. In discussing a 
research design for European policy processes towards target states, Smith 
suggested a framework for scholarly enquiry that does not focus exclusively on 
either European or national policy processes, but treats these domains as two 
clearly linked variable processes.
3
 According to this idea, research design for EU 
human rights promotion can be organised around studying EU activity as a 
combination of dependent and independent variables. 
  
 
          Specifically, the analyst might be interested in the various procedural 
aspects of EU policies that are derived from a range of key actors and institutional 
developments, i.e. human rights promotion as a dependent variable. A study of EU 
human rights promotion as a dependent variable is premised on the idea that EU 
human rights activities do not simply serve a desire to influence power politics. 
They also serve important value-based functions, such as preventing key 
problematic issues in new EU member states from adversely affecting European 
human rights achievements, and also socialising these states and their officials into 
‘European’ methods of human rights protection – both key characteristics of 
‘normative power Europe’. As an independent variable, one could examine how the 
perceptions of EU human rights promotion by political actors in the target country 
influence the process of EU-induced human rights reform. In this thesis, a 
combination of both approaches will involve a single analysis, treating each aspect 
                                                 
3Smith, M.E. ‘Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals’. Politics, vol.28 no: 3 
(2008) p.181 (177-187) 
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separately but in sequence: EU human rights promotion will first be studied 
empirically as a dependent variable through the analysis of specific policy 
instruments (Chapter Four), and then as an independent variable through the 
analysis of political attitudes in Turkey (Chapter Five). A major research strategy of 
this thesis is to elucidate, compare, and contrast the normative foundation of EU 
human rights promotion with its policy practice and the attitudes held by Turkish 
policymakers, thus significantly affecting how human rights are applied and reacted 
to. 
 
  In the process of fulfilling the overall aim of the thesis, the legitimacy 
analysis will be conducted through a ‘normative power Europe’ framework. 
Normative power Europe entered the debate on research design for EU external 
action by bringing ideas of ‘transformative’, ‘civilian’, ‘ethical’, and ‘soft power’ 
centre-stage in the analysis of EU international behaviour. In a carefully designed 
case study on ‘normative power Europe’, Manners was amongst the first scholars 
who attempted to show how the EU shapes conceptions of ‘normal’ in international 
politics in line with its unique normative basis. This basis, he argued, is rooted in its 
Enlightenment history and its character as a political order that contributes to 
freedom and democracy in world politics.
4
 In other words, Europe as a normative 
power plays a unique role in globalising norms such as peace, democracy, the rule 
of law, and human rights.
5
  In other notions, EU normative power refers to its 
pursuit of external policies geared towards world openness, global awareness, 
loyalty to humankind, self-reflection and self-problematisation, and recognition of 
the ‘other’.6  
 
 
            
Nevertheless, there seems to be lack of clarity in the literature over how 
normative power exerts influence on target states (by rational choice or 
socialisation), how it relates to harder aspects of EU external action (such as 
economic interests), and how one can measure normative power empirically. It is 
                                                 
4 Manners. I. ‘Assessing the Decennial, Reassessing the Global: Understanding European Union 
Normative Power in Global Politics’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) p.304-329. 
5
 Merlingen, M. ‘Everything is Dangerous: a Critique of Normative Power Europe’. Security 
Dialogue, vol.38 no: 4 (2007) p.435 (435-453) 
6
 Pichler, F. ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’. European Societies, vol.11 no: 1 (2009) p.6 (3-24) 
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for this reason that the puzzle of legitimacy will be considered for questioning and 
interpreting EU human rights promotion to Turkey. A central analytical aim of this 
thesis is to integrate arguments on the EU’s normative role in the world into the 
analytical language of legitimacy. The notion of legitimacy includes a normative 
component that is not tied exclusively to traditional notions of power but can be 
applied in all political situations and to all types of policies. Thus, the proposal to 
analyse EU human rights policy to Turkey in terms of legitimacy does not lower the 
normative standard of the analysis, it makes it more inclusive. 
  
 
        The scholarly discussion of research design for external EU action has 
occurred in connection with a much wider discussion between scholars on how to 
study the complex arena of EU foreign policy as a novel empirical domain. If we 
accept EU external action as a system of governance that ‘borrows’ mechanisms, 
processes, and procedures from supranational and national level, this provides a 
productive arena for testing out its legitimacy as a leading ‘normative power’ of 
human rights promotion worldwide. This aspect of EU external action provides for 
a research design that pays close attention to EU norms, strategy, and impact. At the 
same time, it focuses on recognition by the target state, and on how the EU human 
rights policy and the domestic policy environment complement or undermine each 
other. 
 
 
The study of the legitimacy of human rights promotion to Turkey will begin 
with an analysis of the broader historical context in which the policy is embedded, 
through a discussion of the practice of human rights in EU integration and why this 
is a question of legitimacy. The thesis will begin with framing human rights 
promotion within the wider literature on European integration, in order to create a 
link between the development of an EU human rights narrative and how this led it 
to frame what is acceptable (or not) political behaviour on the international scene. 
For this purpose, the discussion will begin by outlining the historical development 
of the EU’s legal competences in the area of human rights, both internally and 
externally. This will be followed by a discussion of how conditionality has been 
framed within the wider policy of human rights promotion in EU external relations 
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and enlargement in particular. The linkage of internal and external human rights 
narrative will highlight the issue of consistency (e.g. the EU’s maximalist approach 
to human rights externally when it is more permissive internally) and the 
subsequent questions of legitimacy raised by this divergence. The above discussion 
will further the aims of the thesis by spelling out the EU’s ‘standard of legitimacy’, 
as this stemmed from its so-called normative difference: historical context, hybrid 
polity, and political-legal constitution.
7
 It will also help to draw conclusions about 
the nature of the EU’s involvement in Turkey’s human rights situation and about the 
specific human rights instruments selected for empirical discussion in Chapter Four. 
 
 
By considering legitimacy as located in the relationship between the EU and 
Turkey, the discussion of human rights promotion must include a background of 
human rights issues in Turkey and the EU’s involvement therein. In recent years, 
the EU has been the primary frame of reference for domestic policy decisions on 
human rights reform, and it is for this reason that any discussion of reform must 
focus primarily, though not exclusively, on EU involvement. Human rights 
violations in Turkey owe to certain characteristics found within Turkish politics 
itself. These include historical experiences, the salient role of what can be termed 
‘Kemalist orthodoxy’, the unitary state and division of state and religion, and the 
guardian role of the military as determined in the Constitution of 1960. For a long 
time, human rights protection was only regarded as legitimate by Turkish political 
actors if it did not infringe the Kemalist principles regarding the form of the Turkish 
state.
8
 This general propensity for human rights violations has potentially 
undermined the ability of EU policy to meet its stated aims. Therefore, human 
rights reform in Turkey requires clarifications regarding the foundations of human 
rights problems, their current state of protection, and the involvement of the 
European Union. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, p.240. 
8Baudner, L. ‘The Politics of Norm Diffusion and Turkish European Union Accession Negotiations’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.50 no: 6 (2012) p.927 (922-938) 
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The EU policy mechanisms identified for analysis are a) financial assistance 
through the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and its projects, b) civil 
society development through the European Instrument of Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), and c) human rights consultations. These instruments were 
selected according to three main criteria. The first selection criterion was whether 
the policy tool in question had been present from early on in EU enlargement and 
human rights, in other words, whether it had been applied over a period of 
successive enlargements. The temporal domain of the thesis’ background discussion 
of human rights conditionality is extensive in so far as the first applications for 
membership occurred in the 1960s. In order to be considered for inclusion, EU 
policy tools needed to be instruments that had been stable and long-run, allowing 
for their procedural mechanisms to develop in parallel with the development of the 
EU’s human rights narrative within enlargement. The second criterion concerned 
their ability to effect a degree of direct policy transformation in the target country. 
This ruled out for instance instruments of annual human rights monitoring, as they 
exclusively entail the collection and verification of information on human rights 
problems, yet does not demand concrete policy action. Thirdly, the EIDHR was 
specially selected by an impetus to open up an under-researched dimension of 
normative power Europe, that of civil society development. The EIDHR is hailed as 
a relatively recent tool within enlargement (previously pertaining only to external 
relations) that encourages human rights reform from ‘bottom-up’ without 
government involvement. In this sense, EIDHR funding is promoted as a tool that 
respects social and cultural sensitivities, gives local ‘ownership’ to human rights 
reform, and develops from below an ‘active’ and ‘free’ civil society movement that 
previously might have been disadvantaged. Just how effective this logic is in 
shaping human rights change and encouraging reform will be addressed in the 
empirical part of the thesis. Finally, European Commission officials interviewed for 
this thesis singled out the above instruments as the EU’s main human rights-
promoting mechanisms to Turkey. 
 
 
The discussion so far has delimited the research design of the thesis and 
clarified the selection criteria for the empirical cases. The next section will discuss 
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the data collection methods that will be employed in the individual chapters of the 
thesis. 
 
 
4. Data collection and analysis 
 
           The method applied to the investigation of the historical development of EU 
human rights promotion in Chapter One is literature review and documentary 
analysis. In order to investigate the development of an internal and external EU 
human rights narrative, it is necessary to conduct a longitudinal historical analysis. 
This will initially identify the emergence of European human rights norms and 
institutional mechanisms, and then the elements of an emerging human rights 
policy that each of them affected. This background analysis serves as a useful 
starting point for a discussion of the policy processes in question, because it 
emphasises the EU’s legal competences in the area of human rights, the interaction 
between internal and external EU systems of human rights protection, and the 
different kinds of action taken by the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. It therefore shows how substantive European human rights norms, 
when incorporated into EU legislation, subsequently changed external action goals 
and introduced international co-operation, democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, rights of minorities and good governance as foreign 
policy issues that could shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international life.  
 
 
Tracing the evolution of EU human rights policy was assisted by a 
documentary analysis of EU legal texts and documents. As Bell states, 
‘documentary analysis to trace the evolution of a policy... and its related arguments 
is a critical aspect of the reviewing task’. 9  The main categories of official 
documents studied were EEC/EU treaties, accession treaties of individual member 
states, European Commission opinions, Council declarations, European Parliament 
resolutions, and case-law by the European Court of Justice. In total, forty-eight 
enlargement-related documents were drawn on, serving as a source of data on the 
                                                 
9
Bell, E. Research for Health Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p.91. 
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contextual factors, institutional settings, and decision-making orientations of the 
developers of EU human rights promotion. The timeframe of the document analysis 
ranged from the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 until 
the present day. The data ranging from 1950-1980 was collected from the European 
Documentation Centre of Aberystwyth University, an information centre 
functioning as a repository of official publications and documents of EU 
institutions. Data ranging from 1980 to 2013 was retrieved from the European 
Union legislation website (Eur-Lex). The Eur-Lex website provides online access to 
European Union official journals, treaties, legislation under preparation and in 
force, and case-law.
10
 
 
 
Having identified EU human rights promotion as the main unit of analysis 
for this study, the next step is to outline the methods necessary for developing the 
conceptual basis of the thesis. Chapter Two conducts a literature review into the 
theoretical debates on normative power Europe, legitimacy, and human rights, and 
considers their implications for the study of human rights promotion to Turkey. The 
aim of the review is to synthesise key ideas and findings in a systematic fashion, in 
order to identify gaps in the literature and to elucidate how the present study fits 
into the current literature on EU normative power and human rights promotion. 
 
 
       The literature review discusses theoretical and empirical scholarly works on 
normative power Europe and legitimacy. It provides an overview of the variety of 
ways in which normative power Europe has been defined, interpreted, and 
critiqued. It also discusses the distinct ‘prescriptive’ and ‘descriptive’ methods 
employed in legitimacy assessments in the literature, in order to highlight their 
main contributions and deficiencies and to stress the advantage for this study to 
adopt a combined prescriptive-descriptive approach. Moreover, it compares and 
contrasts the key research on legitimacy for EU normative power, with the aim of 
identifying possible sources of legitimacy that are external to the concept of 
normative power Europe itself. It further specifies the analysis by focusing on 
                                                 
10
Eur-Lex: Access to European Union Law. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>  
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variants of legitimacy that provide direction to the specific research question and 
help make sense of the thesis’ cases: procedural legitimacy and legitimacy as 
recognition by the ‘other’ (substantive legitimacy). Finally, the literature review 
outlines the empirical criteria that will allow establishing whether the empirical 
evidence conforms to the proposed framework. The discussion of scholarly works 
develops, through gradual refinement, a clear research problem: the EU human 
rights promotion within enlargement lacks a solid basis for legitimacy, and the 
ensuing question is how this is manifested in Turkey’s case, and to what extent it 
might obstruct the progress of human rights reform in Turkey. 
 
 
 The literature search involved two strategies. Firstly, a comprehensive list 
was generated of monographs, book chapters, and articles on normative power 
Europe and legitimacy, which have witnessed a remarkable growth since 1999, 
reflecting the ‘deepening’ of European integration and the study of EU foreign 
policy through normative debates within IR.
11
 The purpose was to show how 
academic knowledge has progressed over time, and how perspectives have changed 
in relation to the application of the terms ‘normative power’ and ‘legitimacy’, their 
methodological assumptions, and their operationalisation in empirical cases. The 
scholarly works referenced within the above materials, especially those that 
provided summaries of arguments provided in key texts, were traced to identify 
additional references. Overall, the literature review builds on existing works on 
normative power Europe and the legitimacy of human rights promotion in order to 
construct a basis for application to EU-Turkey relations within enlargement. 
 
 
To grasp in a more focused manner the conditions at work for EU human 
rights promotion, it seemed advisable to offer an analysis of human rights 
protection in Turkey over time. Chapter Three performs a closer look at human 
rights issues at the intersection of domestic politics and EU accession. On the basis 
of secondary literature and with the help of analysis of EU documents on Turkey’s 
                                                 
11 Moumoutzis, K. ‘Still Fashionable yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the 
Europeanisation of EU Foreign Policy’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.49 no: 3 (2011) p.607 
(607-629) 
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pre-accession process, the chapter specifies crucial human rights developments in 
Turkey on its path to membership (with a more short-term focus on particularly 
interesting events), identifies stalemates as well as breakthroughs, and delineates 
EU involvement in the adoption of recent human rights reforms (post-2002). 
Chapter Three also offers an in-depth analysis of the present-day state of human 
rights protection across many domestic policies on the basis of a categorisation 
followed in the annual EU progress reports (freedom of expression, minority rights, 
freedom of religion, freedom of association, and women’s rights). This helps 
elucidate Turkey’s formal commitment to human rights protection and its official 
response to EU requirements. 
 
 
The analysis in Chapter Three draws on primary and secondary sources on 
Turkey’s human rights situation found in a variety of libraries in the United 
Kingdom and Turkey. Legal documents such as Turkey’s national constitutions 
were utilised to clarify its official commitment to human rights protection. Other 
sources of primary data were reports and official documents by NGOs in Turkey 
and abroad (e.g. Human Rights Foundation of Turkey and Amnesty International), 
by international institutions (Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights), 
and by the European Commission and European Parliament. Other public 
documents, such as pronouncements by the Human Rights Commission of the 
Turkish Parliament, were also used. Furthermore, interpreting human rights issues 
in Turkey and EU involvement therein necessitated engagement with secondary 
literature produced by scholars from Turkey. This was to ensure that the discussion 
took sufficiently into account the perspective and expert knowledge of domestic 
authors. Such an inclusive approach is useful in a theoretically informed empirical 
analysis that explores the human rights situation in Turkey where EU policy 
operates. 
 
 
Chapter Four examines empirically the most significant policies of EU 
human rights support in the areas of financial and technical assistance, namely IPA, 
EIDHR, and human rights consultations. The methodologies employed are a) 
qualitative content analysis of EU documents, guided by the thesis’ research 
15 
 
questions; and b) semi-structured interviews with expert European Commission 
bureaucrats discussing their policies’ procedural intricacies and political 
dimensions. Documents and interviews are complemented by the use of the 
secondary literature which engages with the selected policy instruments and the 
core ideas that underpin EU human rights action. 
 
 
Content analysis refers to the process through which an official document’s 
underlying themes are discerned, extracted, and interpreted.
12
 In general, 
documents have been viewed as pervasive for the study of public institutions 
because they represent contextual factors and institutional settings associated with 
the document’s production.13 European documentation analysed in Chapter Four 
came in many forms: EIDHR mission statements and calls for proposals; policies of 
IPA funding allocation and project fichés published by the European Commission; 
annual progress reports on Turkey; European Parliament resolutions and press 
releases; minutes of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) meetings; 
and Council decisions. The variety of functions which these different documents 
play constitutes a rich source of insight into the processes and developments of EU 
human rights policy. They define the understandings of policy problems by the EU 
and the purpose of the instruments in relation to human rights issues in Turkey. As 
the case studies in Chapter Four show, the relevant documents prescribe the 
appropriate actions and ways of ‘getting things done’ within the remit of each 
instrument. In addition, as shown by the JPC meeting minutes, some documents 
offer insight into the interaction and communication between different 
policymaking actors and sub-groups of actors on both sides, including their 
different interpretations of the progress of the negotiations and the standards 
applied. 
 
 
                                                 
12
Bryman, A. Social Research Methods  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.392. 
13Miller, G. ‘Contextualising Texts: Studying Organisational Texts’. In Context and Method in 
Qualitative Research, ed, by G. Miller and R. Dingwall (London: Sage Publications, 1997) p.77 (77-
91) 
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How does the empirical information on specific human rights instruments 
help to draw general conclusions about the procedural legitimacy of EU human 
rights promotion to Turkey? The documents, by offering a description of the policy 
areas and projects conducted by different government agencies and civil society 
organisations, impinge directly upon the procedural abilities of each instrument. 
The IPA-funded project fichés, for example, highlight many deficiencies and 
pitfalls in the conduction of human rights projects, namely lack of sufficient 
resources, lack of contextual research on the extent of the human rights problem in 
Turkey, lack of inclusiveness of all groups who stand to benefit, and reactive rather 
than proactive government responses to specified problems. As a valuable 
supplement to documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews with European 
Commission officials were particularly suited to the purpose of unveiling the 
detailed policy processes of the EU human rights instruments. The purpose of the 
interviews was to obtain expert knowledge on the principles, priorities, and 
methods of their application.
14
 This information is publicly available only to a very 
limited degree. Specifically, the interviews offered knowledge about how the 
priorities of pre-accession assistance are established, and how the instruments 
function on a day-to-day basis. They also discussed perceived shortcomings of the 
instruments and the role of Turkish political dynamics and conflicts for their 
effectiveness. Quite importantly, the interviewees offered direction towards specific 
documents that had not been previously considered. Overall, procedural politics 
were clarified, and the understanding of the thesis on how the policies work in 
practice was improved. 
 
Interviews were held in November-December 2009 at the headquarters of 
the European Union in Brussels, Belgium. Officials were interviewed from two 
separate directorates-general (DGs). These were the DG of Enlargement, where five 
officials were interviewed, and the DG of External Relations, where one was 
interviewed. Within the DG Enlargement, interviewees held the following 
positions: International Relations Officer- Turkey unit, Policy Officer- Western 
                                                 
14
King, N. ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’. In Qualitative Methods in Organisational 
Research, ed, by C. Cassell and G. Symon (London: Sage Publications, 1994) p.14 (14-36) 
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Balkans, Policy Coordinator- Enlargement Strategy, Public Relations Officer- 
Information and Communication, and Adviser on Inter-Institutional Relations. 
Within the DG External Relations, the interviewee held the position of Policy 
Officer in the Human Rights unit, and had previously held a position in the Turkey 
unit of DG Enlargement. The interviews lasted between thirty minutes and an hour, 
and were recorded and transcribed in full. Interviewees were informed in advance 
about the aim and the character of the thesis. The interviews themselves were semi-
structured, leaving room to delve more deeply into the subject matter or into 
sidelines that threw additional light onto the subject (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
Chapter Five examines the politics of EU human rights diffusion to Turkey. 
Methodologically, the chapter considers the goals and strategies employed by the 
political actors and civil society representatives involved in the EU-Turkey 
relationship. A number of official policy texts which emerged from the political 
parties’ programmatic declarations were consulted, in addition to wider texts 
regarding more general Turkish government policies and the initiatives of the 
opposition parties. The analysis of Chapter Five covered a time period of eleven 
years (2002-2013). 2002 marked the year when the ruling Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) assumed office. The discussion of the 
perceived legitimacy of EU also drew on semi-structured interviews with 
independent human rights activists. Ten interviews were conducted in Ankara, 
Turkey with representatives from the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye 
İnsan Hakları Vakfı), the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği), 
Mazlumder, and the Association for Liberal Thinking (Liberal Düşünce Derneği). A 
phone interview was conducted with the Europe and Central Asia unit of the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture, based in Zurich, Switzerland. An 
additional interview was conducted with a scholar specialising on EU-Turkey 
relations at Bilkent University, Ankara. The interviews were conducted in Ankara 
between October-December 2010. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, 
and the names of interviewees have been withheld with mutual agreement. 
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The methodology discussed above concerns the main objective of the thesis: 
to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the legitimacy of EU human rights promotion 
within enlargement with Turkey as an explorative case-study. It is important to note 
here that the thesis is neither primarily about internal Turkish politics, nor about the 
general institutional arrangements made by the EU to give effect to human rights 
action. It does not aim to engage with a systematic study of political struggle in 
Turkey, and it does not explore the detailed decision-shaping and decision-making 
character of the EU for external human rights promotion. This takes us to the 
potential limitations of the research. 
 
 5. Limitations 
 
Although the analysis aspires to be comprehensive and consistent, this 
research also has limitations. The first relates to the subject of this study: human 
rights promotion. EU promotion of human rights is a complex phenomenon which 
integrates political, economic and social factors and advances a particular vision of 
politics. As Turner observes, ‘the analysis of human rights presents a problem... in 
which cultural relativism and the fact-value distinction have largely destroyed the 
classical tradition of the natural-law basis for rights discourse’. 15  Therefore, 
generalisations about human rights and their normative validity inevitably involve 
some level of black-boxing, a fact acknowledged by this study.
16
 In order to 
minimise the effect of this limitation, the analysis draws on perspectives by 
scholars from Turkey, and engages with the perceptions of Turkey’s policymakers 
on EU human rights promotion. Furthermore, it incorporates similar perspectives 
held by representatives of human rights organisations in Turkey. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Turner, B.S. ‘Outline of a Theory of Human Rights’. Sociology, vol.27 no: 3 (1993) p.489 (489-
512) 
16
 The metaphor of ‘black-boxing’ in social science implies that treatment of the subject of research 
as a consolidated, unitary whole, whose entities resist being seen through or pulled apart. See, for 
example, Hudson, V.M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007) p.3. 
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A second limitation concerns the use of the general term ‘EU policy’ to refer 
to human rights promotion to Turkey. The EU is an example of multi-level 
governance in which sub-state, state, and supra-state level actors interact in 
decision-shaping and policy-making processes.
17
 As a result, it becomes a challenge 
for analysts to describe any policy as simply ‘an EU policy’. This challenge is 
particularly relevant to this thesis. In order to make a coherent analysis, the term 
‘EU’ in this project will refer to the European Commission, the Council of 
Ministers and the European Council, which are the main decision-making bodies in 
the area of enlargement. Certainly, this does not mean that member state politics are 
marginal. For example, in Chapter Five it will be highlighted that member states 
have affected the progress of negotiations with Turkey through blocking individual 
chapters of the acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, given that the European 
Commission principally engages in policy design and application of human rights 
support, and the Council decides by qualified majority on the priorities and 
conditions contained, it becomes possible to talk about an EU approach and 
practice. 
 
 
The third limitation concerns that it is difficult to formulate prescriptions 
that will capture more than a few aspects of the process of human rights promotion 
as a whole. The objective of the thesis is, therefore, limited to an analysis of the 
major functions of what has become the ‘general model’ of human rights support to 
candidate states: financial assistance, human rights consultations and civil society 
development. This thesis discusses EU human rights promotion via these 
instruments in order to reveal the principles underlying EU practice.  It is assumed 
that the principles discussed in the empirical part of the thesis can be generalised 
across the EU human rights policy. 
 
 
The last limitation is that the concept of legitimacy constitutes an all-
encompassing concept in political thought. The range of the terms’ coverage is 
                                                 
17
 Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. ‘Multi-level Governance in the European Union’. In The European 
Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. by B. F. Nelsen and A. 
Stubb (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p.281-311. 
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broad, making it difficult to operationalise it in a way that includes most 
manifestations associated with it. To situate the inquiry and analysis, Chapter Two 
will discuss when and how legitimacy observations about EU human rights 
promotion to Turkey can be conducted in practice and why they matter. As a result, 
it will become possible to refer to a standard of legitimacy with reference to the 
concrete requirements that Chapter Two develops. Here, a question arises with 
regard to measurement of legitimacy: given that legitimacy itself has no material 
form, how is it possible to develop a valid measure of achievement? The thesis 
endorses the idea that the presence of legitimacy is a matter of degree, while 
assuming that there is no concrete point that tips the scale in favour of legitimacy or 
illegitimacy. Instead, it divides the concept into component parts (procedural 
performance, participation, policy relevance, domestic perceptions of legitimacy) 
and makes qualitative assessments in the empirical part of the thesis. 
 
 
6. Chapter outline 
 
This thesis is a contribution to EU-Turkey relations in the area of human 
rights, concerning the question of legitimacy for human rights promotion in the 
context of enlargement. It aims to provide a perspective about how human rights 
promote should be pursued in relation to Turkey. As indicated earlier, the main 
argument of the thesis is that the development of an EU human rights policy that 
conforms to requirements of legitimacy can improve its performance and 
justifiability and lead to sustainable human rights protection in Turkey. The 
argument will be elaborated over five chapters. 
 
 
Chapter One traces the evolution of EU human rights promotion from the 
inception of the European Communities in the 1950s until the present day. It 
focuses on the major treaties of European integration and successive EEC/EU 
enlargement rounds, including Turkey’s early attempts to achieve EEC 
membership. The analysis is inspired by the need to clarify human rights as the 
EU’s ‘standard of legitimacy’, which Turkey has to contend with, and the 
contextual factors that generated it. Chapter One introduces a number of leading 
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ideas that re-appear throughout the thesis: human rights as an ‘essential element’ of 
EU external relations, the need for consistency in human rights promotion, and the 
constant evolution of human rights conditionality. 
 
Chapter Two constructs the conceptual basis of the thesis in the form of a 
literature review, which enables the discussion of EU human rights promotion 
according to ideas of ‘normative power Europe’ and requirements of legitimacy. By 
synthesising the main elements of these concepts, an analytical framework is 
developed and presented. This framework illustrates how legitimacy is 
conceptualised in terms of the alignment of EU norms and their promotion through 
external policy. Thereby, the theoretical aim of the thesis is reached. Chapter Three 
switches attention to the multiple sources of human rights problems in Turkey. It 
discusses human rights as an overall political issue in Turkey, outlines historical 
eras and turning points in human rights protection, and examines key human rights 
issues and policies.  In recent years, the EU has been the primary frame of reference 
for policy decisions on human rights reform, and it is for this reason that the 
discussion of national reform  focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on EU 
involvement. 
 
 
Chapter Four examines most significant policies of human rights promotion 
to Turkey in the area of financial and technical assistance. Specifically, it elaborates 
on the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Instrument of 
Democracy and Human Rights supporting civil society activity (EIDHR), and the 
system of human rights consultations. It highlights the strengths of the above 
instruments, yet argues that they are replete with policy implications. The EU 
necessitates a clearer policy strategy that would specify the link between its policy 
instruments and the desired outcome of increased human rights protection. A 
thorough image of Turkey’s historical and developing human rights situations is 
also necessary, along with a stronger perspective on behalf of local stakeholders.  
 
 
The final chapter, Chapter Five, amounts to an application of the framework 
on substantive legitimacy to Turkey’s internal dynamics of human rights 
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implementation. It offers a detailed examination of their understandings of the EU 
as both a supporter and obstacle to human rights reform. It concludes by arguing 
that it is on the national level of policymaking where the overarching human rights 
goals are settled and specified and where the efforts for achieving them are 
determined. The foundations of legitimacy are found to be first and foremost at the 
national level of policymaking and the aspirations and goals of non-governmental 
human rights organisations. 
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     Chapter One 
 
    Human rights as the EU’s ‘standard of legitimacy’ 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will address one of the primary questions that arise in relation 
to EU normative power: how did the EU develop as an actor that promotes human 
rights in world politics, and what main referents of legitimacy can be distinguished 
for its human rights action? An analysis of the development of the EU as normative 
power which is ‘predisposed’ to shaping what is ‘normal’ in international life will 
be related theoretically to EU-Turkey relations in the field of human rights. This 
chapter argues that the historical development of the EU’s human rights narrative 
constructed the EU as an actor whose core characteristics led it to become a 
promoter of norms and values on the international scene (freedom, democracy, 
respect for human rights, and rule of law). For this purpose, the chapter will discuss 
what it is about the historical development and main features of the EU that 
‘predispose’ it to act in a normative way. To begin with, what internal features 
constructed the EU as a normative power in external action? A related question is 
whether EU human rights promotion is essentially rightful, or whether it 
necessitates its own sources of legitimacy. Finally, how are these concerns relevant 
to the case of Turkey? 
 
A useful starting point for examining the historical development of human 
rights as the EU’s international ‘standard of legitimacy’ is the literature in the field 
of internal EU law and policy. The analysis in this chapter will focus on the 
integration of human rights protection in EU law and policy, and its subsequent 
‘spillover’ to enlargement policy and EU external action. Specifically, the analysis 
will focus on how internal human rights policy affected and contributed to the 
development of the goals and mechanisms of human rights conditionality in 
enlargement and external relations. Moreover, the analysis will introduce the main 
sources of legitimacy that construct the EU as a normative power (or otherwise) in 
the above areas, which will be further developed in Chapter Two. 
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1. The EU and human rights promotion: early development through 
European  law 
 
One of the key tenets of normative power Europe is that the EU is 
‘predisposed’ to acting in a normative way in world politics due to its historical 
context, hybrid polity, and legal constitution. Here, it is argued that one of the 
central components that served to develop human rights promotion is EU 
constitutionalism: the development of European law, the integration of human 
rights protection in the internal EU legal system, and the conduction of EU external 
action according to it. The legal development of internal EU human rights 
protection, and subsequent EU attempts to conduct foreign policy consistent with 
existing human rights commitments, have arguably rendered the EU ‘different’ to 
pre-existing political organisations. The crucial point of this difference is that 
human rights have become the EU’s ‘standard of legitimacy’: the centre of its 
relations with member states and partners, and the crucial principle underpinning its 
policy-making. The EU binds itself, and not only its partners, to protecting human 
rights. Based on this reading of EU normative power – one which leads by example 
– external action that implements human rights duties enshrined in European law 
serves to justify human rights promotion as part of a coherent internal-external 
policy action. Therefore, a strong indicator of the EU as a normative power can be 
linked to the universal legal principles that its internal and external policy are based 
on. This section will analyse the dynamics involved in the construction of a 
European normative power by focusing on the internal development of EU human 
rights protection and how this factored into external action. 
 
 
 What we can observe in EU human rights policy in recent decades is what 
Alston and Weiler referred to as increasing bridging between internal and external 
protection ‘as two sides of one coin’.1 External human rights protection has been 
facilitated from home through the initial creation of an EU human rights narrative 
                                                 
1
 Alston, P. and Weiler, J. ‘An Ever-Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European 
Union and Human Rights’. In The EU and Human Rights, ed. by P. Alston (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) p.8 (3-66) 
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by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU integration treaties, the mandate of 
the European Parliament, and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Internal 
protection of human rights within the EU has also been sought outside its borders in 
human rights conditionality towards candidate states, potential accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the objectives of the Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice.  
 
 
Approaching the question of what makes the EU a normative power should 
take as a starting point that EU external human rights policy developed as a result 
of a strong element of constitutionalism and law underpinning European 
integration.
2 
 While it is commonplace to attribute the bridging of EU internal and 
external human rights protection to international developments ‘out there’, such as 
globalisation,
3 
 or free trade,
4
 there were also processes ‘in here’. EU actors sought 
to develop a human rights narrative in order to fulfil their mandates and secure the 
effectiveness of their activities. In opposition to broad global trends, Williams 
suggested examining the bridging of the internal/external distinction mentioned 
above through the role played by the EU’s internal legal order and institutional 
structure.
5 
This approach considers that EU external human rights policy developed 
as a consequence and by-product of internal rights protection, tying together the 
EU’s domestic human rights system with its international policy goals. The EU 
developed its basic global values – human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – 
through the overarching internal goal of appropriate institutional arrangements for 
an effective human rights system. The main institutional instruments for this aim 
were primarily the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the 
European Court of Justice.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Walter, C. ‘History and Development of European Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. 
In European Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ed. by D. Ehlers (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2007) p.23 (1-24) 
3
 Pikalo, J. ‘Economic Globalisation, Globalist Stories of the State, and Human Rights’. In Economic 
Globalisation and Human Rights, ed. by W. Benedek, K. Feyter, and F. Marella (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.33 (17-37) 
4
  Majone, G. ‘The European Community between Social Policy and Social Regulation’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 31:2 (1993), p. 156-157(153-170). 
5
 Williams, A. ‘Mapping Human Rights, Reading the European Union’. European Law Journal, vol.9 
no: 5 (2003) p.663 (659-676) 
26 
 
1.1. The European Court of Justice: steps forward in human rights 
protection 
 
        The relationship between the ECJ and the European Union’s human rights 
protection is of key importance to understanding the early development of EU as a 
prospective normative power. The ECJ case-law gradually widened the scope and 
context of human rights scrutiny by the European Union in the absence of an 
EEC/EU bill of rights and a firm mention of human rights in the Treaty of Rome 
(1957). Considerable judicial activity took place which developed over the years a 
‘human rights role’ for the EU, incorporated in the treaties as a basic principle of 
the EU’s internal and external affairs. In internal EU affairs, the ECJ endorsed the 
already existing moral and legal obligation of member states to protect the rights of 
their citizens. More importantly, it constructed the obligation of EU institutions to 
respect market freedoms and non-discrimination principles.
6
 In external affairs, ECJ 
emphasis on the importance of human rights as an important driving force of an 
‘area of freedom, security, and justice’ contributed to the development of political 
conditionality in the EU’s international trade, development, and enlargement 
policies. The European Commission confirmed that ‘the ECJ has, over many years, 
fleshed out... the general principles [of fundamental rights] into an invaluable 
reservoir of case-law’.7 
 
 
 The key case that introduced human rights into the EEC order was the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft judgement of 1970.
8
 The ECJ ruled that respect 
for rights constituted an integral part of the general principles of law protected by 
the ECJ. ‘The protection of rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions 
common to the member states, must be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community’.9 In the Nold case (1974) the Court 
reaffirmed that fundamental rights were an integral part of the legality of 
Community acts. It also asserted that international human rights treaties to which 
                                                 
6
 Barnard, C. The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 
7
 ‘Respecting Fundamental Rights while Ensuring Security and Justice in the European Union’. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/rights/fsj_rights_intro_en.htm (accessed 31 March 
2009). 
8
 Craig, P. and De Burca, G. EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) p.320. 
9
  Case 11/70. 
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the member states are signatories ‘supply guidelines’ that should be followed within 
Community law.
10
 The Rutili case (1975) referred explicitly to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
11
 The next important moves took place in 
the 1990s, when the ECJ asserted in the Wachauf and Elliniki Radiophonia (ERT) 
cases that its fundamental rights jurisdiction encompassed member states’ acts, but 
only to the extent that these acts fell into the sphere of Community law.
12
 These 
cases paint a picture of the EU developing as a law-based polity that attempts to 
fuse fundamental rights with an emerging institutional capacity to protect those 
rights. 
 
 
Several reasons account for the ECJ’s development of human rights into a 
general principle of EU law. These reasons are both political and legal in nature. 
The most common reason cited is that the ECJ, constituting the judicial branch of a 
system of economic and political integration, ought to guarantee human rights 
internally and externally as a contribution to a social and sustainable market 
economy and to democratic citizenship.
13
 In relation to enlargement, Dogan 
maintained that the accession process of states with shorter experiences of 
democracy, such as Greece, Spain, and Turkey, required the ECJ to assume an 
active role in harmonising fundamental rights law in the EU, in order to bring the 
degree of protection in those countries in line with that provided in member states 
with longer democratic traditions.
14
 From a legal perspective, lack of judicial 
human rights protection was seen as incompatible with the principle of supremacy 
of Community law.
15
 As De Witte rightly argued, if Community acts were to prevail 
over national law, including national constitutional law, then judicial review of 
those acts could only be based on Community law itself.
16
 In a similar line, Torres 
Perez argued that the principle of supremacy of EU law effectively meant that the 
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Union’s legal order had the form of constitutional law embracing both states and 
individuals alike. Consequently, if the coherence of the EU as a legal order 
common with that of the member states were to be preserved, fundamental rights 
had to be handled at European level.
17
  
 
 
 As with internal human rights protection, the EEC/EU originally lacked an 
explicit legal basis for the development of an external human rights policy. The 
principle source of law for human rights in the EU legal order were the general 
principles of Community law and the legal traditions of the member states. The ECJ 
jurisprudence did not extend to external actions, but came to serve as a source of 
inspiration for treaty provisions that introduced external objectives into the EU’s 
general mandate, such as to ‘develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’.18 The combined 
effect of Treaty provisions and case-law of the ECJ on human rights as general 
principles of EU law progressively elevated human rights to an external objective. 
From the 1990s onwards, with further combination of Treaty amendments and ECJ 
jurisdiction, EU human rights competence expanded into external fields such as 
enlargement, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation, the environment, trade, 
and development.
19
 At present, a considerable part of EU external human rights 
activities and policies are situated within enlargement.
20
 
 
 
Overall, the leadership of the ECJ has, over time, been instrumental in 
setting forth the EU as an organisation that embodies universal human rights in its 
legal system, a characteristic considered to partly constitute the ‘nature’ of the EU’s 
normative power. Through the fifty-year jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice, human rights have been increasingly situated at the forefront of the agenda 
of the European Union. The jurisprudence of the Court has had a substantive impact 
on the development of an internal human rights agenda, and has simultaneously 
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helped shape an external human rights policy through the legal extension of the 
human rights competence of the EEC/EU. The ECJ effectively shaped treaty 
provisions on external human rights activity and extended the acquis 
communautaire through inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
 
1.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000): internal-external consistency?  
 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been considered vital in legally 
binding the EU and its institutions to human rights in internal and external relations. 
The European Council at Nice in December 2000 officially proclaimed the Charter 
as an indispensable factor for EU human rights protection.
21
 After an initial lack of 
legal status, the Charter became binding through Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009).  
 
The Charter has been considered to break new ground in the protection of 
human rights in the EU. Several authors agree that its aspirational purpose was to 
bring human rights to the forefront of EU policy.
22
 It articulated the ‘shared values’ 
of the European Union that are common to all member states and any country 
wishing to become a member of the EU.
23
 Walter wrote: ‘it would mean 
underestimating the indirect legal effects of the Charter if one were to qualify it as... 
irrelevant to EU human rights protection because of its lacking binding character’.24 
According to Walter, the Charter contained the most up-to-date systematisation of 
human rights in Europe. Because of the principle of consensus which was largely 
followed in the drafting deliberations, it constituted an authoritative representation 
of EU human rights standards. Similarly, Ward argued that the sources on which the 
EU relies upon to determine human rights are not limited to legally binding 
instruments. The ECJ, for example, is concerned with international instruments 
with respect to which the member states have collaborated, such as the Charter, 
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even if they are not legally binding.
25
  
 
 
The scholarly discussion of the Charter locates its utility in reducing some 
of the ‘disturbing’ aspects of human rights promotion in external policy and 
enlargement in particular. Specifically, it addresses the internal/external divide 
between the scope of human rights protected in the EU and the extent of the 
reforms required by the accession states, along with the lack of clarity and 
specificity in the human rights requirements.
26
 According to Williams, prior to the 
Charter, the EU policy of human rights entailed that ‘applicant states are subjected 
to a process of human rights scrutiny and intervention... which possesses no 
imitation within the European Union and... extends some way beyond that which 
falls within the European Union’s internal concerns’.27 In turn, Sasse criticised the 
‘ad hocery and... different external standards that have given rise to ambiguity 
and... inconsistencies’.28  
 
  
 How has the Charter of Fundamental Rights addressed the above 
weaknesses in EU human rights policy? The Charter has been viewed as a partial 
solution to the previously described ‘double standard’ issue in internal/external 
human rights protection. Turkey’s European integration has involved this apparent 
contradiction, as will be discussed further on. In her analysis, Ficchi put forward 
such an interpretation. Her starting point was that the Charter has a significant 
impact on the ECJ’s internal scrutiny of human rights protection when assessing the 
gravity of a violation committed by a member state (Article 7 TEU). In this regard, 
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the ‘far more severe scrutiny’ applied to accession countries is balanced with a 
more equal procedure against member states.
29
 Overcoming the internal/external 
bifurcation enhances the EU’s legitimacy towards its accession states in so far as 
they receive an equal and fair procedure for implementing human rights. According 
to Sadurski, the closure of the gap between external requirements and internal 
human rights problems implies that accession states will not feel the discrimination 
generated by the existence of a double standard.
30
 For Eeckhout, a binding Charter 
would contribute to the development of a ‘meaningful’ EU human rights policy: a 
proactive, horizontal policy permeating all other EU policies, which would make it 
easier for the EU to justify its actions and involvement abroad.
31
 Consequently, the 
EU’s credibility on the international scene would be enhanced by a more coherent 
policy towards member states and accession states, feasible through the Charter.  
 
 The main motive for the launch of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was to 
strengthen fundamental rights protection in areas of EU legal competence with a 
comprehensive rights catalogue. As part of the EU treaties framework, the Charter 
has developed into a significant instrument for human rights policy within 
enlargement. The value of the Charter for EU normative power lies in reducing the 
problem of double standards by creating internal/external convergence, and thus 
accelerating the process of bringing uniformity between domestic and external 
human rights policies. The granting of official legal status to the Charter by the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 was a significant step forward in rendering the procedures of 
accession to the EU more transparent, and the assessment of candidate performance 
more open and predictable.
32 
This can add legitimacy to normative power Europe 
both in terms of its performance and its ability to transform the legal status of 
human rights inside the EU to ensure consistency between internal/external human 
rights promotion. The latter is important for overcoming perceptions that the 
standard of protection is higher for candidate states that for the EU. 
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1.3. The European Parliament as a promoter of human rights 
 
 
The European Parliament as the only institution of the EU elected by direct 
universal suffrage is perceived as playing quite an assertive role in the development 
of a human rights agenda for the European Union.
33
 There have been claims about 
the EP as the EU’s ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the field of human rights, in other words 
as an institution that sets out to change the behaviour of others by convincing them 
to embrace new norms.
34
 In terms of normative power, the ‘norm entrepreneur’ 
argument appears to be that the EP might be directing the EU towards promoting 
norms in the world irrespective of its own strategic interests. The following 
paragraphs will discuss the role of the European Parliament across three areas of 
human rights activity: internal protection, enlargement, and external relations. 
 
 
In internal human rights protection, Rack and Lausseger underline that ‘it 
has been one of the outstanding achievements of the European Parliament that 
human rights are nowadays taken into account in many different spheres of 
activity’.35 The European Parliament was the primary institution that advocated the 
inclusion of human rights in the major treaties of European integration.
36
 The EP 
engages in a wide range of monitoring and consultation activities for upholding 
human rights internally, draws attention to areas or member states where it 
perceives human rights to be compromised, and makes policy recommendations. 
For example, the EP was fully involved in the drafting of the Charter, and its 
members pressed for the inclusion of the Charter into primary EU law with the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009). In enlargement, the European Parliament has to give assent 
to accession treaties enlarging the EU to include new members, thus exercising 
parliamentary control over enlargement policy. In practice, parliamentary assent 
requires an oversized majority of approval of the human rights and democracy 
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record of the states under accession.
37
 The EP has the right to exercise its veto 
power in the event of serious human rights violations during accession negotiations. 
For example, in 1994 it suspended parliamentary cooperation with Turkey for two 
years due to the widespread human rights violations related to the Kurdish issue. In 
addition to approving new accessions, the EP plays an active role in association 
agreements, and establishes Joint Parliamentary Committees with candidate states 
(JPCs). The EU-Turkey JPC deals with specific cases of alleged human rights 
violations, and exchanges information and expertise on specific human rights 
cases.
38
 Furthermore, the EP drafts annual reports on accession states assessing 
their human rights record. These are designed to encourage the Commission and the 
Council to adjust the relevant enlargement strategies in the event of human rights 
concerns. Overall, the European Parliament's contribution to enlargement appears 
to be strongly inspired by its responsibility as an elected body to show the rest of 
the world that it actively upholds human rights in a constructive way.   
 
 
In external relations, the European Parliament has accommodated the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights since 2004, a European platform for the debate 
and defence of human rights in the world. It is primarily responsible for debating 
and monitoring civil and political rights, the rights of minorities, and EU 
democracy promotion.
39
 This gives it the opportunity to publish reports and 
resolutions on the human rights situation worldwide and on the quality of the 
relevant EU mechanisms, on which it makes policy recommendations.
40
 According 
to Camporesi, the EP played an important role in the construction of the human 
rights clause in development and trade cooperation with non-EU countries through 
persistent requests to the European Commission.
41
 In 1978, for example, it pushed 
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for the inclusion of a human rights clause in agreements with African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific States. In 1995 it pressed for the generalisation of the human rights 
clause by successfully requesting that the Council of Ministers include a 
compulsory clause in all EU international agreements. Furthermore, the EP was the 
architect of the European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), a 
financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide that is also 
utilised within enlargement to Turkey. Whether used to exert parliamentary control 
over the EU’s human rights promotion or to express collective condemnation of 
abuses worldwide, the European Parliament is generally deemed to be a credible 
actor in human rights promotion, strengthening the legal-institutional underpinnings 
of EU normative power.
42
 
 
 
1.4 Treaties of European integration (1953-2009): formulation of political criteria 
for membership 
 
 
The legal-institutional underpinnings of EU normative power are 
strengthened by the treaties of European integration and their progressive 
incorporation of human rights as a condition of EU membership. The specification 
of political criteria for membership can be seen to contribute to the construction of 
the EU as a normative power, as they nurture a collective policy-making 
environment that is conducive to the development and effective implementation of 
‘normative’ policies. To some extent the development of political criteria for 
membership ensure, as Walker argues, the adoption of both a common legal 
dimension for normative action – through binding human rights obligations – and a 
sense of common identification with the polity amongst its members.
43
 In this 
respect, political conditionality is crucial to nurturing a legal community and a 
sense of common identity on which the legitimacy of normative power Europe 
rests. In other words, the EU’s identification of common political ideals for its 
members can be linked to a potential for solid commitment to the norms in 
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question, action which is seen to take these norms seriously, and coherent 
performance in terms of formulation and delivery of policies. 
 
 
 The roots of the appearance of human rights conditionality in EU 
enlargement can be traced back to 1953, when the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Political Community (EPC) subjected membership to the fulfilment of 
human rights criteria.
44
 The ambitious EPC Treaty never entered into force, but the 
political condition remained in the Community’s legal and political order, setting 
the beginning of a long practice regarding the admissibility of candidate states.
45
 
Article 116 of the EPC declared that ‘accession to the Community shall be open to 
the member states of the Council of Europe and to any other European State which 
guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (emphasis 
added). 
 
The EPC Treaty was never ratified, and the momentum of European 
integration was resumed by the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the 
European Economic Community (EEC). It was not until the Amsterdam Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1999 that human rights and fundamental freedoms were 
mentioned again as ccriteria for accession.
46
 
 
 
In relation to human rights criteria, the Treaty of Rome (1958)
 
stated that 
applicant states had to be democratic in nature, and prepared to enter into a closer 
political arrangement in the future.
47
 Unlike the EPC Treaty, Rome did not include 
a direct reference to human rights as political criteria for accession. Article 237 
determined that ‘the conditions of admission... shall be the subject of an agreement 
between the member states and the applicant state’.48 In 1978, several years after 
the first enlargement of 1973, the ECJ was requested to give a ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 237. The Court ruled that ‘the legal conditions for such 
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accession remain to be defined in the context of that procedure without it being 
possible to determine the content judicially in advance’.49 Effectively, the ECJ ruled 
that the conditions of accession were subject to the negotiations and the discretion 
of the member states and would be specified in the individual accession treaties. 
Therefore, the Treaty of Rome did not have a set standpoint on human rights 
criteria for accession, but served more as a framework of integration open to further 
development. Given that the treaty maintained importance and relevance for the 
EEC for a period spanning nearly four decades (1957-1993), the subsequent 
formulation and specification of the political criteria occurred to a large extent 
through the various enlargement rounds (1973, 1981 and 1985), rather than through 
primary Community law. The analysis of the enlargement rounds will be conducted 
in the latter part of the chapter. The following paragraphs will examine the treaties 
of Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2000), and Lisbon (2009).  
 
 
         The Maastricht Treaty (1993) explicitly introduced the concept of human 
rights protection into the body of the treaties and linked it to existing legal 
instruments of international human rights protection. Article F(2), for example, 
stated that:  
 
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law. 
 
Maastricht referred to political criteria for accession in Article O(2) in a rather 
abstract manner which simply reaffirmed the provision of 237 EEC: ‘the conditions 
of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded 
which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the 
member states and the applicant state’.50 It was only with the Amsterdam Treaty, 
signed in 1997 and entering into force in 1999, that human rights as an accession 
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criterion were explicitly addressed. 
 
  
The political and economic criteria for EU membership were regulated in 
Article 49 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. According to 49 TEU, any European state 
which respected the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU could apply to become a 
member of the EU. Article 6(1) stated that these principles were ‘liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the member states’. Article 6(2) reiterated the 
Maastricht statement that ‘the Union shall respect fundamental rights... as general 
principles of Community law’.51 Article 7(1) added that any ‘persistent breach’ of 
rights after accession would lead to sanctions being imposed by the Council.
52
  
 
 
There were both internal and external reasons that prompted the 
development of human rights membership criteria in the period between Maastricht 
(1993) and Amsterdam (1999). Internally, the changing relationship between the 
EU and its citizens, and heterogeneity as a result of enlargement, are central to 
understanding the enhancement of the political criteria. In the 1990s, the expansion 
of the EU agenda to take on political – and not only economic – matters triggered a 
crisis of democratic legitimacy.
53
 The necessity and utility of supranational 
governance was questioned by EU governments and citizens alike. Attempts to 
improve the democratic credentials of the EU were viewed as pushing the political 
boundaries of national governance at the expense of the citizen.
54
 This was 
demonstrated by the rejection of the Treaty by referendum in Denmark and its 
tentative acceptance in France.
55
 Enlargement, on the other hand, was seen to 
aggravate the problem by limiting the capacity of EU institutions, budget, and 
goods and service markets to absorb new member states.
56
 Following the 
                                                 
51
  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, Article 6(1) and 6(2). <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0001010001> (accessed 1 December 2010) 
52
  Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 7(1). 
53
  Hansen, L. and Williams, M.C. ‘The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the Crisis of 
the EU’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.37 no: 2 (1999) p.233-249; McCormick, J. 
European Union Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p.108. 
54
  Friis and Murphy, ‘EU Quest’, p.234. 
55
  On 2 June 1992, the Danes rejected the Maastricht treaty in a referendum with 83 per cent voting 
against the treaty. On 20 September 1992, the French electorate approved the Maastricht treaty with 
51 per cent.  
56
 Emerson, E., Aydin, S., Sachsse, J. and Noutcheva, G. ‘Just what is this Absorption Capacity of the 
38 
 
establishment of democracy and liberal economy in post-war Europe, ideas about 
the future of the EU became unclear. What purpose did EU integration now serve 
for citizens of both member and accession states alike? As Shaw argued, 
‘Amsterdam, following Maastricht, was the culmination of a growing legitimacy 
crisis in which all aspects of integration – processes, procedures, institutions, 
leadership, goals and raison d’être – were thrown into a serious question for the 
first time in forty years’.57 
 
 
The pressures of integration and the challenges of enlargement prompted the 
drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty to endorse a supranational conception of human 
rights for the EU as a set of constitutive and unifying values of the European 
political community. Explicit reference was made to human rights and to the 
principles of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, as characteristics of a 
supranational ‘ever closer union’. This achievement should also be viewed in the 
light of the unification of the EU’s organisational structure by Amsterdam.58 
According to the general principle of consistency in Article 3, human rights now 
found explicit application to all acts of the EU institutions. Since human rights and 
democracy were conceived as embedded in EU structures and functions, the 
reformulation of political conditionality became consistent with the need to reshape 
candidate states according to ‘EU norms’ and in conformity with internal 
considerations. Consequently, political conditionality in the Amsterdam Treaty was 
reformulated according to the EU’s notion of human rights and democracy as norms 
rooted in its institutions and social structures.   
 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was amended by the Treaty of Nice (2000). In the 
wake of the challenge of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, Nice did not amend or 
reformulate the political criteria for membership. Instead, its major breakthrough in 
the human rights area was the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which was added to the Treaty as an appendix. As discussed earlier, Nice did not 
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award the Charter official binding status, but paved the way for its enshrinement in 
EU law. The inclusion of the Charter into the Treaty of Nice has been touted as 
evidence of the EU's increasing commitment to establishing itself as a polity 
grounded in human rights principles.
59
 In the external sphere, Nice extended the 
objective of promoting human rights from development cooperation to all forms of 
cooperation with third countries (Article 181). 
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, amending the former Treaty on European Union, was 
signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009. Lisbon did not 
amend the political criteria for accession as these were reformulated by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Article 1(A), however, referred explicitly to minority rights for 
the first time in an EU treaty, thus enhancing the body of supported rights and 
aligning it with the Copenhagen Criteria (1993). In Article 6, the Treaty increased 
the Union’s commitment to human rights support by conferring upon the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights legally binding status (with some derogations for the United 
Kingdom and Poland), and by envisaging EU accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It also established a new fundamental rights 
Commissioner. The new portfolio on Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship 
was intended to address criticisms that the EU lacked a tangible human rights 
‘policy’, with its own directorate-general and its own budget.60 Furthermore, 
Lisbon established the new European External Action Service, which firmly 
embeds human rights in development and trade cooperation.
61
 Overall, the Lisbon 
Treaty coordinated a common approach for all EU human rights programmes and 
improved their impact and overall efficiency. 
 
 
 By enhancing the system of human rights protection through the above 
provisions, the Lisbon Treaty paved the way to transcending the bifurcation 
between internal and external human rights protection. As discussed earlier, this 
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distinction had previously invited criticism about inconsistency and double 
standards in EU enlargement policy.
62
 Lisbon’s focus on human rights and 
democratic citizenship as the foundation stone of the EU, along with making human 
rights an essential aspect of its external relations, provided impetus for a human 
rights policy that would be coordinated across all internal and external action.
63
 The 
Lisbon Treaty thus lays special focus on the link between internal and external 
human rights protection. As stated in Article 2(5) of the Treaty, EU international 
action ‘shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law...and human rights’.64  
   
 
The major treaties of European integration progressively embedded the 
human rights criteria for membership in EU primary law, and framed them 
rhetorically in EU political processes and community identity. However, in order to 
ensure a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the EU’s human 
rights narrative and its characterisation as normative power, it is important to 
discuss the development of the human rights criteria through enlargement and EU 
interaction with specific candidate states. The following section will discuss the 
development of EU human rights conditionality through an analysis of the 
enlargement rounds. 
 
 
2. EEC/EU enlargements and the development of human rights 
conditionality 
 
 
The aim of this section is, firstly, to examine how elements of normative 
power Europe developed within enlargement through distinct processes of EU-
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candidate state interaction, and secondly, to distinguish the main referents of 
legitimacy in the development of the EU’s human rights policy. The following 
processes led to the emergence of a human rights policy: intergovernmental 
negotiations regarding the utility of establishing a general framework of accession 
criteria (1973 enlargement); deliberative processes, both intergovernmental and 
country-based, providing arguments in favour of establishing human rights criteria 
(1981 and 1986 enlargements); candidate state pressure on the EU to increase 
human rights protection in areas where the applicants held superior standards (1993 
enlargement); the emergence of an institutionalised human rights strategy rooted in 
common European values, and a conception of human rights protection as identity-
driven (2004 and 2007 enlargements).  
 
 
The legitimacy of the emerging human rights policy will be located in 
several sources, in accordance with each enlargement round. The first enlargement 
of 1973 paints a picture of legitimacy through performance. This enlargement did 
not establish human rights criteria for accession, but specified a framework for 
application of general membership conditions, applicable to human rights. Thus, it 
created a policy framework for the future application of human rights criteria. The 
Mediterranean enlargements (1981 and 1986) instigated a process of discussion 
whereby different actors argued pragmatically, politically, and morally in favour of 
the inclusion of human rights criteria in the accession conditions. Thus, EU human 
rights initiatives were legitimised with reference to principles considered just by all 
parties. The Nordic enlargement (1993) served to highlight discrepancies between 
human rights protection in the applicant countries and that of the EU, as in some 
areas the Nordic countries offered a higher degree of protection. In this case, the 
legitimacy of EU policy was challenged through erosion of performance; EU policy 
entailed a ‘race to the bottom’ for the Nordic countries and put forward 
requirements that were not contextually relevant. The 2004 enlargement to Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) raised new dimensions in the development of EU 
normative power: an institutionalised human rights strategy (with concrete policies 
and contextually relevant methods), conceptions of universal values as constitutive 
of European identity, and self/other differentiation. Conflicting sources of 
legitimacy can be identified for this new type of EU policy. On the one hand, the 
official approach to enlargement is now fully in line with the logic of human rights 
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for the European polity. This means that human rights policy is legitimised through 
what is considered appropriate given the EU’s conception of self and what it 
represents. On the other hand, the policy’s promotion of universal rights through the 
establishment of a European/non-European differentiation raised issues of 
ambiguity and self/other distinction (e.g. CEE as ‘one of us’, Turkey as an 
outsider). Finally, the 2007 enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria served to mitigate 
accusations of internal/external bifurcation by introducing an element of ex-post 
conditionality in human rights protection.  
 
 
 The analysis reveals several issues in the practice of the EU’s human rights 
policy. Each enlargement round developed a core of principles which continues to 
underpin the EU’s application of human rights to the present day. Human rights 
criteria initially emerged in a reactive way to protect the cohesion of the EEC/EU 
institutions and its democratic structures from the pressures posed by accession 
states. On the basis of the particularities of each candidate state, the EEC/EU 
reformulated a core of human rights criteria on an ad hoc basis.
65
 In the first four 
enlargements (1973, 1981, 1985, and 1994), when the EU lacked a consistent 
approach to internal human rights protection, there was insufficient engagement 
with human rights issues even in the face of severe violations . For example, the 
human rights violations in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup did not meet 
with meaningful opposition by Europe. The lack of a consistent standard and the 
uncertainty about further steps resulted in an element of arbitrariness in the 
assessment of applicant preparedness. In view of the accession of ten new member 
states in 2004, the EU developed a much more standardised human rights approach 
based on ‘pre-accession strategies’ and ‘pre-accession instruments’ that currently 
play a much more predominant role than in previous enlargements (where they 
were virtually lacking). 
 
 
Three enlargement rounds occurred before the EEC was substituted by the 
European Union. The first group comprised Britain, Ireland and Denmark, and 
acceded in 1973. Greece became a member in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 
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1986. During the same period, Turkey pursued its quest for membership, and 
human rights gained increasing prominence in EEC-Turkey relations. The analysis 
that follows will discuss the gradual evolution of the EU’s human rights approach, 
aims, and priorities through the early enlargement rounds.   
  
 
2.1.  The first enlargement: the case of the United Kingdom (1973) 
 
 
In 1973 the matter of human rights did not rise on the enlargement agenda. 
This was due to the generally successful records of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, 
and the absence of a human rights standard in the acquis communautaire. Most of 
the interest of the first enlargement lies in the developments sparked by the British 
application. Despite political violence in Northern Ireland, human rights 
considerations were conspicuously absent from EEC demands. Nevertheless, 
Britain’s accession process certainly provided the basis of what constitutes the 
overall mode of application of EU conditionality - the ‘classical Community 
method’ - which also strongly underlines the human rights policy. Accession 
negotiations with the UK, and also Denmark and Ireland, made it clear that the 
conditions of membership and their full implementation were inalienable. 
Membership criteria had to be accepted and were not open to negotiations. Full 
acceptance of the EU legal and political order with no derogations became and 
remains a core accession principle to this day, and is fully applicable to the human 
rights criteria. At present, any economically viable state that does not meet 
‘common European standards’ of human rights and democracy cannot apply to or 
be associated with the EU. The EU’s self-representation as a normative power 
within enlargement is one that prioritises rights over economic interests. 
 
 
The case of Northern Ireland as an example of ethnic conflict within 
accession is relevant to the EEC approach to human rights in the first enlargement. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the EEC played a virtually non-existent role in 
demanding human rights improvement in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the Irish and 
British governments did not view the EEC as a possible ‘third party’ in the 
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conflict.
66
  
 
 
 The EEC’s lack of human rights demands vis-à-vis the British and Irish 
governments is epitomised in the limited human rights dimension of its internal and 
external policy agenda, as explained earlier in the chapter. As such, there was no 
strategic approach or vision for human rights within enlargement. Even on an ad 
hoc basis, however, the European Commission did not show any interest in playing 
an active role in the British/Northern Irish relationship. According to Tannam, the 
Commission’s role as a normative actor in the domestic political matters of 
accession states had not yet matured; Commission officials viewed their role as 
subordinate and constrained by the intergovernmental activity of British and Irish 
policy-makers.
67
 At the same time, lack of direct elections to the European 
Parliament meant that the latter did not serve as a forum for debate on human rights 
concerns. Another reason, argued by Boyle, was that both the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland demonstrated at least some commitment to legality and human rights 
within the conflict.
68
 This appearance of human rights legality possibly diminished 
the necessity of strong human rights conditionality towards the two states. 
 
 
The challenge against human rights, limited as it was, sparked the need to 
elaborate on the political conditions of accession for the very first time.
69
 In this 
respect, the 1962 Birkelbach Report on the political and institutional aspects of 
EEC membership constituted a significant step beyond the Treaty of Rome and an 
important landmark in the development of human rights criteria.
70
 It confirmed, 
amongst other things, that liberal democracy was a condition for accession.
71
 Only 
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those states that guaranteed democratic practices and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms could be admitted into the EEC. The report added that it was 
not possible to establish firm political criteria, but each case would be assessed at a 
level of generality. In the absence of concrete political conditionality, the 
Birkelbach Report was used as a reference document during the Council’s 
deliberations on the response to be given to aspirant EEC members.  
 
 
Apart from the Birkelbach Report, early elements of political conditionality 
were reaffirmed in June 1970 at a Luxembourg conference between the EEC and 
the applicant countries. Aiming at clarifying the nature of the EEC’s inclusiveness, 
Pierre Harmel, President-in-Office of the Council, gave explicit attention to two 
points. First, Harmel reasserted the Community’s political goal of an ever closer 
union of peoples based on democracy and freedoms. He stated that ‘we must 
preserve and fortify a type of civilisation that we do not think of imposing on any 
state, but which in our eyes guarantees liberty and progress for the people’.72 
Second, he insisted on the future member states accepting the Treaties, their 
political finality and ‘every nature’ of decision without attempts of alteration. 
Overall, Harmel delineated commitment to so-called European values of democracy 
and freedoms, ex ante adaptation to EEC rules, and inalienability and non-
negotiability of the acquis communautaire.  
 
 
In analysing Britain’s accession process, we can clearly observe that from 
the very first enlargement the non-negotiability of EEC conditions was strongly 
asserted. The main ways in which Britain challenged the overall acquis was 
through its desire to retain lasting Commonwealth preference in trade and an open 
external trade regime with its former EFTA partners.
73
 As a result of these 
exigencies, Britain was considered as reluctant to accept the Community’s legal 
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order, especially by France. Britain’s requirements were considered incompatible 
with the emerging core commitments of EC membership: the non-negotiability of 
the acquis, and the avoidance of activities that were contrary to the interests of the 
Community.
74
 France asserted that the UK could only join if it accepted the 
conditions of the EEC Treaty unreservedly.
75
  Meeting in the Hague in December 
1969, the heads of state of the EEC confirmed that aspirant members should expect 
to adapt to Community rules and standards rather than vice versa: ‘In so far as the 
applicant states accept the Treaties, their political finality and the decisions taken 
since the entry into force of the Treaties … [there will be] agreement to the opening 
of negotiations’. 
 
 
Although it did not serve to stimulate a clear human rights standard, the 
importance of the first enlargement for the construction of the EU as a normative 
power in enlargement lay in the development of the ‘classical Community method’ 
of conditionality, which underlines most of its dimensions, including human rights, 
to the present day. The classical Community method relates to the general 
framework that the EU uses in pursuing its policy objectives and applying human 
rights. It has been elaborated by Preston as ‘a constant pattern both to the formal 
accession procedures adopted’.76 We can identify five focal points in Preston’s 
classical method, which constructed a policy environment for the future application 
of human rights: a) membership conditions must be accepted in full and without 
permanent derogations, b) accession negotiations focus on the practicalities of 
acceptance of the membership criteria, c) if existing instruments are inadequate, 
they are addressed by the creation of new ones, d) new members are integrated into 
the EEC’s institutional structures through limited adaptation, and e) the EEC prefers 
to negotiate with groups of states that have a similar level of political development.  
 
 
In summation, the first enlargement depicts the EU as an effective actor that 
nurtured a policy environment conducive to the future development of a policy 
framework for human rights promotion. In this way, the EU’s human rights norms 
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would not be free-floating, but would be grounded in a set of concrete principles 
guaranteeing their effective implementation. The five aforementioned principles 
remain in current EU practice and determine that the human rights criteria, like all 
dimensions of the acquis, are obligatory for candidate states, should be fulfilled 
before accession, and cannot be renegotiated. This is to suggest a process of human 
rights implementation where candidate states are expected to accept the totality of 
the obligations and responsibilities of the existing members; they cannot renegotiate 
or challenge the content of the human rights requirements; they cannot object on 
the grounds that they were not the ones who adopted them in the first place; nor can 
they argue that they are ‘different’ or that their administrative structures cannot 
support the effective implementation of the reforms.
77
 These principles, which 
justify EU human rights policy with reference to its performance, were established 
through the first enlargement and set ‘ground rules which have been adhered to ever 
since’.78 
 
 
The second and third enlargements of the European Community, described 
below as the ‘Mediterranean’ enlargements, saw the accession of Greece in 1981 
and Spain and Portugal in 1985. Turkey also pursued accession as part of the 
Mediterranean group, but its applications in 1959 and 1987 resulted in rejection for 
human rights and economic reasons.  
 
 
2.2.   The Mediterranean enlargements: Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1985), 
and Turkey 
 
 
The Mediterranean enlargement brought to the fore issues of democracy and 
human rights that had previously been implicit in the membership conditions. The 
main characteristic of EU normative power that emerged clearly from this 
enlargement was the primacy of a developing set of political requirements, 
including democracy, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law, over 
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economic considerations. The cases of Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal are 
generally understood as having a political dimension that was essentially distinct 
from the first enlargement. All Mediterranean applicants had emerged from 
authoritarian rule and were seeking the opportunity to be placed within an 
institutional framework that would facilitate the development of their democratic 
institutions. The Mediterranean enlargements revealed several tendencies in the 
practice of political conditionality in the 1970s and 1980s. The first clear 
formulation of human rights conditionality was encountered. Apart from the 
economic dimension, the political profile of an applicant state appeared important 
in determining the success of the membership application, and respect for 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law emerged as areas of key significance. The 
Mediterranean enlargements revealed that in practice only states with democratic 
institutions were offered association agreements or membership. This was made 
evident in Greece and Turkey’s association agreements being suspended and 
Spain’s remaining a dead letter. The following analysis will discuss the focal points 
in the development of human rights requirements through the Mediterranean 
enlargements and Turkey’s early applications for EEC membership.  
 
 
In 1975, Greece and Turkey did not appear to be promising candidates for 
membership. Their political and economic level of development was a cause of 
concern and created a dilemma for both the European governments and the 
Community authorities. On the one hand, they could not neglect the opportunity of 
supporting the political and economic development that they had been demanding 
from the two countries. On the other, they could not overlook the fact that offering 
membership would imply that the political dimension was of secondary importance 
in EEC accession criteria. The European Commission expressed these concerns in 
its Opinions on membership, where it made clear that fulfilling democratic 
requirements was necessary both for the individual countries and for the future of 
the political union.
79
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The European Commission and Parliament were generally firm and 
consistent players in response to Greece’s authoritarianism and human rights 
violations. In 1967, the Commission froze vital portions of the EEC-Greece 
Association Agreement (1961) and only its day-to-day management was 
maintained. The European Parliament, in a resolution in May 1967 stated that the 
Association Agreement, which also functioned as a form of pre-accession 
agreement for Greece, could not be applied unless democratic institutions and 
human rights were re-instated.
80
 It also underlined the need that Greece respects the 
European Convention of Human Rights, and demanded that civil and political 
rights of political prisoners be restored. Furthermore, it requested that the EEC 
institutions follow all developments in Greek political life and inform the EP.
81 
In 
response to the initiatives of the EP, the European Commission also suspended 
financial aid.
82
 Greece applied for full membership on 12 June 1975 after the 
collapse of the military dictatorship. Negotiations commenced in 1976 and Greece 
gained full entry in 1981. 
 
 
In parallel with Greece’s efforts to accede to the EEC, Turkey also sought 
full membership. Its first application was lodged on 31 July 1959. Instead of 
membership, the model of cooperation that the EEC agreed upon was an 
association establishing a customs union. The Association Agreement, also known 
as Ankara Agreement, was signed on 12 September 1963. The Ankara Agreement 
did not contain any human rights and democracy requirements, despite the fact that 
the Birkelbach criteria had been adopted a year earlier and Turkey’s human rights 
situation was volatile. According to Faucompret and Könings, the aim of the EEC 
was to establish ‘a simple commercial agreement’, given that Turkey's political and 
economic problems were so major that that the transformation they required 
exceeded the Agreement’s scope.83 In fact, the chaos and instability that Turkey 
lapsed into in the late 1960s, resulting in widespread human rights violations 
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between citizens and, subsequently, the military memorandum of 1971, did not 
visibly affect EEC-Turkey relations. 
 
 
The 1980 military coup severed EEC-Turkey relations and brought human 
rights to the fore of their relationship. Both EEC institutions and member states 
determined that the military regime conducted widespread and systematic human 
rights violations of Turkish citizens.
84
 By implication, accession of Turkey to the 
EEC could not be considered. However, the Council of Ministers decided to 
maintain the Ankara Agreement with the expectation that the dictatorship would 
soon return power to a civilian government, as had occurred with previous coups in 
1960 and in 1971. The European Parliament, however, called on the European 
Commission in April 1981 to freeze the Agreement, and passed a resolution in 
January 1982 suspending the Joint EC-Turkey Parliamentary Committee.
85
 EEC-
Turkey relations deteriorated to such an extent that the European Commission did 
not recommend the fourth Financial Protocol to the European Council, and 
financial aid towards Turkey was suspended for six years.
86
 Some member states 
with a normative orientation in their foreign policy, such as the Netherlands and 
Denmark, insisted on expelling Turkey from the Council of Europe, a step which 
did not eventually materialise.
87
 The EEC continued to be dissatisfied after the 
restoration of democracy in 1983. The 1983 elections were deemed undemocratic, 
given that the pre-1980 parties and politicians had been banned from participation. 
Overall, the human rights record continued to be dismal, despite Turkey assuming 
the presidency of the CoE in 1986.
88
 
 
 
On 14 April 1987, Turkey re-applied for EEC membership. At that time, 
however, the EEC’s rationale behind enlargement had taken a different turn from 
that of the 1960s and 1970s. The transformation of the EEC in this period can be 
described as an evolution from an economic community to a political union.
89
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Human rights and democracy had gained significant prominence in determining 
further expansion. Nevertheless, Turkey’s ruling elite failed to notice the changing 
importance of human rights and democracy. According to Kahraman, they believed 
that the liberalising economic reforms they had been implementing since 1980 
would be adequate to ensure the acceptance of Turkey’s application.90 Contrary to 
expectations, on 20 December 1989 the European Commission recommended not 
entering into negotiations with Turkey.
91
 The Commission’s Opinion put forward 
democratic and human rights reasons as important grounds on which the 
application should be rejected, amongst other considerations. It stated that ‘the 
human rights situation and respect for the identity of minorities, these have not yet 
reached the level required in a democracy’.92 As an alternative, the Commission 
proposed to enter into negotiations concerning a Customs Union (concluded in 
1996). 
 
 
Spain and Portugal prompted a similar firm EEC approach on human rights 
as the one that immediately preceded them in relation to Greece and Turkey. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, both countries had suffered from autocratic regimes and 
backward economic structures, which rendered membership to the EEC 
unattainable.
93
 Only in 1959 did Spain embark on a process of limited economic 
liberalisation, which subsequently led to an application for an Association 
Agreement in February 1962. The application was eventually accepted and the 
Association Agreement was concluded in 1970. However, in 1975, the 
renegotiation of the Agreement in the light of the first enlargement was suspended 
because of human rights violations and lack of advancement of democratic 
principles.
94
 The newly democratic government of Spain applied for membership 
on 28 July 1977. The European Commission submitted a reticent but favourable 
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opinion on Spanish accession.
95
 The negotiations began on 5 February 1979 and 
culminated in the signing of Spain’s treaty of accession to the EEC on 12 June 
1985. 
 
 
Portugal was also isolated from European economic and political 
developments due to its dictatorial regime, but by virtue of its trade dependence on 
Britain it became one of the founding members of EFTA.
96
 In 1970 it requested an 
Association Agreement with the EEC, which was concluded in 1973. After the 
collapse of the Caetano government in 1974 and the loss of its colonies in Africa, 
Portugal entered a period of instability and turned its vision towards the EEC, 
desiring a renegotiation of the Association Agreement.
97
 The European Council in 
Brussels in July 1975 asserted that it was ‘prepared to initiate discussions on close 
economic and financial co-operation with Portugal’, however, ‘...in accordance 
with its historical and political traditions, the EEC can only give support to a 
democracy of pluralist nature’ (emphasis added).98 Portugal applied for membership 
in March 1977 and the signing of the treaty for accession occurred on 12 June 1985. 
 
 
The construction of normative power Europe in the Mediterranean 
enlargements evolved around a central focal point. For the first time in 
enlargement, there was institutional and public discourse that emphasised the 
integration of values and norms in the European project. Self-representation of the 
EU as a ‘force for good’ remains strongly present in EU normative power today, as 
will be shown in Chapter Two. At the time of the Mediterranean enlargements, the 
issue of the protection of human rights was firmly linked to the argumentation of 
the ECHR and the emerging rights doctrine of the ECJ. In April 1977 the European 
Commission, Parliament, and Council issued a joint declaration on the protection of 
human rights.
99
 This declaration appeared to serve as a powerful reinforcement 
within enlargement of the task of internal protection that the ECJ had embarked on. 
Furthermore, at the April 1978 European Council, referring to the problems arising 
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from the politically sensitive  accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EEC, 
it was declared that ‘respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights in each member state are essential elements of membership of the 
European Communities’ (emphasis added). In parallel, the Commission proposed 
Community accession to the ECHR in a memorandum in April 1979. According to 
Brown and McBride, this proposal of accession was ‘not unconnected’ with the 
potential entry of Greece, Spain, and Portugal into the Community; accession to the 
ECHR was expected to provide a measure of guarantee against the risk of revived 
authoritarianism.
100
  Furthermore, as Thomas highlights, the development of human 
rights criteria for the Mediterranean enlargement was also linked to the emergence 
of a vigorous public deliberation, both within the European Parliament and within 
societal forces, voicing strong concerns on the human rights record of the countries 
concerned.
101
 Overall, the EEC’s attempt to introduce human rights criteria into 
enlargement was linked to arguments and reasons, provided by institutional and 
societal actors, to strengthen the liberal democratic tradition of the EEC and 
constitutionalise democratic and human rights principles. 
  
 
As explained above, the human rights approach of the EEC in the 
Mediterranean enlargements consisted of producing a general policy framework 
around which a wide consensus could be articulated. Nevertheless, in the absence 
of the later Copenhagen Criteria and comprehensive pre-accession instruments for 
human rights, the EEC’s discussion of human rights and democracy was broad-
brush. It did not target any particular situations, nor did it involve specific policy 
instruments. The EEC certainly invested political and financial capital in its 
candidate states, but at this stage lacked a clearly defined strategy on the practice of 
human rights conditionality. Instead, the practice of conditionality developed in a 
reactive way, by default rather than design, in response to the particular context of 
each enlargement round and the character of the applicants concerned. An 
implication of this reactionary approach was the impromptu ‘extension’ of the 
political criteria for Turkey, whose Association Agreement had a much weaker 
accession perspective than those of Greece, Spain and Portugal (although there is 
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little doubt that its human rights record was indeed poor).
102
 
 
 
 The negotiations for the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal and the 
developments in EEC-Turkey relations revealed the emergence of human rights as 
an autonomous policy area in the context of enlargement. Processes of 
argumentation, where reasons were provided in favour of human rights criteria, had 
a significant effect on the development of human rights criteria: they defined, 
involved, and committed human rights as a distinct area within enlargement. In 
approaching the question of legitimacy, it can be argued that the policy was 
legitimised with reference to ethical-political norms considered just by all parties. 
Ethical-political arguments were made that justified human rights criteria on the 
basis of the responsibilities of the EEC that stemmed from the universal values it 
‘should’ represent. In the absence of a perception of common European identity in 
the 1980s, legitimacy lay in actors’ rational assessments of what areas should be 
rightly and fairly prioritised in EEC enlargement. The next section will analyse the 
development of the EU’s human rights policy through the Nordic enlargement 
(1995).  
 
 
2.3. The Nordic enlargement and ‘impact conditionality’: Finland, 
Sweden, and Austria (1995) 
 
 
In terms of the practice of human rights criteria, the 1995 enlargement to 
include Finland, Sweden and Austria was relatively uncontroversial. Although the 
Copenhagen Criteria, introduced in 1993, required a much more stringent approach 
to political conditionality and detailed adherence to the acquis communautaire, the 
candidate states in question undoubtedly fulfilled both the political and the 
economic criteria for accession. The wider implications of the fourth enlargement 
for the practice of conditionality is that it introduced the element of ‘impact 
conditionality’ into the European Union’s experience of application of the human 
rights criteria. The idea of impact conditionality points to a rather negative impact 
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of the EU on some aspects of individual rights protection in the Nordic countries. 
This occurred especially in the area of social rights, for example the right to social 
security, to work, or gender equality within employment. Simply put, the EU was 
viewed to be causing a ‘race to the bottom’ whereby the new member states faced a 
downward pressure to comply with lower continental standards.
103
 
 
 
‘Impact conditionality’ refers to conditionality whose overall effect is 
deemed to be negative, in other words causing more harm than good through 
unwelcome side effects.
104.
 For this analysis, the term can be used where EU 
standards in a particular policy area are lower than the domestic standards of a 
candidate state. This entails a differentiation where the candidate states are ‘leaders’ 
and the EU is a ‘laggard’. Candidate states might have to adapt as part of their 
membership to the EU, not only due to pressures by the European Commission and 
the ECJ, but also due to adjustment pressures.
105
 Alternatively, the candidate state 
might be permitted to maintain these standards for a certain period after accession 
and not adopt EU standards straight away. This can be accompanied by a 
commitment on behalf of the European Union to review its policy and raise its 
standards in this policy area. 
 
 
When Austria, Sweden and Finland applied to accede to the EU in 1989, 
1991, and 1992 respectively, they were already prosperous, members of EFTA, and 
signatories of the European Economic Area Agreement. The EU’s response to their 
applications was positive. All candidates were modern market economies, with 
long-standing democratic traditions and positive human rights records, and with 
GDP per capita above the EU average.
106
 In addition, the countries’ membership in 
the EEA had resulted in their accepting a substantial part of the EU acquis before 
applying for membership. These characteristics, along with their reputation for 
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being exemplary countries in terms of socio-economic structures, facilitated their 
road towards integration.
107  
 
 
Nevertheless, social policy was an area in which the applicants, excluding 
Austria, maintained higher standards than the EU. Sweden, in particular, held a 
level of protection of socio-economic rights that was viewed domestically as much 
higher than that of the EU. In the referendum campaign advocating against Swedish 
membership, for example, the domestic-EU divide in social protection was used as 
a campaigning card by the ‘No’ camp.108 Austria, on the other hand, had a higher 
level of environmental protection in its legislation.
109
 Each candidate state was 
permitted to uphold its higher level of protection for a period of four years after the 
date of accession (i.e. until 31 December 1998). At the same time, the Accession 
Treaties included a commitment by the EU to review existing EU standards with 
the aim of raising them to the level of the applicant member states.
110  
 
 
 The EU encountered a rather unexpected paradox as a result of the 1994 
accession to the European Union, which highlighted the issue of internal/external 
divergence in human rights protection and the need to address it. The paradox was 
that the level of protection of human rights in these countries (specifically gender 
equality, the right to environmental protection, and other socio-economic rights) 
came rather close to having to be downgraded after accession, due to the principle 
of supremacy of EU law and other adjustment pressures. In the above areas where 
the EU had vague or no competence, the overall effect of human right 
conditionality was the potential deterioration of the existing human rights record; a 
‘race to the bottom’ where the new member states would face pressure to comply 
with lesser EU standards. According to Albi, this paradox was closely linked to the 
internal/external divide elaborated earlier in this chapter. If monitoring mechanisms 
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are not available vis-à-vis member states, potential deterioration of the record of 
new members is more likely.
111
 Albi’s observation underlines the fact that the 
internal/external bifurcation has served not only to advance the EU’s system of 
human rights protection, but also to render it less vigorous. Nevertheless, the 
criticisms that ‘impact conditionality’ prompted in the 1994 enlargement led the EU 
to review its human rights policy and raise its standards in the area of socio-
economic rights. This progress was made visible in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
 
 
2.4.    The Eastern enlargements (2004-2007): the ‘return to Europe’  
 
 
      The Eastern enlargements of the EU to include former communist countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania are perceived as a 
milestone in the development of a human rights policy within enlargement. Firstly, 
they introduced the design of concrete policy mechanisms, whose aim was to 
achieve the EU’s goal of human rights protection through norm-diffusing 
instruments. Institutionalised procedures triggered the ability of the EU to shape 
and manage the practice of human rights protection in the candidate states 
according to its own perspectives. The inclusion of normative elements in financial 
assistance programmes, conditionality, and targeted technical measures was 
highlighted as a powerful tool to promote reform and ensure stability. The 
acceptance of human rights norms was also tied to possible sanctions; a recent 
example was the temporary suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey due 
to police brutality during the Gezi protests of 2013.  
 
 
 Secondly, the EU employed a human rights discourse establishing a self-
identity for the EU by turning countries that are not historical partners into ‘others’. 
The Eastern enlargements tied human rights promotion to an element of EU duty to 
return CEE countries to the ‘European family’ after the end of the Cold War. The 
idea of ‘return to Europe’ was strong in arguments relating to human rights 
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promotion towards CEE. In contrast, when human rights promotion to Turkey was 
discussed, it was explicitly linked to utility defined in terms of peace and stability 
in the near region.
112
 Based on this reading of the EU’s normative power, the EU 
mobilises instruments for norm convergence, peace, and stability that rely on a 
logic of European identity. This section will analyse the new direction in the EU’s 
human rights policy regarding its aims, approach, and priorities, and their 
implications for the legitimacy of normative power Europe. 
 
 
The formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) constituted a defining 
moment in the further development of EU human rights policy within enlargement. 
For the first time in the history of the EU, a list of explicit, albeit general, political 
criteria for accession were formulated. The Copenhagen Criteria broadened the 
scope of EU conditionality beyond the formal criteria of a limited notion of 
democracy (fair and free elections) and into areas of substantive democracy (active 
civil society, social equality and freedom).
113
 The political conditions covered the 
stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including minority rights. The Copenhagen Criteria were 
subsequently incorporated into primary EU law through Article 6(1) of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1999). The presidency conclusions of the June 1993 European 
Council summarised the Criteria as follows: 
 
The European Council ... agreed that the associated countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of 
the European Union... Membership requires that the candidate country 
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the 
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. The Union’s capacity to 
absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of 
both the Union and the candidate countries.
114
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The Copenhagen Criteria were accompanied by the development of a 
comprehensive human rights policy, since they did not constitute a straightforward 
‘strategy’ of conditionality in themselves. The aims, approach, and priorities of 
conditionality expanded significantly with the Eastern enlargements. As Kochenov 
emphasised, the Eastern enlargements divided ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU approaches.115 
The accession criteria (structured around the acquis communautaire) increased to 
an unprecedented volume. The timeframe for negotiations became visibly tighter, 
and progress monitoring more rigid and objective. For the first time candidates had 
to show that they possessed capacity for full-scale compliance.
116 
Conditionality no 
longer concerned whether a country satisfied the minimum requirements for 
membership. To ensure high alignment with European standards, the Eastern 
enlargements were the first to transpose the whole body of the acquis into national 
law without opt-outs and prior to signing the accession treaty. This occurred in the 
absence of reciprocal commitments from Europe, a situation often referred to as 
power asymmetry.
117 
 In the words of Papadimitriou and Gateva, ‘profound power 
asymmetries between the negotiating parties unleashed massive pressure for 
domestic adaptation across Central and Eastern Europe’.118 Therefore, the 
flexibility that characterised the adaptation process of past candidate states was now 
absent.
119
 According to Balfour, this ‘new’ system was perceived by the EU as a 
valid route towards democratic consolidation and domestic implementation of 
human rights standards.
120
  
 
 
Overall, three developments in the scope and shape of EU human rights 
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policy opened the way for a more comprehensive assessment of current and 
forthcoming accessions through the adoption of norm-diffusing procedures. The 
first of these developments was the shaping of a more principled and sophisticated 
policy procedure which utilised a wide range of instruments to shape and manage 
human rights reform in candidate states. In her analysis of conditionality to Central 
and Eastern Europe, Grabbe differentiated those instruments according to 
intergovernmental and transnational policy processes. On the one hand, the EU 
began to apply human rights through intergovernmental policies, such as technical 
and financial assistance packages for various thematic issues, keeping a direct role 
in determining when each candidate could progress to the next stage of accession. 
On the other hand, it exercised policies of transnational socialisation, such as civil 
society cooperation, which attempted to exert indirect influence and pressure on 
human rights protection.
121
 NGO transnational cooperation and activism became a 
crucial element in the Union’s ‘new’ approach to enlargement.122 Nevertheless, 
serious criticisms have been raised of shortcomings on transparency and 
bureaucratisation within the new policy procedures. Petrov argued, for example, 
that some projects have been deemed ineffective, since they have not been adapted 
to local needs, and consultation participants have not been sufficiently qualified or 
informed.
123
 The contextual relevance and appropriateness of EU instruments for 
the case of Turkey will be evaluated empirically in Chapter Four. 
 
 
The second development was an unprecedented degree of scrutiny of the 
human rights performance of the candidate states (‘monitoring’), which has served 
to highlight the familiar double standard critique in relation to the EU’s internal and 
external human rights policies.
124 
 The system of annual monitoring of the candidate 
state’s progress involves the compilation of progress reports on the country’s 
implementation of the acquis, with human rights featuring prominently. The reports 
are concerned not only with adoption of laws in major areas of human rights, but 
also with realities on the ground. They also assess the administrative capacity and 
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institutional ability of the candidate states to implement the human rights criteria 
and to distribute and receive funds. These reports are meant to provide a direct lever 
on policy-making in the candidate countries by indicating a collection of priorities 
that have to be implemented within the short and medium term.
125 
Notwithstanding 
its effort to guide fundamental and solution-based reform, the monitoring process 
has been criticised for a lack of clear EU benchmarks, lack of clear foundation in 
EU law, reliance on external bodies (such as local NGOs) to perform the 
monitoring functions, promotion of vague international standards, and a double 
standard that arises from lack of monitoring of the human rights record of member 
states.
126
 
 
 
The third development in the renewed scale and ambition in EU human 
rights policy included the adoption of civil society development. Civil society 
development was constructed as an instrument of transnational socialisation within 
EU enlargement. Based on the definition by Schimmelfennig et al., socialisation 
constitutes a process in which candidate states are induced to adopt the constitutive 
rules and norms of the European Union ‘from below’.127 With the Eastern 
enlargements, civil society development was intended to induce reform through the 
ability of citizens and non-governmental organisations to affect the preferences of 
CEE governments, according to the norms that defined the collective ethos of a 
‘rights-based’ European community.128 To this end, the EU approach was directed 
towards strengthening the capacity of civil society to induce reform in the candidate 
state by ‘enriching the political agenda and public debate’.129 Civil society 
organisations were understood by the EU as actors that would contribute to the 
implementation of human rights norms by pressing governments to change policies 
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and altering public perceptions of what human rights protection entails.
130  
 
 
This renewed approach to the application of human rights conditionality, 
although effective in its leverage for change in candidate states,
 
can be criticised, 
both in principle and in practice. A primary criticism refers to the contested 
character of the process of human rights promotion, which links ideas of human 
rights, democracy, and rule of law to official technical and financial assistance, 
without a clear definition of their relationship, and without a comprehensive view 
of liberal democracy.
131
  Although the instruments allow the EU to reward those 
states that are effectively and successfully meeting the targets set, the definition of 
the fundamental elements has proved a sticking point. The EU appears to suggest 
that any kind of support to human rights as a constitutive norm of the EU will 
contribute to a more democratic system and vice versa, without a clear conceptual 
strategy of how this would occur.
132
 The role of non-state actors and civil society 
organisations also proves to be contentious. Wider inclusion in the process of non-
state actors serves to enhance local ownership and transformation from below, but 
is ambiguous as to who is regarded as important within civil society and why their 
cause is included in financial assistance.
133
 The definition of the role of civil society 
‘cooperation’ with respect to reform is crucial, yet is not elaborated in sufficient 
detail in the enlargement texts. 
  
 
A further point of controversy relates to inconsistencies in the application of 
conditionality in human rights policy. Such uncertainties are understood in terms of 
the EU’s specific policy agenda, the linkage between tasks and benefits, and 
reluctance to engage with sensitive human rights issues.
134
 Inconsistency can 
undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the European Union’s human rights 
conditionality. An important example of inconsistency is the re-emergence of 
‘impact conditionality’ in the 2004 accessions. Albi argued that the post-communist 
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constitutional courts, which upheld human rights vigorously after the fall of the 
communist regimes, came close to having to downgrade human rights protection 
after accession, due to the constraints of the supremacy of EU law. According to 
Albi, the courts ‘confronted difficulties in maintaining the pre-accession level of 
fundamental rights... with regard to measures that implement EU law’. These 
limitations facing EU human rights conditionality were made visible in the Eastern 
enlargements despite the emergence of specific and professionalised policy 
instruments. Nogueras and Martinez argued that if the normative values of 
reference are not established strictly and clearly, ‘there is a risk of drowning the 
Union’s actions in discretion or even arbitrariness’.135 Vincent added that 
consistency is an absolute necessity to conditionality, ‘because... it is on the 
substance and appearance of even-handedness that a successful human rights policy 
depends’.136   
 
 
Another question arising from the renewed EU policy is the question of 
ambiguity on the issue of universal human rights promotion versus a particular duty 
towards those considered ‘one of us’. The Copenhagen Criteria claim to rely on 
universally accepted principles that increase the objectivity and credibility of EU 
policy.
137
 However, when looking more closely, European human rights action 
towards CEE appeared determined by the standard of legitimacy and 
appropriateness of EU normative power based on the constitutive norms of the EU 
and its self-understanding as a ‘force for good’.138 Consequently, the CEE states 
that are perceived to share in the EU's collectively identity (as evidenced by the 
‘return to Europe’ rhetoric), and thus adhere to its values, were entitled to join the 
organisation. By contrast, the aim of human rights policy towards Turkey appears 
linked to utility defined in terms of security.
139
 There is no suggestion of common 
values as a positive incentive for Turkey’s accession, but rather suggestions that 
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Turkey is strategically important.
140
 The EU, by exercising its normative power 
through a European-focused view, has been criticised for inconsistency between its 
past rhetoric and treatment of CEE and its policy towards Turkey, and for building 
dividing lines between Europe and Eastern neighbours. Inconsistency harms EU 
credibility, and the EU’s ability to be credible is critical to the legitimacy of the 
normative power Europe enterprise, as will be shown in Chapter Two.  
 
 
  Enhanced conditionality and stronger mechanisms of monitoring were 
visible in the European Union’s enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The 
human rights criteria that the candidate countries had to respect were extended to 
include the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was utilised as 
a further set of benchmarks against which to assess candidate performance. As 
Phinnemore observed, the European Commission’s monitoring process was 
significantly tightened in comparison to the accessions in 2004.
141
 Additionally, for 
the first time the EU determined ‘post-accession conditionality’. This entailed that 
the Commission would continue to monitor the countries’ compliance with the 
overall acquis even after they had formally acceded to the EU. Failure to comply 
entailed sanctions such as the withdrawal of EU funding and suspension of 
cooperation on judicial matters. The imposition of enhanced conditionality against 
the 2007 entrants has been viewed as a political device for discrimination in the 
hands of member states.
142
 Nevertheless, the application of post-enlargement 
conditionality might be attributed to more complex dynamics than discrimination. 
According to Papadimitriou and Gateva, Bulgaria and Romania regularly appealed 
to their traumatic communist experience and the large size of their populations to 
account for their slow pace of reform and promote fast-track accession to the EU.
143
 
Their self-promotion as exceptional candidates led the EU to allow their accession 
despite their imperfect record of compliance, in order to avoid the unpredictable 
costs of their exclusion.
144
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This section analysed the accession of Britain, the Mediterranean 
enlargements, the Nordic enlargements, the Eastern enlargements of 2004, and the 
enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania (2007). The Eastern enlargements marked a 
turning point in the evolution of EU human rights policy and institutionalised 
human rights promotion in enlargement. In the light of the CEE accession in 2004, 
the EU developed a much more intensified, consolidated strategy to human rights 
protection within enlargement, which brought the official approach to enlargement 
in line with human rights. Pridham found that, contrary to pre-2004 policy, 
‘political conditionality has become broader in its scope, much tighter in its 
procedures, and within a less enlargement-friendly environment in the EU’.145 The 
development of succinct policy instruments for human rights promotion has been 
considered a key feature of normative power Europe and one that enhances its 
legitimacy through the practice of value-based policies, rooted in universal 
standards of human rights protection. The EEC/EU experience with CEE served to 
substantially modify and specify the pre-existing rules and practice of human right 
promotion which had been generated from the earlier rounds, and paved the way for 
delineable policy instruments in the context of human rights promotion.  
 
 
However, the new strategy has been at odds with the EU’s more permissive 
stance towards its member states. The EU continues not to have explicit means for 
judging whether its own states effectively implement their human rights 
obligations, nor does it subject them to the same kind of scrutiny. This is 
accompanied by a lack of clear benchmarks on the acceptable standards that have to 
be achieved by candidate states, potentially demanding more concessions, 
commitments, and longer periods of preparation. Moreover, inconsistency resulting 
from the EU’s universal human rights norms versus a particular duty towards those 
considered ‘one of us’ damages the credibility of the EU as a normative power 
within enlargement. Issues of performance and European/non-European 
differentiation have resulted in concerns about a credible EU commitment to 
promote human rights norms, which potentially obstructs effective implementation 
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by candidate states, as will be examined in Turkey’s case in Chapter Five. In an 
overall perspective, therefore, the promotion of human rights norms does not 
automatically signify that EU policies are rightful and universally acceptable, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
 
3. External EU action and human rights promotion in trade and 
development 
 
 
This section will discuss human rights promotion as a feature of normative 
power Europe through the European Union’s external policy agenda. The EU’s 
practice as a ‘normative power’ in external relations is assumed to be intrinsically 
linked to its attempt to act according to its legal principles, visible in both internal 
human rights protection and enlargement policy. As European Union integration 
has become more political and ambitious in its goals, its external human rights 
policy has achieved substantial growth and importance as a cross-cutting dimension 
of EU external policies. At the same time, however, it is beset by similar legitimacy 
problems associated with enlargement policy, primarily regarding to matters of 
inconsistency, failure to show real leadership to address human rights violations 
internationally,
146
 lack of effectiveness, and motivation by strategic rather than 
normative considerations.
147
 These shortcomings might undermine the European 
Union’s credibility as a normative actor and constrain its ability to deliver 
meaningful improvement.  
 
 
Similarly to enlargement, the idea of human rights promotion is not new in 
EU external policy. As the protection of human rights evolved internally and gained 
momentum in enlargement, the EU began to place more significance on their 
promotion to third countries. EU efforts at external human rights promotion have 
been inextricably linked to the projection and affirmation of its own identity as a 
‘community of values’ (and not simply a technical collaboration), formed by 
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principles common to all member states and applied by the ECJ as the ‘legal 
heritage’ of the EU. Changes at the end of the Cold War also explain the EU’s turn 
towards further realisation of external human rights policies.
148
 Since the early 
1990s human rights have become ‘the name of the game’ in international relations, 
where it is believed that a peaceful and prosperous continent of Europe and 
international system can only be achieved through realisation of protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Fulfilling the conditions of liberal 
economy, democracy, and human rights is assumed to pave the way for 
international development. As a result, the EU attempts to influence the conduct of 
third states on human rights protection in accordance with its constitutive values 
and norms.  
 
Human rights concerns feature centrally in EU development policy and 
external trade, and nearly all agreements with third countries that are in force today 
contain human rights clauses which allow the EU to suspend the relevant agreement 
in the event of violations by the trading partners. At present, with the Lisbon Treaty, 
the EU is attempting to streamline human rights throughout its entire external 
action, so that they are reflected fully both in its structure and in the resources 
available within it. According to the European Parliament, this is essential if the EU 
is to play a significant, constructive role in promoting human rights to third 
countries affiliated to the EU through common policies.
149
 
 
 
 EU external human rights promotion commenced from the area of 
development cooperation in the 1970s. It subsequently broadened to include trade, 
and today encompasses foreign and security policy and all types of international 
cooperation agreements with third countries.
 
Yet, the efforts of the EU have not 
been entirely successful in achieving a great degree of human rights protection 
through these agreements. While an EU membership perspective offers sufficient 
evidence of achieving implementation of human rights, the same does not apply to 
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the EU’s broader external relations.150 The following analysis will discuss the most 
commonly used instruments of EU human rights policy abroad and the major 
debates surrounding their legitimacy. It will argue that the value of the EU priorities 
and approach is obscured by the attempt to secure European interests and achieve 
greater integration of third countries into the global economy at the risk of 
neglecting human rights concerns. 
 
 
3.1. Development and trade cooperation 
 
 
 Early efforts to include human rights in EU external relations were visible in 
the Lomé Conventions on EU (then EEC) cooperation with the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific group of states (ACP). The main objective of the Lomé Conventions 
was to construct a trade and aid partnership with forty-six ACP countries as a 
framework for free trade and investment, but without a human rights priority.
151
 
The first two Lomé conventions (1975 and 1979) did not include human rights 
provisions. Lomé III, however, signed in 1984, introduced respect for human rights 
into the Convention. This development was reportedly influenced by the accession 
of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Charter on Human Rights in 
1981, and the ACP’s search for an EEC response to the human rights violations in 
South Africa during the apartheid. The EEC was reportedly hesitant to include 
human rights in Lomé III, in case it be considered a ‘condition of aid’.152 The 
outcome of the negotiations was the inclusion of a general reference to human 
rights in the Preamble and Annexes. Therefore, Lomé III became the first attempt 
for a development agreement to set a human rights clause. The absence of 
conditionality, however, rendered the human rights clause a rather ineffective 
political statement of intent, instead of a binding clause, similar to the early treaties 
of European integration vis-à-vis enlargement. 
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 Lomé IV (1991) became the first development agreement to incorporate a 
binding human rights clause as an ‘essential element’ of EEC-ACP cooperation. 
Yet, the European Parliament criticised Lomé IV, because it did not include an 
enforcement mechanism, nor did it make reference to upholding democracy and the 
rule of law.
153
  The amended version of Lomé IV (1995) sought to address the EP’s 
concerns. Article 5 of the Convention claimed that ‘development policy... shall be 
closely linked to respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights and 
to...democratic principles, the consolidation of the rule of law and good 
governance’.154 Two main tools enforced these provisions. Article 366a provided 
for a mechanism of suspension of aid, stating that any violation of the human rights 
clause could lead to partial or total suspension of development assistance on behalf 
of the EEC.
155
 At the same time, the Convention included a series of instruments for 
institutional support of democratisation, including financial assistance and an APC-
EU Joint Parliamentary Committee. Lomé IV increased the prospects for human 
rights promotion to third countries, and improved coherence between the EU's 
internal and external relations goals as regards human rights policy. 
 
 In addition to development policy, human rights and democracy promotion 
are explicit goals of the EU trade policy.
156
 In May 2001 the European Commission 
emphasised the promotion of human rights and democracy through a 
Communication on ‘the European Union’s Role in promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries’.157 This policy document obliged the EU to 
uphold human rights in trade policy, ensuring the maintenance of a coherent 
external policy with respect to human rights.
158
 These obligations were codified 
into primary EU legislation with Articles 3 and 207 of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). 
Similarly, the European Parliament has continued to actively call for respect for 
human rights in EU trade. In 2009, an EP Resolution on trade highlighted that the 
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EU should not envisage trade as an end in itself, but ‘as a tool for the promotion of 
European values and commercial interests’ in accordance with ‘the principles and 
objectives of the Union’s external action’.159 Consequently, the EU has a clear 
obligation under EU law to promote human rights in its external trade policy, thus 
linking its normative power to the legal status of human rights in EU and its 
responsibility to act according to these principles in the international arena. 
 
The EU has developed a systematic strategy and sophisticated array of 
instruments to promote human rights within trade. Its strategy has two main 
elements: human rights clauses in bilateral trade agreements, and human rights 
conditionality in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Bilateral trade 
agreements, as with the Lomé Conventions, include human rights clauses as 
‘essential elements’. The ‘essential element’ clause stipulates that respect for human 
rights and democratic principles are a critical aspect of the relationship between the 
parties.
160
  Sanctions dealing with the non-execution of the agreement can be found 
in the ‘suspension clause’. In cases of widespread violations, the clause provides for 
immediate suspension of the agreement. In cases of lesser violations, measures are 
less drastic and provide for various stages of escalation, such as suspension of high-
level contacts or postponement of new projects.
161 
In fact, the suspension clause has 
been employed by the European Union on repeated occasions. In 2011, for 
example, trade and investment cooperation was withdrawn from Burma/Myanmar 
for a year as a result of internal repression. The suspension measures were reversed 
in April 2012 as a result of ‘positive changes’, but an embargo on arms equipment 
remains in force at the time of writing.
162
 The suspension clause has also been 
employed against the Palestinian Authority, Belarus, and Russia.
163
 Nevertheless, 
calls by the European Parliament for sanctions against Israel, Algeria and Vietnam 
were rejected by the European Commission, leading to strong EP accusations of 
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‘double standards’.164  
 
The second instrument in which the EU seeks to promote human rights as 
part of its trade policy is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Under the 
GSP scheme the EU offers exporters from developing countries lower tariff rates on 
some or all of the products they sell to the EU. This gives them access to EU 
markets with the aim of contributing to the growth of their economies.
165
 The GSP 
has been operational in this form since 1971. Since the early 2000s the scheme has 
been further expanded to include negative human rights conditionality with the 
creation of the GSP+ system, to which any state can gain access if it has ratified 
and effectively implemented a total of 27 international agreements on human rights, 
labour standards, sustainable development, and good governance. GSP+ is defined 
by the European Commission as a ‘special incentive arrangement’ that offers 
further opportunities for sustainable development to those countries that commit to 
embracing core universal values on human, labour rights, environment, and 
governance.
166
 This essentially involves an upgrading of the human rights and 
democracy clause, which is evident in the stricter scrutiny of the eligibility of 
participant states by the EU, and the closer monitoring of human rights 
implementation. This effectively constitutes a conditionality mechanism, enabling 
the suspension of the agreement in the event of perceived human rights violations 
and internal threats against democracy. 
 
3.2. Legitimacy implications of EU human rights promotion practices 
 
The above mechanisms of human rights promotion raise particular issues for 
the practice of normative power Europe in external policies. Generalisations are 
hazardous; nevertheless, a number of points can be made. The first problematic area 
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is the peril of inconsistency and ‘double standards’ that result from disparities in the 
implementation of the EU’s suspension clause in development and trade policy. The 
EU has been repeatedly criticised that its scrutiny in trade and development policy 
is considerably more severe towards weaker partners than agreements with 
powerful partners.
167
 It would be politically credulous to argue that a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach could ever be justified or effective. Yet the problem of treating third 
countries differently even though their human rights and democratic records are 
similar, by involving different decision-making, implementation, and supervision 
levels in the suspension clause, or by favouring cases that serve the political and 
economic interests of EU member states, has been are frequently stressed both in 
academic and policy-making circles. In the words of Maier, ‘the EU is most 
successful when it has a lot to offer and little to lose’.168  
 
 Meuner and Nicolaidis have argued that the consistency in which the EU 
applies its development and trade policy towards non-EU partners depends on the 
distribution of gains from cooperation between the EU and the partner country.
169
 
Whilst the EU has taken action in a number of cases where human rights violations 
were relatively low (e.g. Kenya and Malawi), the reluctance of EU member states 
to antagonise major partners led the EU to adopt ‘informal’ or no sanctions (such as 
Turkey, Russia, China, or Saudi Arabia).
170
 The EU has also been reluctant to 
engage effectively with democracy and human rights in Northern Africa, which 
serves as its ‘buffer zone’ for irregular immigration, despite the dismal record of the 
countries concerned. On the other hand, adopting sanctions against underdeveloped 
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African countries entails significantly less financial and trade loss for the EU. The 
above discrepancy can undermine the effectiveness of the human rights promotion 
and damage the EU’s credibility as a human rights actor. As Duquette underlined, 
not only does such unequal treatment appear hypocritical, it also reinforces the idea 
that EU responsibility to protect human rights lacks a strong moral foundation and 
commitment to an apparently ethical policy.
171
 
 
Secondly, a problem similar to ‘impact conditionality’ can be encountered in 
the EU's agenda within trade, cooperation, and development. Given its duty of 
protection, the EU must not ratify agreements that would themselves lead to a 
violation of human rights. In other words, the policies applied must not have 
adverse implications for the very values that they set out to protect – implications 
for individuals’ fundamental human rights and socioeconomic welfare. 
Nevertheless, the irony of adverse implications can be considered here with respect 
to an important example, the control of irregular immigration through the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) with North African states. The EMP was 
launched in 1995 to create an area of ‘peace, security, and stability’ between the EU 
and 16 neighbours to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East.172 The 
security policy of the EMP is primarily focused on cooperation on immigration 
control and effective repatriation of immigrants who would potentially seek asylum 
in the EU. However, it has been considered complicit with the infringement of 
human rights of asylum seekers. As Bilgic argues, far from protecting the rights of 
immigrants, EU policy forces detentions and repatriations at the EU border that 
expose them to severe violations of their fundamental rights by the North African 
regimes.
173
 EU member states have also been criticised for using Turkey as a buffer 
zone to prevent access to their territory for fleeing Syrians, when part of the EU's 
conditionality to Turkey requires the improvement of its refugee regime.
174
 This 
greatly restricts the universal legal right of any individual to seek asylum, and also 
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occurs without sufficient legal scrutiny by the European Court of Justice, despite 
the legal obligation of the EU member states – and the EU itself – to uphold the 
rights contained in international human rights in their foreign policy. This practice 
reveals a clear tension between Europe’s duty to protect human rights as a 
‘community of values’ and the implications of those very agreements designed to 
protect and promote these values. 
 
  Thirdly, one of the most well-known criticisms against EU human rights 
promotion is that it is an attempt to shape the rest of the world according to 
‘European’ norms of economic and political cooperation.175 In this regard, the EU is 
viewed as socialising the world around a set of historically-philosophically 
contingent principles, including human rights and economic liberalisation, to an 
extent that it has been negatively described as a normative power with a 
civilisational role.
176
 Two specific concerns have been raised: first, the need to 
promote human rights ‘from outside’ and the role of the EU in this process, and, 
second, the particular conception of human rights that is being promoted.
177
 The 
idea of promotion of rights has been linked to the EU presumption that human 
rights are absent in the relevant countries, an idea portrayed as potentially 
unrealistic and politically insensitive. What conception of rights the EU promotes is 
a second key question. Its central claim, reflected effectively by Evans, is that the 
EU advances a historically-specific Western conception of human rights – with 
emphasis on norms of individualism, in contrast to a notion of community 
solidarity.
178
 The risk this entails, according to Smismans, is a self-representation of 
the EU as ‘a lighthouse of fundamental rights in the dark world of less civilised 
regimes’, thus hardening the boundaries between the EU and the rest of the 
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world.
179
 
 
 
            Finally, a major concern about the scope of the policies, reflected in a recent 
edited volume on the EU’s strategies of engagement with Northern Africa and the 
Middle East, is that they reduce human rights promotion to concern with human 
rights legislation and procedures, neglecting their deeply political character in the 
process.
180
 At their core, human rights consist of an ethos of questioning official 
behaviour, as they are political norms dealing mainly with how people should be 
treated by their governments and institutions.
181
 Treating human rights merely as a 
matter of formal rules and procedures has been viewed to result in inconsistency in 
their application and lack of proper impact.
182
 Whereas the human rights clause 
serves the purpose of allowing the EU to prevent its funds from flowing to 
authoritarian regimes violating their population's rights, it is questionable to what 
extent it actually improves human rights on the ground.
183
 Especially in the light of 
the shortcomings touched upon (proceduralism, economic and strategic motives, 
‘impact conditionality’), it is important to ask whether the EU should take a more 
principled and systematic approach that does not have adverse implications for the 
very values it sets out to protect (human rights, rule of law, democracy, social 
welfare). 
 
 
 The progressively increasing profile of human rights in EU external 
relations has been attributed to the economic weight of the EU and the greater 
opportunities it brought for the exercise of international political influence.
184
 The 
promotion and protection of its economic and legal interests has long been a 
cornerstone of the EU’s human rights policy in external relations.185 In addition, the 
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widening and deepening of European integration and the growth of EU policy areas 
led to the accommodation of human rights in a more comprehensive development 
policy.
186
 These changes encouraged a stronger EU role in trade, security, and 
development affairs, and facilitated the recognition of the importance of human 
rights in the above areas.
187
 The EU represents itself as a stabilising effect in world 
politics, deriving from its historically-developed and formed values and principles, 
and its ‘ethics of responsibility’ towards others.188 In the European Council’s 
document on ‘European Security Strategy’, we read that:  
‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for... the development 
of a stronger international society... A rule-based international order is our 
objective... Spreading good governance, supporting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of 
law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the 
international order’.189 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the foundation of the European 
Union’s policy of human rights promotion by shedding light on its relevance for EU 
normative power. The chapter followed the trajectory of the policy from its internal 
legal construction to the external EU activities that shaped its application. It argued 
that in order for this thesis to interpret the policy process and legitimacy of human 
rights promotion to Turkey, it needs to begin by understanding the EU’s internal 
dynamics and international action. The understanding of the EU as a normative 
power in human rights promotion is better captured by bringing the ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ dimension into a relationship with each other. Such an integrated focus 
captures some of the ways in which the development of a human rights narrative 
within the EU has affected human rights promotion externally. It also highlights 
how conditionality is framed within the wider human right policy in external 
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relations. Whilst the chapter does not claim to have exhaustively analysed all 
aspects of EU human rights activity, the attempt to discuss the major dynamics in 
the evolution of human rights promotion through the academic literature pertaining 
to it was central to its focus. 
 
 
The first part of Chapter One focused on the legal-institutional 
underpinnings of EU normative power through the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice and the activities of the European Parliament as key institutional 
actors driving EU human rights action. It also dealt with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and with the major treaties of European integration. Successive 
treaties have lead to the progressive refinement of human rights conditionality as 
the EU changed scope, direction, and the capacity to formulate and implement a 
European ‘human rights policy’. The second part of the chapter discussed the 
external dimension of human rights promotion through its application during 
consecutive enlargement rounds: Britain (1973), the Mediterranean enlargement 
(1981, 1985), the Nordic enlargement (1995) and the enlargements to Central and 
Eastern Europe (2004 and 2007). The second part argued that on the basis of the 
particularities of each candidate state under consideration, the EEC/EU 
reformulated a core of human rights requirements that today underpin the EU’s 
application of human rights to Turkey. The third part discussed the EU’s human 
rights promotion towards the rest of the world through an analysis of the trade and 
development agreements with third countries. It argued that despite its importance, 
external human rights promotion is replete with legitimacy implications, primarily 
associated with matters of consistency, instrumentalism, and lack of effectiveness. 
Chapter Two will discuss the legitimacy of EU normative power from a theoretical 
perspective. 
79 
 
 
                                                       Chapter Two 
 
        Legitimacy and Normative Power Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
 
EU human rights promotion has acquired increasing significance through internal 
legal developments, successive enlargements, and external relations. This chapter 
analyses human rights promotion from the theoretical perspective of normative power 
Europe. Normative power Europe, conceptualised by Manners, has so far provided 
insightful analyses of contemporary practices of the EU that interpret its international role 
in ‘normative’, ‘ethical’, or ‘soft power’ terms. However, a central foundation of these 
analyses prevents them from taking further steps: the idea that normative power Europe is 
essentially a ‘good’ concept, that its standard of legitimacy is ‘normal’, and should be 
adopted by the rest of the world. By contrast, this thesis ascribes to the idea that the EU’s 
normative power actions are not neutral; they put forward a particular vision of politics 
which requires its own sources of legitimacy. Thus, human rights promotion within 
enlargement will be discussed in relation to possible sources of legitimacy, ones that are 
external to the normative power concept itself. The chapter discusses the value and 
applicability of two such sources: legitimacy as procedural propriety (procedural 
legitimacy), and legitimacy as recognition by the non-European other (substantive 
legitimacy). It will be argued that a process of EU human rights promotion that draws its 
legitimacy from these sources has the potential to contribute to sustainable human rights 
change in Turkey. 
 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a legitimacy analysis seeks to highlight 
the contradictions with actual EU human rights promotion (what it is doing) and its better 
potential (what it could do). Legitimacy in this sense is adopted as the analytical 
framework for the normative power analysis of EU human rights promotion to Turkey. It 
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helps to assess the EU’s capacity to exercise effective and justifiable human rights 
promotion, one which encourages political development and social improvement in the 
target country while remaining ‘in dialogue’ with the Turkey’s local context. The usage of 
legitimacy transforms the analysis of human rights promotion from a situation describing 
an intergovernmental bargaining exercise between EU-Turkey elites to an analytical 
framework in which human rights actions on the ground and local socio-political 
dynamics (including civil society organisations) can be studied jointly. This fits into the 
agenda of EU normative power analyses which argues that the EU cannot be a normative 
power without an external recognition of its legitimacy. 
 
 
The chapter will start with a review of the prescriptive and descriptive methods 
for legitimacy analyses. In this section, it will discuss the key methods adopted in the 
literature on EU legitimacy in key policy areas (including enlargement), and will explain 
the importance for this thesis to adopt a combined prescriptive-descriptive approach. This 
discussion will be followed by an analysis of normative power Europe theorising, whose 
central works generally focus on the EU as a ‘force for good’ that ‘shapes conceptions of 
normal’ in international political behaviour. It will be argued that early NPE theorising 
almost uncritically adopted the idea that the EU’s external action is a ‘force for good’. 
The final section will explore how legitimacy can be operationalised for the purposes of 
normative power analysis of human rights promotion to Turkey. Two dimensions of 
legitimacy, procedural and substantive, will be explored based on different normative 
power conceptualisations that emerge from the literature. The chapter will conclude by 
arguing that a rethinking of EU human rights promotion within enlargement in relation to 
legitimacy could contribute to improved human rights promotion to Turkey. 
 
 
1. A definition of legitimacy 
 
 International legitimacy has constituted an all-encompassing idea in political 
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thought.
1
 Its precise meaning has always puzzled theorists of international relations. At 
bottom, it is seen as a normative belief that a rule or a demand of an institution should be 
obeyed, not due to coercion or self-interest, but due to its inherent normative strength.
2
 
According to Hurd, legitimacy contributes to compliance by providing an internal reason 
for an actor to follow a rule. When the rule is perceived by that actor as legitimate, 
compliance is no longer motivated by a fear of sanctions or a by a rational cost-benefit 
calculation, but by an internal sense of moral obligation.
3
 A similar understanding of 
legitimacy is specified by international law theorists, who conceptualise legitimacy on the 
basis of the fairness of rules which make sure that all peoples and nations derive benefit 
from them.
4
  
 
 
 Despite its ambiguity, legitimacy constitutes an important dimension in the 
practice of international institutional activity. Its frequent mention in EU policy reports 
testifies to its significance. The European Parliament resolution on the White Paper on 
European Governance (2002) showed twelve instances of the word ‘legitimacy’ in ten 
pages, indicating that it is an issue of relevance to EU governance.
5
 This attitude is 
accurately explained by Beetham, who argued that all power structures seek legitimacy.
6
 
In order to form a thorough understanding of the meaning of legitimacy for this study, the 
discussion must be carefully situated within its specific context and conducted on the 
basis of precise criteria. What is important to be made clear is a) the conceptual stance of 
the author as emerging from the academic literature, b) the nature and the range of the 
criteria upon which the concept is employed, and c) the empirical cases from which the 
                                                 
1
 Several examples include Franck, T.M. ‘Legitimacy in the International System’. American Journal of 
International Law, vol.82 no: 4 (1988) p.705-759; Clark, I. ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’. Review of 
International Studies, vol.29 no: 1 (2003) p. 75-95; Mulligan, S. ‘Questioning the Question of Legitimacy 
in IR’. European Journal of International Relations, vol.10 no: 3 (2004) p.475-484; Clark, I. Legitimacy in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)  
2
 Buchanan, A. ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of International Legitimacy’. Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics vol.10  no: 1 (2011) p.8 (5-19) 
3
 Hurd, I. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007) 
4
 Koller, P. ‘International Law and Global Justice’. In  Legitimacy, Justice, and Public International Law, 
ed. by L.H. Meyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.192 (186-206) 
5
 European Commission, European Governance: Preparatory Work for the White Paper (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002) p.337-353. 
6
 Beetham, D. The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.3. 
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analysis draws. According to Caron, without a comprehensive framework it is difficult to 
understand whether and when legitimacy warrants attention in a practical sense.
7
 
 
 
   The task here is to review how the EU can attain legitimacy for human rights 
promotion within enlargement. The idea that the European Union is a normative power 
that promotes human rights as a ‘force for good’ needs an assessment that makes it 
possible to substantiate this claim. This chapter addresses the above theme through the 
prism of Turkey’s EU accession process. The section that follows will provide a detailed 
review of the prescriptive and descriptive methods for the discussion of EU legitimacy, 
followed by a discussion of their analytical usefulness for this study. It will then stress the 
benefits for the study to adopt a combined prescriptive-descriptive approach.  
 
 
 
2.  Descriptive and prescriptive methods for the study of legitimacy for EU human 
rights promotion to Turkey 
 
 
 Notwithstanding the intellectual diversity of work on legitimacy, most theorists 
are able to categorise the main methods for its assessment as one of two types: the so-
called ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ techniques. This distinction coincides with a 
putative boundary between individual beliefs and normative benchmarks of acceptability 
and justification. In his work on the legitimacy of international institutions, Hurd 
highlighted the two distinct conceptions from which evaluations of legitimacy arise: 
individual assumptions, and contextual standards of appropriateness.
8
 While these two 
conceptions are a useful departure point for conducting legitimacy analyses, they still 
leave the observer wondering what they mean in the practice of empirical research. It is 
                                                 
7Caron, D.D. ‘The Legitimacy and Collective Authority of the Security Council’. American Journal of 
International Law, vol.87 no: 4 (1993) p.557 (552-588) 
8
Hurd, I. ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’. International Organization, vol.53 no: 2 
(1999) p.389 (379-408) 
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therefore necessary to discuss these two methods and spell out the framework they offer 
for the analysis of EU human rights promotion to Turkey. This will be accomplished by 
reviewing their usage in the legitimacy literature, and describing how the adoption of 
either a descriptive or prescriptive methodology is not entirely appropriate for the present 
study. Instead, a combined approach will be selected. 
  
 
A descriptive technique for the study of legitimacy involves analysing people’s 
beliefs about a political order. This explicitly refers to why they accept and support it in 
reality. The object of analysis is the perceptions held by elites and citizens about a 
government, organisation, or policy.
9
 The result is empirical assessments of the kind that 
‘this is more or less accepted’. This approach draws primarily from the perspective of 
Max Weber. Weber argued that as long as political rule is considered legitimate by its 
recipients, no decision arrived at will be considered unlawful.
10
 In turn, Stillman and 
Rothchild argued about compatibility with societal values to show that the performance 
of public actions should evoke consent, trust and identification by their recipients.
11
  
Similarly, Simmons argued that a policy which is coherent and procedurally sound could 
still lack legitimacy if not perceived it as ‘lawful, exemplary, morally acceptable or 
appropriate’ by society.12  Or, as put simply by Hurd, legitimacy is the normative belief 
by an actor that a rule of institution ought to be obeyed.
13
 Overall, the descriptive method 
has been summarised as ‘motivational’, because it is interested in the reasons that 
motivate individuals to voluntarily consent to authority.
14
 Broadly speaking, a descriptive 
study of legitimacy might ask: ‘to what extent is the political authority rightful in the eyes 
of its recipients?’  
                                                 
9
 Friedrich, C. Man and his Government: an Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1963) 
10
Mommsen, J.W. The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989) p.47. Perhaps Weber went too far in arguing that under modern conditions legitimacy 
depends solely on the belief of those governed, but his observation that people will regard a properly 
justified process as a source of the legitimacy remains valid all the same.  
11Stillman, P.G. ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’. Polity, vol.7 no: 1 (1974) p.39 (32-56); Rothschild, J. 
‘Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe’. Political Science Quarterly, vol.92 no: 3 
(1977) p.487-501. 
12
 Simmons, J. ‘Justification and Legitimacy’. Ethics, Vol.109 No: 4 (1999) p.749 (739-771) 
13
 Hurd,  ‘Legitimacy’, p.381. 
14
 Habermas, J. Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976) p.97-8. 
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Why do descriptive techniques to studying legitimacy matter? As mentioned 
earlier, a classical argument of theorists employing the descriptive method is that for 
authorities to perform effectively, those consenting to the obligations should be convinced 
that the authority has the ‘right’ to make decisions and impose obligations. This 
attitudinal quality is important for the study of EU human rights promotion, because it 
leads political actors to feeling internally obligated to implement the EU’s rules, 
decisions, and social arrangements.
15
 While some theorists argued that it is possible to 
rule using only power, it is widely agreed that authorities benefit from having legitimacy, 
and governance is more effective when a belief of appropriateness and rightfulness is 
widely held by the recipients. Legitimate rules have been claimed to exert a ‘compliance 
pull’ on target governments, not because of fear or instrumental calculations, but because 
those addressed ‘believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’.16 Demands for 
legitimacy become greater for an institution like the EU as its scope increases and it 
expands into areas that were formerly considered domestic preserves, such as human 
rights protection.
17
 
 
 
The prescriptive method for the study of legitimacy involves discussing under 
which conditions the political order and its policies deserve the predicate ‘legitimate’.18 
In this case, the criteria for assessing legitimacy result from the analyst’s views about 
when policies should be recognised as acceptable and justified. The analyst derives the 
grounds for legitimacy from ‘contextual standards of appropriateness’, as mentioned 
earlier. These involve general criteria of justifiability for formal rules and actions of 
policy. In contemporary institutional political orders these criteria frequently relate to 
                                                 
15
 Menon, A. and Weatherill, S. ‘Transnational Legitimacy in a Globalised World’. West European Politics, 
vol.31 no: 3 (2008) p.401 (397-416) 
16
 Franck, T.  The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p.24.  
17
 Berstein, S. ‘The Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: Three Conceptions’. Institute of 
Globalisation and the Human Condition Working Paper 04/2 (2004) p.3 (1-30) 
18
 Heywood, A. Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) p.29. 
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procedural and distributional issues rooted in democratic theory. Breitmeier, for example, 
emphasised equality, participation, competence, effectiveness, and accountability.
19
 On 
this view, if such conditions for legitimacy are met, political institutions exercise 
authority justifiably. A well-known example of a legitimacy study adopting a prescriptive 
method is Beetham and Lord’s Legitimacy and the European Union.20 In this work, the 
authors developed three criteria for the evaluation of the prescriptive qualities of the EU 
political system: democracy, identity, and performance. These criteria highlighted what 
the EU should do, in the opinion of the authors, in order to claim the grounds for 
legitimacy. In general, a prescriptive study of legitimacy might ponder: ‘to what extent 
are the acts and practices of political authority morally acceptable, rational, or both?’  
 
 
Prescriptive techniques to studying legitimacy are important because they are 
rooted in the idea of appropriateness of procedures. When studying institutions and their 
activities, the prescriptive category best describes the scholarly work that concentrates on 
proposing improvement to institutional frameworks through more commitment to certain 
overriding principles in policy, such as transparency, due process, efficiency, 
participation, and respect for fundamental rights. This position is less concerned with the 
attitudes of the recipient community and more concerned with the quality of the policy 
process more generally. It is heavily reliant on principled technocratic attributes to 
provide legitimacy, which becomes especially important if the attitudinal aspects of 
legitimacy are deficient in certain respects.
21
 Thus, it is a process-oriented 
conceptualisation of legitimacy that studies the function of policies and proposes 
procedural improvement. 
 
 
The EU legitimacy literature usually describes and analyses particular forms of 
                                                 
19 Breitmeier, H. The Legitimacy of International Regimes (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008) p.37. 
20
 Beetham, D. and Lord, C. Legitimacy and the European Union (London: Longman, 1998) 
21
 See Banchoff, T. and Smith, M.P. (eds) Legitimacy and the European Union: the Contested Polity 
(London: Routledge, 1999); Kohler-Koch, B. and Bittberger, B. Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the 
European Union (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007);  Neyer, J. ‘Justice, not Democracy: 
Legitimacy in the European Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.48 no: 4 (2010) p.903-921. 
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EU policy-making both within the EU and in its external relations. In domestic EU 
processes, legitimacy has been approached as central to the relationship between the EU 
political system and its recipient citizens. These have examined the degree of citizen 
acceptance of, and support for, specific EU policies in relation to the normative values 
that should underpin the promotion of public goods.
22
 Studies discussing legitimacy have 
examined either domestic support for specific policies in EU governance,
23
 or diffuse 
support by Europeans to the political system of the EU and European integration per se.
24
 
The legitimacy of EU policies has been examined through normative conditions of 
rightful governance, in other words whether the process of policy implementation 
conforms to ideals of equality, participation, coherence, effectiveness, and accountability. 
If the instruments deliver on the expected conditions, then they are viewed as legitimate. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that in studies of EU legitimacy, the interaction between the 
local and European context is not absent. In an asymmetric relationship where the EU 
enforces its norms upon a target government and society, legitimate authority is also that 
which is recognised as such by others in the context of their interaction.
25
 
 
 
Studies of the EU’s international legitimacy vis-à-vis third countries emerged 
from what one might call a theoretical framework of legitimacy for the international 
system. This was concerned with the creation of international legitimacy through a 
process of development and global acceptance of international norms, such as human 
rights.
26
 Contemporary literature on the EU’s international legitimacy has tended to 
                                                 
22
 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C., and Nolke, A. ‘Legitimacy under Pressure: the European Web of Counter-
Terrorism Networks’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.46 no: 1 (2008) p.101-124; Klintman, M. 
and Kronsell, A. ‘Challenges to Legitimacy in Food safety Governance? The Case of the European Food 
Safety Authority’. Journal of European Integration, vol.32 no: 3 (2010) p.309-327. 
23
 For example, Deroose, S., Hodson, D., and Kuhlmann, J. ‘The Legitimation of the EMU: Lessons of the 
Early Days of the Euro’. Review of International Political Economy, vol.14 no: 5 (2007) p.800-819. 
24
 Scheuer, A. How Europeans See Europe: Structure and Dynamics of European Legitimacy Beliefs 
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005); Maas, W. Creating European Citizens (Plymouth: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 
25
 Schwarz, N.L. ‘Communitarian Citizenship: Marx and Weber on the City’. In Karl Marx’s Social and 
Political Thought, ed. by B. Jessop and R. Wheatley (London: Routledge, 1999) p.286 (276-292); Susen, S. 
‘Bourdieu and Adorno on the Transformation of Culture in Modern Society’. In The Legacy of Pierre 
Bourdieu: Critical Essays, ed. by S. Susen and B.S. Turner (London: Anthem Press, 2011) p.173-202. 
26
 The study carried out by Ian Clark on legitimacy in international society provides analysis on the 
processes by which norms are accepted internationally and confer legitimacy on the states that adopt them. 
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examine the extent to which EU external policies, introduced in various policy domains 
(e.g. human rights and democracy promotion, enlargement, trade, development) 
contribute to the EU as a ‘normative power’. The attainment of legitimacy for normative 
power Europe, and policies of human rights promotion in particular, will be discussed in 
detail in the following section. 
 
 
Against the division between descriptive and prescriptive methods, it is argued 
here that it is useful to conceive the two approaches as closely related in the study of the 
legitimacy of EU human rights promotion to Turkey.
27
 Arguably, it is not possible to 
understand the beliefs of domestic actors about the conditions under which human rights 
promotion should be legitimate, unless a combined approach is employed.
28
 As was made 
visible in the EU literature discussed above, even if we rely on the judgements of the 
recipients as a legitimacy criterion, we still need to decide for which aspects of the 
political order these judgements are relevant. On the other hand, substantive legitimacy 
perceptions affect the prescriptive qualities of the EU’s activity, namely its ability to 
make decisions, the strength of these decisions, and the ability of states to build domestic 
support to carry them out.
29
 This evokes the idea that the recipients’ actual assessment of 
the legitimacy of EU human rights promotion can influence the domestic adoption of EU 
norms and thus the ability of the EU to effectively transfer its norms to the domestic 
context.  
 
Moreover, a combined approach is quite useful for studying domestic political 
dynamics, social cleavages, and political interests in Turkey and their impact on the 
development of legitimacy beliefs for EU norms. This would reveal how legitimacy is 
constructed, debated, agreed upon or rejected within the context of processes of change in 
                                                                                                                                                
Clark, I. Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
27
 See for example Brighouse, H. ‘Civil Education and Liberal Legitimacy’. Ethics, vol.108 no: 4 (1998) 
p.720-721 (719-745) 
28
Beetham, Legitimation, p.11. 
29Schmitt,H. and Thomassen, J. ‘Introduction’. In Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European 
Union, ed. by H.Schmitt and J. Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.11 (3-23) 
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Turkey.
30
 As Steffek argued, political actors develop reasons for or against supporting a 
system of governance and its binding rules. They evaluate the policy and if they find the 
‘pros’ convincing they will develop a sense of obligation towards the respective political 
system. If they do not find them convincing, they are likely to oppose the system in 
words and actions. The reasons actors have to support or oppose a new system of 
governance are not developed in isolation, but emerge through a process of debate, 
change, and occasionally through political conflict. As Baudner rightly pointed out, EU 
accession negotiations in Turkey have been strongly politicised, have met a well-
entrenched state doctrine, and the Turkish case can be regarded as one of the most salient 
examples of change related to the prospect of EU membership in the past decade.
31
 
Stemming from the above, the two methods to making legitimacy judgments can be 
evaluated as less independent than they might appear.  
 
 
 
In short, what does this discussion of description and prescription in legitimacy 
reveal in terms of the analysis of EU human rights promotion to Turkey? The analysis of 
the legitimacy of EU policy in this study will follow a combined prescriptive and 
descriptive method. Insights into what EU human rights promotion ought to do, or how to 
support human rights effectively, are grounded within a prescriptive approach. 
Prescriptive approaches prescribe what ought to be done or how to do something better. 
As argued earlier, this approach does not aim to simply explain what the EU is 
promoting. It also provides the answer to the question of how – ‘how should EU promote 
human rights to Turkey’ and, by extension, ‘why should it be done this way’. While the 
description of the known features of the current policy forms a useful knowledge base, it 
is nevertheless important to suggest improvements to the policy’s quality, and to argue 
                                                 
30
 Risse, T. and Sikkink, A. ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction’. In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. 
by T. Risse, S.C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.11 (1-38); 
Steffek, J. ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: a Discourse Approach’. European Journal of 
International Relations, vol.9 no: 2 (2003) p.249-275; Erman, E. Human Rights and Democracy: Discourse 
Theory and Global Rights Institutions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. 
‘Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy’. Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.50 no: 1 (2005) p. 37 (35-67) 
31
 Baudner, J. ‘The Politics of Norm Diffusion in Turkish European Union Accession Negotiations’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.50 no: 6 (2012) p.923. 
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how it can achieve the desirable outcomes in an environment where these outcomes have 
not been previously observed or in existence.
32
 For this purpose, a prescriptive method 
will help specify how to best apply the EU human rights policy, what outcomes should be 
expected, and how EU performance should be evaluated. As such, it involves value 
judgements of what ‘ought’ to be. These value judgements are most evident in the 
selection of the specific criteria for evaluating legitimacy, analysed later on: policy 
relevance, participation, and effectiveness. These criteria reflect democratic values as the 
normative foundation of legitimacy. 
 
 
Yet, a prescriptive analysis of human rights promotion cannot be conducted 
successfully without a detailed discussion of the relevant human rights instruments. The 
position adopted here is that any arguments about legitimate policies and their 
effectiveness combine not only prescriptive but empirical elements. Let us look at the 
following example of a prescriptive proposition that suggests this clearly: ‘If the EU 
wishes to further ensure progress in Turkey’s fulfilment of the human rights criteria, it 
should raise the amount of funding for governmental human rights projects’. This is a 
prescriptive statement, because it argues that the EU ought to raise funding for projects if 
it wants to ensure better domestic human rights implementation. It is also (at least 
implicitly) an empirical statement, because it proposes that funding is correlated with 
implementation progress. This means that the prescriptive analysis necessitates prior 
knowledge, which is based on information and facts about the policy process and its 
context. These facts are then described and explained in order to construct prescriptive 
claims. Therefore, a successful prescriptive approach is based on solid explanation of the 
function of the policy instruments. For this purpose, the empirical section of the thesis 
will include description of the relevant EU policy processes and the function of different 
types of human rights instruments (financial and technical assistance, human rights 
consultations, and civil society development). 
                                                 
32
 Dompere, K.K. and Ejaz, M. Epistemics of Development Economics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1995) p.148. 
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On the other hand, a prescriptive analysis of EU policy to Turkey cannot sensibly 
be conducted independently from a domestic analysis of the political attitudes and 
legitimacy beliefs of implementing actors. Even if the EU’s human rights policies possess 
a considerable degree of independent procedural validity, this is made operational by 
domestic socio-political affirmation.
33
 Thus, the focus here is on how human rights norms 
are accepted in Turkey. The literature focusing on the impact of EU norms on state 
practices is an integral part of the debate concerning the interaction and influence of 
normative power Europe on partner countries, as will be shown further on. Analysis of 
this dimension is increasingly useful in contemporary EU human rights promotion, where 
we are more aware of instruments of civil society development and the role played by 
non-state actors. How does the EU diffuse human rights norms and practices to candidate 
states?  
 
 
The process of acceptance of externally-induced norms by domestic actors has 
been studied in the literature on conditionality, which is applied to describe and analyse 
the adoption of human rights rules by candidate states. We can distinguish two different 
aspects of the conditionality approach to human rights promotion. The first is a ‘top-
down approach’, which focuses on the EU as a transformative power that provides the 
Turkish government with external incentives to comply with its human rights 
requirements. This approach can be identified with the interaction of individuals at elite 
level with their EU counterparts in a process of bargaining and persuasion. The second is 
the ‘bottom-up approach’, which focuses on processes of acceptance of EU norms in the 
wider political and societal sphere, beyond the interaction at the elite level. This approach 
is concerned with the effect that domestic power positions, social cleavages and political 
party interests have on the EU’s ability to shape human rights protection in Turkey.  
                                                 
33
 Clark, International Legitimacy, p.14; Schneider S.,Nullmeier F. and Hurrelmann A. ‘Exploring the 
Communicative Dimension of Legitimacy: Text Analytical Approaches’. In Legitimacy in the Age of Global 
Politics, ed. by Hurrelmann A., Schneider S. and Steffek, J. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.133 
(126-155). 
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According to the ‘top-down approach’,34 the impact of the EU’s conditionality 
and material rewards on human rights implementation is particularly pervasive.
35
 Studies 
in this area show that the EU influences the implementation behaviour of the target 
government through processes of rational choice and social learning. Rational choice 
shows that the main condition for the success of EU human rights promotion is 
reinforcement by reward, which works through intergovernmental material bargaining.
36
 
Its efficacy depends on whether it offers Turkey a credible membership perspective, 
which will reward rule adoption and influence the cost-benefit calculations of the target 
government.
37
 The importance of influencing cost-benefit calculations resonates sharply 
with the assumption that domestic actors are strategic utility-maximisers who adopt 
human rights in order to increase their power and welfare.
38
 Thus, the analytical basis of 
rational choice ideas assumes a logic of consequences; conditionality affects the power 
position of the target government, either by increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis 
other domestic actors, or by empowering domestic socio-political actors who might 
oppose the government (e.g. opposition parties or civil society organisations). Another 
factor that influences implementation behaviour is the salience that the EU attaches to 
human rights in its enlargement policy, which in turn increases the credibility of EU 
human rights promotion in the eyes of the domestic implementing actors.  
 
 
However, how can we explain the (albeit limited) alignment of Turkey to EU 
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 Pridham, G. ‘Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, 
and Priorities’. Democratization, vol.14 no: 3 (2007) p.462 (446-471) 
35
 Grabbe, H. ‘How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol.8 no: 6 (2001) p.1013–31; Kelley, J. ‘International 
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(2004) p.663 (661-679) 
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human rights requirements that occurred since 2007 in the absence of a credible EU 
commitment? In this case, the top-down conditionality approach would assert that 
compliance was precipitated through social learning, which forms the ‘alternative’ model 
of EU external incentives.
39
 Social learning presupposes that the EU holds specific 
understandings of what is appropriate international behaviour in the area of human rights 
(‘norm-maker’), and that its candidate states accept these collective understandings if 
they want to partake in EU benefits (‘norm-takers’).40 The social learning model assumes 
a logic of appropriateness.
41
 According to this logic, domestic actors are motivated by the 
internalisation of the values and norms promoted by the EU.
42
 The process of rule 
transfer and rule adoption is characterised by political debate about the legitimacy of 
human rights norms and the appropriateness of EU behaviour, rather than bargaining 
about conditions and rewards. 
43
 The perspective of social learning would argue that 
Turkey would internalise and view human rights norms as legitimate under the following 
conditions: a) when rules are formal and applied through concrete policies; b) when the 
processes of human rights promotion are fair (e.g. EU internal-external consistency);
44
 
and c) when EU rules are resonant with existing or traditional domestic standards of 
legitimacy, which ‘makes subjects willing to substitute the regime’s decisions for their 
own’.45 Legitimacy then generates voluntary compliance irrespective of either 
sanctioning mechanisms or the utility of the rule for those who have to comply.
46
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In examining EU human rights promotion to Turkey, this thesis suggests a 
‘normative power Europe’ analysis to assessing the impact and the legitimacy of EU 
policies. A normative power Europe analysis conveys a different narrative of the EU’s 
transformative capacity as being much more indirect than the elite-level analysis 
suggests, and more subject to socio-political dynamics and conflicts within the candidate 
state. The usage of ‘normative power Europe’ can contribute to an analysis of the politics 
of norm diffusion through the development of a bottom-up approach, which examines a) 
how specific EU policies work within the reality of Turkey’s human rights problems, and 
b) how the acceptance of the standard of legitimacy offered by EU normative power is 
motivated by domestic power positions, social cleavages, and political party interests. In 
light of the above, the method of legitimacy evaluation adopted in the discussion of EU 
human rights promotion to Turkey follows a combined prescriptive and descriptive 
approach. It is accurate to suggest that it is impossible to divorce the two, as in order to 
make value judgements about legitimacy we need to describe and understand the real-life 
empirical phenomena we are making judgements about. As Steffek rightly pointed out, 
‘in the international legitimacy debate, normative political and legal theory encounter 
empirical social science’.47 
 
3. Normative power Europe in theory and practice  
 
 
A focus on normative theory within the discipline of international relations has 
been a significant area of research since the end of the Cold War.
48
 Yet, the idea of 
normative power Europe also has roots in existing theories of European integration and 
the EU’s role in the world. Most notably, it builds upon the work of Duchêne in his notion 
of ‘civilian power’49 and Galtung’s ‘ideological power’ and ‘power of ideas’.50 The 
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concept of ‘normative power Europe’ was developed by Manners, who attempted to 
bridge an emergent debate on EU foreign policy with normative debates within IR. 
Manners himself attributed the reason behind the concept of normative power Europe to 
the need to frame post-Cold War EU politics into a more principle-oriented analysis, 
since the EU had come to the forefront with an emphasis on the principles of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law.
51
 The research aim was to facilitate an alternative 
conceptualisation of Europe and Europe’s international role through questioning the EU 
institutions and policies in terms of essence, actions and impacts rather than taking them 
for granted.
52
 Thus, Manners argued that not only is the EU constructed on a normative 
basis, but importantly this ‘predisposes’ it to act in a normative way in world politics.53  
 
Since the publication on Manners’ original article in 2002, scholars have used the 
concept to inform empirical work and to stimulate critical theoretical interrogation of the 
normative basis of European foreign policy and the EU’s role in the world, as will be 
discussed further on. The following section will discuss how normative power Europe 
scholarship has debated and refined the concept in EU international action and its role in 
the world. We can distinguish two different aspects of EU normative power: what it is 
(the substance of EU governance as a new type of political entity), and what it does (how 
it diffuses its norms through external policies).   
 
To begin with, a crucial point to be considered is that being normative and acting 
in a normative way is not coterminous. Thereby, Manners proposed a distinction between 
two aspects of EU normative power: EU norms and rules of governance (what the EU 
‘is’), and actual support of principles through policy action (what the EU ‘does’). The 
former is a result of the nature of the EU embracing intergovernmental and transnational 
governance, whereas the latter involves acting in an ethico-politically good manner. 
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3.1. ‘Being’: The European Union’s normative difference 
  
Although there is no commonly accepted definition of normative power Europe, it 
is commonly accepted as the ability to project externally the norms and values it holds 
internally (democracy, human rights, rule of law) and hence to define what passes as 
‘normal’ in international affairs.54 What makes the EU different in its claim to represent a 
normative power, when other international actors (United States, China) also label their 
international behaviour as normative?
55
 Manners claimed that ‘the EU has been, is and 
always will be a normative power in world politics’.56 In particular, he observed that the 
EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity, and political-
legal constitution. The combination of the above characteristics accelerated a 
commitment to placing human rights norms in an important position in its relations with 
its member states and external partners, as discussed in Chapter One. They key question 
is how normative power happens, in other words what form it takes in the EU’s 
behavioural action. Manners described the policy objectives of EU external action as 
predominantly founded on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights. A normative power promotes universal principles (peace, democracy, rule of law, 
human rights). Its actions rely on formal instruments, such as dialogue and debate, and 
informal actions, such as ‘living by example’ and internal-external consistency. 
Moreover, it influences partner countries through socialisation, partnership and local 
ownership, rather than through coercion.
57
 EU normative power mainly acts to change 
norms in the international system and define appropriate practices and objectives of 
behaviour. 
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If we are to conceptualise systematically the legitimacy of normative power and 
its actions, it is first necessary to define its identifying features. What does normative 
power Europe look like? The scholarly debate that addresses the question of ‘what makes 
the EU a normative power’ has focused systematically on characteristics stemming from 
EU declarations, treaties, policies, and external actions. Firstly, normative power is found 
to be rooted in the historical context of the EU and the nature of its international 
identity.
58
 As Scheipers and Sicurelli stated, ‘processes of identity construction are 
involved in the emergence of the EU as a normative power’.59 Here, the source of 
normative power is Europe’s legal, political, and institutional context, as discussed in 
Chapter One. In this regard, the EU’s emergence from the massive human rights 
violations of World War Two, the growth of supranationalism, and the development of 
European law predispose the EU to acting in a normative way. This line of argument 
integrates the insight that EU normative power is rooted in the rejection of ‘non-
normative’ principles, or of those principles that are presently not acceptable according to 
international legal standards (conflict, oppression, human rights violations, political and 
economic illiberalism, theocratic governance). Normative power thus emerges from the 
sui generis characteristics of the organisation, which embody the principles of human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law, and social justice. 
  
 
As mentioned previously, it has been argued that ‘shaping conceptions of normal’ 
involves EU promotion of norms ‘even if they are against its own interests’. As important 
as this observation might be for putting the interest dimension of normative power on the 
research agenda, it nevertheless has problems. Diez argued that the so-called 
materialist/idealist bipolarity fails to consider the idea that there might not be a clear-cut 
distinction between norms and interests in EU policy action. In his words, ‘norms and 
interests cannot so easily be separated, and both are infused by each other’.60 For 
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example, can the EU inclusion of minority rights in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, when 
there was no EU law in favour of minority protection, be considered unjustifiable? And is 
it possible that the inclusion of minority rights in the Copenhagen Criteria might have led 
the EU to officially integrate them in the Charter and the Lisbon Treaty? In order to 
answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the possibility that norms shape 
interests and interests shape norms. The point is not that normative power is not strategic, 
but that strategic interests and norms are mutually constitutive, and that norms might 
produce implications for EU interests. Moreover, as Sjursen argued, strategic 
considerations do not topple the normative power argument, as the norms diffused might 
be considered valid and legitimate even if the EU's motivation for promoting them are 
instrumental.
61
 Consequently, the contention here is that ‘interest’ in normative power 
Europe relations is organically linked to norms, whereas in ‘non-normative’ relations, 
norms might be subordinate to the premises of power politics. 
 
Secondly, normative power has been assumed to emerge from the EU’s propensity 
to act as a ‘force for good’ in international politics, which shapes conceptions of ‘normal’ 
and the common standard of behaviour concerning international human rights protection. 
Pace, for example, discussed the construction of the EU as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ vis-à-
vis its partners the Southern Mediterranean and whether this construction could influence 
and modify their behaviour.
62
 ‘Force for good’ has been treated by other authors as the 
propensity of the EU’s external policies to be derived not only from self-interest, but from 
the EU’s understanding of what ‘ought’ to be done.63 Nevertheless, as explained in 
Chapter One, doubts hang over the idea that the EU promotes norms at the expense of its 
interests, given that emphasis on values and norms is also associated with strategic 
purposes, hidden interests, and double standards.
64
 Human rights promotion is not always 
                                                 
61 Sjursen. H. ‘The EU as a Normative Power: How can this Be?’ Journal of European Public Policy. vol.13 
no: 2 (2006) p.239 (235-251) 
62
 Pace, M. ‘Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?’ Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol.20  no: 4 (2007) p.659-675. 
63 Rosecrance, R. ‘The European Union: a New Type of International Actor’. In Paradoxes of European 
Foreign Policy, ed. by J. Zielonka (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 15–23; Whitman, R. 
From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998); Manners, ‘EU Normative Power’, 2002. 
64
 King, T. ‘Human Rights in European Foreign Policy’. European Journal of International Law, vol.10 no: 
98 
 
 
a benign activity and can be normatively biased. 
 
 
Thirdly, lack of military instruments is considered an important feature of EU 
normative power. This argument has its roots in Duchêne’s notion of ‘civilian power 
Europe’, which argued that the EU was a distinctive international actor because it utilised 
‘soft’ civilian means, rather than coercive military measures, to manage and solve 
international conflict. Contemporary scholars also consider this characteristic to be the 
core feature of the EU’s external action today, underpinning its political and economic 
capabilities to manage differences peacefully.
65
 Cases in point are the usage of the 
Copenhagen Criteria within enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, human 
rights consultations, civil society development, the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, and 
many others.
66
 Yet, the EU has been known as developing military capabilities that are 
particularly controversial in terms of human rights protection - such as the EU border 
agency Frontex - as an appropriate course of action against threats to European security. 
At the same time, the use of economic instruments such as aid or conditionality can be 
coercive and cause harm to vulnerable groups, such as farmers, women, and children.
67
 
Overall, what is important here is that the methods and instruments employed by the EU 
in order to promote its norms draw on influence and socialisation and can be considered 
sources of normative power, particularly when compared to other global actors. 
  
 
The EU’s material mechanisms to diffuse norms and practices create the need to 
reflect on their policy implications for normative power. As Birchfield suggests, 
accepting the normative basis of EU action does not mean that EU mechanisms always 
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act in a normative way, nor that the norms they seek to promote are necessarily or always 
consistent with the EU’s own internal principles.68 According to Eriksen, ‘a policy based 
on good intentions may very well neglect others’ interests or values’.69 Empirical 
evidence against the EU as a power that can ‘shape conceptions of normal’ relies mainly 
on inconsistencies in EU behaviour. Langan found that the EU has used moral narratives 
and norm-laden policy frameworks for commercial gain that had negative material 
outcomes for its partners, especially in the global south.
70
 Similarly, Powel, in his 
discussion of EU-Tunisia ties, argued that the EU suppressed those political actors that 
advocated different values to the government. Competing and contested norms, he 
claimed, have a negative effect on both the effectiveness of external support to human 
rights and democracy, and on the EU’s claims to be a normative power.71 As will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, perceptions of inconsistency and ‘unfairness’ are prominent in 
the implementation of human rights reform by Turkey. These judgements on EU policy 
demonstrate that consistency between internal and external EU values, or between EU 
rhetoric and policy action, has been considered an important dimension of the EU’s 
ability to ‘shape conceptions of normal’. 
 
 
While the academic discussion of the meaning of ‘normative power Europe’ 
continues, the concept itself as the EU’s ability to ‘shape conceptions of normal’ in 
international behaviour has spurred much criticism in realist and constructivist circles. 
From a realist perspective, normative power Europe has been criticised, particularly by 
Kagan and Hyde-Price, who argued that the EU does not possess the power capabilities to 
be effective and can thus degenerate into a civilising crusade.
72
 The constructivist 
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literature on the EU’s external relations has also voiced criticisms concerning the EU’s 
lack of genuinely normative intentions and commitment,
73
 the contested legitimacy of its 
normative action,
74
 the problematic nature of normative processes in terms of 
inclusiveness,
75
 and the lack of impact or effectiveness.
76
 Kavalski asserted, for example, 
that the concept is essentially Eurocentric and overlooks the fact that third countries 
might not view the EU as a normative power, particularly in the global south.
77
 The 
premise of this criticism is that the EU should be defined as a normative power in context, 
through its interaction with partner states, rather than standing alone. Moreover, there has 
been general concern that the literature on NPE is empirically underexplored, and 
necessitates a more systematic empirical focus in order to reach conclusions on how 
normative power operates in the ‘real’ world.78 
 
 
3.2. ‘Doing’: the promotion and diffusion of EU human rights norms 
 
 
 Having established a conceptual basis for claiming that the EU is a normative 
power, we face the fundamental question: how should it act? This requires a 
consideration of the wider policies and resources that the EU employs to ‘shape 
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conceptions of normal’ in partner countries. In this context, normative power focuses on 
the EU’s ability to shape the political, economic, and social institutions and practices of 
societies in accordance with its own norms. According to Manners, one of the most 
important features of normative power is the EU ‘ability to shape conceptions of the 
normal’ and to influence international behavioural action through the power of norms. An 
important implication of these statements is that normative power strongly relates to the 
ability of the EU to project material and ideational influence and diffuse its norms 
through policy instruments that require formal adaptation by others. In order to 
conceptualise systematically how the EU should act if it is to be considered a normative 
power, this section will examine the main characteristics of EU human rights promotion, 
and under which conditions it is most effective for instigating human rights change in 
target countries.  
 
 
 The EU spreads human rights norms and practices through material and ideational 
instruments.
79
 These include financial and technical means such as the building and 
shaping of institutions, the transfer of principles through conditionality, financial 
assistance, human rights consultations, and civil society development.
80
 The diffusion of 
human rights norms is underpinned by reinforcement through reward, in other words, the 
provision of positive and negative incentives to target countries to comply. Thus, the 
EU’s application of human rights instruments within enlargement diffuses norms and 
practices through the promise of EU membership. In a similar vein, the EU might offer 
individual gains to a country in return for stabilising a political situation. Concerning EU 
mechanisms of external diffusion, Telò wrote that the EU aims at altering the economic 
and social structures of third parties ‘through pacific and original means (diplomatic 
means, agreements, sanctions, and so on)’ in the middle and long run.81 Therefore, as 
Whitman argues, normative power Europe has not only ideational implications, but 
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concrete practical implications.
82
 
  
 
  In order, then, to locate the precise nature of the ‘normative’ element in the EU’s 
policy instruments, it is necessary to discuss the ability of these materially-based 
mechanisms to promote the establishment of democratic forms of governance, sustainable 
human rights protection, and strong civil society. These objectives are the very reason 
why the EU is referred to as a normative power. The EU attempts to promote a process in 
the partner country towards an ideal form of political and social governance based on 
universal values (human rights, democracy, and rule of law). This raises issues that relate 
to the performative quality of the EU’s policies of human rights promotion. We could 
point to a special issue of International Affairs (2008) and Cooperation and Conflict 
(2013) as recent examples of normative power Europe theorising in cases where the EU 
employs materially-based mechanisms to promote change in partner countries. 
 
 
 In International Affairs (2008), the idea of ‘ethical power’ was put on the research 
agenda as a concept that feeds into the wider normative power Europe debate. It evaluates 
whether the EU behaves as a responsible international actor in terms of abilities, means, 
and resources. The use of ethical power resulted from a conceptual shift in the study of 
the EU’s normative role from what it ‘is’ to what it ‘does’, in order to interpret the 
exercise of normative power Europe through materially-based mechanisms. It emerged 
from a scholarly necessity to infuse EU capability with responsibility and invoke 
dilemmas as to what kind of EU external action is appropriate; as such, it did not aim to 
replace the concept of normative power. Analytically, the empirical cases examined in the 
special issue offered a series of criteria for assessing the performative qualities of EU 
normative power and its capacity to promote governance appropriately. Hyde-Price 
formulated an ethic of ultimate ends, namely prudence, scepticism, and reciprocity.
83
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Manners presented ‘procedural normative ethics’ of ‘living by example’, ‘being 
reasonable’, and ‘doing least harm’.84 Mayer emphasised principles of EU responsibility, 
such as contribution, capacity, legitimate expectation, and consent.
85
 Barbé and 
Johansson-Nogués developed utility, rights, values, and fairness to analyse the 
appropriateness of EU policies,
86
 and Matlary applied the narrative of human security as 
an important legitimising tool for the EU as a non-state actor.
87
 Consequently, the most 
crucial contribution of the ‘ethical power’ empirical analyses is the establishment of a 
conceptual link between normative power Europe and criteria of procedural legitimacy 
(e.g. fairness, consistency, and procedural capacity). 
  
 
 A second central trend has been the use of normative analysis to understand or 
explain European power in an era marked by a decrease in the EU’s international role. 
The scholarly contributions in the special issue of Cooperation and Conflict (2013) 
showed particular interest in how the EU can exercise normative power at a time when 
‘its own new normal (euro crisis, together with rise of emerging economic powers from 
global south) often seems unfit for purpose’.88 The lack of perceived capacity to exercise 
an effective international role provided the rationale for a scholarly reappraisal of the 
premises and implications of normative power Europe. In this issue, the concept of 
normative power was re-assessed through studying its intersection with international 
relations theory (hegemony, cosmopolitanism, and postcolonialism, to name a few). Of 
particular relevance to this study are the contributions of Kavalski and Nicolaidis/Fisher-
Onar respectively. A key preoccupation of Kavalski was how normative powers are 
constituted in a contextual manner through interaction with ‘outsiders’.89 He argued that 
normative powers are those actors that are recognised as such by others. This is because 
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the definitions of ‘normal’ are not undertaken merely by the normative power, but they 
emerge in the context of its specific interactions with states that have their own normative 
character and standard of legitimacy. Recognition-in-context is based partly on the 
performative qualities of normative power, because EU policy mechanisms and the 
dynamic processes of politics they engage with are those that frame the responses of the 
recipient actors. He detailed this proposition through a parallel assessment of normative 
power Europe and ‘normative power China’. The construction of normative power 
through its recognition by ‘others’ is reiterated in the work of Nicolaidis and Fisher-
Onar.
90
 In a different vein, their work sought to strip talk of normative power Europe of 
its Eurocentric connotations. Nicolaidis and Fisher-Onar were sceptical of rooting the 
EU’s normative appropriateness in a particular brand of European universal values. The 
quality and appropriateness of the EU’s normative power, they argued, should be rooted 
in the judgement of the non-European other. Like Kavalski, the authors located the 
sources of EU normative power outside European society, in the recognition of the 
recipient country. In practical terms, the EU’s political, economic, and social policies 
should be contextualised and ‘in dialogue’ with local preferences in order to genuinely 
transfer across countries and regions. 
 
 
 The examples above illustrate how conceptions of normative power can be 
utilised to define and justify the promotion of EU norms; to evaluate particular policies, 
practices, and mechanisms; and to prescribe political interaction between Europe and the 
partner country. We might also consider that they have important impact on how EU and 
local actors perceive and receive each other. A research agenda that incorporates analysis 
of EU normative power is one that allows us to probe and explore how the prescriptive or 
‘normative’ qualities of the EU construct a permissive context for human rights 
promotion abroad; and how the procedural qualities of human rights promotion frame the 
responses of local actors who are required to implement human rights reform.  
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Normative power is not, or should not, be property only of relations between 
states. The role of civil society has so far been hardly addressed in the body of literature 
on normative power Europe, despite civil society development being an important 
external EU policy. The works that have examined the topic of civil society development 
in EU external action have done so in the context of EU democracy promotion. Empirical 
case-studies in the above area focus primarily on the processes by which local 
organisations fulfill the EU’s democratisation mission by acting as local agents and 
diffusers of EU norms.
91
 They mostly argue that NGOs are resourceful targets for 
socialisation initiatives.
92
 Yet, discussions of civil society as part of the EU’s normative 
power are largely absent, despite the fact that the inclusion of NGOs appears to reflect the 
essence of normative power much more appropriately than accounts that focus solely on 
the EU and state-level actors. While existing democratisation accounts illustrate certain 
aspects of the EU’s normative agenda towards partner countries, they have an important 
blind spot. Support for NGOs as an agent of democratisation is often framed by a liberal 
democratic view in which the strengthening of NGOs is beneficial for bolstering civil 
society and enhancing EU legitimacy. This is problematic because it legitimises a western 
worldview on how democratic consolidation ‘should’ de done.93 According to Pace, such 
ideas fail to address the question of how and why liberal democracy and civil society 
development achieved a normative status and a ‘taken-for-granted’ state of affairs: ‘In the 
case of the EU, while much of the literature on democracy promotion has looked at the 
EU’s normative foundations for exporting democracy, little has been done by way of 
analysing what is ‘normative’ about the EU’s democratisation policy’.94 The literature on 
normative power Europe could usefully lend itself to addressing this research vacuum by 
discussing why NGOs should be part of the EU’s normative mission to promote reform 
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within existing institutions. 
 
 
Although it is not the intention of this thesis to theorise civil society, the empirical 
analysis of Turkey’s human rights reform will discuss the EU policy of civil society 
development to enrich the understanding of normative power at non-state level. The 
benefit of this approach is twofold. It will bring the interaction of the candidate state with 
the EU more strongly into the picture, rather than focusing exclusively on the EU’s 
normative agenda; and it will widen our gaze to Turkey’s social fabric as a whole and its 
preferred norms in the area of human rights. The focus of the discussion will precisely be 
on the role of human rights NGOs in the implementation of the norms emanating from 
the EU. This requires taking into consideration the importance of legitimacy perceptions, 
and whether human rights NGOs recognise the EU’s normative agenda or the obligation 
to comply with it despite its specific content. It is worth recalling that NGOs play an 
increasingly important role in the EU's enlargement policy, whereby money is being 
channelled through the civil society development programme and the EIDHR for the 
conduction of a variety of projects in the area of human rights. 
 
 
4. Legitimacy and EU normative power 
 
EU normative power is considered to rest, to a certain degree, on legitimacy. 
Legitimacy and normative power can be considered to have a close, mutually defining 
relationship because EU normative power is normally understood as power that enjoys 
legitimacy. Normative power Europe, as discussed earlier, is not just any power. More 
specifically, it is the power to ‘shape conceptions of the normal’ in international 
behaviour through peaceful means, and to have these demands obeyed because of the 
validity of the demands themselves. It implies a communicative relationship, however 
broadly defined, between the EU and the partner country. Contained in the EU’s 
definition of its international role are words that point to the question of legitimacy: 
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‘strong and effective human rights policy’,95 ‘credibility of enlargement policy’,96 and 
‘legitimacy of human rights norms’.97 These terms imply some wider endorsement of the 
EU’s power. Normative power cannot be self-constituting, but requires policies that 
partake in general qualities of legitimacy, and are perceived as legitimate by their 
recipients. Simply put, normative power necessitates legitimacy. 
 
 
In parallel with the conceptual construction of normative power Europe, questions 
about the EU’s innate ‘normativity’ triggered a discussion about the legitimacy of EU 
external action. How can we be sure that the EU’s pursuit of norms in external action is 
legitimate? Since the normative power argument corresponds very closely to the EU’s 
own description of its international role, it needs to be further specified with criteria and 
assessment standards that make it possible to substantiate the claim that the EU is a ‘force 
for good’. Some European scholarship assumed a theoretical link between EU normative 
power and legitimacy, by subscribing to the argument that core European norms of 
universal value may serve as a legitimating basis for the EU policies.
98
 In an attempt to 
alter this state of affairs, several authors questioned this ‘natural’ link between normative 
power and legitimacy. Sjursen, for instance, asserted that just because the EU ‘acts in a 
normative way’, this does not naturally entail that it is a good thing.99 With regard to the 
link between normative power and legitimacy, Leino also adopted a skeptical stance: 
‘while the EU is today both capable and willing to do good, many of its actions appear 
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ineffective, badly justified or simply arrogant and ought to be re-evaluated’.100 Empirical 
case-studies regarding issues such as EU democracy promotion, human rights clauses in 
trade agreements, and regional cooperation also examined processes by which these 
policies fulfilled (or not) standards of legitimacy.
101
 The quest for legitimacy for 
normative power has been aptly summarised by Bickerton: ‘from being a source of 
legitimacy, normative power Europe is today in search of legitimacy’ (emphasis in 
original).
102
 
 
 
Views that claim that normative power Europe is not necessarily ‘good’ by virtue 
of diffusing norms enable us to address questions regarding its legitimacy. As mentioned 
above, part of the scholarly debate has asserted that acting in a normative way is not 
considered automatically to be a ‘good thing’, and does not naturally entail that EU 
external policy should be considered rightful. Consequently, the idea of normative power 
Europe necessitates its own sources of legitimacy. In the words of Clark, ‘there is no such 
thing as legitimate principles per se... Norms... depend for their power on the specific 
circumstances in which they are applied. This lends a high degree of indeterminacy to the 
achievement of legitimacy’.103  The identifying features of EU normative power 
discussed earlier in the chapter are considered inadequate as a source of legitimacy, 
because their moral value is not self-evident. It is crucial, then, to draw on sources that 
are external to the concept of normative power itself.  
 
Three main conceptions of legitimacy, external to the concept of normative power 
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Europe, have been developed in the literature: EU adherence to international legal 
principles in its external action (legality);
104
 EU legitimacy as perceived by the non-
European ‘other’, i.e. the non-European recipient of its external policies (recognition by 
the ‘other’);105 and procedural appropriateness of EU policies, i.e. linking normative 
power to performance, contextual relevance, consistency, and other principles that 
underpin the EU's own governance system (procedural propriety).
106
 A detailed 
discussion of the understandings of legitimacy held by each conception, and which ones 
will be selected for the empirical part of the thesis regarding the nature and limitations of 
EU human rights promotion to Turkey, will follow. 
 
 
4.1. Legitimacy as legality 
 
Sjursen put forward an interpretation of legitimacy for normative power that is 
based on the legality of international human rights norms. Her analytical starting point 
was that the EU as a promoter of human rights norms ought to be differentiated from 
other so-called ‘normative’ actors in the international system. For example, emphasis on 
values, norms, and human rights and democracy promotion can also be found in US 
foreign policy. Her analysis of the EU’s enlargement policy raised a similar concern: ‘the 
arguments and reasons provided in favour of enlargement have to be of a type that others 
can support; they must be considered legitimate’. What is needed is an understanding of 
human rights norms that have universal content. The most appropriate way in which this 
could occur in practice would be whether or not the EU adheres to and promotes a set of 
norms that are common to all. Human rights would be regarded as fair and legitimate 
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when formed dialogically in course of time by several different kinds of political 
actors.
107
 Therefore, according to Sjursen, ‘to act in a normative way’ would entail ‘to 
promote universally accepted legal principles of human rights’. 
  
 
According to the logic of legality, EU human rights promotion to Turkey would be 
justified by a strong element of constitutionalism and legality underpinning the EU 
human rights norms, as discussed in Chapter One. The development of European law, the 
integration of human rights protection in the internal EU legal system, and most 
importantly the advancement of universal legal principles that emphasise human rights, 
would serve as a source of legitimacy to EU human rights promotion. Similarly to 
Sjursen, Dunne argued that the EU’s fusion of cosmopolitan ideas of universal rights with 
a developing institutional capacity to promote those rights abroad is likely to serve as a 
source of legitimacy.108 Hence, a strong indicator of the EU as a legitimate normative 
power would be linked to the overarching legitimacy of international human rights law, 
promoted through the European Union’s external human rights instruments. This 
argument paints a picture of EU human rights promotion legitimated by the universal 
legal standards that bind humanity as a whole. To ‘act in a normative way’ would mean 
‘to act according to legal principles’. 
 
The universal character of international law and the rational-empirical character of 
law-making have been aptly conceptualised as a source of legitimacy for EU human 
rights promotion, because they conceive of a normative power that acts according to 
normative convictions rather than with reference to strategic calculations. Thus, it 
differentiates normative power Europe from other ‘normative powers’ (e.g. United States) 
who may advocate a principled foreign policy as a guise for the promotion of strategic 
interests. Nevertheless, the focus on legality also presents problems. A well-known 
problem with grounding legitimacy in legality is that international law, and the 
instruments of human rights promotion that it underpins, can easily be derived from 
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interests as from norms. To address this limitation, Sjursen eschewed the idea that EU 
human rights promotion should not be judged solely in terms of its ability to inscribe 
itself in the international legal system. Instead, it should also be assessed according to 
whether it promotes a transformation of power politics towards a more ‘cosmopolitan’ 
order in the EU’s partner countries.109 Furthermore, an additional problem in grounding 
legitimacy in legality is that it offers the false impression that human rights promotion 
can be rightful and effective provided we exercise diligence and reason when drafting and 
enforcing human rights law, although there is little evidence for this suggestion.
110
 
Galtung, for instance, contented that most human rights violations owe more to current 
political and economic structures in the country perpetrating the violations. Consequently, 
expectations of legality might be inadequate on their own to serve as a source of 
legitimacy for EU human rights promotion to Turkey.
111
  
 
4.2. Legitimacy as recognition by the non-European ‘other’  
 
The legitimacy of EU normative power in this study, particularly for human rights 
promotion, has been rooted in another area of key importance: the recognition of EU 
normative power by the non-European ‘other’. EU normative power has been treated as 
constructed through the relationship between the European ‘self’ and the non-European 
‘other’.112 It has been generally described as configuring boundaries between self and 
other by constructing an identity of the EU against an image of the ‘outside world’. 
Accordingly, the construction of the EU as a normative power has important implications 
for the way human rights promotion treats ‘others’, and whether it results in the 
formulation of a boundary between EU and non-EU recipient states. As argued by 
Flockhart, the EU’s expression of what is ‘normal’ invokes certain agendas and entails 
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power relations.
113
 The normative power role pushes the EU beyond being merely a 
passive presence in the international system to being an active norm-diffuser, whereby it 
‘attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms’ and to reshape the 
other into another self.
114
  
 
Nevertheless, because identity is relational, the self-image of EU normative power 
is (or should be) dependent on the perceptions that recipient actors have of its agenda and 
practice. Although ‘European’ values are all-encompassing, actors outside EU boundaries 
might not share in the EU’s conception of ‘the normal’. The impact of normative power 
can only exist where non-EU countries perceive the power’s norms as acceptable for 
adoption and conforming to their own standard of legitimacy. The conception of 
legitimacy for normative power should therefore be based on an external evaluative 
perspective regarding both the EU’s particular set of values and norms, and its 
concordance with socio-political standards of legitimacy within the recipient country. 
This requires that non-EU states implementing EU human rights policies should perceive 
the EU as embodying the norms it espouses, perceive these norms as attractive for 
emulation, and perceive EU action to be norm-driven (rather than interest-driven). At the 
same time, policies flowing from the EU will be legitimated when they are perceived as a 
powerful resource fostering desired change at elite level and wider society. For that 
reason, rather than inquiring whether the EU acts as a normative power, the empirical 
analysis of Chapter Five will ask whether political and societal actors in Turkey perceive 
EU human rights promotion as that of a normative power. 
 
Based on the reading of legitimacy as recognition of normative power Europe by 
‘others’, what aspects of Turkey-EU interaction will the empirical analysis draw on? One 
aspect of Turkey-EU interaction is that the former has frequently been constructed as 
Europe’s ‘other’ in the academic and policy-making debate. In this regard, Turkey has 
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been viewed as possessing a homegrown ‘standard of legitimacy’ that is incompatible 
with that of the EU.
115
 Following Turkey’s potential candidacy (1999), controversy was 
sparked inside the EU about Turkey’s limited compatibility with so-called European 
values of secularism, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Uncertainty was 
expressed in several ways. Supporters of Turkey’s membership emphasised the prospect 
of its ‘otherness’ serving as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East,116 whereas 
opponents viewed the country’s poor democratic credentials and predominantly Muslim 
society as an obstacle to integration.
117
 A key difference between the EU and Turkey’s 
standard of legitimacy can be suggested to be the following: while the former concerned 
primarily the EU’s advancement of its historically-developed human rights norms 
through peaceful means, the latter was exclusively about the maintenance of Turkey’s 
deeply entrenched state doctrines through repressive means. Notwithstanding the 
essentialism of this idea, its presence in EU-Turkey interaction makes it necessary to 
evaluate the legitimacy of EU human rights promotion from a recipient perspective. If 
Turkey has traditionally not shared in the EU’s standard of legitimacy, as claimed in pro-
EU circles, then an analysis linking the potential success of EU human rights promotion 
to wider processes in Turkish politics and society is necessary. Such an analysis points to 
political parties and civil society organisations (to a lesser degree) as key actors of ‘norm 
diffusion’ or ‘norm rejection’ in Turkey. The empirical analysis will examine the extent to 
which domestic actors embrace the EU’s human rights norms as offering gains to the 
political struggle, or reject them as entailing a loss in domestic power resources (in the 
dimensions of standards of legitimacy and political power positions). To achieve this 
purpose, the ‘standards of legitimacy’ in Turkish politics will be discussed in Chapter 
Three, and a comparison of Turkish political dynamics with the equivalent EU standards 
will be conducted in Chapter Five. 
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There is another important aspect in Turkey-EU interaction that makes necessary 
an analysis of EU normative power as viewed by the non-EU ‘other’. Several notable 
studies on Turkey as Europe’s ‘other’ have been published, including the work of 
Rumelili, Diez, and Bilgin.
118
 Rumelili’s work is most relevant to the present study, 
because she highlighted Turkey’s critical role in the shaping of Europe’s normative power 
within enlargement. Turkey occupies a critical position in the extended political, 
economic, legal, and security orders that have developed around the EU. By virtue of 
being part of the ECHR and having accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR, 
Turkey also actively shapes the EU’s human rights order with the high number of cases 
brought by Turkish citizens. In addition, Turkey as an ‘other’ has been historically 
constitutive of European identity.
119
 Thus, an analysis of Turkey-EU interaction should 
recognise that Turkey is a strong regional actor which does not necessarily perceive the 
EU as a magnet (in contrast to other countries of recent enlargement rounds). This is a 
new condition for the EU, because its ability to enforce human rights reform in Turkey 
depends not only on its procedural abilities, but on its construction of an asymmetric 
power relationship which leads Turkey to comply. Yet, Turkey’s power position and its 
strong domestic institutions mean that EU human rights promotion is applied to a novel 
locale: that of a country that is a leading regional actor and has itself historically and 
progressively shaped the conceptions of ‘normal’ inside Europe. In this setting of mutual 
identity-shaping, it is not accurate to assume that normative power manifests as an 
intrinsic property of the EU, nor that the recipient country will accept it at face value. 
Quite importantly, it needs to be recognised by Turkey and perceived as legitimate, in 
order to successfully frame human rights reform in the country. 
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Therefore, an empirical aim of this study is to address the question of whether we 
can indeed speak of a legitimate normative power Europe in the case of Turkey or not. 
This question will be analysed from two perspectives. The first is to examine the degree 
to which major political parties in Turkey perceive an ideational affinity between the 
human rights norms emanating from the EU and their domestic power positions and 
political interests. Legitimacy will also derive from their perceptions of fairness regarding 
the consistency of the EU’s human rights promotion. EU attempts to promote human 
rights may lack legitimacy with the Turkish audience insofar as the EU does not have a 
coherent human rights policy itself which binds member states, or if it is perceived to 
apply ‘double standards’ to Turkey. Here, it is assumed that suspicion and prejudice might 
play into political interests and reduce Turkey’s receptivity to the arguments of the EU as 
a norm-promoter. As Lord rightly highlighted, ‘EU policy is more likely to be seen as 
legitimate when underpinned by a we-feeling; it is we who are agreeing to act together, 
rather than they who are imposing some unwanted policy on us’.120  
 
4.3. Procedural legitimacy 
 
In the discussion of the EU’s normative power so far, the sources of legitimacy for 
human rights promotion (legality and recognition by the ‘other’) have been located 
outside EU policymaking. Nevertheless, one of the main legitimacy arguments of this 
study is that the spread of EU norms needs to be properly grounded in a set of procedural 
qualities, as explained earlier in the chapter. In this way, EU human rights promotion is 
not free-floating, but serves the more concrete purpose of assisting and managing human 
rights reform in recipient countries.
121
 In grounding the legitimacy of EU human rights 
promotion in the methods and instruments of normative power Europe, the empirical 
analysis of this study will focus on whether EU policy is capable of ‘delivering the goods’ 
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and ensuring beneficial outcomes regarding human rights change in Turkey.
122  
 
As the EU gained greater authority in human rights promotion and was 
conceptualised as a normative power, the procedural underpinnings of the legitimacy of 
human rights policy began to require further explication. The level of scrutiny of the EU 
candidates’ human rights policies from the 2004 enlargement onwards raised concerns 
about a far higher level of interventionism than ever was the case with previous 
enlargements.
123
 The bureaucratisation of EU human rights policy and the development 
of concrete human rights instruments based on material rewards gave rise to another 
requirement for legitimacy – the imperative of delivering public goods.124 Consequently, 
the research agenda on legitimacy and normative power started to focus more precisely 
on empirical cases that examined the procedural legitimacy of EU policy and 
instruments.
125
 In the procedural view, legitimate institutional activity should be 
grounded in the performance quality of the policy process. In this regard, the conception 
of legitimacy is essentially a procedural one: the legitimacy of human rights promotion 
depends not only on legal or relational grounds, but on what the development of effective 
solutions practically requires. 
  
 
Procedural legitimacy has been discussed in the literature on the methods and 
priorities of EU human rights promotion within enlargement.
126
 These analyse formal EU 
procedures and their implementation in national political systems from the conditionality 
perspective discussed earlier. The assumptions underlying legitimacy recur in several 
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analyses within the rich body of literature on EU human rights policy towards Central 
and Eastern Europe and Turkey. The focus of the discussion has been on the EU’s 
achievement of domestic human rights implementation through procedural means. Here, 
the legitimacy criteria observed are standards of appropriate institutional activity, derived 
from democratic values underlying policymaking (coherence, participation, 
accountability). In several empirical works on EU conditionality, legitimacy flows from a 
credible EU membership perspective that facilitates compliance.
127
 Many accounts of the 
policy process have emphasised procedural shortcomings, such as inconsistencies 
between internal and external EU human rights promotion, the generality and ambiguity 
of the criteria, lack of consultation with affected parties, and limited EU parliamentary 
involvement in the policy’s application (parliamentary oversight).128 In discussing the 
procedural legitimacy of EU human rights support to Turkey, a range of empirical criteria 
are used for assessment and evaluation purposes. Stemming from the earlier discussion of 
the prescriptive method of legitimacy analysis, the criteria selected for the evaluation of 
EU human rights promotion to Turkey are policy relevance, participation, and 
effectiveness, and are examined empirically in Chapter Four. 
 
 
Most important is policy relevance, which relates to policy being pertinent in a 
specific way to a particular problem or situation.
129
 The key issue here is that instruments 
of EU human rights promotion be timely and topical, demonstrating understanding of 
specific conditions and circumstances in Turkey and the likely impact of EU policies. In 
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order to fulfil this legitimacy requirement, the EU should be oriented towards making a 
contribution in those human rights areas that are particularly contentious for Turkey. For 
EU-Turkey relations, four possible mechanisms for such an approach can be identified: 
thorough background information of the human rights situation in Turkey, clear 
incorporation of insights and knowledge in document analysis of EU policy, inclusion of 
citizens and civil society groups in consultation and debate, and auditing exercises on the 
effectiveness and impact of instruments. What is implicit in the relationship between 
policy relevance and legitimacy is that the former covers all stages through which EU 
conditionality is applied, and is actively wielded in the broader politics of human rights 
promotion.
130
 
 
 
Secondly, the analysis supports a participatory orientation for the evaluation of 
procedural legitimacy. A participatory conception of legitimacy refers to the quality of 
EU policies that encourage or require participation in the process of human rights 
implementation by beneficiary groups. Participation involves formal and informal ways 
in which civil society organisations, local leaders and minority groups cooperate with 
government officials and make their values, interests and policy preferences known in a 
variety of forms.
131 
These forms consist primarily of information-sharing, dialogue and 
negotiation, and confidence-building measures. Ideally, the EU should apply information 
strategies that include publicity and education on human rights activities that reaches all 
relevant groups. It should also involve dialogue and negotiation, such as the 
commissioning of public involvement exercises on human rights issues (citizen juries, 
conferences, opinion polls, electronic interactive meetings). Moreover, the EU may also 
have to build capacity and mutual confidence. This would involve community 
development and support for relevant groups. Participation ties into discussions of 
legitimacy because it is assumed that normative power ought to be viewed as such by its 
recipients, according to the earlier legitimacy discussion. 
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Moreover, participation relates to the European Parliament and the parliamentary 
scrutiny of methods, effectiveness, and performance. According to Beetham, the most 
systematic method of oversight is by parliamentary committees, which by virtue of their 
specialist expertise track the work of individual departments, investigate aspects of their 
policy, and conduct budgetary scrutiny.
132
 For EU human rights promotion to Turkey, the 
actor under consideration is the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Possible 
mechanisms for oversight are parliamentary enquiries and regular reports that require 
justification of policy and any shortcomings. Parliamentary oversight enhances 
procedural legitimacy from an input point of view, through EU responsibility to account 
for performance of duties to those required to implement human rights rules. As such, it 
ensures satisfaction of minimal moral acceptability and comparative benefit conditions.
133
 
 
 
Thirdly, it is necessary to locate legitimacy for EU human rights promotion in 
assessments of outcomes. According to Andreassen and Sano, the chief purpose of 
outcome assessment in the area of human rights is to examine how a policy influences the 
overall human rights situation in a local or national community.
134
 The assumption is that 
human rights promotion and the relevant policies will deliver in terms of substantive 
outcomes (reduction of human rights infringements).  This creates the need for verifying 
positive impact, or documenting failures to achieve expected impact, at various points 
and dimensions of the policy cycle. The empirical part of the thesis will identify 
indicators for the relevant policy. In general terms, the main indicators are the following: 
increase in level of empowerment that citizens should possess in order to make human 
rights claims; change in conduct of state policies; improvement of institutional capacity, 
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such as strengthening of civil society organisations; and social change conducive to 
human rights norms, such as non-discrimination. The conception of legitimacy is 
necessarily also one of effectiveness: the legitimacy of human rights promotion depends 
on whether the relevant instruments demonstrate the capacity to ‘deliver the goods’ in 
terms of human rights change. 
 
 
  The indicators of procedural legitimacy – as identified for this study - are rather 
diverse, but central to its definition is the notion of sufficient EU ability to address 
structural injustices and imperfections. It is worth noting, however, that the evidence 
stemming from the analysis will not provide answers that are strictly compelling, 
documenting a specific causal pathway by which the legitimacy of EU policy affects the 
implementation of human rights in Turkey. As will be indicated in Chapters Three and 
Five, a weak implementation record by Turkey is consistent with a number of possible 
causal routes beyond the procedural capacity of the instruments: implementation can be 
obstructed strong administrative centralisation, reform fatigue, lack of sufficient 
information and communication, deficient understanding at societal level, national 
security concerns of political elites, or domestic beliefs that the fulfillment of a human 
rights-respecting system, with all that it entails, may not ultimately lead to EU 
membership. Irrespective, however, of the specific causal pathway, the thesis maintains 
that legitimacy assists human rights reform, even though its implications may not be 
independent of other auxiliary factors. It contributes to the implementation of human 
rights by promoting a more stable structure for solving human rights problems, creating 
perceptions of good practice in Turkey-EU relations, and developing shared norms on 
how to discuss human rights problems. Legitimacy would not simply give human rights 
norms the function of a social ideal; rather, it would support them as values having actual 
directive utility.  
 
 
Overall, EU human rights promotion needs to be defended not simply on broad 
moral or legal grounds, but on the grounds that there is something unique about the 
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enforcement applied by the EU and about the specific policy processes of its particular 
instruments. For this purpose, the analysis of procedural legitimacy will grow out of the 
features of EU policy. 
 
 
Constructing the analysis along an extended domain that covers the development 
of EU normative power, its procedural features, contextual factors influencing human 
rights protection in Turkey, and domestic political dilemmas of implementation, this 
study aims to provide a compelling account of the legitimacy of EU policy to Turkey in 
both its procedural and substantive strands. The analytical stance adopted in this study is 
that the legitimacy of EU human rights promotion can positively influence Turkey’s 
capacity to implement human rights conditionality. Accordingly, the thesis provides a 
twofold account of legitimacy that grows out of EU application of human rights 
promotion and Turkey’s implementation of human rights reform. Procedural legitimacy, 
studied empirically in Chapter Four, concerns the EU’s ability to shape human rights 
implementation in accordance with democratic principles of legitimate policymaking: 
policy relevance, participation, and effectiveness. Legitimacy as recognition by the 
‘other’ (substantive legitimacy), studied in Chapter Five, concerns the domestic processes 
of acceptance or rejection of the norms and policy processes of EU human rights support. 
It takes as a criterion the support and credibility that the implementing actors in Turkey 
give to EU policies and the transferred human rights norms – whether they are recognised 
as ‘lawful, exemplary, morally acceptable and appropriate’.135 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has explored the question of the EU’s normative power within 
enlargement through the concept of legitimacy for human rights promotion. It argued that 
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human rights promotion to Turkey has difficulty justifying itself on its own terms, with 
several scholars emphasising that what the EU promotes as ‘normal’ in international 
political behaviour might not be normal for everybody else. As a result, this chapter 
searched for alternative sources of legitimacy that could justify EU human rights policy 
to Turkey as an allegedly non-European ‘other’ with important human rights problems on 
the ground. The chapter rethought EU human rights promotion in relation to the 
legitimacy of normative power, and explored how this rethinking could contribute to 
improved human rights protection in Turkey. It suggested improved procedural capacity 
for EU policies, along with a redefinition of Europe’s ‘other’ along more inclusive and 
equal lines. The former credits policy relevance, participation, and effectiveness for 
enabling the assessment of legitimacy. The latter will use as a basis for evaluation the 
degree of recipient agreement with the features of the policy process and their 
responsiveness in terms of human rights reform. Each source of legitimacy draws upon a 
different understanding of human rights promotion, which signals the underlying lack of 
clarity regarding the definition and priorities of the EU’s vision of governance through 
norms. Chapter Three will continue with a detailed discussion of human rights in Turkey 
and the European Union’s involvement therein. 
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        Chapter Three 
 
 
                      Human rights reform in Turkey and the role of the European Union  
 
 
 
Having suggested an approach for the study of legitimacy for human rights 
promotion, this chapter analyses the dynamics of human rights protection in Turkey 
and the involvement of the EU. It is organised to answer the primary question asked 
for the purposes of any policy of human rights promotion: what are the main human 
rights challenges facing Turkey during its pre-accession process, and what are the 
sources of these challenges? Through mapping the post-1960 political dynamics and 
relations with the EU, it argues that human rights have been and remain an important 
area of contestation in Turkey. The conclusions reached through this discussion 
deepen our understanding of the character of those legitimacy issues facing EU 
human rights promotion to Turkey. It thereby provides us with insights into how the 
degree of legitimacy, and thereby sustainable human rights change, can be furthered 
and improved. 
 
 
 The first section provides an analysis of Turkey-EU relations and human 
rights vis-à-vis each other, and focuses on the effect that EU concerns had on the 
award of a concrete membership perspective. The second section analyses Turkey’s 
recent progress on human rights reform across six key areas: freedom of expression, 
minority rights, freedom of religion, freedom of association, women’s rights (gender 
equality), and prevention of torture. These are emphasised as areas of primary 
concern in EU progress reports and thus reflect the notion of EU normative power 
shaping partner countries according to its standard of legitimacy. It argues that recent 
human rights initiatives in Turkey show signs of adaptation to the EU’s requirements, 
but at the same time domestic politics and the weakening of Turkey’s EU 
membership prospects are likely slowing down the diffusion of European norms to 
Turkey. 
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1. Human rights in Turkey and EU involvement 
 
Human rights have occupied the agenda of EU-Turkey relations since 1959. 
Since the articulation of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), human rights as the EU’s 
standard of legitimacy have shaped government decisions and have had significant 
running impact in Turkey’s domestic political arena. As a modern and Western 
republic, Turkey became an equal member in the major international human rights 
instruments of the twentieth century, and pledged to promote human rights both at 
home and in the world. It was a founding member of the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe and a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1949).  In 1954 it became a signatory of the European Convention of Human Rights 
and in 1990 recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Since 2005, Turkey has officially been a candidate state conducting accession 
negotiations with the EU. Yet, modern Turkish history is replete with human rights 
violations, which have been criticised for their tenacity by the EU, the Council of 
Europe, and international human rights NGOs (Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch) as will be shown in this chapter. This section will examine the 
challenging processes of human rights progress in Turkey vis-à-vis the involvement 
of the European Union in promoting human rights reform. 
 
 
The standard of legitimacy in Turkish politics has been determined by what 
can be termed Kemalist ideology or ‘Kemalist orthodoxy’.  Kemalist orthodoxy has 
been developed by military and state elites on the basis of six inalienable tenets 
included in Turkey’s first constitution (1924), known as the ‘six arrows’. The 
constitutional principles of the Turkish republic are statism (state-controlled 
development), populism (achievement of social justice), revolutionism (radical and 
continuous reconstruction of the political and socio-economic system), secularism 
(subordination of religion to the state), nationalism (rejection of ethnic, cultural and 
religious diversity; full integration into the West), and republicanism (democratic 
system of government). These principles direct the so-called process of 
modernisation and Westernisation, which from an early stage encompassed every 
aspect of society and politics. Accordingly, public policy could only be regarded as 
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legitimate if it did not infringe the Kemalist principles regarding the form of the 
Turkish state and nation. 
 
 
Turkey-EU relations commenced in 1959 with Turkey’s first application for 
EEC membership by the Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DP) led by Adnan 
Menderes (1950-1960). The DP governments relaxed some of the stringent 
‘modernisation’ initiatives led by the single-party regime that had preceded them. For 
example, they promised to reduce some of the cultural restrictions against the Kurds 
and followed more liberal economic policies.
1
 However, domestic power positions 
and, in particular, the interests of the bureaucratic-military elite resisted the change 
processes induced by the DP. These changes were met with reaction by the elite, 
which had bestowed upon itself the role of safeguarding the Kemalist framework of 
legitimacy and the primacy of the state. In this sense, the DP had abused the power of 
the state and locked the country into ‘crisis’.2 These perceptions were sufficient to 
create a pretext for a military intervention, launched on 27 May 1960. The military 
coup did not draw significant EEC reaction, due to the limited importance attached to 
political factors in enlargement at the time. Still in its very early stages, the project of 
European integration had not yet matured into the direction of external human rights 
promotion. 
  
 
When military rule ended in October 1961, civilian power was restored. The 
civilian government led by İsmet İnönü developed a new constitution, adopted by 
referendum, which increased the protection of human rights and democratic 
freedoms. The political order set by the 1961 Constitution was an order which, under 
the circumstances of the time, largely conformed to the common standard of 
democracy encountered in Europe.
3
 Indeed, several scholars have referred to this 
constitution as the most liberal in the history of the republic.
4
 The Constitution of 
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1961 defined the republic as a state based on human rights and democratic freedoms, 
and attributed to the state the responsibility to uphold these rights and provide social 
welfare.
5
 Nevertheless, domestic power positions and the well-entrenched Turkish 
state doctrine remained prevalent. In a less liberal direction, the military established 
the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC, which comprised the Chief of Staff, 
select members of the Cabinet, and the President of the Republic, institutionalised 
the political role of the Turkish army as the custodian of the state. This development 
grounded human rights protection in the shadow of national security-related 
concerns, and made them amenable to periodic suspensions by military interventions 
in politics over several decades.
6
 More broadly, the diffusion of human rights norms 
emerged as closely related to domestic power and interests. 
 
 
The swift return to multi-party politics and the ‘liberal’ character of the new 
constitution were welcomed by the EEC.
7
 However, the Community did not grant 
accession status to Turkey at the time, partly due to the objections of several member 
states that Turkey’s unstable political situation did not satisfy the Birkelbach Criteria 
(1962).
8
 This is to say that human rights issues had begun to emerge as a standard of 
legitimacy within enlargement, but they had not yet been officially accepted as 
‘strings attached’ to EU accession (as discussed in Chapter One). Instead, an 
agreement for the progressive establishment of a Customs Union, known as the 
Ankara Agreement, was signed between the two parties in September 1963. The 
Ankara Agreement was more than a mere trade agreement as it foresaw eventual 
Turkish membership to the EEC in a long-term perspective.
9
 Article 28 of the 
Agreement acknowledged Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but deferred such a 
possibility to future examination by the contracting parties, certainly after the 
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completion of the Customs Union.
10
 The preamble of the Agreement declared that 
the possibility of Turkey’s accession at a ‘later date’ was dependant on efforts of 
Turkish people to improve their standard of living, and on support given by the EEC 
in that direction.
11
 Although the Agreement foresaw taking appropriate steps to 
promote and strengthen political cooperation, no reference to political criteria was 
made. The motivational force behind the Agreement was obtaining resources and 
advantages in competition. 
 
  
The reforms of the 1961 Constitution, coupled with Turkey’s industrialisation 
and the subsequent growth and politicisation of the working class turned the 1960s 
and 1970s into a period characterised by a proliferation of civic organisations, social 
mobilisation, and political polarisation.
12
 Industrialisation and subsequent civic 
activism proved to have serious political and social implications. The creation of an 
unprecedented level of labour, student, and other civic organisations challenged 
official state policies as well as the ideological positions of rival groups. These 
political/social developments reached a violent peak with frequent protests, physical 
clashes, and terrorist incidents across major urban centres. The prevailing political 
party at the time, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), which governed for most of 
this period either independently or in coalition, blamed the ‘luxuries’ of the 1961 
Constitution for the civil unrest in the country. According to Bal and Laainer, the 
1961 Constitution was blamed for liberalising political and civic life and creating 
legal grounds for the socialist movement to adopt revolutionary approaches.
13
 The 
perceived incompatibility of the 1961 Constitution with entrenched norms invoked 
the resistance of the military establishment, which acted to overcome the resistance 
of opposing interests. The 1971 military intervention ousted the elected government 
and replaced it with a handpicked civilian government (‘coup by memorandum’). 
The military-backed government removed those constitutional ‘luxuries’ by 
introducing extensive amendments, which reversed human rights safeguards and 
demonstrated the lack of durability of human rights adoption in Turkey’s domestic 
context. 
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The constitution of Turkey was amended without public discussion in a less 
democratic direction in 1971 and 1973. In the words of Hershlag, the 1971 
Constitution turned Turkey into a ‘guided democracy’.14 The amendments removed 
the rights and freedoms of the previous constitution and prioritised security and order 
over democratic reform. The architects of the new constitution increased military 
control over Turkey’s political life by subjugating civilian power to the authority of 
the armed forces.
15
 Citizen duties towards the state began to be emphasised more 
than individual rights.
16
 The Turkish military attempted to legitimate the 
government’s systematic programme of repression to the EEC. They claimed that it 
was safeguarding Turkey’s Westernisation project for the future and that the 
aforementioned constitutional amendments already existed in the constitutions of 
France, West Germany, and Italy.
17
 Nevertheless, the 1971 military intervention and 
the subsequent picture of Turkish politics attracted certain criticism from the EEC. 
Bilateral economic assistance was suspended by several member states, and calls for 
return to democracy echoed across Europe, but hardly in an official, consistent 
manner.
18
 Yet, in January 1973 the Additional Protocol of the EEC-Turkey Ankara 
Agreement entered into force, comprehensively setting out how the Customs Union 
would be established. As a result, military rule and suppression of human rights in 
Turkey did not have great political or economic costs for Turkey-EEC relations.
19
 
 
 
The return of the country to electoral politics and full civilian rule in 1973 
was not sufficient to ensure the political and administrative changes that the 
circumstances of the time needed. Political violence again became common amongst 
ideologically opposing groups and incidents of political violence continued to be 
widespread, perpetuating further state repression. The involvement of the extreme-
right Nationalist Action Party in the coalition governments of the 1970s did nothing 
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to ease radicalisation, primarily in the labour movement and in higher education.
20
 
The Turkish Parliament was stalemated. In parallel, the country’s economic situation 
deteriorated, party as the result of an embargo by the United States. The chaos of the 
1970s ended with a decisive military intervention on 12 September 1980, which 
established a new political era and long-term challenges to the protection of human 
rights in Turkey. 
  
 
The 1980 coup firmly established its own framework for what it considered 
legitimate behaviour and legitimate demands in the Turkish political sphere. It did 
this by institutionalising a ‘de-politicisation’ of society and by regulating state 
repression against political and civic programmes that were not considered desirable 
or permissible. In this regard, the 1980 military coup launched a systematic 
programme of repression that exceeded that of 1960 and 1971.
21
 According to 
Barkey, the 1980 military intervention was different than previous ones ‘in that it was 
an attempt by the military to shore up the defenses of what it perceived to be a 
weakened state under assault by Leftists, Islamists, and Kurds by returning to the 
ideological precepts of the Kemalist era’.22 With the politicisation of society 
presented as a national security threat, serious violations of human rights followed.
23 
The military government initiated a ‘democracy without freedoms’ involving a 
widespread, coercive and effective de-politicisation for society. In the aftermath of 
the coup, political parties were banned, political organisations and labour unions 
were closed, and their leaders were either imprisoned or forced into exile. In 1982, a 
new constitution was devised which listed human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while simultaneously outlining the conditions under which these could be curbed. 
Strict limits to individual rights were codified into law, the role of the NSC was 
enhanced, and Kemalist orthodoxy was reinvigorated and allocated strong 
legitimacy. 
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The 1982 Constitution severely restricted the scope of human rights 
protection in Turkey, and provided a strong reference framework for evaluating the 
legitimacy of domestic human rights aims. It forbade political associations of youth, 
women, religious and linguistic groups, where ‘association’ was defined as a group 
of two or more people gathering under a common aim. This measure reduced the 
relevance and freedom of citizen action in Turkey. In a similar vein, restrictions to 
freedom of expression were stringent, primarily directed at publications causing 
‘offences against the state’, a vaguely defined offence that included any type of 
political expression. A large number of codes regarding political life were declared to 
be exempt from judicial review by the Constitutional Court. The military’s already 
predominant position in Turkish politics was strengthened to influencing or dictating 
government policy in order to protect the state from internal subversions. 
Accordingly, the Constitution, which has been argued to have created a ‘censored 
democracy’, strengthened the powers of the centralised state and military while 
stifling democratic freedoms.
24
 The 1982 Constitution has since been considered a 
liability for the protection of democracy and human rights in Turkey, with its 
constraining effects continuing to the present time.
25
 Transition to civilian rule 
occurred in 1983. However, continuation of military control was secured through a 
‘two-party system’ established by the regime, and by the appointment of the leader of 
the coup, Kenan Evren, as the new President of the republic. 
 
 
The EEC initially did not effectively oppose the regression of the democratic 
regime in Turkey, and its reaction has been described as ‘mild’.26 After the 1980 
military coup, neither the European Commission nor the European Council made any 
substantial step to ensure the protection of the constitution (as amended in 1973) and 
the supremacy of the rule of law. After the military coup, the Council of Ministers 
declared on 15 September 1980 that the EEC would continue its cooperation with 
Turkey.
27
 The European Parliament, however, took a firmer position against 
                                                 
24
 Elver, H. ‘Gender Equality from a Constitutional Perspective: the Case of Turkey’. In The Gender 
of Constitutional Jurisprudence, ed, by B. Baines and R. Rubio-Marin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) p.301 (278-305). 
25
 Gönenc, L. ‘The 2001 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey’. Ankara Law Review, vol.1 
no: 1 (2004) p.108 (89-109); Özbudun, E. ‘Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004’. Turkish 
Studies, vol.8 no: 2 (2007) p.192 (179-196) 
26
 Pevehouse, Democratization, p.143. 
27
 Council of Ministers. ‘Joint Stament on the Situation in Turkey’ (15 September 1980) 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/5582/1/002280_1.pdf> (accessed 29 September 2011) 
131 
 
 
violations of human rights, and strongly asserted the need for their protection. 
Following a request made by the EP to the Council and the Commission to suspend 
the Ankara Agreement, relations became formally frozen for six years on 22 January 
1982. The European Parliament proceeded to suspend the duties of the EU-Turkey 
Joint Parliamentary Committee until general elections were held in Turkey and a 
parliament was formed in 1983. Throughout the 1980s, the EP published numerous 
critical resolutions on the human rights situation in Turkey, despite Turkey’s return to 
electoral politics in 1982.
28
 According to Hale, the EEC progressively became the 
most vociferous international objector to Turkey’s situation, surpassing the milder 
objections voiced by the United States.
29
 That said, it can be suggested that the EP-
Turkey interaction in the aftermath of the 1980 coup clearly revealed the opposing 
standard of legitimacy between the two actors. The EP projected a standard based on 
the constitutive norms and values of Europe’s emerging normative power, whereas 
Turkey provided a different and competing reference framework based on a stringent 
and exclusionary interpretation of Kemalist orthodoxy. 
 
  
Turkey reapplied for EEC membership on 14 April 1987. According to Usul, 
this was a historical point for human rights in Turkey: domestic actors now moved 
into the sphere of European norms and strategic influence, and became susceptible to 
European external constraints on their political programme.
30
 In this vein, Turkey’s 
application for EU membership subjected national policy-making to the EEC’s 
judgment on the country’s commitment to democratic governance and the protection 
of human rights. The EU accession negotiations would now determine which 
political programmes would be desirable and permissible, and what type of 
behaviour and demands could be considered legitimate in the political sphere. In 
turn, EU negotiations, norms and constraints could play into domestic conflicts and 
be utilised by political actors to support or contest the obstacles imposed on human 
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rights protection by the Kemalist framework of legitimacy. For instance, EU 
negotiations offered new opportunities to disadvantaged actors with limited domestic 
power to exercise their agenda (e.g. pro-Islamic parties, human rights NGOs), as will 
be shown in Chapter Five. Conversely, the negotiations were met with some 
resistance by the military and political elites that defended Kemalist orthodoxy and 
their power position against the ‘alternative legitimacy framework’ imposed by the 
EU. Therefore, Turkey’s application for membership would introduce processes of 
change within state and society, and the norm diffusion process induced by the EU 
would interact strongly with domestic power positions and political cleavages. 
 
 
In the light of securing EU membership, the Turkish governments in the 
1980s made some effort to engage with concerns about human rights in an organised 
way.
31
  In an attempt to persuade European counterparts that Turkey was committed 
to aligning its human rights protection to international standards, Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal (Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party) recognised the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in 1987. Moreover, he 
conducted official visits to Brussels, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and 
announced a series of legal reforms, including the establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission within the Turkish Parliament.
32
 Contrary to expectations, on 20 
December 1989 the European Commission recommended not entering into 
negotiations with Turkey, and declined to tie itself to any accession timeframe. The 
reasons for rejection put forward by the Commission were economic, democratic and 
human rights reasons.
33
 Regarding Turkey’s human rights situation, the 
Commission’s Opinion stated that ‘although there have been developments in recent 
years in the human rights situation and in respect for the identity of minorities, these 
have not yet reached the level required in a democracy’.34 According to the EEC 
perspective, candidate status was now conditional on democracy, human rights and 
peaceful conflict management, and Turkey had to conform to these political norms in 
full, rather than conduct a limited number of prior reforms. 
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The 1990s were a period of political transformation for EU-Turkey relations, 
which largely determined the framework for how EU norm diffusion would 
heretofore interact with domestic interests and power positions. As discussed in 
Chapter One, in the 1990s the EU became a stringent promoter of human rights in 
enlargement. This development was precipitated by the end of the Cold War, the 
advancements in EU law, the establishment of the European Union (1992), the 
articulation of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), and human rights as an essential 
element in external relations. The formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria was a 
defining moment for the development of Turkey-EU relations, as it transformed the 
‘classical Community method’ of EU enlargement to a professionalised human rights 
strategy. The EU’s rationale behind enlargement had taken a different turn from that 
of the seventies and eighties, with primacy of political considerations over economic 
ones in determining further expansion.
35
 Thus, the Copenhagen Criteria began to 
function as a critical transmitter of the EU’s standard of legitimacy by promoting 
democracy and human rights through material instruments (conditionality) and 
socialisation efforts.
36
 In this new environment, the Turkish state’s rigid attitude 
towards human rights reform was challenged by direct contact with more flexible 
and pluralistic European norms, as these were incorporated in the Copenhagen 
Criteria.
37
  
 
 
An analysis which links EU accession negotiations to processes in Turkey 
should consider the wider challenges in Turkish politics and society in the 1990s, and 
their implications for the diffusion of human rights norms by political actors. During 
the 1990s, the Kemalist orthodoxy was subjected to a set of severe challenges with 
the rise of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.
38
 The exacerbation of these 
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political phenomena meant that governments and military became key actors for 
‘norm rejection’, rather than norm diffusion. Turkish politics witnessed threats to the 
principles of secularism and national homogeneity on which the Turkish state was 
founded, and employed national security as a justification for repressive methods that 
undermined human rights. The ensuing human rights violations were conducted 
under the rubric of protection of national security, in accordance with the 1982 
Constitution that pledged the suspension of human rights protection when state 
security was threatened.  
 
 
Various authors concur that Kurdish nationalism in the form of the armed 
struggle of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) played 
a crucial role in the implementation of public security policies that suppressed human 
rights.
39
 The reaction of the state to even the mildest displays of Kurdish support 
amongst Turkish society was oppressive and authoritarian. Brutal punitive security 
operations, marked by allegations of torture, extrajudicial execution, and the burning 
of villages, were carried out in the name of state security. Death in police detention 
persisted because the governments failed to take the key steps to combat torture.
40
 
Journalists, writers, parliamentarians, trade unionists, human rights defenders and 
political parties were prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned because of their public 
statements or writings.
41
 Weak commitment to human rights norms at state level was 
also demonstrated by lack of compliance with international obligations and the 
disregard of legal provisions that had been in place for decades. National security 
was left at the discretion of the security forces, which treated international human 
rights law and domestic Turkish law with equal disdain, despite strong condemnation 
by the EU and the EP in particular.
 42
  
 
 
Human rights infringements in the 1990s were also justified through claims in 
political discourse about Turkey’s ‘uniqueness’, which prevented it from fully 
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endorsing the validity of EU-induced human rights norms. According to Bilgin, the 
perception of ‘uniqueness’ was formulated in terms of Turkey’s so-called 
‘geographical determinism’ and ‘fear of loss of territory’, both of which implied that 
Turkey had unique political and security-related interests and needs that did not 
allow for substantial democratisation and human rights protection.
43
 ‘Fear of loss of 
territory’ arguments maintained that respect for human rights would obstruct the 
effort to combat armed Kurdish opposition, and that no priority should be given to 
human rights in an alleged period of war and disorder. ‘Geographical determinism’ 
claims suggested that Turkey’s geographical location in a region of uncertainty and 
instability (neighbouring Iraq is also home to Kurdish population) forced Turkey to 
be cautious, not to invite political processes that would result in reshaping its security 
policies. Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey from 1998 to 2002, declared that 
‘Turkey’s special geopolitical conditions require a special type of democracy’.44 
Thus, invoking norms of national security was utilised to resist the opposing 
framework of legitimacy emanating from EU-level and the political 
institutionalisation of its normative framework (human rights, democracy, and rule of 
law).  
 
  
Moreover, lack of human rights reform in the 1990s was justified through 
arguments that externally-induced human rights protection violated Turkey’s national 
sovereignty.
45
 Generally, there was a certain degree of suspicion towards human 
rights promotion by international organisations active in Turkey. The idea of an 
international NGO, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, 
campaigning in Turkey and trying to persuade government and public of the urgent 
need for human rights protection for all people, was perceived by various 
governments as intervention in domestic affairs. Framing international concern as 
interference in domestic affairs also occurred directly in relation to the European 
Union, despite Turkey’s ongoing process of integration into the EU. For instance, in 
December 1998 the European Parliament published a detailed resolution identifying 
the Kurdish issue as a significant impediment to human rights protection in the 
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country, and called for multi-party dialogue, respect for freedom of expression, 
cultural rights, and respect of the right to life.
46
 The resolution was met with harsh 
criticism in Turkey. The NSC and other authorities strongly opposed it. Concerning 
the proposal, President Süleyman Demirel declared, ‘Turkey cannot accept any 
intervention to its sovereignty, its indivisible integrity, and any decision on its 
domestic affairs... Let the EU be theirs. This is a direct interference in the domestic 
affairs of Turkey.’47 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the EP’s attitude as 
‘irresponsible’.48 This occurrence is indicative of Turkey having its own (more or 
less dominant) normative framework for what was considered legitimate behaviour 
in the area of human rights promotion and protection. Accordingly, domestic political 
actors confronted EU requirements as interference with their domestic standard of 
legitimate political behaviour, despite there being no strictly ‘domestic’ affair in a 
country that is a potential EU candidate state. 
 
 
Despite external constraints, throughout the 1990s Turkey continued to 
pursue EU membership, and the political reform process began to acquire its own 
domestic dynamic.
49
 As Kalaycıoğlu highlighted, the process of Turkey’s EU 
integration forced human rights into a more visible position on the country’s political 
agenda.
50
 Some institutional adjustments occurred that were favourable to human 
rights, such as a Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights (1990) and a state 
ministry responsible for human rights issues (1991). Following these policy 
measures, in June 1990 the EU Commission presented a package of political, 
economic and trade measures – the so-called Matutes package – designed to 
revitalise EU-Turkey relations and strengthen political ties.
51
 From 1993 onwards 
Turkish governments made various depositions of commitment to adapt the political 
regime of the country to the Copenhagen Criteria before starting accession 
negotiations. The Customs Union Agreement (1995) provided a new incentive for the 
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Turkish government to undertake new political and economic reforms, and a series of 
constitutional amendments were motioned and successfully carried through in 1995. 
The coalition government of Tansu Çiller (Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party) put 
forward constitutional reform in 1995 by adopting amendments to fourteen articles of 
the 1982 Constitution. The most important change in the area of human rights was 
the amendment of the Anti-Terror Law. Previously, the Anti-Terror Law forbade any 
expression that sought to ‘change the character of the state’ and was practised widely 
in the persecution of Kurdish nationalism. The government also declared its 
readiness to collaborate with the EU and international human rights bodies.
52 
However, at the same time it did not provide a detailed basis for freedom and 
autonomy upon which all levels of society could determine their life free from state 
domination.
53
  
 
 
Such progress on the implementation of reforms did not satisfy EU 
expectations. The award of new powers to the European Parliament by the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) made EU membership candidacy dependent on an EP vote, 
and human rights thus became an even more thorny issue in Turkey-EU relations. An 
EP resolution of 9 September 1996 called on the Commission ‘to block, with 
immediate effect, all appropriations set aside under the MEDA programme for 
projects in Turkey, except those concerning the promotion of democracy, human 
rights and civil society’.54 This suspension of financial aid was primarily motivated 
by the human rights situation in Turkey. Furthermore, in its first progress report on 
Turkey in 1998, the European Commission pronounced that reforms were only partly 
reflected in Turkey’s secondary legislation, and criticised the lack of political will for 
implementation.
55
 The report acknowledged the Turkish government’s ‘commitment’ 
to combating human rights violations, but stressed that there had been no significant 
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effect in practice.
56
 The report highlighted many continuing violations in Turkey, 
such as torture and forced disappearances, lack of freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly, the status of women, and the death penalty. 
 
 
With these problems, human rights remained repressed since the 1980 
military coup and constituted a major problem for Turkey’s EU integration process.57 
The Luxembourg European Council on 12-13 December 1997 (which launched the 
accession process of the CEE countries) decided not to award official candidate 
status to Turkey but only eligibility for candidacy. According to the Conclusions of 
the Presidency, ‘the political and economic conditions allowing accession 
negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied’.58 This decision was a bitter pill to 
swallow for Turkey’s policymakers and public. After the summit, Turkish Prime 
Minister Mesut Yilmaz announced the interruption of political dialogue with the 
European Union and rejection of all political conditions, although the meetings of the 
EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee remained uninterrupted. The daily 
Hürriyet revealed that the right wing of the government coalition would harden the 
position of Ankara against the EU.
59
 An uncommon voice of self-criticism came from 
a well-known journalist of the left, Ali Sirmen, who wrote that ‘we accuse the 
Europeans... without asking ourselves: what have we done to deserve Europe in 
terms of human rights and economic stabilisation?’60 
 
 
The relations between the EU and Turkey re-gained their momentum with the 
decision of the Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999) to award Turkey 
official candidacy. The Presidency Conclusions stated that ‘Turkey is a candidate 
state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the 
other candidate states’, with the financial advantages that the pre-accession period 
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involves, but without a fixed date for the opening of negotiations.
61
 The award of 
candidacy occurred despite the EU Progress Report of October 1999 where the 
Commission used strong language, stating that the violent abuse of human rights 
occurring in Turkey was ‘inadmissible and under no circumstances tolerable’.62 The 
1999 report concluded that although the basic features of a democratic system 
existed in Turkey, it still did not meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Nevertheless, the 
1999 decision of the European Council at Helsinki to award official EU candidacy to 
Turkey was significant. It firmly established the possibility of the country becoming 
a member of the European Union, thus rendering democratisation a focal point in 
Turkish politics and providing a stronger incentive for human rights reform. As Öniş 
observed, a firm membership perspective after years of uncertainty generated ‘a new 
wave of optimism concerning the future course of democratisation and economic 
reforms in Turkey’.63 According to Human Rights Watch, EU candidacy ‘proved an 
unparalleled opportunity for domestic and international pressure for positive 
change’.64 The broadening from 1999 onwards of Turkey’s agenda for human rights 
took place against the backdrop of an increasing EU membership prospect and strong 
public support for reform. 
 
 
Overall, in the 1990s there was little progress in implementing and 
internalising the human rights norms emanating from the European level. This 
situation was characterised by instrumental adoption of legal reforms to satisfy the 
immediate demands of the EU and a domestic political perception that European 
demands were incongruent with Turkish realities. On the positive side, the initial 
steps of simply ‘accommodating’ human rights created a precedent for the present-
day human rights awakening in Turkey, both by segments of the political 
establishment and by societal actors. Currently there appears to be acceptance of 
practices that would probably have been regarded as intolerable in the 1990s, such as 
citizens questioning the genuineness of the military’s commitment to modernisation 
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in the national media (among many other examples).
65
 The current development of 
an independent base of legitimacy for human rights is largely a legacy of intense 
human rights struggles between 1980-1999 on how to incorporate human rights into 
Turkey’s political agenda. The EU’s concrete membership perspective offered 
Turkey political, economic, and social incentives for human rights reform. The 2002 
Copenhagen decision granted October 2004 as a conditional date for the beginning of 
negotiations. 
  
 
In 2002 a pro-Islamic and pro-EU party, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) won the parliamentary majority in a wave of 
popular support. The AKP pronounced a pro-EU stance and declared its commitment 
to human rights and democratisation reforms in compliance with EU requirements. 
Accordingly, the new government framed its programme of human rights reform 
within the legitimacy framework of the EU. Despite being founded on Islamist roots, 
the AKP made no attempt to construct its own standard of legitimacy based on pro-
Islamic values. Instead, it interpreted the EU-induced human rights norms as 
compatible with and even fostering religious freedom, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. The endorsement of the EU’s standard of legitimacy would make it 
possible for the AKP to pursue some of its core policy aims, such as reconciliation of 
Islam and democracy, subordination of the role of the military in political life to 
civilian control, and sustained economic development. Given the gains that EU 
policies would bring to the domestic arena, the AKP appeared determined to promote 
reforms even in the absence of tangible rewards from the EU. This was indicated in 
the Prime Minister’s statement that the Copenhagen Criteria would be interpreted 
and adopted in the Turkish context as ‘Ankara criteria’.66  
 
 
In 2002-2005, following the granting of official candidacy status and strong 
public support for EU membership, the AKP launched an unprecedented reform 
process. The reform packages of 2002-2005 covered a wide range of human rights 
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issues. The Turkish Parliament adopted a new Civil Code and amended several 
constitutional provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
gender equality, prevention of torture, and children’s rights. With a constitutional 
change, the State Security Courts that had military members were abolished in 2004 
and all criminal cases, including those related with the security of the republic and 
terrorism, were transferred to the Criminal Court. The death penalty was also 
abolished. The position of minorities was improved through a guarantee of the right 
to property for non-Muslim community foundations, and the right for public media to 
broadcast in Kurdish (with several restrictions). Emergency rule in South-East 
regions, where the majority of the population was Kurdish-speaking, was put to an 
end. In its October 2004 Progress Report, the European Commission gave the green 
light for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.
67
 These human rights 
reforms, along with other political and economic reforms, led to the decision of the 
Council of Ministers to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 
2005.
68
  
 
 
This section has offered an overview of Turkey’s human rights situation since 
the 1950s with reference to the European Union’s involvement therein. EU leverage 
served to accelerate the reform process in Turkey, and generated an enabling 
environment which permitted previously peripheral social groups to reformulate their 
demands from a human rights perspective. At the same time, the reform process 
became seriously challenged by an impasse in Turkey-EU relations that followed a 
period of substantial reforms (2002-2005), which will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Five. This impasse has been punctuated by growing alienation between 
Turkey’s political elites and core EU members as a result of a number of stumbling 
blocks, including human rights issues. The following section will analyse human 
rights issues across six key dimensions that are regularly emphasised in EU progress 
reports: freedom of expression, linguistic human rights, freedom of religion, freedom 
of association, women’s rights (gender equality), and prevention of torture. 
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2. Human rights reforms and the EU ‘standard of legitimacy’ 
  
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Europe has 
constantly been a point of reference for Turkey’s process of Westernisation. Norms 
regarding the organisation of political, social, economic, and cultural life in Turkey 
have been largely directed and articulated according to common European standardsö 
as mentioned earlier. Following the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy status in 1999, 
the process of Europeanisation acquired new momentum with the EU promotion of 
an impressive raft of human rights and democratisation reforms. According to 
Rumelili, the EU accession process, particularly through its societal enabling 
impacts, functions as a critical transmitter of a European standard of legitimacy.
69
 By 
accepting the EU’s standard of legitimacy in the area of human rights, Turkey has 
been induced to pursue reform in sensitive areas such as minority rights and freedom 
of expression. At the same time, there is common agreement amongst scholars and 
policymakers alike that Turkey’s momentum of human rights reform has decelerated 
considerably since 2005, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, the EU 
continues to apply its human rights instruments to Turkey consistently, and adoption 
of European norms as a precondition for entering the club retains its importance.  
 
 
When consideration is given to Turkey’s human rights progress, one can note 
considerable advances compared to the troubled 1980-1999 era. The EU’s annual 
progress reports, which are based on information provided by local and international 
human rights NGOs, confirm slow but steady progress on sensitive issues of human 
and minority rights. Yet, several of the biggest barriers that are thought to exist in the 
contentious fields of freedom of expression, minority rights, freedom of religion, 
freedom of association, prevention of torture and women’s rights, remain to be 
addressed. This section details the steps in Turkey’s process of human rights reform 
with the aim to provide examples of norm diffusion to Turkey. These rights constitute 
an important part of the European normative framework, and Turkey is expected to 
share in these values by adopting EU-induced political reform. At the same time, it is 
these aspects of human rights requirements that meet with strong domestic dynamics 
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of adaptation and contestation in Turkey, as they invoke both enabling and 
debilitating impact to society, the maintenance of Kemalist orthodoxy, and the 
historical identity of the state. The main sources utilised for the outline of Turkey’s 
human rights reforms are the EU’s annual progress reports, especially the most recent 
reports of 2012 and 2013. 
 
 
2.1.        Freedom of expression 
 
   According to EU progress reports, the discussion of freedom of expression 
for Turkey centres on three main areas: freedom of the media, the legal framework 
on terrorism, and citizens’ right of access to information. Another issue repeatedly 
stressed by the European Commission has been the wording of Article 301 of the 
Penal Code, which rules that the denigration of Turkish identity and state institutions 
is a punishable offence. The European Union has repeatedly stressed freedom of 
expression as an area of serious concern, and both the European Commission and 
European Parliament have emphasised the need for revision of the Penal Code, Anti-
Terror Law, and Law on the Internet to permit significant improvement in the above 
area.
70
 
 
As regards freedom of the media, the news media in Turkey has been 
subjected to frequent and numerous restraints and repression. Although freedom of 
the press is not completely absent, it is restricted in practice and constitutes one of 
the longest-standing human rights issues in the country.
71
 The tendency to imprison 
journalists, media workers, and distributors with long pre-trial detention periods for 
debating topics perceived as sensitive continues at the time of writing. Contentious 
topics primarily relate to the Kurdish issue and discussion of terrorism, and more 
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limitedly to the Armenian genocide and the role of the military in Turkish political 
life. Such constraints frequently lead to a common phenomenon of self-censorship in 
the Turkish media. In 2013, for example, important domestic events such as 
bombings on Turkish-Syrian border and police brutality during the Gezi park protests 
were met with silence by many national media outlets. Lack of press freedom is 
inextricably linked to the legal framework on terrorism and organised crime. This 
legal framework is imprecise and open to conflicting interpretations by the courts, 
prosecutors, and security officers, leading to abuses. As regards Article 301 of the 
Penal Code, this was amended in 2008 after repeated pressure by the EU, by 
requiring permission from the Ministry of Justice to launch a prosecution. This 
measure resulted in a reduction of the number of prosecutions. However, the article 
remains in the Penal Code, prompting the EU to demand its complete removal. 
 
 
In terms of citizens’ right of access to information, frequent website bans 
according to the Law on the Internet have restricted the right to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authorities. In 2013, the 
aforementioned Turkish media blackout on the Gezi Park protests rendered the usage 
of social networking site Twitter the primary source of public information. In 
response, the government criticised social networking for being a danger for society 
at large, authorised police detentions of protesters sending Twitter messages 
(‘tweets’), and set in motion Parliament proposals on how to monitor the legality of 
‘tweets’.72 Furthermore, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) issued 
warnings to a number of television stations which eventually transmitted live 
coverage of the Gezi Park protests on the basis that they were violating the principle 
of objective broadcasting and fined them for inciting violence. According to the 2013 
Progress Report, this measure limited freedom of expression unduly and restricted 
citizens’ right of access to information.73 
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2.2.    Minority rights 
 
  The EU’s internal legal framework does not provide an established norm of 
protection in the area of minority rights. References to minority rights in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the Lisbon Treaty stem from a strong principle of non-
discrimination, which is based on the key objectives of economic integration and 
freedom of movement. As Cengiz and Hoffmann highlighted, the obligation of EU 
members to respect minority rights is negative (refraining from discrimination on the 
basis of nationality) rather than positive (promoting minority and cultural rights).
74
 
Regardless of the negative character of the EU standard, accession states are required 
to actively promote and protect the cultural and linguistic rights of their minorities. 
According to the European Commission’s Directorate-General on Employment, 
‘minority’ is defined as a group having stable ethnic, linguistic or religious 
characteristics that are different from the rest of the population, as well as a 
numerical minority position and the wish to preserve its own separate identity.
75
 
 
 
Minority rights for Turkey refer to the freedom of members of ethnic and 
religious minorities to be educated in their own language, publicly use their 
language, and practice their religion without restrictions by the state. It is worth 
noting that apart from the non-Muslim minorities recognised under the Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923), the Turkish authorities consider Turkish citizens as individuals 
with equal rights rather than belonging to the majority or a minority. The EU, 
however, emphasises that this approach should not prevent Turkey from granting 
specific rights to certain citizens in line with European standards, on the basis of 
ethnic origin, religion or language, so that their identity can be preserved. To this 
effect, Turkey is a signatory to international conventions such as the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding the Rights of 
Minorities, and to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
regarding the Right to Education. Nevertheless, it has not signed the CoE Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities nor the Charter for Regional 
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and Minority Languages. The issue of minority rights in Turkey is related both to 
minorities recognised by Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne (non-Muslim 
minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) and to minorities not legally 
recognised as such, such as the Kurdish-speaking population. 
  
 
The rights of recognised (non-Muslim) minorities have traditionally been 
limited in Turkey, a state which did not encourage social diversity due to the uniform 
vision of the republican establishment.
76
 Perceived as ‘domestic foreigners’, their 
situation has been frequently linked to Turkey’s foreign relations.77 Since 1999, 
Turkey’s EU membership prospect has paved the way to promoting non-Muslim 
minority rights in three types of legislation, namely freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion, and the status of minority foundations. Non-Muslim minorities are 
currently allowed to be educated in minority schools and receive official graduation 
certificates if they are Turkish citizens. Minority newspapers are enabled to run and 
publish official announcements, and the Law on Radio and Television Channels has 
been amended through various harmonisation packages to allow broadcasting in 
minority languages and dialects. Furthermore, the Law on Foundations has been 
amended to permit non-Muslim foundations to acquire property, and some seized 
properties have been returned under conditions. In preparation for the new 
constitution in 2012, recognised minorities were allowed to be present in Parliament 
to present their views for the first time. Some limitations are encountered by the 
Greek minority in terms of access to education, especially concerning the closure of 
the Halki Theological School. Moreover, there is no legal framework that addresses 
discrimination issues, and non-Muslim communities continue to lack legal 
personality. Rhetoric against minorities is present in several compulsory schoolbooks 
and in the mainstream media. Despite shortcomings, Turkey’s EU membership 
process has improved dialogue on the rights of recognised minorities in an 
unprecedented way, and the implementation of legislative changes, though slow, is 
uninterrupted.
78
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  The issue of minority rights for non-recognised minorities primarily relates 
to the discord over the Kurdish language, which is strongly affected by the long-
standing Kurdish political issue in Turkey. From a legal perspective, the fundamental 
issue is that following the emergence of the republic, Turkey’s constitutional regime 
created a unified nation on the basis of Turkish identity. The purpose was to reject 
other cultural identities that could cause foreign interference in the affairs of the state 
and lead to its subsequent disintegration. According to this approach, there was no 
‘Kurdish issue’ in Turkey, only a problem of terror.79 In addition to this legal 
rejection, the armed conflict between the Turkish military forces and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in the predominantly Kurdish-populated south-east Turkey 
rendered the Kurdish issue multidimensional: on the one hand, there is a strong 
human rights dimension due to the disproportionate use of force by the state 
particularly under the emergency rule and the Anti-Terror Act; and on the other hand, 
there are significant socio-economical implications caused by state-induced internal 
displacement.
80
 In addition, the existence of a Kurdish ethnic group was denied for a 
long time and the Kurdish language was prohibited in education, publication, and 
public (official) use. 
  
 
It is against this background that EU-induced reforms in the area of minority 
rights ought to be discussed. EU human rights promotion to Turkey has frequently 
placed the Kurdish issue at the core of Turkey’s obligation for political reform. The 
European Commission’s very first progress report on Turkey (1998), for instance, 
placed the Kurdish issue at the centre of the entire assessment of compliance with the 
Copenhagen political criteria. The report considered the state’s military approach to 
be keeping the status of human rights in Turkey hostage to national security 
considerations, and attributed the country’s general non-compliance with the human 
rights criteria to the effects of the Kurdish issue.
81
 In addition, the EU pushed for the 
advancement of Kurdish ‘cultural rights’ through the prism of equality and non-
discrimination, which had the positive effect of de-securitising the issue. This 
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prevented the EU’s demands from playing into the hands of those accusing the 
organisation of only wanting to weaken Turkey’s territorial integrity.82 Since 1999, 
there has been progress of reforms in favour of Kurdish rights in Turkey,
83
 which will 
be outlined below.  
 
 
Since Turkey became a candidate state for EU membership, the usage of 
Kurdish language has been re-framed as a human right for the natural expression of a 
national identity. Politically, reforms in areas of direct impact on the Kurdish issue 
changed the context in which Kurdish cultural/linguistic rights were viewed by key 
actors. Some of the reforms that had bearing on the Kurdish issue included freedom 
of expression and association, the abolishment of state security courts, and the 
reduction of the role of the military in Turkish politics. As Larrabee and Töl argued, 
‘the strengthening of civilian control over the military in Turkey in recent years has 
made it easier for Ankara to change its approach to the Kurdish issue’.84 
Consequently, several noticeable reforms have been implemented as part of Turkey’s 
accession process. The ban on broadcasting in Kurdish has been lifted, and Kurdish 
has been partially introduced into the national curriculum of private schools. There 
are currently fewer restrictions to the use of Kurdish in courts and prisons. The 
South-East Anatolia Project has aimed to improve socio-economic development in 
the primarily Kurdish-populated region. The AKP government’s engagement with 
Kurdish issues through peace talks and democratisation packages has opened up 
space for political and media debate on Kurdish rights in an unprecedented way. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Turkey’s general approach to Kurdish rights has 
been subjected to significant fluctuations in the last decade, and remains restrictive. 
Legislation still prohibits the public use of languages other than Turkish, including 
the Constitution and the Law on Political Parties. There is no provision for public 
services in Kurdish or for Kurdish education in public schools. Although the 
Kurdish-related Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) has 
demanded a definition of citizenship without ethnic references, no action has been 
taken in this area. More significantly, arrests of BDP-affiliated Kurdish politicians, 
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activists, and local mayors on suspicion of terrorism continue. Kurdish journalists 
continue to be detained under Article 314 of the Penal Code on membership in an 
armed organisation.
85
 Overall, the expression of Kurdish identity has gained 
noticeable ground since the 1990s, but the protection of civil liberties is not currently 
in pace. 
 
 
2.3.      Freedom of association 
 
The development of human rights protection in Turkey has been inhibited by 
the constraints placed by the state on freedom of association. Civil society is still not 
widely considered by those traditionally involved in politics as a legitimate 
stakeholder in Turkish democracy.
86
 The development of civil society and human 
rights activism in Turkey, since the quest for EEC/EU membership began, can be 
briefly examined within three historical periods: 1960-1980, 1980-1999, and post-
1999.
87
 For the purpose of this analysis, the following definition of civil society is 
adopted, as put forward by Diamond: ‘civil society is the realm of organised social 
life that is voluntary, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound 
by a legal order or a set of shared values’.88  
 
 
The first period, 1960-1980, was characterised by strong state influence and 
oversight over associational freedom which hampered the functioning of civil society 
organisations.
89
 Initially, the Constitution of 1961 provided the legal framework for 
the development of associational activity.
90
 It widened fundamental rights and 
freedoms and introduced social rights, such as the right to form associations without 
prior permission. This transformation was disrupted by the ideological polarisation of 
the 1960s and 1970s, which divided organisations into opposing political camps that 
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simultaneously clashed with the state.
91
 As discussed earlier, a series of military 
coups suspended democratic life (1960, 1971 memorandum, and 1980). The 
suspension of democratic life not only disrupted the multi-party parliamentary 
system, but also redefined the national security concept at the expense of democratic 
and human rights norms.
92
 In practice, this meant that any internal political or 
associational activity could be interpreted in the language of internal security threat. 
Such a definition influenced the codification of laws pertaining to associational 
activities, freedom of expression, and the expansion of military jurisdiction over 
civilians.
93
 This development eliminated the possibility of structured civic dialogue 
with the state to exchange ideas and expertise on human rights protection. 
 
 
The second period, 1980-1999, began with the 1980 military coup and the 
ensuing military regime. The military regime and the illiberal constitution that 
followed the transition to party politics in 1982 had disastrous effects for civil society 
and human rights in Turkey. The junta announced a plan to ‘depoliticise’ society, so 
as to render any future intervention unnecessary.
94
 With any political or associational 
activity presented as a national security threat, organisations were suspended or shut 
down permanently, and serious human rights violations followed.
95
 The 1982 
Constitution severely restricted freedom of association and weakened trade unions, 
professional organisations and voluntary associations. No form of cooperation was 
allowed between political parties and civil society.
96
 However, the widespread human 
rights violations of the 1980s and 1990s led to the emergence of human rights non-
governmental organisations that operated against state arbitrariness within a context 
of intensified state control over their activism. In the 1990s, there was certainly a 
desire for real progress in the area of human rights protection in parts of Turkish civil 
society. Leading Turkish NGOs, such as the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 
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and the Human Rights Association (discussed in Chapter Five), along with the 
representations of international NGOs, published reports annually that highlighted 
the extent of human rights violations by the state. 
 
 
It was not until 1999 that civil society began to show renewed importance in 
quantitative and qualitative terms.
97
 The emergence of this growth is related to 
Turkey’s status as a candidate state for EU membership. The condition that ‘the 
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ promoted 
constitutional amendments and legal reforms that would revise the regulations 
limiting freedom of association.
98
  In the reform period that followed (2001-2005), 
the Law of Associations and the Law of Foundations underwent a comprehensive 
revision which aligned freedom of association to broader international standards. At 
the same time, the EU actively supported human rights organisations as an agent for 
change in Turkey.
99
 The EU programmes of financial support and human rights 
consultations, analysed in Chapter Four, are considered to have strengthened the 
position of human rights organisations vis-à-vis Turkish governments. In the period 
of EU accession negotiations, the quest for further consolidation of democracy has 
been strongly tied up with debates on civil society as ‘volitional, organised collective 
participation in public space between individuals and the state’.100 
 
 
Freedom of association in Turkey during the chronological period presented 
above was hampered by government interventions, such as legal barriers preventing 
NGO formation and the acquiescence of funding sources. In addition, imprisonment 
of activists and bureaucratic harassment constituted decisive forms of intervention. 
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This left human rights NGOs generally uneasy in expressing opinions that challenged 
the state’s implementation of law and policy for fear of sanctions.101  Self-censorship 
of this form is in contrast with international principles protecting civil society, which 
conceptualise it as a realm of activity that is independent (although complementary) 
to the state.
102
 Furthermore, the attitude of the state towards active citizenship in 
Turkey has constituted an impediment to public involvement in human rights 
activism. The citizens of Turkey were expected to put state interest before their 
individual rights and freedoms because the emphasis in Turkish citizenship has 
traditionally been on ‘duty’ rather than on ‘right’. As Keyman and İçduygu argued, 
‘the citizen is only active in terms of its duties to the state, but passive with respect to 
its will to carry the language of rights against state power’.103 The preamble of the 
2001 Constitution stated that ‘no protection shall be accorded to any activity contrary 
to Turkish national interests, the ... indivisibility of state and territory, Turkish 
historical and moral values’.104 Under this particular notion, international human 
rights norms could only be considered lawful insofar as their practice did not put into 
question the six principles of Kemalism.
105
 The above concerns challenged the 
legitimacy of human rights activism. 
106
  
 
 
Moreover, the ability of human rights activism in Turkey to act as an 
effective agent of reform was compromised by a considerable degree of political 
fragmentation within civil society itself. It is important to highlight that in the 
period preceding EU candidacy (1980s and 1990s), the overall sphere of civil 
society was characterised by acute ideological divisions. As Öniş highlighted, the 
social structure in the above period was characterised by polarisation between 
Turkish-Kurdish, secular-Islamist, right-left and urban-rural divisions.
107
 This 
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reality included discords concerning political Islam against secularism, national 
sovereignty against membership of the EU, Kurdish rights against nation-state 
unity, and uncompromising industrial growth against environmental 
conservation.
108
 The diverse sphere of associational activity often lacked tolerance 
for opposing views. Diverse organisations tended to conceptualise human rights 
norms in a conflicting way, and did not develop shared understandings or a 
common discourse in order to advance human rights claims. Despite some positive 
work, NGOs generally did not cooperate in developing common positions about 
human rights claims.
109
 The director of Women Entrepreneurs Association of 
Turkey, Gülseren Onanç, recently claimed that: 
 
When society is polarised in such a way... people are almost forced 
to choose their ideological sides. This actually prevents us all from 
seeing the big picture. Some of the civil society in Turkey, instead 
of siding with the individual, stands behind an ideology. This 
approach prevents it from seeing the problem from the perspective 
of equal citizenship and compassion, just like some politicians. 
Civil society remains so clumsy in the face of humanitarian 
demands.
110
 
 
Consequently, the ability of civil society organisations to develop common 
positions about human rights reform was limited. This situation created an important 
weakness for Turkey's human rights actors, and further affected their ability to 
influence policy-making.
111
 
 
 
Concerning recent reforms in freedom of association, the EU Progress Report 
2013 identified several important shortcomings. Regarding participation, there are 
currently no mechanisms whereby NGOs can voice demands and be involved in 
policymaking. Rather, the approach is ad hoc and often limited to specific phases of 
policy design as opposed to the entire policy cycle. In addition, some civil society 
activities are regulated by restrictive primary and secondary legislation. For example, 
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the right to publish press statements is limited and prior notice is required for 
demonstrations, which are often confined to a limited number of designated sites and 
dates. The financial environment of NGOs is characterised by insufficient incentives 
for private donations and sponsorship, making many of them dependent on public 
(often international) project grants. The collection of domestic and international 
funds was difficult and bureaucratic procedures cumbersome, and fundraising rules 
remain restrictive and discretionary. In 2013, many associations had to seek court 
protection to defend their rights. In Van, 10 NGOs were shut down following 
accusations of having helped terrorist organisations and having engaged in terrorist 
propaganda. Nevertheless, the court case against them was rejected for lack of 
evidence.
112
 Additionally, international NGOs providing relief to the Syrian refugees 
and displaced were legally investigated. Moreover, the European Court of Human 
Rights found Turkey in violation of Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 
(freedom of assembly and association) of the ECHR concerning the closure case 
launched against a trade union for referring in its charter to its support for the ‘right 
to mother tongue education’. The EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue programmes 
continue and have now involved more than 1600 CSOs.
113
 As will be discussed in 
Chapter Four, EU financial and technical assistance contributes to civil society 
development and helps to increase the capacities, partnerships and visibility of 
individual human rights NGOs.   
 
 
2.4.      Freedom of religion 
 
Freedom of religion in Turkey can be seen as a function of the state’s 
definition of national identity in a manner that impedes citizens from living and 
expressing their religious identity in public lıfe. In the twentieth century, republican 
Turkey expressed and popularised the perception that there is an essential 
incompatibility between democratic values and beliefs in Islam.
114
 Broadly speaking, 
two approaches to Turkish secularism can be identified. The long-dominant political 
approach can be labelled here as the ‘essentialist’ approach. This approach 
traditionally argued that religiously-based political ideologies undermined the ideals 
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of modernisation and Westernisation of the republic.
115
 Expression of Islam through 
a political front was persecuted through the banning of political parties, military 
ultimatums, and prosecution of politicians on suspicion of planning to destabilise the 
secular state. Public expression of pro-Islamic ideas was also contained by restriction 
on the wearing of the Muslim headscarf by females at schools, universities, and the 
civil service. To this day, this particular secularism shapes the world-views of many 
Turkish citizens and is widely proclaimed by the educated elite and the military.
116
 
  
 
The second, more liberal approach to secularism in Turkey is based on the 
premise that the state controls religious affairs while not supporting or condemning 
any religion as such. Indeed, Turkish governments have done little to prohibit non-
political religious activities. The consecutive constitutions have articulated the 
principle of freedom of religion and conscience for Turkish citizens, minorities, and 
foreign residents alike, and religion remains an enduring and important factor in the 
social life of the country, with little or no contestation by the political elite.
117
 After 
decades-long policy of stringent secularism that subordinated religious liberties to 
the primacy of the state, the latter approach found its official political expression 
with the election of the pro-Islamic AKP in 2002. The struggle for the political 
expression of Islam re-emerged in a strong shape, and the AKP framed religious 
freedom through an EU-inspired discourse of equality and non-discrimination. 
 
 
Turkey’s official policies on religion normally permit the practice of any 
religion, and freedom of worship is generally respected. However, non-Muslim 
minorities and non-Sunni sects of Islam suffer from limitations to their right to 
religious expression. Non-Muslim communities lack legal personality and thus 
encounter limitations concerning the right to construct their own places of worship. 
Furthermore, due to absence of relevant Turkish legislation, problems are 
encountered in relation to education of non-Muslim religious functionaries. There is 
also no legislation regarding the conduct of missionary work, or exemptions from 
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Muslim religious education in school. Elements creating religious discrimination can 
be found in school textbooks, such as the inclusion of ‘missionary activities’ in the 
National Threats section of a Grade Eight schoolbook.
118
 Non-Sunni sects of Islam 
also encounter restrictions, with Alevi communities facing administrative difficulties 
and frequent rejections to their applications for places of worship. In its annual 
progress reports on Turkey, the EU repeatedly emphasises the importance of aligning 
freedom of religion and worship to the European standards declared by the Council 
of Europe.  
 
 
Moreover, the banning of Muslim headscarf in the civil service and 
educational and political institutions was also considered an infringement of 
enjoyment of religious liberty until its re-instatement in 2013.
119
 For the women 
concerned, the ban on the headscarf as an expression of religious freedom had 
signified not only a violation of religious freedom, but also a violation of women’s 
rights and gender equality, which in Turkey is placed as a core value of republican 
secularism. Some affected women argued that stringent secularism caused 
psychological suffering of one being legally forbidden to live a life of integrity and in 
harmony with one’s religious conscience and convictions, resulting in disintegration 
of a central aspect of their lives.
120
 While claims were made arguing for the full 
legalisation of the headscarf as a human right, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ruled in 2005 that Turkey, a ‘democratic society’, was entitled to ban adult 
women from wearing the Islamic headscarf on the basis that the ban has been 
prescribed by law and has a ‘legitimate aim’ (to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others).
121
 Conversely, the EU viewed the so-called headscarf problem as an issue 
relating to equality and non-discrimination and urged Turkey to regulate a lasting 
solution, without proposing any concrete measures per se. By virtue of these 
conflicting understandings of religious freedom and secularism, even after its official 
re-instatement, the headscarf issue continues to spark debate in Turkey. In particular, 
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female MPs bearing the headscarf have been challenged by their secular counterparts 
to act as true promoters of women’s rights for all women in Turkey.122 
 
 
2.5.   Women’s rights and gender equality 
 
During the EU accession process, the Turkish government has fuelled legal 
reforms to improve gender equality and eliminate discriminatory provisions against 
women. The AKP government has been noticeably successful in securing gender 
equality based on sameness between women and men in the labour market and as 
independent citizens. However, while many reforms have been implemented, gender 
equality still remains one of the main human rights concerns in Turkey. The EU’s 
gender equality agenda to Turkey is filtered through local political and cultural 
attitudes towards women’s place in society. Some scholars have gone as far to argue 
that EU gender equality requirements have actually worked against women, because 
the AKP, reflecting the patriarchal structure that permeates almost all political 
tendencies in Turkey, promotes conservatism through liberal strategies.
123
 Dedeoğlu, 
for instance, argued that because the implementing government consists of a 
conservative political party, its implementation ideology is based on securing 
women’s place in the family while simultaneously securing women’s role as 
independent citizens. This results in a tension between two opposing lines of action: 
legislation promises greater gender equality, while policy is directed towards keeping 
women’s traditional roles intact.124 Thus, traditional gender roles in Turkey constrain 
the interpretation and implementation of the EU’s agenda on the policy front, even 
though legislation is enacted.  
  
 
Turkey has legally espoused women’s rights since the inception of the 
republic in 1923. Women’s rights were considered an integral part of the 
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modernisation and Westernisation of Turkey. Women gained the right to vote earlier 
than most Western nations (1934) and various customary or religious practices that 
were considered gender-biased were abolished (e.g. polygamy). Since the 1980s, a 
new feminist movement campaigned to challenge laws and practices that had been 
accepted for generations, such as laws on property-sharing, adultery, and rape that 
favoured the male.
125
 It subsequently contributed to Turkey’s signing in 1985 of the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. A 
large number of women’s organisations continue to advocate for change in the 
existing and ‘deeply entrenched’ social frameworks that discriminate against 
women,
126
 and some reach out to EU instruments for financial and technical 
assistance. Nevertheless, despite pro-women legislation and an official stance in 
favour of gender equality, women in Turkey remain far from equal to their male 
counterparts. Gender bias manifests in areas such as educational access, the 
representation of women in decision-making posts and politics,
127
 participation in 
labour,
128
 and domestic violence.
129
 In the words of Kardam: ‘the translation of 
international norms to the national and local level remains elusive, and there are 
many gaps between global norms and local responses where it comes to 
implementation’.130 
 
 
In its process of EU integration, Turkey has been keen on emphasising its 
pro-liberal stance on gender equality, and legal reforms have been enacted. At the 
time of writing, legislation upholding gender equality in Turkey is progressing. In 
2012, a Law on the Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence against Women 
was adopted, and a Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men 
and Women was established. Additionally, the Ministry of Family enacted a 
‘National Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women’ for the period 2012-2015. 
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In 2013, Domestic Violence Prevention Centres were established in twelve pilot 
cities. Nevertheless, many legal measures remain pending, and implementation of 
Turkey’s international obligations to enforce gender equality remains incomplete. 
 
 
 According to the EU’s 2013 Progress Report, substantial efforts are needed 
to turn new laws, and earlier legislation such as the Turkish Civil Code, into political, 
social and economic reality. Gender equality laws are not consistently applied across 
the country, and there is considerable inequity between women in urban/rural, 
western/eastern and upper/lower income divisions in terms of access to education, 
healthcare, labour, and public decision-making.
131
 Girls’ school enrolment and drop-
out rates remain problematic, and need to be centrally monitored. The issue of early 
and forced marriages is also a concern, as is the issue of ‘honour killings’. Violence 
against women continues to figure, both in family life, and in mainstream media and 
entertainment productions. Shelters for women subject to domestic violence are only 
established in cities holding population of 100,000 or more. The number of women 
in the labour force and politics remains low, and women’s organisations which 
attempt to advocate for these issues argue that governmental dialogue with civil 
society organisations is limited to those close to the AKP. Overall, the report 
concluded that there is a need for greater involvement of and participation by women 
in employment, policy-making and politics. More importantly, there is need for 
proper enforcement of Turkey’s already advanced web of gender equality legislation 
which will only occur with change in deeply ingrained attitudes on male-female 
relations. 
  
 
To conclude, the AKP’s adoption of EU human rights standards through legal 
reform has been constrained.
132
 After 2005, and more perceptibly after its second 
electoral victory in 2007, the party has shown less dependence on the EU’s human 
rights agenda and less willingness to stand behind achieved reforms. For example, 
the new penal code adopted in 2005 not only fell short of effectively protecting 
women’s rights particularly with respect to honour killings and virginity testing, but 
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also tightened prosecution for the expression of non-violent opinions deemed to 
insult the nation and harm national interest. The governing party also retained the 
controversial anti-terror law,
 
and there were episodes of police using unwarranted 
lethal violence during street disturbances.
133
 In 2009, the European Parliament called 
to ‘end the current accession negotiations with Turkey’, stating that it was making 
‘limited or absolutely no progress’ on fulfilling the human rights criteria,  and that it 
would be beneficial to both sides to enter into negotiations about a privileged 
partnership.
134 
Leftist and pro-Kurdish political newspapers and journals especially 
were subject to arbitrary closure.
135
 Condemnation were raised internationally in 
June 2013 when lethal police violence against waves of peaceful Gezi Park protesters 
attracted criticism from international and local observers, leading the EU to postpone 
a new round of membership talks by four months.
136
 Yearly EU progress reports 
persist in reminding Turkey that much remains to be done, and that the reform 
process must incorporate not only legal adoption but also practical implementation.  
 
2.6. Prevention of torture and ill-treatment 
     Prior to the enactment of EU-induced human rights reforms, torture in Turkey 
was so widespread that it did not simply constitute an acceptable practice in 
detention; it was expected.  In 1988, Amnesty International reported that ‘over a 
quarter of a million people have been arrested in Turkey on political grounds and 
almost all of them have been tortured’. It added that ‘some were convicted for no 
more than expressing their opinions’.137 Of major concern in Turkey’s history of 
torture is the culture of impunity that protects the perpetrators of the violations.
138
 
According to Yıldız and McDermott, the issue of impunity remains a crucial obstacle 
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to human rights progress and hinders reform at a basic level.
139
 The climate of 
impunity has been repeatedly criticised by the EU and remains a cause of concern. In 
an interview to the author, a European Commission official stated: ‘an important 
problem in torture prevention is that the follow-up to cases of ill-treatment [in 
Turkey] is unsatisfactory. There is impunity for security forces who have committed 
such crimes… In our enlargement packages, we make the wording on impunity quite 
harsh’.140 
 
       The European Union’s 2013 Progress Report criticised the lack of effort in 
establishing a national preventive mechanism under the Optional Protocol of the 
Convention against Torture. It declared that: ‘more efforts are required to... promote 
independent and impartial investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatment 
by the police and establish the truth about the numerous cases of extrajudicial 
killings in the 1990s’.141 In October 2013, the Anti-Torture Committee of the CoE 
published a report that described ‘a positive impression’ regarding the prevention of 
torture in Turkish prisons. The report, which was compiled after the Committee 
conducted an ad hoc (unannounced) visit to Turkish prisons in June 2012, declared 
that inmates reported few incidents of ill-treatment by prison staff. The reported 
allegations prompted a criminal investigation on behalf of the Turkish authorities.
142
 
Nevertheless, the report stressed that although torture inflicted by prison staff is 
limited, violence amongst inmates is frequent and severe and needs to be addressed 
under the framework of prevention of torture. According to Freedom House, physical 
and sexual abuse against minors is widespread in Turkish prisons and remains 
unaddressed by the reforms enacted by the government.
143
 The recommendations of 
the EU, the CoE, and other international watchdogs thus challenge the restrictive 
interpretation of ‘torture’ in Turkish law, and call for the prevention of all forms of 
mistreatment conducted within an official setting.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter drew out the main sources of human rights problems in Turkey 
and challenges that underpin the EU-induced reform process. As stated in the 
introduction, this exploration constitutes the first step in analysing the legitimacy of 
human rights promotion and the interaction of normative power Europe with 
Turkey’s local context. It argued that European norm diffusion and political reform in 
Turkey demonstrate signs of both recognition and contestation of EU human rights 
standards. On the one hand, key political actors in Turkey continue to utilise the EU 
standard of legitimacy as one that presents political opportunities and empowerment 
possibilities to previously disadvantaged actors (pro-Islamic parties, Kurdish 
minority). On the other hand, domestic confrontations regarding the Kemalist 
orthodoxy and competing power positions in Turkish politics can undermine 
domestic reforms. Although the focus on only six human rights areas has 
compromised the depth of the analysis, it has proved useful in highlighting the 
tension between EU reform requirements and the standard of legitimacy that is 
embedded in Turkish politics. 
 
              From the perspective of legitimacy, it appears likely that EU norms and 
Turkey-EU relations will continue to feature as elements of Turkey’s modernisation 
credentials. Turkey’s chances of joining the EU might have receded in recent years, 
but in political reform, relations with the EU and discussions of democratisation 
continue to be situated at the intersection of Europe’s universal norms and Turkey’s 
particularistic historical and contemporary ‘realities’. Turkey is still locked into a 
process of accession-related reforms, and the exclusivity of EU membership 
continues to motivate the Turkish elites, who value accession as a way of validating 
their country’s European credentials.144 Thus, the EU–Turkey relationship continues 
to be an important area of human rights development and change.  
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       Chapter Four 
     Legitimacy in Practice: EU Financial and Technical Assistance to Turkey 
 
This chapter examines Europe’s ‘normative power’ in its relations with 
Turkey with specific reference to the procedural legitimacy of its main human 
rights instruments. It analyses the key procedural challenges of each instrument 
vis-à-vis its human rights goals, and problematises arising discrepancies between 
norms and material policy outcomes. It argues that there is a tension between the 
normative character of the human rights instruments and their implications in terms 
of the well-being of their beneficiaries. This tension is well-placed to furthering a 
reorientation of EU normative power within enlargement. Rather than align with 
the instruments’ own visions and their norm-laid communications, the conception 
of EU normative power should rethink the effects of the EU external agenda for the 
disadvantaged communities in candidate countries outside Europe. 
 
In order to understand and interpret the deficit in procedural legitimacy, 
Chapter Four will examine empirically the policies of human rights promotion to 
Turkey in the area of financial and technical assistance. Specifically, it will analyse 
the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Instrument of 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the system of human rights 
consultations. These mechanisms were chosen for analysis according to the 
selection criteria explained the introductory chapter: their long-standing presence in 
EU enlargement policy, their focus on bottom-up approaches to human rights 
reform, and their delineation as the EU’s most important human rights instruments 
to Turkey by the EU officials interviewed for this chapter. Drawing upon the 
normative power and legitimacy literature reviewed in Chapter Two, the analysis 
will highlight the necessity for EU human rights policy to combine policy 
relevance to Turkey’s current policy needs, with options for enhanced citizen 
participation and the ability to produce effective outcomes. These three criteria 
form the basis of the legitimacy evaluation. 
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The empirical data for this chapter draws extensively on interviews 
conducted by the author with European Commission officials (as noted in the 
introductory chapter and the appendices). In the absence of public information on 
the day-to-day operation of the policies applied by the Commission, these 
interviews were an invaluable source of data. They were conducted with 
Commission officials in Brussels and Ankara, and with representatives of human 
rights organisations in Turkey that are involved in EU-Turkey civil society 
cooperation. Every effort was made to verify the data on the operation of the 
procedures through following an identical line of questioning with different 
interviewees. The information was subsequently corroborated by official EU 
information on the Union’s enlargement strategy towards Turkey – although the 
latter is limited in nature and scope. An exception is the analysis of the human 
rights activity of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, which is based on 
the public records of its meetings.  
 
1.  The Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
The central objective of the provision of financial pre-accession assistance 
to Turkey is to assist its preparation for EU membership, based on the political, 
economic and structural priorities identified by the 2008 Accession Partnership.
1
 
Turkey has been receiving financial assistance under the IPA since 2007.
2
 The 
amount of IPA funding for each reform area is designed in accordance with the 
overarching multi-annual programme for Turkey, the Multi-Annual Indicative 
Planning Document (MIPD).
3
 The MIPD determines the management and 
implementation of the IPA. It takes the form of a strategic plan for the allocation of 
funds, broken down by component, on the basis of Turkey’s needs, administrative 
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capacity, and previous compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria.
4 
To ensure 
targeted action and impact, the IPA consists of five components. Each component 
covers a specific priority area which is defined according to the needs of Turkey.
5
  
The component that is of special relevance to human rights is Component I 
‘Support for Transition and Institution-Building’.6  
 
The strategic objective of IPA Component I is to speed up human rights 
reform in Turkey. As an EU official stated in an interview to the author, ‘in this 
context [Component I] we are trying to help Turkey raise its standards in line with 
European standards on rule of law, democracy and human rights’.7 The actors 
involved in its implementation are the EU Commission, Turkish government 
authorities, and to some extent domestic human rights-based NGOs. The reform 
areas are determined by the EU and reflect EU priorities, yet the EU requests 
Turkish authorities to identify concrete projects in order to preserve Turkish 
‘ownership’. As the same interviewee stated, ‘it’s best to have a strategic 
programme, and within that context [of ownership] Turkey makes proposals’.8 
According to the MIPD, public projects should reflect the following broad 
objectives: 
 Support for the promotion of effective human rights governance in a broad 
sense (e.g. independence of the judiciary); 
 Development of institutions and policies in line with relevant international 
human rights instruments; 
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 Enhancement of human rights knowledge amongst judges, law enforcement 
officials, prosecutors, educators, and other stakeholders involved in human rights 
issues in Turkey; 
 Establishment of an independent National Human Rights Institution 
(NHRI) and an Ombudsman office to deal with complaints on human rights; 
 Increase in the capacity of human rights NGOs; and 
 Awareness on human rights of vulnerable groups, such as women and 
children.
9
 
These objectives generally correspond to the broader human rights issues in Turkey 
that were highlighted in previous chapters. 
 
Regarding the projects’ beneficiaries, the bulk of the Component I budget 
allocated to human rights is dispensed by Turkey’s Ministry of European Union 
Affairs. Although the project areas and their amount of funding are determined by 
the EU, their implementation is a matter for the relevant Turkish authority. Each 
authority is in charge of the strategic planning of the project in coordination with 
the objectives of the MIPD. Legitimacy considerations are discussed within the 
implementation of Component I according to the procedural criteria for normative 
power instruments analysed in Chapter Two: policy relevance, participation, and 
effectiveness.  
 
 A key IPA limitation in Turkey is lack of sufficient policy relevance. It 
addresses human rights issues selectively, often funding areas of lesser contention 
while overlooking more sensitive human rights demands. Component I is 
fundamentally selective: so far the EU has not requested projects on the most 
contentious issues criticised in its annual progress reports, namely freedom of 
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expression, freedom of religion, and minority rights. In 2007-2012, Component I 
did not include any projects in these areas, even though it covered other relevant 
issues (e.g. gender equality, children’s rights, and prevention of torture).10  Instead, 
EU pressure in favour of the aforementioned rights was limited to annual progress 
reports and human rights consultations. These are not as influential as funding, 
since their agendas serve as guidelines and do not deal directly with the day-to-day 
function of key implementing authorities in Turkey (e.g. Ministry of Justice or 
National Police).
11
 Therefore, in the absence of projects, direct contact between EU 
officials and key stakeholders in the above human rights areas has been rather rare 
and usually ends up with the two sides engaging in general talks at the level of 
human rights dialogues (to be discussed further later in the chapter). Given the 
absence of projects, IPA is not likely to act effectively or exercise influence on the 
protection of freedom of expression, religion, and minority rights. Part of the 
question of legitimacy, however, is the extent to which the EU unproblematically 
accepts certain human rights problems as too ingrained for reform, thus preferring 
to back conventional practices rather than the process of human rights promotion. 
According to an EU official from DG Enlargement interviewed for this study, the 
reason for absence of projects on freedom of expression, religion, and minority 
rights reflects a lack of EU political will to engage with internal conflicts in 
Turkey. In his words: 
I have just come from a hearing in the European Parliament on Turkey 
and NGOs have criticised the EU on not doing enough on Turkey. The 
point is that yes, but we are not Amnesty International, and we also 
have to talk to the Turks about other things – I mean the environment 
is also important. We can’t alienate any partner to the extent that they 
are not going to talk to us about other issues. We also have an interest, 
so there has to be a balance.
12
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 In the area of freedom of expression, EU credibility has recently been 
harmed by negative developments in the Ergenekon trial,
13
 a crackdown against an 
alleged coup d’etat against the AKP government dating back to 2008.14  The 
detention without trial of a large number of public figures, such as well-known 
secular activists, politicians, academics, journalists, and judges, for peaceful 
expression of ideas as part of an ongoing investigation into the alleged coup, is a 
striking example.
15 
Although the EU has taken note of the case in its annual reports, 
it has not taken concrete action to condemn the repressive nature of the trial’s 
procedures. The 2009 Progress Report, for example, praised the trial as a defence 
of democracy: ‘the first case in Turkey to probe into a coup attempt and the most 
extensive investigation ever on an alleged criminal network at destabilising the 
democratic institutions’.16 Nevertheless, it failed to acknowledge the long pre-trial 
detention periods, absence of concrete evidence, and public denigration of 
detainees by pro-government media. The procedural irregularities of the Ergenekon 
case have not found any significant echo in Brussels, and no IPA projects address 
limitations to freedom of expression in Turkey more generally. 
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highlighted that the thousands of people in Turkey who are on trial for ‘terror’ crimes face even less 
fair trials and flimsier evidence. In the words of Human Rights Watch: ‘from a human rights point of 
view, a key disappointment of the Ergenekon trial was that it did not represent progress toward 
holding public officials, military, police and civil servants accountable for human rights violations in 
a way that will resonate with the public across the political divide, and that it did not serve to 
promote a more democratic culture’. Human Rights Watch, ‘The Turkish Trial that Fell Far Short’ 
(6 August 2013) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/06/turkish-trial-fell-far-short>  (accessed 6 
August 2013) 
14
Çizre, Ü. and Walker, J. ‘Conceiving the New Turkey after Ergenekon’. International Spectator, 
vol.45 no: 1 (2010) p.94-5 (89-98). 
15
 Eligür, B. The Mobilisation of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) p.273. 
16
 European Commission, ‘Turkey 2009 Progress Report’. SEC (2009) 1334 (Brussels: 14 October 
2009) p.7. 
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 The EU-funded IPA projects similarly suffer from a lack of relevance to a 
wide range of struggles that erupt within the realm of minority rights. The EU has 
long promoted minority rights in Turkey: for example, the European Parliament 
was a vocal actor in this area since the 1980s and 1990s, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three. The European Commission’s annual progress reports document Turkey’s 
progression meticulously. However, it is one thing to issue declarations, and 
another to push specific reforms through IPA assistance. The absence of 
Component I funding for minority rights projects puts official EU claim-making in 
support of linguistic and cultural freedoms into question.
17
 The EU’s isolation from 
minority rights becomes clearer if we compare its rhetorically supportive stance 
towards the Kurdish community with that towards other long-standing ethnic 
groups in Turkey. For instance, the rights of other communities are entirely absent 
from MIPD and IPA-funded projects. In an interview to the author, an official (of 
Assyrian descent) from Turkey’s Ministry of European Union Affairs criticised the 
EU assistance for neglecting the presence of other ethnic groups in Turkey and the 
erosion of their freedoms rights as a result of centralised national homogeneity.
18
 
Consequently, in instances of human rights protection where decisive reform could 
not be politically accommodated, the EU remains reluctant and sceptical, and IPA 
financial assistance almost absent. The EU’s self-assigned position as a promoter 
of minority rights in Turkey cannot then be considered a safe benchmark for 
legitimacy. 
 
 
Further observation of IPA funding reveals lack of policy relevance within 
funding allocation in Component I. It appears there is gradual decrease in funding 
towards human rights projects in Turkey, despite the annual increase in overall IPA 
assistance (Components I-V). In order to examine the allocation of EU pre-
accession financial assistance to Turkey, Table 1 presents information on IPA 
human rights funding for the period 2007-2013. The aim of the table is to highlight 
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As with freedom of expression, minority rights in Turkey are understandably contentious. 
Considerable segments of political elite and society fear that promoting Kurdish rights and regional 
devolution can lead to territorial disintegration. 
18
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the limited amount of financial assistance the EU has directed towards human 
rights in relation to the total amount of IPA assistance that the EU has planned for 
Turkey.  
Table 1:  European Union IPA assistance to Turkey, 2007-2013   
 (In Euro, millions, unless specified as percentages) 
 
Component 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Amount allocated to human 
rights and democratic reform, 
civil society dialogue, and 
implementation of the acquis  
(component I: Transition 
Assistance and Institution-
Building) 
256,7 256,1 239,5 211,3 228,6 233,9 238,3 
 Percentage of component I 
allocated to human rights and 
democratic reform 
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 Percentage of IPA allocated to 
human rights and democratic 
reform* 
13% 12% 10% 9% 7% 7% 6% 
 Amount allocated to economic 
and social cohesion  
(components III and IV: 
Regional Development, Human 
Resources Development, and 
Rural Development) 
217,7 226,7 238,3 301,5 371 457,7   474 
TOTAL IPA ASSISTANCE 497,2 538,7 566,4 653,7 781,9 899,5 935,5 
*Estimates based on average annual amounts provided to Turkey for projects in 
components I,III, and IV. Sources: Turkey Multi-Annual Indicative Planning 
Document (2007-2009); 2008 Annual Report on the Implementation of IPA; 
Commission Communication on IPA and MIPD for 2011-13; and Turkey - 
Financial Assistance <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/turkey/financial-assistance/index_en.htm?id=keydoc#library>  
   
The annual total budget for IPA and the amount of financial resources 
allocated to human rights reform in Turkey varies from one year to the next. As the 
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data demonstrates (see Table 1), the overall amount of IPA support to Turkey has 
increased significantly each year, reaching almost one billion euro for 2013. 
However, the amount of money channelled into Component I regarding the 
implementation of human rights decreased gradually in the period 2007-10. It 
began to increase again from 2011 onwards, though not reaching the original 
amount of 2007.  
  
The percentage of Component I assistance allocated to human rights and 
democratic reforms remains stable every year (25 per cent). However, the annual 
increase in overall IPA funding has not been reflected in the support for human 
rights reform. Prior to 2011, the raise in IPA assistance, accompanied by the 
decrease in Component I funding (see Table 1) resulted in human rights occupying 
a limited part of the overall budget (13 per cent-10 per cent). The post-2011 
increase in Component I correspondingly increased the amount allocated to human 
rights, but this was not in synchronisation with the raise in overall IPA assistance. 
The significant post-2011 boost in IPA was only very marginally reflected in 
Component I. As a result, the percentage of aid for human rights projects has been 
decreasing yearly, and reached the lowest point of meagre 6 per cent of IPA in 
2013.  
 
To this point, the case of IPA funding allocation illustrates that the EU has 
been reluctant to press Turkey for heavy engagement with the implementation of 
human rights reform. In an interview to the author, an official from DG 
Enlargement’s Turkey Unit claimed that this restraint derives from lack of 
confidence in the European Commission that the Turkish government would accept 
EU human rights demands for areas considered sensitive.
19
 The implication would 
be assumed to be that domestic political calculations might brand EU requirements 
as illegitimate and possibly derail the reform process. Additionally, the interviewee 
claimed that the EU lacks funds to engage comprehensively with Turkey’s deeply 
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entrenched human rights problems, even though it recognises the importance of 
financial assistance in human rights promotion: 
 We don’t have enough money. The budget of the Union is now 
more or less 130 billion euros a year. It is a significant amount, but 
it is only a bit more 1% of the GDP of the Union, it is very small. 
This is the reason why we do not spend that much money on 
Turkey. But we know that it is important that they receive this 
money.  
 
This response does not entirely correspond to the prediction of normative 
power Europe that the EU has the ability to alter the human rights practices of 
states even outside the cost-benefit calculation of a membership prospect. The 
interviewee agreed with the author’s proposition of a more policy-relevant 
instrument of financial assistance, but insisted that this would be of use only if the 
EU provided a clearer membership perspective to Turkey. 
 
The main issue of participation that can be raised for the general policy and 
strategy of Component I concerns lack of comprehensive scrutiny by the European 
Parliament over the decision on funding allocation.
20
 The five EC services that 
determine IPA assistance to Turkey's national programme (DGs Enlargement, 
Regional Policy, Employment and Social Affairs, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, and EU Delegation in Turkey) do not consult with the EP, which 
merely enjoys a passive right to information.
21
 The EP accords political 
endorsement to the IPA budget, but does not formally adopt its policy goals as 
there is no formal provision for its involvement in the management and distribution 
                                                 
20
 The crucial reason why the EP does not participate in the decision-making on IPA allocation is 
due to the nature of IPA falling under article 188H of the Treaty of Lisbon (previously 181A of 
Treaty of Rome) concerning Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries, 
where the EP role is limited to consultation. Although the EP does have co-decision role in other 
areas of the Union’s external relations (e.g. Development Cooperation, article 188E of Lisbon, 
previously 179 Treaty of Rome), the aim of IPA is considered relevant to preparation for accession 
rather than to the implementation of a development policy. By virtually excluding the possibility of 
effective exercise of EP political role and responsibility, the appropriate choice of human rights 
instruments and the form and application of the proposed instruments is determined by the 
Commission and the Council. 
21
 Gates, A. ‘Mixed Messages and Mixed Results: The European Union’s Promotion of Human 
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of funds, nor is there any publicly available document with a clearly stated mandate 
for the EP or a similar constituting document.  
 
What positive effects would increased European Parliament participation in 
funding allocation produce? Inclusion of the EP in strategic decisions regarding 
allocation of IPA assistance would provide substantial added value to the human 
rights areas that are not supported by IPA funding. This would encourage a more 
differentiated approach tailored to Turkey’s specific needs, thereby increasing IPA 
policy relevance and potential for impact. A provision for EP participation would 
arguably make IPA more strategic, result-oriented, flexible, and targeted to the 
needs of Turkey.
22
 Stronger involvement could potentially increase funding to 
Component I. This idea is linked to the EP’s frequent practice of elevating human 
rights problems to a central and well-publicised issue in Turkey’s bid for 
membership. It frequently argues in press releases, resolutions, and oral/written 
questions to the EC that the Turkish government does not sufficiently address 
human rights problems. The EP’s annual resolution on Turkey in 2009 claimed 
dissatisfaction about the ‘continuous but constantly postponed’ promise for 
solidification of human rights.
23 The Parliament’s scrutiny of Turkey's record tends 
to focus on specific human rights situations and acts in given situations.
24
 Although 
Commission representatives acknowledge the extent of human rights infringements 
in Turkey, they tend to emphasise Turkey’s ‘sufficient’ progress and the 
importance of other non-political challenges within the pre-accession process. 
Some perspectives have seen the Commission as being ‘lenient’ on Ankara by 
overstating the level of human rights progress in Turkey.
25
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 House of Commons, ‘Financing EU External Action: the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA)’ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-
xlviii/42811.htm>  (accessed 20 December 2012) 
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This account of limited EP participation in IPA management and 
distribution suggests that lack of EP oversight over the distribution and 
management of IPA funds might erode the alignment of projects with national 
priorities. Though the quality of their representative mandate is often criticised, as 
representatives of the citizens MEPs are able to speak on behalf of oppressed and 
vulnerable groups, ensure that proposed projects are informed by real priorities on 
the ground, and approve or amend budget allocations. The Subcommittee on 
Human Rights of the European Parliament, for instance, has the independence, 
knowledge, and resources to perform these functions.
26
 Strengthening its role in the 
process of funding management and distribution will have positive implications for 
the linkage between these allocations and Turkey’s national priorities. More 
broadly, it will contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the EU’s human rights 
promotion by achieving an optimal balance between norms and policy; in other 
words, between the role of the European Commission as the institution promoting 
supranational policy interests, and that of the European Parliament as a 
representative institution with a mandate to pursue normative concerns. In this way, 
EU policies to Turkey will be more appropriately described as those of a 
‘normative power Europe’ rather than an institutionalised transferral of EU policies 
abroad.  
       
The effectiveness of IPA as a virtue of legitimacy will be discussed at the 
level of IPA-funded projects targeting specific human rights problems in Turkey. It 
is assumed that the normative character of EU human rights promotion should not 
be accepted at face value, but that the EU should demonstrate that it is effective in 
projecting its norms to different types of recipients in Turkey. Legitimacy cannot 
be achieved if EU human rights promotion is high on rhetoric and low on delivery. 
Instead, there should be tangible consequences for the well-being of those who 
benefit from human rights policies and projects.  
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In order to carry out a broad discussion of effectiveness, it is necessary to 
judge the performance of Component I in terms of how actual effects measure up 
to the policy’s objectives. This is best achieved with a discussion of the 
performance of specific projects. Performance criteria range from general (for 
example, whether a project is in compliance with the participation of minorities) to 
specific and quantitative (for example, a target value associated with a specific 
indicator on a specific time scale, such as the reduction of child abuse in schools). 
The assessment of legitimacy will examine a typical sample of projects by 
Component I that focus on the three major human rights issues, emphasised in EU 
progress reports: gender equality, children’s rights, and the prevention of torture. 
These are currently the only projects of Component I that directly address the 
improvement of civil, political, or socio-economic human rights. The remaining 
projects (not selected) are more variable, focusing on transition assistance and 
institution-building that have a more diffuse impact on human rights protection (for 
example, promotion of democratic citizenship, ethics in the public sector, and 
improvements in mental health care). The sample selected is based on projects that 
address on average the most high-profile human rights issues in Turkey (with the 
exception of those related to territorial integrity and secular identity, as explained 
earlier). 
 
Unlike other IPA components characterised by multi-annual programming 
and planning, Component I is managed through annual projects. The European 
Commission in Turkey adopts projects annually on the basis of proposed fichés 
submitted by the beneficiary organisations (e.g. Ministry of National Education, 
Police, and Gendarmerie). Financial support for specific projects is aimed towards 
the transferral of know-how and expertise to Turkey, implementation of reform 
policies, adoption of European standards, and development of administrative 
capacity in the specific policy areas. Under Article 65 of the IPA regulation, 
assistance is provided in the form of twinning with EU member state institutions, 
technical assistance in preparation of documentation, grants, budget support, and 
investments. At the time of writing, the IPA-funded human rights projects support 
the following priority lines: gender equality, children’s rights, and prevention of 
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torture. In what follows, these individual projects will be discussed in terms of their 
capacity to influence the agenda and choices of the beneficiary institutions and 
effect positive change in the area of human rights they are centred on. 
 
1.1.   Project 1: Prevention of domestic violence against women  
 
 This project, initiated in 2011, concerns gender equality and domestic 
violence incidents against women (including honour killings and early forced 
marriages). The beneficiary of the project is the Gendarmerie, whose capacity is to 
be strengthened in order to protect women from violence. The catalyst for action in 
this area is Turkey’s 2008 Accession Partnership document. The Accession 
Partnership stated that Turkey should ‘pursue measures to implement legislation 
relating...to all forms of violence against women... Ensure specialised training for 
judges and prosecutors, law enforcement agencies... and strengthen efforts to 
establish shelters for women at risk of violence’.27 The project seeks an increased 
capacity for the Gendarmerie through special training of judges, local authorities 
and other relevant institutions, public campaigns against domestic violence, nation-
wide research on the causes and consequences of gender-based violence, and the 
establishment of women’s shelters. 
 
The project has the advantage that it deals with domestic violence through 
direct prevention, by reducing risk factors and eliminating possible causes 
(mitigation). Prevention happens before domestic violence takes place and aims to 
address the root causes through training programmes, a national database profiling 
domestic violence incidents, research on prevention, and public awareness 
campaigns. Therefore, it attempts to create an environment where domestic 
violence is not likely to occur. Yet, it has several limitations in terms of indirect 
prevention, in other words with handling cases that have already occurred 
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– IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2009) p.2. 
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(deterrence). The Gendarmerie Service is the primary agency protecting women 
from violence perpetrated by men, but the project does not recognise domestic 
violence as a serious crime, but rather as a ‘social problem’. As such, it does not 
advocate a ‘pro-arrest strategy’ nor special domestic violence officers, which 
according to research is the most positive action against domestic abuse. In 
addition, the project does not encourage police officers to liaise with victim support 
NGOs or women's shelters. The project fiché simply includes a general statement 
on cooperation with NGOs regarding ‘positive effects on civil society in the fields 
of human rights and gender protection’.28  
 
Moreover, the project does not promote an equal opportunities and diversity 
approach on dealing with domestic violence. There is no consideration of the 
complex and multiple needs of women from ethnic minorities approaching 
authorities for help nor assurance of provision for victims of human trafficking or 
refugees. In response to the EU’s question on how the project will reflect minority 
and vulnerable groups’ concerns, it is simply stated that ‘according to the Turkish 
Constitutional System, the word ‘minority’ encompasses only groups of persons 
defined and recognised as such on the basis of bilateral or multilateral instruments 
to which Turkey is a party’.29 No further discussion is provided, reflecting the 
reality that active engagement with the priorities of women and minorities is 
lacking in Turkish politics, or at least that these are not engaged with from a human 
rights perspective. 
 
 The ability to improve women’s rights on the ground is generally present in 
the Gender Equality project in the form of provisions of direct prevention, as 
explained earlier. However, provisions of indirect prevention have hitherto been 
underdeveloped. As a governmental project, its effectiveness would be enhanced 
through treating domestic violence as a serious crime instead of simply a social or 
family problem; through stronger inclusion of voluntary organisations; and full 
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IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2010) p.5. 
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consideration of women belonging to minorities (broadly defined). It is premature 
at this stage to speculate on what long-term impact this policy initiative will have, 
but the present analysis points to limited potential impact in relation to domestic 
violence. 
 
1.2.     Project 2: Fight against violence towards children 
 
The project ‘Fight against violence towards children’ (2011) concerns the 
protection of children against all forms of violence of a physical, emotional, verbal, 
and psychological nature. The beneficiary of the project is the Ministry of National 
Education of Turkey. The catalyst for action in this area is, again, Turkey’s 2008 
Accession Partnership document. The Partnership document states that Turkey 
should ‘ensure the full implementation of the Law on Child Protection and promote 
protection of children’s rights in line with EU and international standards’.30 The 
translation of the protection of children’s rights into action is envisaged through 
preventive measures, such as the establishment and promotion of Counselling 
Services, the development of a Safer School Model free from physical, emotional, 
verbal, and psychological violence, the promotion of training programmes for the 
awareness of parents, teaching staff, NGO members, and children themselves, and 
a national survey on violence against children. 
 
 On the basis of the content of the project fiché, there are reasons to be 
apprehensive about the ability of the project to effectively guarantee children’s 
rights. In order to address the root causes of child abuse, a direct preventive 
strategy should contain an analysis of risk factors. Apart from proposing a Safe 
School Model, the project does not suggest a concrete risk assessment to examine 
the complexity and dynamics involved in family violence situations and the impact 
on children. Legal measures are being pursued for schools, yet family programmes 
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are limited to ‘increasing awareness’. The project does not challenge Article 232 of 
the Criminal Code, which foresees that parents maintain ‘disciplinary power’ over 
children, making corporal punishment lawful in the home. Neither does it include 
recommendations to explicitly prohibit corporal punishment against children in all 
settings (including the home), which is provided by the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s Ministry of Health and Ministry of Family and Social Policies are not 
included in the project and are not provided with training about violence against 
children. Moreover, studies have indicated violence in alternative care settings in 
Turkey (e.g. rehabilitation centres and orphanages), but no relevant training 
services or monitoring programmes have been proposed for these institutions.
31
 
The project has limitations both in terms of direct prevention (mitigation) and 
indirect prevention (deterrence). This decreases its ability to improve child 
protection in Turkey.  
 
  In terms of direct output, there are several positive indicators that training 
programmes for teaching staff have decreased physical and verbal abuse in 
secondary schools. The rate of children exposed to physical violence in secondary 
schools has decreased from 36.3% to 25%, but the project fiché does not provide 
further data in support of its effectiveness. Participation is certainly visible in the 
project, guaranteed through cooperation between different public institutions, and 
NGO training programmes at provincial level that offer ownership to local 
stakeholders. The project addresses equal opportunities for minorities and 
vulnerable groups to a stronger degree that the Gender Equality project, stating 
commitment to equal opportunities and non-discrimination. Overall, there is some 
ability for positive impact, but this remains contestable due to a mixture of limited 
direct and indirect preventive strategies for child abuse at home and in alternative 
care centres. These findings are hard to reconcile with procedural legitimacy, 
because the opportunities that the project offers to children as a disadvantaged or 
vulnerable group do not match its desired outcomes. The promotion of children’s 
                                                 
31
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rights by this project cannot serve as a de facto source of legitimacy, because the 
failure to secure more comprehensive engagement by the project beneficiaries 
compromises its ability to protect the well-being of children. 
 
1.3. Project 3:  Prevention of torture  
 
 This project addresses the development and implementation of torture and 
force-prevention practices by the security forces in Turkey in accordance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
32
 The beneficiary of the project is the 
Turkish National Police, whose capacity is to be increased according to the stated 
objective and with full compliance with Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. The catalyst 
for action in this policy area is Turkey’s National Plan for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (NPAA, 2008). According to the NPAA, Turkey should implement the 
measures in the context of a ‘zero tolerance policy’ against torture and ill-
treatment, and apply a training system to its law enforcement officials regarding the 
use of proportional force by police. The translation of the aforementioned problem 
into increased capacity of the National Police occurs through nation-wide training 
activities into the use of force, research on Turkey’s legal framework regarding 
torture and ill-treatment prevention, exchange programmes between Turkish and 
EU member state police organisations, review of the working conditions of law 
enforcement personnel, and the establishment of a review system concerning 
incidents of use of force. 
 
 How effective is the torture prevention project in terms of rooting out the 
practice from the National Police? The project certainly has the potential to 
effectively prevent torture through striking a balance between legitimate police 
force according to different aspects of its mandate, and engaging in preventive 
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actions in a more strategic way. It terms of direct prevention (mitigation) it aims to 
eliminate the possible root causes through training programmes, an analysis of 
current Turkish legislation on the use of force, and exchange of expertise through 
twinning programmes with EU member states. This type of direct prevention is 
forward-looking and can have long-term positive effects through creating an 
environment where torture is unlikely to occur.  
 
 However, the project does not effectively combat torture and ill-treatment 
that has already occurred. As such, it does not deter repetition. Lack of deterrence 
does not address key factors within Turkey’s political, legal, and institutional 
environment that heighten the risk for torture. Impunity for the perpetrators of 
torture in Turkey is an important factor to consider. The organisation of the 
criminal justice system and the lack of independence of the judiciary are 
particularly conducive to impunity. An institutional environment favourable to 
torture is excluded from the analysis, such as lack of accountability and 
transparency of public authorities and lack of official complaints mechanisms 
(including no reparations for victims). The main obstacle to its effectiveness within 
IPA is the complete absence of a dimension of indirect prevention that would 
challenge political, legal, and institutional root causes of torture. As long as there is 
no fight against impunity, no effective investigation of torture allegations, and no 
strengthening of the independence of the judiciary, the results of the torture 
prevention project are bound to be disappointing. 
 
 As cornerstones of IPA Component I for the promotion and protection of 
human rights, the projects on gender equality, children’s rights, and prevention of 
torture are well-placed to actively engage and support national actors in the 
prevention of abuses. These projects have been designed as a practical tool to 
develop concrete activities of prevention, improvement, and change. They present a 
range of good practices and useful information for raising awareness. Nevertheless, 
the principle underpinning these projects is predominantly one of ‘reaction’ that 
responds to criticisms brought to national institutions by the EU, rather than 
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initiating preventive actions or investigations. While moving from this reactive 
focus can be challenging, it is important to note that the EU does have the mandate 
to request preventive actions, such as legal reform regarding violence against 
women, domestic abuse, and impunity for torture. Placing greater emphasis on 
preventive action would offer the EU the opportunity to engage with prevention in 
a more strategic way and to contribute to long-term positive effects in human rights 
protection. The possibility of long-term effectiveness is an important basis upon 
which EU human rights policy can be legitimated. The projects outlined above, 
although well-placed, raise questions about the legitimacy of the project allocation 
and their goals and outcomes. 
 
2. The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
 
The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is an 
EU-funded civil society-focused programme. Its mandate encompasses facilitating 
democracy and human rights worldwide ‘from below’ through direct support to 
activities of civil society organisations. It is, as Kurki highlights, part of the EU’s 
agenda to move towards a more locally sensitive approach to human rights 
promotion based on grass-roots civic engagement.
33
 It is open to all countries 
outside the European Union, including candidate and potential candidate 
countries.
34 
 The EIDHR complements the European Union’s instruments for 
human rights promotion within enlargement. EIDHR funding to Turkey is not 
considered separate from the country’s candidate status.35 What is notable about 
this is that EIDHR permits the funding of locally sensitive projects that deal with 
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focal human rights issues that are not politically accommodated by IPA (as 
explained in the previous section) and to which the Turkish government may be 
reluctant to consent. In the words of an EU official,  
‘What is special about the EIDHR is that it enables us to support 
NGOs directly. So it’s a very unusual instrument. Through it we are 
granting money to NGOs which authoritarian governments see as of 
the state. They are exactly the kind of people that some governments 
would like to see locked up behind bars, whereas we encourage them 
by giving them money’.36 
 
The EIDHR is independent in its budget line and works according to its 
own internal objectives. These overall objectives, applicable to all recipients 
including Turkey, are: 
 Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries 
and regions where they are most at risk; 
 Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and 
democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group 
interests and in consolidating political participation and representation; 
 Supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for 
the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of 
democracy.
37
 
 
In the EIDHR framework there is direct support to non-governmental 
human rights and democracy projects without need for host government consent. 
Most of the external human rights instruments that the EU has at its disposal are 
programmed in cooperation with partner governments in recipient countries. In 
contrast, the EIDHR operates autonomously from host governments. The 
instrument is unique in that its main operating system is a call for proposals where 
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human rights NGOs submit applications for funding directly to the Commission 
Delegation in their country without any involvement by the Turkish government. 
The aim is not to coerce the state to adopt democratic processes, but rather to 
facilitate pressure ‘from below’ through enhancing civic conceptions of the good 
life and producing the capacity for NGOs to challenge authoritarian practices.
38
 
Therefore, room exists for the EIDHR-funded NGOs to see themselves as crucial 
human rights-defending actors, focus on sensitive political issues, and challenge 
governmental practices.
39
 Consequently, the EIDHR is capable of offering a degree 
of flexibility of action, local ownership, and a participatory approach to human 
rights engagement that has the potential to instigate sustainable reform. Part of the 
question of procedural legitimacy is the extent to which EU’s human rights 
promotion through the EIDHR Turkey programme is policy-relevant, inclusive, 
and able to improve the well-being of those who supposedly benefit. 
 
 Since 2002, the EIDHR has provided support to more than 100 projects in 
Turkey ranging from freedom of expression and religious freedom, to protection 
and respect of cultural and minority rights.
40  
These human rights fields have been 
absent from the policy agenda of IPA. The inclusion of these objectives in EIDHR 
is envisaged to intervene in existing forms of repression and actively push for 
political reform. EIDHR funding for Turkey is modest in relation to the IPA (€3 
million for 2007-2010, in contrast to €654 million under IPA for 2010 only, of 
which €221.3 was allocated to Component I – see Table 1).  
 
According to the EIDHR’s 2010 Call for Proposals for Turkey, published 
by the Commission Delegation in Ankara, project proposals by local civil society 
organisations are expected to address at least one of the two specific objectives 
below:  
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 To strengthen and/or increase civil society’s involvement in the making, 
implementation, and monitoring of human rights policies at local and 
national levels 
 To support human rights defenders in their efforts to promote and strive for 
the protection and realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at 
the local level.
41
  
 
Both specific objectives are expected to address particular priority areas. 
There are seven priority areas under the first objective: freedom of expression, 
religion, association and press; human rights in prisons and right to fair trial; 
prevention of torture and fight against impunity; minority rights and cultural rights; 
rights of the child; elimination of violence against women; and social rights of 
vulnerable groups. Aside from addressing the above issues, each proposed NGO 
project is expected to ensure stakeholder participation in the planning and 
implementation of the project. The second objective relates to human rights 
defenders and focuses on three priority areas: protection of human rights defenders; 
amelioration of their technical knowledge and skills; and financial support for their 
activities, which involve documenting infringements, treating victims of violations, 
and fighting against impunity.  
 
On the basis of the above spectrum of objectives, the EIDHR can be seen as 
establishing policy goals that correspond to almost all spheres of human rights 
infringements in Turkey, in accordance with the principles of policy relevance and 
participation. In terms of policy relevance, the objectives that are envisaged are 
properly selected and quite targeted to the predominant challenges in Turkey. With 
a total of ten areas, the EIDHR’s intention is to encourage action in as many fields 
as possible despite modest financial resources. The projects funded in 2009-10 
actively push almost all the issues raised by the European Commission’s 2010 
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Progress Report.
42
 Issues raised by transnational NGOs, such as Human Rights 
Watch, were also reflected by EIDHR priorities. For example, the recognition of 
pervasive issues is also reflected in the provision of support to human rights 
activists, referred to by the EU as ‘human rights defenders’.43 The vision of 
protection of human rights activists was first pursued by the 2010 EIDHR, a year 
when the necessity of their protection in Turkey became particularly visible. In 
2010 the ECtHR  had ruled that Turkey had failed to protect the life of Hrant Dink, 
a Turkish-Armenian journalist and human rights defender, or to conduct an 
effective investigation into his January 2007 murder.
44
 Another event was the 
prosecution of the chairs of the Diyarbakır and Siirt branches of the Human Rights 
Association, Muharrem Erbey and Vetha Aydın, for alleged membership in an 
illegal organisation.
45
 By inviting proposals pertaining to the issue of protection for 
activists, the EIDHR has shown to be in tune with the realities of human rights 
activism in Turkey.  
 
In terms of participation, the organisations selected for funding represent 
with relative accuracy the need for stakeholder participation in facilitating human 
rights reform, and it is this participation that the EIDHR seeks to support and 
increase. The NGOs that are chosen as partners conform to a broad notion of civil 
society where the focus is on the enhancement of human rights, democracy, and 
pluralism. The EIDHR only funds large organisations that are deemed as capable 
and effective producers of change. Many of the partner NGOs emerged during the 
tumultuous period of the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the violations suffered not 
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only by their founding members, but also by their current staff. As such, they are as 
independent as possible from government influence, pluralistic in the defence of 
freedoms, and well-positioned to engage citizens in actively pushing for human 
rights reform. This assumption would be questionable if the partner organisations 
principally focused on ingrained dividing lines of group and national solidarity. 
The partner organisations are generally accountable and responsive to citizens’ 
expectations. 
 
EIDHR funding also plays a crucial role in assisting various types of 
organisations to involve stakeholder participation. An example is the Human 
Rights Association branch in Diyarbakır, located in South-East Turkey, which in 
2010 received funding to conduct a project on children’s access to justice in remote 
areas of Turkey, thus expanding participation in geographically remote areas.
46
 In 
addition, the EIDHR supports academic endeavours that act as a check against the 
state and challenge it when it impinges on freedoms. A relevant partner 
organisation is the Association for Liberal Thinking (ALT). The ALT is directed by 
a team of academics from Turkey and engages in the dissemination of information 
on liberal thought, EU-Turkey relations, and Turkey’s fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen criteria.
47
 Within these goals a range of participatory activities occur, 
such as the annual essay competition aimed at students of Turkish universities on a 
topic related to democratic freedoms.
48
  
 
In terms of effectiveness, although it is impossible for this study to evaluate 
the diffuse impact of EIDHR projects on aggregate human rights protection in 
Turkey, it is possible to comment on the manifestation of the EIDHR strategies and 
its management processes. The programmes the EIDHR funds are determined 
following a call for proposals. Calls for proposals can be seen as potentially 
strengthening the effectiveness of the instrument, as they facilitate local ownership 
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and give a sense of responsibility and ‘free will’ to the relevant NGO which is then 
more likely to implement the project. As such, calls for proposals can be seen as a 
non-intrusive method of encouraging human rights promotion ‘from below’. It is 
worth noting that the degree of financial structure and management experience that 
the calls require from NGOs effectively exclude proposals by organisations of 
limited size and resources, without a focused purpose, pragmatic strategy, and clear 
long-term perspective. Despite the possible implications of ruling out grass-roots 
organisations from the eligibility to apply, the managerial set-up of the calls filter 
out untrustworthy partners that would potentially use public money without turning 
in a measurable positive output. This suggests that the effectiveness of the EIDHR 
may be adequate when considered in relation to the nature of the instrument, which 
places non-ideological and effective promotion of human rights at the centre of it. 
 
Should the EU’s policy of funding bottom-up human rights reform in 
Turkey be seen as a manifestation of normative power? The EIDHR mandate to 
export civil society development to Turkey has certain aspects that might put its 
procedural legitimacy under pressure. Firstly, in terms of policy relevance, the EU 
should develop a clearer approach regarding the relationship between financial 
assistance and civil society. The assumption that financial assistance increases civic 
activism and subsequently affects governmental policy is not entirely 
straightforward. In order to enhance policy relevance for the EIDHR within 
Turkey, its developers should conceptualise and articulate the relationship between 
civil society, human rights protection and democracy more clearly. As argued in 
Chapter Two, it is important to note that it is not ‘any’ type of civil society support 
the EU aims for, but a specific kind: one in which civil society is a democratising 
actor with human rights, as specified in EU documents, at the heart of it. This 
approach reflects the idea that material and technical support for the development 
of civil society is important for constructing robust democracies.
49
 However the 
spill-over potential of civil society to the political arena depends not only on the 
vitality and profile of individual associational or advocacy groups, but also on an 
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effective link between civil society as a whole and the political arena.
50
 Crucially, 
the notion of civil society as an effective and relevant producer of change in 
Turkey's societal context is not elaborated in the specific priorities. 
  
Secondly, in terms of participation, the civil society organisations chosen as 
partners within the EIDHR are expected to be profit-driven and ‘entrepreneurial’ in 
defending human rights. The EIDHR supports NGOs that are mission-driven 
enterprises with a market logic, which presumably increases their competition 
against other NGOs, and thus their productivity in human rights promotion. 
However, doubts arise concerning the inclusiveness of this model. In the national 
competition for EIDHR funding in Turkey, small grass-roots NGOs are unable to 
attain funding under the pressure of competition. According to the 2007-10 EIDHR 
Strategy Paper, local organisations without an international framework or reach are 
not eligible to apply for funding.
51
 Although there is no official justification by the 
EU, small organisations might not be generally preferred by international donors 
because their size and limited resources entail that they generally operate with a 
short-term perspective. This point is challenged by Youngs who argued that that 
external assistance which concentrates on a relatively small number of urban and 
strongly westernised NGOs with little grassroots involvement is likely to set up 
tensions between a favoured circle of activists linked to international networks, and 
the broader range of civil society groups struggling to survive.
52  
 
 Another dimension of lack of participation is found in the EIDHR’s 
technical and depoliticised framework of assistance, which persistently 
concentrates funding on non-ideological and secular organisations in Turkey. As 
explained in Chapter Three, civil society in Turkey is characterised by 
misalignment of interests between ideologically diverse human rights NGOs. 
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Selective funding affects the variety of projects, reinforces the unevenness 
characterising the human rights community in Turkey, and hampers efforts to 
advance human rights nationally as common values. The EIDHR does not fund 
joint projects between organisations with seemingly opposing agendas. For 
example, Muslim-based human rights organisations that are positively disposed 
towards the EU have not so far received funds, although the EIDHR has funded 
projects promoting respect for different religious groups.
53
  
 
The EIDHR should focus on enhancing dialogue and cooperation between 
diverse NGOs by inviting joint proposals for projects. It needs to request partner 
projects between diverse organisations, such as professional urban-based NGOs, 
local community initiatives, secular and faith-based organisations, academic-run 
think-tanks, and NGOs led by victims of violations, since all groups have a 
legitimate contribution to make. Specifically, the EIDHR should plan beyond 
single projects and consider a) how it can reach citizens who are not already 
members of NGOs nor particularly politically active, and engage them in exerting 
pressure on the administration; and b) how it can ensure greater understanding of 
the history, political characteristics and context of Turkey in order to design a more 
targeted policy approach. This would ensure increased stakeholder participation, 
thus conforming to a principle of inclusiveness for EU policy. To be sure, 
encouraging diverse human rights NGOs to compile joint projects is demanding. 
Civil society is assumed to be permeated with power relationships that may curtail 
its democratic activity.
54
 An effort at cooperation might be challenged by an 
instinctive resistance to alternative approaches and lack of analytical tools 
regarding successful cooperation with the state. Although the promotion of joint 
projects by the EIDHR might not achieve the ideal answer for Turkey’s human 
rights problems, participation and inclusiveness can only be approximated if a 
broader knowledge base is built from which to start.  
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Thirdly, in terms of achieving effectiveness, the EIDHR is characterised by 
lack of flexibility of action, which manifests itself in the standardised structure of 
the requirements for the acquisition of grants and lack of transparency. The 
publication of the Call for Proposals and the accompanying Annexes is in English 
but not in Turkish. Their publication in English complicates the application process 
for local NGOs. The accompanying documents – specifying, for example, the 
indicators against which the effectiveness of the project should be measured - 
contain highly technical language. Even urbanised organisations that have received 
EIDHR funding on multiple occasions, such as the ALT, have complained that the 
process of submitting a successful proposal is highly complex and bureaucratic.
55
 
The European Commission Delegation in Ankara has attempted to remedy the 
language problem by organising courses to train civil society organisations to apply 
for funding.
56
 Moreover, the projects are almost entirely unknown to the public, 
even in major urban centres, and are not followed by the media. The primary 
means of public information is the general information provided by the 
Commission Delegation website. As a result, most initiatives in rural Turkey are 
unable to access and interpret the relevant information unless they are associates of 
the organisations operating in major Turkish cities, due to weakness in financial or 
administrative capacity (e.g. lack of computers). Encouraging transparency and 
availability of information should clearly be an important part of the Union’s 
application of the EIDHR to Turkey.    
 
This section examined the quality and performance of the EIDHR for 
Turkey, and the implications of the methods through which its policy commitments 
and priorities are implemented into projects. The next step is to examine the policy 
instrument of human rights consultations between EU and Turkey policy-makers. 
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3. Human rights consultations 
 
Direct discussion of human rights issues occurs through the system of 
consultations, which encompass a regular assessment of developments concerning 
the respect for human rights. The objectives of human rights dialogues for each 
candidate state are defined on a case-by-case basis. They do, however, conform to 
the general objectives of the European Union’s Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogues. These objectives include: 
 Discussion of questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on 
human rights; 
 Registration of the concern held by the EU at the human rights situation in 
the country concerned, information-gathering, and endeavouring to improve the 
human rights situation in that country.
57
  
 
The EU has established dialogues with Turkey that follow a particular 
structure. The central negotiating role belongs to the Turkish government and to the 
EU member state holding the rotating Council Presidency. The consultation 
meetings occur at high (ministerial) or at low (bureaucratic) level twice a year, 
either in Ankara, or Brussels, or the capital of the country that holds the rotating 
presidency. Human rights consultations are also held bi-annually within the 
framework of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, discussed further 
on.
58
 The analysis that follows will first discuss the general features of the human 
rights dialogues, namely the ministerial and bureaucratic meetings and the 
meetings of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.  
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The ministerial meetings concern bilateral, state-level negotiations between 
the EU and the national elites of Turkey. They occur once during each six-month 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Ministerial meetings take place in Brussels 
between the EU ‘troika’ (the foreign minister of the country holding the Council 
Presidency, the foreign minister of the incoming Presidency, and the director of the  
European Commission’s Turkey Unit in DG Enlargement) and the Turkish foreign 
minister and chief negotiator.  
 
In the ministerial meetings, the Turkish team is responsible for explaining 
the government’s activity towards fulfilling the human rights requirements raised 
in the annual progress reports and Turkey’s action plans. In this regard, it presents 
official reform efforts, announces upcoming reforms, and responds to follow-up 
questions posed by the EU team regarding specific human rights violations. These 
presentations offer the opportunity to the EU to raise directly both general and 
specific points on each human rights priority on the agenda. Among the issues 
discussed in the dialogues are the ratification by Turkey of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, reform of the justice system, 
and the persecution of human rights defenders.
59
 Aside from information on the 
observance of human rights objectives, the EU team might request financial 
information on the usage of the IPA within the projects of Component I, given that 
it is Turkey’s Ministry of EU Affairs that manages the funds.60   
 
Meetings at lower bureaucratic level occur between officials from the 
Commission and national representatives from Turkey. The Commission 
representatives are experts from DG Enlargement in Brussels or from the Section 
of Political Affairs of the Delegation in Ankara. The Turkish team is constituted by 
government representatives and by local human rights NGOs, which participate in 
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order to discuss the situation of human rights activism in Turkey and the role the 
EU can play in promoting and ensuring its protection.
61
  
 
In the lower-level bureaucratic meetings, the diverse Turkish team engages 
in a structured debate on individual human rights cases, explaining and justifying 
infringements, and highlighting the relevance of the existing national legal 
provisions.
62
 This renders the bureaucratic meetings rather more informative than 
the ministerial meetings. According to a Commission official interviewed in 
Brussels, the presentations are detailed: ‘they announce a number of reforms for 
each and every aspect’.63 The EU team questions the Turkish team on special, 
individual cases. A chance sighting of a newspaper article reporting on an alleged 
case of human rights violation can sometimes form the basis of a whole line of 
questioning.
64
 This way, bureaucratic meetings operate as what is termed a 
‘thematic mechanism’, namely a mechanism dealing with individual cases of 
human rights violations or threatened violations.
65
  
 
A third type of structured human rights dialogue occurs within the 
framework of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC). The EU-
Turkey JPC, established in 1965, is currently the main collaboration forum for 
members of the Turkish Parliament and European Parliament. The main task of the 
JPC is to deliberate on ‘all matters relating to Turkey’s relations with the European 
Union’ as an important platform of EU-Turkey relations.66 As part of its remit, the 
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JPC also deals with individual cases of human rights infringements. In reality, 
issues relating to human rights constitute the major part of the discussions 
conducted in the JPC meetings. The EU-Turkey JPC meetings occur at the request 
of the EP Subcommittee on Human Rights and in the presence of relevant Turkish 
ministers and authorities (e.g. Minister of Justice or EU Affairs). The JPC normally 
meets bi-annually, alternately in Turkey and in one of the work places of the 
European Parliament (Strasbourg or Brussels). The meetings are addressed by 
representatives of the European Parliament (including the Rapporteur on Turkey), 
the EU-Presidency-in-Office, the European Commission, the Turkish government 
and the Turkish Parliament.  
 
JPC meetings are mostly dedicated to the discussion of human rights issues. 
According to the publicly available minutes of the meetings, Turkey’s 
parliamentarians mainly inform the EU team on the country’s efforts for maximum 
implementation of human rights criteria.
67
 The EU team, on the other hand, 
questions its counterparts both on broader reform processes (e.g. the drafting of 
Turkey’s new constitution) and on individual cases (e.g. the imprisonment without 
trial of academics in the Ergenekon case).
68
 In their declarations, Turkish MPs 
might comment on general EU policy towards Turkey and its impact on the ‘rights’ 
of Turkish citizens, such as lack of visa exemption.
69
 They also frequently defend 
the country’s human rights progress, highlighting specific reforms and the dates of 
their adoption,
70
 or claiming that current EU members do not possess a higher 
standard of protection.
71
 As part of the debate they might express concerns about 
inconsistency in EU human rights policy, such as privileging non-Muslims over 
Muslims in the promotion of freedom of religion.
72
 Other statements have criticised 
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the strategy of particular EU member states towards Turkey’s accession, including 
the veto of specific acquis chapters by Cyprus and France.
73
 The minutes of the 
meetings convey that Turkish officials frequently challenge their EU counterparts 
in JPC meetings, but at the same time recognise the JPC as a fruitful platform for 
the EU-Turkey cooperation process.  
 
 
With regard to policy relevance, the main value of the system of EU-Turkey 
human rights consultations concerns the strong political dimension of the 
negotiations. All types of meetings analysed earlier incorporate in the official 
process directly elected political representatives from Turkey (MPs and 
government ministers) as agents accountable not only for human rights reform, but 
also for violations. Engagement of the high executive ensures visibility for the 
EU’s human rights policies domestically, and contains a clear message of priority 
that increases the political weight of human rights issues and the necessity for 
effective policy solutions. Relevance is supported by the fact that the ministerial 
dialogues require from Turkey’s administration reason-giving for human rights 
shortcomings, rather than an interest-based discussion.
74
 Although interest-based 
discussion is not precluded, the process requires that speakers appeal to human 
rights principles and norms to make their points.  Moreover, consultation meetings 
clarify EU benchmarks and enable the Turkish team to clarify its own 
shortcomings. Human rights conditionality being inconclusive, an important means 
for mutual clarification of expectations for both teams is offered in these 
meetings.
75
  
 
With regard to participation, the consultation meetings show participation 
from different actors in the official process. The teams on both sides are quite 
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diverse, including European Commission officials from various different units and 
sections in Brussels and Ankara, EU parliamentarians, the EU Presidency, Turkish 
parliamentarians and governmental ministers, and NGOs from Turkey specialising 
on diverse types of human rights. The JPC meetings enable members of the 
European and Turkish Parliaments, directly elected bodies of rather secondary 
importance in the pre-accession process, to engage in a sincere and open 
communicative process. This dialogue takes place publicly and every document is 
publicly accessible on the European Parliament website. Thus, citizens are able to 
follow and trace back every proposal and justification of human rights reform (or 
lack thereof). This publicity is a precondition for the ability of citizens to be 
informed and indirectly involved in the human rights dialogue. Furthermore, all 
consultation meetings offer a direct channel of interaction with human rights 
defenders. As shown earlier, local human rights NGOs are invited in writing to 
participate in the meetings in order to testify about the problems and progress 
associated with the reforms under review, through direct interaction with the 
delegates. 
  
As to effectiveness, although it is impossible to gauge precisely the actual 
impact of human rights consultations, there are indications that official human 
rights reforms in Turkey may be considered outcomes of the structured human 
rights dialogues. The formal dialogue sessions generally engage high-level officials 
who are directly engaged in the development and delivery of policies and 
programmes that impact on the rights of citizens. More generally, these 
consultations assist in building closer relationships between the representatives of 
the EU and Turkey, generating goodwill and trust which benefits the human rights 
dialogue and the overall relationship between the two actors. This is crucial, given 
that ‘an essential element in human rights dialogues is the government's willingness 
to improve their human rights situation’.76 However, it is important to remember 
that, as with other instruments in the EU human rights policy, the consultations are 
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an incremental process that takes time to bring about change. Measuring their 
impact is methodically difficult under any circumstances. 
 
Although there is little doubt that the EU has established a sound system of 
human rights consultations, there are aspects of the process that merit further 
consideration regarding their quality and performance. The process is characterised 
by several weaknesses that relate to the inherent limitations of any international 
system of human rights consultations, discussed at large by the scholarly literature 
on human rights consultations.
77
  
 
Legitimacy regarding policy relevance is compromised by issues of 
restricted time and resources. The EU team must make decisions as to which 
infringements it can address and which it should overlook, and the time spent 
might make it slow and inflexible. There are a large number of issues that need to 
be covered in the EU-Turkey meetings, especially given the size of the country 
concerned, the scope of its human rights problems, imbalanced regional 
development, and the limited number of meetings that are held. The risk in these 
circumstances is that not all infringements and their causes will be sufficiently 
addressed, and several issues will be neglected or entirely omitted. For example, it 
is normal practice that human rights issues that were addressed in one meeting are 
not addressed in the following meeting a few months later, in order to open up 
scope for discussing other types of human rights.
78
 This may as a result remove the 
possibility of effective follow-up, and seal off the discussion from Turkey's 
national reality at the time. Therefore, an important task for the EU is to determine 
which issues can and ought to be addressed. This leads to a number of crucial 
questions: should EU policy give priority to individual cases or to general human 
rights concerns? Should it address larger societal issues that contribute to human 
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rights violations, or should it restrict itself to the violations, encouraging NGOs to 
address the former? Should it support all categories of rights equally? How can it 
ensure the largest possible participation of stakeholder groups? Adopting a policy 
that corresponds to these questions in every instance requires a highly developed 
and targeted policy design, one which is lacking in the EU’s human rights 
consultations with Turkey.  
 
Quality and performance stemming from participation is compromised by 
issues of involvement and composition of the delegations on both sides. On the EU 
side, there is lack of participation by relevant actors including EU-based 
academics, EU-based NGOs, and the European Parliament (which is not involved 
in the higher and lower bureaucratic meetings). On Turkey’s side, only EIDHR-
funded NGOs are invited to the meetings, raising the same participation concerns 
discussed earlier regarding the inclusiveness of the EIDHR. In addition, the 
delegation of Turkish officials is unbalanced in terms of participation. The 
bureaucratic meetings only engage government officials and are, as such, heavily 
weighted in favour of the leading AKP party without inclusion of the opposition. 
Regional political and public institutions are entirely omitted, and women and 
minorities are underrepresented in the delegations. Similarly, Turkey's 
representatives in the JPC stem almost exclusively from Ankara and Istanbul, 
represent the two major political parties (AKP and CHP), and are mostly male 
political figures belonging to the Turkish majority (no minority politicians 
currently sit on the JPC). More balanced and gender/minority-sensitive 
participation should be considered in order to achieve the following objectives: 
more information exchange, more expertise-based dialogue, and more leverage for 
change. Moreover, a stronger ability for participation could be ensured through 
more public information. Lack of access to documents concerning the bureaucratic 
meetings is a fundamental problem. Often, the only publicly available documents 
are press releases of little substance, and the earlier analysis almost entirely relies 
on interviews with EC officials. 
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Quality from the point of view of effectiveness is notoriously hard to 
measure, primarily because human rights consultations intervene in political 
processes that are hard to grasp and often impossible to control. A report by the 
German Human Rights Institute in 2005 emphasised that ‘there is no generally 
accepted set of human rights indicators or benchmarks... applied to human rights 
dialogues’.79 Accordingly, a 2002 study by the OECD stated that ‘there is currently 
considerable confusion over the purpose, methodology, terminology, and typology 
of indicators [for human rights consultations]’.80 The establishment of a causal link 
between EU-Turkey human rights consultations and visible change, while 
potentially possible at the level of ratifications and national constitution/legislation, 
is much less likely at the level of implementation and long-term guarantees for 
human rights. Therefore, as with the EIDHR, the assessment of procedural 
legitimacy will draw on the consultations’ strategies. It is assumed that whether 
human rights consultations can yield effective policy outcomes is contingent upon 
another two attributes in connection with dialogues: coordination with other human 
rights activities, and impact assessment. 
 
Coordination between human rights consultations and other EU policies of 
human rights promotion does not currently appear to pass the procedural legitimacy 
test. In 2007 the European Parliament published a resolution on this issue entitled 
‘the Functioning of the Human Rights Dialogues and Consultations with Third 
Countries’.81 Here, the EP concluded that consultation activities were not 
sufficiently coordinated with other pre-accession human rights instruments, nor 
properly integrated into EU external human rights policy. In this regard, the EP 
declared that: 
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The fact of conducting a human rights dialogue or consultations with a 
third country should lead to systematic mainstreaming of human rights 
in every sphere of EU cooperation with the country concerned, 
including ... economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries, so that the existence of a human rights dialogue or 
consultations does not constitute an end in itself.
82
  
 
The EP stressed that neither the EC nor the Council have devised a method 
for organising and systematising the human rights consultations, making the results 
impossible to evaluate EU-Turkey consultations are being conducted through a 
variety of structures, formats, and procedures, without sufficient regard for 
consistency and communication between different methods. Bilateral consultations 
between Turkey and individual EU member states are not mainstreamed into the 
EU human rights policy to Turkey neither are the dialogues within multilateral 
fora, such as the Commission on Human Rights or the General Assembly of the 
United Nations
.
 Furthermore, they are not coordinated with the EIDHR and only 
loosely relate to the IPA. According to the EP, lack of strategic coordination 
endangers the effectiveness of the EU’s human rights policy. 
 
The possibility of effectiveness would be strengthened through an EU-led 
assessment of human rights consultations as a policy instrument. Currently, a 
consistent review mechanism is not in place, even though there is a clear need to 
assess their impact on the reform process in Turkey. The EU needs to develop an 
empirically-grounded impact assessment of the conditions under which the 
instrument is likely to succeed in its objectives. The value of impact assessment 
lies in developing understanding of the most effective mix of instruments, ensuring 
transparency, credibility, but also for the ability of the EU and Turkey teams to 
learn.
83
 Through monitoring activities and results, evaluating ‘before’ and ‘after’, 
and ex-post observations, a review mechanism would help human rights 
consultations contribute to sustainable human rights protection in Turkey. In 
parallel, the Council of Ministers could invite proposals from other EU institutions 
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or from groups of experts in both EU and Turkey on how to best achieve a policy 
of human rights support that will not lead to potential repercussions once Turkey 
accedes to the EU.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Chapter Four operationalised a legitimacy-based approach for evaluating 
the EU human rights promotion to Turkey. It examined the function of specific 
instruments of human rights promotion and how they fall short of being able to 
provoke a policy transformation that would sufficiently address the profound 
shortcomings of Turkey’s system of human rights protection. The policy tools 
under consideration were the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the 
European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the human 
rights consultations conducted under the aegis of the European Commission and 
the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Despite their evident strengths in 
terms of design and organisational principles, the procedural attributes of the 
instruments (funding allocation, project selection, and assessment of impact) do not 
adequately benefit the disadvantaged groups they are designed to protect to the 
highest degree possible. They are not sufficiently contextualised, inclusive or 
procedurally effective to unlock further progress on specific human rights issues 
and open up space for sustainable improvement to Turkey’s human rights record. 
The present chapter also critiqued the EU for focusing its engagement with Turkey 
on key pressure points while at the same time refraining from developing ways to 
encourage the country to diagnose its historical and developing human rights 
problems more accurately and inclusively.  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical analysis of this 
chapter is that the oft-quoted proposition that normative power Europe has the 
ability to shape the ‘normal’ in partner states should emerge in the context of its 
procedural propriety. In this respect, the issue is not merely about being a 
203 
 
 
normative power through historical context, or about becoming one through the 
development of instruments of human rights promotion. Rather, it is about the 
ability of the EU effect change in vulnerable situations, and mitigate the structural 
obstacles to human rights protection, according to its norm-laden vision and moral 
claims. Simply put, EU normative power should ensure consistency between what 
it claims to do and what it does. The investigation of the EU’s procedural 
legitimacy showed that the actions of the EU are important and not only its 
intrinsic properties. Drawing from the analysis of Chapter Four, Chapter Five will 
further develop the critique of the legitimacy of EU human rights promotion by 
focusing on the EU’s legitimacy (or lack thereof) in the responses of political and 
civil society actors in Turkey. 
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      Chapter Five 
                 Legitimacy as Recognition by the ‘Other’: 
Turkey and Internal Dilemmas of Implementation 
 
Introduction   
After analysing the major EU procedural instruments towards Turkey in 
Chapter Four, this chapter examines the diffusion of EU human rights norms 
through the positions adopted by Turkey’s major political parties and non-
governmental human rights organisations. The purpose of this chapter is to show 
that domestic political and societal actors in Turkey who are disadvantaged in their 
domestic power position embrace EU human rights norms as legitimate, whereas 
domestic actors who feel threatened in their domestic position reject them as a risk 
to Turkey’s dominant standard of legitimacy. This chapter argues that the policy’s 
efficacy is dependent upon what Chapter Two explained as recognition of EU 
normative-laden reform framework by the ‘other’. This refers to legitimacy based 
on perceptions of compatibility with domestic standards from the point of view of 
the recipients (rather than independent criteria). To accept EU policy as legitimate, 
political and civil society actors have to understand their political interests or those 
of their community as congruent with those of the EU. The previous analysis of the 
procedural characteristics of the policies will thus be strengthened with an 
examination of the substantive views of domestic actors. 
 
The argument is made in two main sections. The first section presents the 
evidence that Turkey’s main political parties view the EU human rights 
requirements as both a supporter and an obstacle to their political interests, through 
challenging and strengthening the Kemalist standard of legitimacy simultaneously. 
The second section analyses the perceptions of legitimacy held by civil society 
organisations working on human rights and how they differ from those of political 
actors. The empirical analysis draws from interviews with human rights 
organisations and EU officials in Ankara, policymakers’ speeches, media reports 
(Turkish and international), and the wider literature on Turkey’s relations with the 
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EU. The chapter concludes by highlighting the significance for the EU to enhance 
its understanding of Turkey’s contextual realities, with the aim to apply a more 
inclusive human rights support which captures Turkey’s past, present, and outlook. 
 
1.   The AKP and human rights: ‘Europe as the answer’ 
 
This section will discuss the development of the governing pro-Islamic AKP 
before evaluating how EU norm diffusion relates to the party’s domestic power and 
interests. The starting point is that the AKP has its own normative framework for 
what it considers legitimate behaviour and legitimate demands within the sphere of 
national decision-making and human rights reform. The standard of legitimacy in 
AKP politics has emerged by what can be termed ‘conservative democracy’,1 
‘conservatism without tradition’,2 and a ‘synthesis of liberalism with traditional 
values’.3 It will be argued that the EU human rights requirements offered the AKP 
an external legitimacy standard that advantaged the party as a domestic actor and 
offered gains in its competition with other domestic parties. In particular, EU-
induced human rights reform offered the governing party new opportunities for 
policies advancing freedom of religion and for limiting the domestic power of the 
military and judicial establishment. Therefore the AKP, as a pro-Islamic party 
whose predecessors were systematically disadvantaged by the deeply entrenched 
Kemalist Orthodoxy in Turkey, had strong incentives to embrace the EU’s external 
standard of legitimacy. Yet, following a period of rapid human rights reform (2002-
2005), the AKP has distanced itself from the EU and only selectively promotes 
human rights. It will be argued that these shifts in the party’s interests have 
challenged the AKP’s recognition of the EU as a normative power and have led the 
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party to search for alternative sources of legitimacy rooted in its own domestic 
power structures. 
 
The AKP was established in 2001 and has been governing the country, 
through successive electoral victories (2002, 2008, and 2011) since 2002. 
Following its electoral programmes, the cornerstones of AKP policy were presented 
concisely in a 2003 document entitled Conservative Democracy (Muhafazakar 
Demokrasi).
4
 The AKP claimed to acknowledge and promote the principles of 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, secularism coupled with respect to 
religion as an important institution of humanity, modern conservatism open to 
innovation, and a free market economy. On the basis of its programme, the AKP’s 
standard of legitimacy appeared to be founded not only on the free exercise of 
human rights, but also on bridging the gap between a strong state and weak society. 
Policy output would be regarded as legitimate if it did not run within narrow and 
divisive ideological frameworks, and if it did not infringe the freedoms of religious 
citizens. According to Çınar, the AKP’s strategy transcended national political 
differences and de-emphasised competing ideologies in Turkish politics.
5
 The AKP 
principles served to motivate a generally constructive and ameliorative relationship 
with the EU, whose core demands appeared easy to reconcile the AKP’s normative 
agenda of ‘common EU-Turkey values’ of freedom and democracy.  
 
The AKP was not the first political party in Turkey to embrace pro-Islamic 
values, but it was one of the first to abandon efforts to use Islamist tenets as a 
standard of legitimacy and to fully embrace European norms instead.
6
 The Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi), the AKP’s predecessor, was forced out of coalition 
government by the military in 1997 under the accusation of espousing anti-secular 
activities. The Turkish Constitutional Court subsequently banned it from political 
participation in 1998. The Welfare Party was replaced by the Virtue Party, which 
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distanced itself from pro-Islamic politics and expressed commitment to secularism, 
pluralism, and EU membership for a democratic Turkey. Having framed its overall 
party programme in accordance with the legitimacy framework of EU norms, the 
leadership of the Virtue Party decided to take the case of the Welfare Party’s 
closure to the European Court of Human Rights. The belief was that the ECtHR 
would reverse the decision for dissolution of the Welfare Party in accordance with 
European norms of equality and religious freedom. Nevertheless, the ECtHR ruled 
against the Welfare Party. It upheld the dissolution by the Turkish Constitutional 
Court on the basis that some former members of the party had voiced the 
possibility of establishing Sharia law in Turkey. The Virtue Party was also forced to 
shut down in 2001 for having violated the secular principles of the Turkish 
constitution. The above events led pro-Islamic politicians to the belief that in order 
to maintain and promote their political agenda, both European backing and self-
imposed limitations on the religious ambitions of a pro-Islamic party were 
necessitated. Thus, when the AKP succeeded the Virtue Party in 2001, it 
constructed an alternative legitimacy framework for itself grounded on EU norms 
and ‘common EU-Turkey values’. The party emphasised secular democracy and 
framed religious goals as demands for human rights and equality for all segments 
of society, irrespective of ideological differences and social cleavages.  
 
Departing from the position held by the Welfare Party, after its first election 
(2002) the AKP championed Turkey’s EU integration and actively promoted human 
rights and democratic reforms (as discussed in Chapter Three). The identification 
of the AKP’s political agenda with EU norms was given expression in the human 
rights debate conducted within the realms of the AKP. AKP representatives 
presented the EU as an important normative project in which Turkey’s national 
identity was rooted. They offered to submit voluntarily to the pressures for 
behavioural change, and their acceptance attested to the idea of the EU as a 
normative power. Thus, any attempt to construct a legitimacy framework based on 
Islamist values was abandoned from the start. Former Minister of Interior 
Abdulkadir Aksu stated in Parliament that integration into the EU would ensure 
that Turkey’s political development remained tied to universal values such as 
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human rights, democracy, pluralism, and development of civil society.
7 
According 
to AKP parliamentarian Ruhi Akgaröz, human rights and democratic reforms were 
‘political steps... towards civilisation’.8 Prime Minister Erdoğan reflected the idea 
of normative congruence with the EU by declaring that even if the accession 
process were terminated, Ankara would still implement the Copenhagen Criteria 
and internalise these under the name of ‘Ankara Criteria’.9EU requirements, 
according to this idea, would be accepted by the government as normal: ‘Our goal 
is not simply acceding to the European Union. Our goal is to construct a country 
that is more democratic, free, and peaceful for our people’.10 Nevertheless, these 
statements can more appropriately be described as instrumental in an attempt to 
successfully distance the AKP from the Islamist agenda of its predecessors and 
secure its political survival. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, in the period 2002-2005 the AKP embarked 
on a series of rapid human rights reforms. These were conducted through a strategy 
of ‘democratisation via Europeanisation’, which de-emphasised national 
differences and focused on the AKP’s standard of legitimacy as one that was 
‘above politics’.11 However, the human rights agenda adopted by the AKP left 
room for an interpretation that pointed to the instrumental way in which the party 
was using the reform process. The AKP was viewed with mistrust by Kemalist 
elites and opposition parties who suspected the pro-Islamic governing party for 
attempting to use EU integration as a vehicle to reconfigure the official ideology.
12
 
Scholars have provided an explanatory framework for AKP policies by frequently 
labelling the party and its leadership as pragmatic,
13
 and have argued that the trait 
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of rationalism also underlines the AKP’s attitude towards EU human rights 
requirements.
14
 These reflections can be placed within the body of literature on 
rational choice and cost-benefit calculations in the adoption of the EU’s normative 
framework by candidate states, discussed in Chapter Two. For the AKP leadership, 
the pursuit of EU membership not only provided a legitimacy framework for its 
policy goals; it was also a useful opportunity structure that would help protect it 
from the power of the military, stay in office and carry out its declared political 
programme. In this sense, human rights reform was likely the result of cost-benefit 
calculations towards the EU, whereby the AKP embraced EU norms because they 
offered the party new advantages in competition against domestic actors that 
embraced Kemalist orthodoxy. 
 
In a similar vein, the 2002-2005 reform process seems to confirm a well-
known position within EU enlargement studies that EU-induced norms 
‘institutionalise a standard of legitimacy that is based on the constitutive norms and 
values of the recipient community’.15 The AKP identified EU human rights 
promotion as a source of legitimacy across two broad dimensions: a) the perception 
that the EU gave flesh to the main principles of conservative democracy upon 
which the AKP was founded, with religious freedom featuring prominently; and b) 
the perception that the human rights norms would guarantee the survival of the 
AKP in the domestic political arena against competing parties that constructed it as 
a menace to the continuation of the status quo. In this regard, EU human rights 
promotion offered legitimacy to AKP policies as an effective solution to domestic 
policy challenges.
16
 After all, the AKP would not be able to extend the religious 
freedoms of its Muslim/conservative electoral base and curb military involvement 
                                                                                                                                       
Turkish Policy Quarterly vol.7 no: 3 (2008) p.85 (83-95); Göl, A. ‘The Identity of Turkey: Muslim 
and Secular’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 30 no: 4 (2009) p. 795–811; Jacoby, T. ‘Identity Politics, 
Turkey, and the European Union’. Mediterranean Politics, vol.15 no: 1 (2010) p.113-117 (109-119) 
14
Fisher Onar, N. ‘Constructing Turkey Inc: the Discursive Anatomy of a Domestic and Foreign 
Policy Agenda’. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol.19 no: 4 (2011) p.466 (463-473) 
15
 Schimmelfennig, F. ‘EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: 
Consistency and Effectiveness’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.  15 no: 6 (2008) p.918 
(918-937) 
16
 Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.11 no: 
4 (2004) p.662 (661-679) 
210 
 
 
in politics without the leverage of the EU norms. This is because EU human rights 
promotion serves the benefit of membership in a Union where good governance 
overrules doctrinal attachment to state control over the individual, and where issues 
of freedom and equality for unpopular groups are not set aside in favour of rigid 
interpretations of secularism and national heterogeneity.
17 
Consequently, the AKP 
granted legitimacy to EU human rights promotion through an approach of internal 
incentives, which perceived the EU as an anchor that would discard suspicions of 
an alleged Islamist agenda and would place AKP reforms under its surveillance and 
‘ownership’. This contests the previous statements by Turkish politicians who 
claimed to recognise the EU as a normative power. Their statements appear more in 
line with those of strategic actors who engage with the EU when its power of 
attraction helps them achieve preferred outcomes. 
 
At the same time, the AKP constructed EU human rights requirements as 
aligned with domestic audiences and the preferences of the people of Turkey. 
Public support for EU-induced change confirms the currently prevailing argument 
in normative power Europe studies that the EU should be found to be legitimate in 
the eyes of the (non-European) people.
18
 Even though the AKP core electorate was 
split on the question of EU membership, the party presented EU requirements as 
compatible with and fostering freedom of religion and the socio-economic rights of 
the hard-working masses. Public support for EU accession was at a high 70% in 
2005.
19
 In national and municipal election campaigns it often portrayed pro-secular 
and Eurosceptic opponents as autocratic ‘elites’ who only superficially adhered to 
western norms.
20
 At the same time, the party attempted to reach out to diverse parts 
of the electorate and improve their position through demonstrating adherence to 
‘Europe’. The most visible initiative adopted by the government was the so-called 
Kurdish opening, in the form of a ‘National Unity Project’. In fulfilment of EU 
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requirements, the AKP government granted several cultural and linguistic rights to 
the Kurdish population, made efforts to improve the social and economic 
conditions of the South-East region, and initiated a process of disarmament and 
dissolution of the PKK without military action. The human rights requirements of 
the EU and the AKP’s demonstration of adherence to the EU’s standard of 
legitimacy helped these efforts and gained the endorsement of the human rights 
policies by the Kurdish electorate.
21
  
 
Even more important for the recognition of the EU norms was the 
endorsement of the ‘democratisation via Europeanisation’ strategy by Turkey’s 
major business associations. The ascent of the AKP to government has often been 
interpreted as the emancipation of the new middle classes of entrepreneurs in 
eastern Turkey, the so-called ‘Islamic capital’,22 or more widely known as 
‘Anatolian tigers’.23 These are characterised by strong informal, religious networks 
and represented by the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(MÜSIAD). MÜSIAD, which prior to 1999 was staunchly Eurosceptic, shifted its 
position and embraced a moderate pro-EU attitude with the rise of the AKP.
24
 It 
demanded the extension of human rights and fundamental freedoms from the 
government and a new democratic constitution. The association of secular business 
interests in Turkey is the highly influential Turkish Industrialist’s and Business 
Association (TÜSIAD). TÜSIAD played a significant role in the major wave of 
EU-induced reforms accomplished under the first AKP government.
25
 With EU 
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membership as a reference point, it pressured for reform in controversial areas: 
freedom of expression, prevention of torture and ill-treatment, minority rights, 
independence of the judiciary, and civil-military relations.
26
 
 
Recent analyses of the AKP, whether critical or supportive of its 
‘democratisation via Europeanisation’ agenda, have emphasised the change the 
party has undergone since 2005 and the stagnation of its human rights reform 
programme.
27
 In the course of less than a decade, the government has conducted a 
reversal of policy and has become visibly Eurosceptic. Moreover, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan has been accused of authoritarian tendencies that have created local and 
international doubts about whether he is genuinely committed to viable reform.
28
 
These include undemocratic public statements, authorisation of lethal police force 
against peaceful demonstrations, limitations on the advocacy and fundraising 
activities of NGOs not affiliated to the AKP, detention without trial, and torture in 
detention, among other things. Since 2012, Turkey is the world’s leading country 
with journalists in jail, overriding China and Iran.
29
 Some analysts have argued that 
the AKP leadership has used EU conditionality as a vehicle to replace the state’s 
totalising Kemalist discourse with a new but equally totalising Islamist discourse 
which, like its predecessor, subordinates state to society in a paternalistic and 
illiberal fashion.
30
 It would seem that in contradiction to past claims, the AKP 
leadership has distanced itself from the EU’s ‘standard of legitimacy’ and no longer 
adheres to human rights as universal values applicable to Turkey.
31 
What happened 
to precipitate this regression?  
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Various accounts have attempted to resolve the paradox of Turkey’s ‘reform 
fatigue’. Following the top-down conditionality approach, one could draw from the 
external incentives model of conditionality and the credibility of the EU’s 
membership perspective in particular. Advocates of the external incentives model 
would argue that double standards of EU behaviour towards Turkey (perceived or 
real) have increased the domestic cost of undertaking EU-required reforms and thus 
limited the AKP’s motivation and capacity.32 If the EU appears more partial than 
impartial during the processes of promoting human rights reform, then it 
contradicts one of the core principles of normative power Europe (‘leading by 
example’) and the normative content of human rights promotion will no longer be 
accepted. 
 
Indeed, the AKP has challenged EU ‘hypocrisy’ on three leading fronts. The 
first is a perception of a ‘lesser’ degree of human rights protection in European 
countries. The EU has been understood as an inconsistent actor that imposes human 
rights criteria on Turkey that several of its own member-states themselves do not 
themselves fulfill.
33 
The alleged lesser standards of human rights protection in 
Europe have led the AKP to argue that Turkey is currently the most reformist 
government in Europe, despite all political obstacles.
34 
Secondly, perceptions of 
double standards are linked to a statement by the European Commission’s 2004 
Enlargement Strategy report that Turkey’s pre-accession process should be ‘an 
open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand’.35 The 
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reference to an ‘open-ended process’ was interpreted as an indicator of the 
‘moving’ nature of EU expectations and lack of EU commitment to membership, 
which affects the AKP’s incentive for human rights reform.36 Thirdly, the AKP 
criticised the EU’s annual monitoring process of Turkey’s human rights and 
democracy record as evidence of EU hypocrisy. Turkish politicians have tended to 
view EU recommendations on human rights and democratic reform as subjective, 
poorly researched, and rather sweeping and general in their criticism. For example, 
the release of the European Commission’s 2012 Progress Report caused an ardent 
reaction by the AKP, which for the first time released its own counter-report that 
challenged the objectivity of the EU report and highlighted Turkey’s reforms over 
the past year.
37
    
 
However, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the interaction of 
domestic Turkish politics with EU human rights promotion is more complex than 
argued by the top-down conditionality approach and Manners’ original definition of 
normative power Europe (a power that shapes conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
international politics). Instead, this chapter argues that the domestic power 
positions, social cleavages and interests of political parties in Turkey determine the 
processes of change induced by EU human rights promotion. The legitimacy of EU 
norms is evaluated by political actors in Turkey according to their potential utility 
in domestic politics. In accordance with a ‘logic of consequences’, the AKP 
adopted external human rights norms because they provided the government with 
significant advantages in the domestic power struggle against the dominant 
Kemalist elite and the Kemalist opposition party. According to Baudner, once the 
additional resources provided by EU norms decreased in value and could be 
replaced by domestic sources of legitimacy, the enthusiasm for EU accession and 
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the efforts to comply with EU human rights requirements increasingly slowed 
down.
38
 
 
Stemming from the above, the AKP government’s reform fatigue can be 
explained according to the idea that EU norms are no longer valuable in the pursuit 
of the party’s domestic interests. At present, the leadership and representatives of 
the AKP appear to have realised that EU was not as effective in the pursuit of 
freedom of religion as they had initially envisaged. The AKP’s interpretation of EU 
human rights norms is not always in line with the EU understanding. When, for 
example, it attempted to include the criminalisation of adultery in the proposed 
amendments to the Turkish Penal Code in 2004, the EU reacted firmly to such a 
possibility. Another example was the 2008 attempt to reverse the headscarf ban in 
education and the civil service, which did not meet with EU support. Also, 
although the AKP promoted the case of Leyla Şahin to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the ECtHR rejected the case.
39
 Consequently, a growing resistance 
towards the EU’s normative self-representation emerged within the AKP. 
Furthermore, the decline in public support for EU membership made it difficult for 
the governing party to seek electoral coalition and consensus for a wide agenda of 
reform. Domestic resistance to the EU came not only from the disillusioned 
governing party, but from an increasingly unenthusiastic public that doubted the 
EU’s commitment to Turkey and the EU’s capacity to benefit the country (public 
support to EU membership stood at 44% in 2013, while 20% believed accession 
would be a ‘good thing’).40 Moreover, AKP-induced strategies and reforms that 
curbed the powers of the military and subordinated the higher judiciary to 
government power meant that the AKP no longer necessitated the ‘umbrella’ of EU 
norms as a guarantor of its political survival. In particular, the Ergenekon 
investigation seriously weakened the position of the military and shifted the 
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balance power in Turkey in favour of the AKP.
41
 Consequently, the AKP could now 
utilise the state executive and the judiciary as domestic resources and as alternative 
sources of legitimacy. 
 
This section has argued that Turkey’s progress towards human rights reform 
can be better explained by the rational choices of the AKP government, rather than 
by the influence of EU normative power as able to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
Turkey’s human rights protection. This situation has recently limited the political 
space for the continuation of human rights reforms, and has marked a reversal in 
the AKP government’s EU policy at the expense of individuals suffering from 
human rights violations or state repression. At the same time, exposing the non-
normative basis of the EU’s ‘hypocritical’ attitude towards Turkey has become a 
political tool for the AKP government, which has challenged the EU standard of 
legitimacy and has shifted its preference towards alternative sources of legitimacy 
(economic success, pro-Islamic values, erosion of military power). These findings 
– though they do not cover Turkey’s entire political spectrum – contest the 
conceptualisation of the EU as a normative power in Turkey based on the attitudes 
and understandings of the ‘non-European’ partners. The EU did succeed in framing 
the domestic discourse and policy responses of the AKP. Nevertheless, it was not 
able to influence the perceptions of political actors and the inter-subjective political 
environment that acts as a barrier to sustainable human rights reform. Although this 
by no means excludes the possibility that human rights norms will in the long run 
acquire their own path dependency, at present their durability appears insecure. 
 
2.  The CHP and human rights: ‘European norm rejection’ 
 
The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) is Turkey’s 
oldest party, formed by Kemal Atatürk in 1924 on the basis of the ‘six arrows’ 
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(founding principles) of the Kemalist orthodoxy. It was the only political party in 
Turkey until 1950, becoming virtually synonymous with the state and formulating 
its ideology without any organised political opposition. The ideological substance 
of CHP policy has traditionally been Kemalist orthodoxy (especially secularism 
and nationalism), western values, and a social-democratic outlook (the CHP is an 
associate member of the Party of European Socialists). The CHP has traditionally 
supported Turkey’s path to the EU as a natural extension of the vision of 
modernisation and Westernisation.
42
 Party leader İsmet İnönü signed the Ankara 
Agreement in 1963, and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit signed Turkey’s 
candidature document in 1999. Yet, the CHP’s position towards human rights 
reform has been less enthusiastic, and took a sharp turn following the rise of the 
AKP. In fact, the party opposed the AKP government’s human rights reforms by 
taking legal action against several of them, and accused the AKP of infringing 
domestic standards of legitimacy through its pursuit of EU-induced reforms.
43
 This 
section will discuss the CHP’s understandings of EU human rights promotion as 
they emerged in the context of its interaction and opposition to the AKP policies. 
 
Several scholars have emphasised that the CHP’s human rights agenda has 
transformed negatively over time. Güneş-Ayata, for example, drew on the party’s 
history to argue that the CHP started as a committed proponent of rights and 
freedoms at its inception (religious freedom, women’s rights), perceiving 
democratisation as ‘a culture where the right to be different and tolerance of that 
right are... preconditions for coexistence [in Turkey]’.44 However, according to 
Ciddi, after the rise of the AKP, the CHP replaced an accommodating and ‘rights-
based’ approach to sensitive issues with concerns for national unity and national 
security.
 45 
Kubicek highlighted that the party viewed EU demands regarding the 
Kurdish issue as going ‘too far’ and that the EU was playing into the hands of the 
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AKP, which ‘uses EU harmonisation as an excuse to bolster a religious way of life 
over Turkish society’.46 As argued by Öniş, a strong and defensive nationalism in 
the CHP as well as a narrow and authoritarian understanding of secularism has led 
to grown Euroscepticism in the post-2005 era, and has strengthened the party 
against religious conservatives and Kurdish nationalists. In these views, CHP 
attitudes emphasise that Turkey should fulfil EU criteria, but on the basis of 
equality and EU respect for the founding principles of the Turkish Republic.
47
 
 
Following the AKP’s rise to power, the CHP reflected a growing 
preoccupation with the governing party’s human rights policies. In fact, it has been 
argued that the CHP’s European policy consisted of providing evidence to the 
Turkish public that the AKP had infringed domestic standards of legitimacy, even 
when it pursued reforms that were demanded by the EU in the annual progress 
reports.
48
 The CHP approach might even represent a conspicuous indication of 
‘return to Kemalism’, given that prior to the 2002 elections CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal had attempted a programmatic renewal and reform of Kemalist orthodoxy 
that would reconcile it with ethno-religious rights (‘New Left’ and ‘Anatolian Left’ 
programmes), only to retreat from these reformist positions as a response to AKP 
policy. Indeed, Baudner asserted that the CHP’s reform outlook has been steeped in 
the AKP’s challenge of rigid Kemalist orthodoxy and the ensuing power struggle 
between the two major parties.
49
 In contrast to the AKP, the CHP did not attempt to 
infuse EU norms into its political agenda in order to increase its domestic 
legitimacy. Instead, it counted on the military and higher judiciary establishment to 
provide it with power and opportunity resources in the domestic political arena. It 
is not coincidental, therefore, that after the AKP came to power, the CHP firmly 
defended Kemalist orthodoxy in deeming EU-induced human rights reform as 
illegitimate. There have been two aspects to the CHP’s concerns about the 
legitimacy of EU human rights promotion: that the AKP and its EU-induced human 
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rights reforms are unconstitutional, and that the EU is not committed to a credible 
membership perspective for Turkey. 
 
Although the CHP stated that it supported Turkey’s EU membership 
perspective in principle, it opposed nearly all the reforms conducted by the AKP. 
With regard to the reform packages addressing specific EU requirements, in 2008 
the CHP referred 16 adopted laws to the Turkish Constitutional Court, some of 
which were intended to introduce EU-induced reforms (e.g. amendments to the 
Law on the public service broadcaster to include Kurdish, amendment to the Law 
on Municipalities). In February 2008, the Turkish Parliament adopted a Law on 
Foundations which addressed a number of issues faced by religious minorities 
regarding the acquisition and management of property. This law was subsequently 
vetoed by then President Ahmet Sezer.
50
 At the same time, the CHP was reluctant 
to agree to the reform of the 1982 Constitution, even though it was adopted under 
military rule and had been considered illiberal by the EU. In 2008 the AKP 
developed a new draft constitution which envisaged, among other things, reverting 
the legal meaning of the word ‘Turk’ to ‘citizen living in Turkey’, anti-corruption 
measures, expansion of religious freedoms, and curbing the powers of the military. 
Nevertheless, the draft constitution never went to parliamentary vote after the CHP 
ruled out cooperation with the AKP, making it difficult for the governing party to 
secure two-thirds of the parliamentary majority. At a speech to the CHP caucus in 
August 2009, party leader Deniz Baykal declared: ‘We don’t think there is any 
need to change the constitution’s basic philosophy. We say ‘no’ to changing the 
constitution just to suit the AKP. Let the AKP adapt itself to the constitution’.51 
 
 In February 2008, the AKP passed a constitutional amendment that lifted the 
headscarf ban in university education. Deniz Baykal accused the governing party of 
using EU requirements to erode secularism and attack the Kemalist standard of 
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legitimacy. In response, Ali Babacan, minister of foreign affairs, asserted that 
Turkey lifted the ban in order to comply with EU norms of freedom of religion and 
respect to private life. This provoked a denial by EU officials, who replied that they 
had not recommended lifting the headscarf ban since there was no common 
standard on the issue in the EU. The CHP subsequently filed a case to the 
Constitutional Court against lifting the headscarf ban, and in March 2008 the chief 
prosecutor demanded the closure of the AKP under the accusation of anti-secular 
activities. The Turkish Constitutional Court reinstated the headscarf ban but 
stopped short of ruling in favour of AKP closure. This outcome occurred after 
strong warnings by the EU that a ban on the AKP would be a breach of the 
Copenhagen Criteria and would offer sufficient grounds for suspending 
membership negotiations.
52
 Instead, the Court ruled that the party’s treasury 
subsidy would be cut by half. The crisis in Turkish politics in 2008 demonstrated 
that the CHP and the pro-Kemalist elite not only opposed the legitimacy of AKP 
reforms; they also opposed the legitimacy of the party’s existence itself. 
Additionally, the AKP’s indictment indicated that the legitimacy of the EU human 
rights norms was embedded (and dependent upon) domestic power positions and 
interests, rather than any implicit or explicit EU ‘force for good’ that might frame 
such norms. 
  
Another AKP initiative that met with opposition concerned a number of 
democratisation initiatives to address minority rights, including Kurdish rights, 
freedom of worship for the Alevi religious community, and socio-economic 
integration of the Roma (2009). According to the government, the aim of the 
initiatives was to strengthen the social unity and cohesion of Turkey through a 
democratic debate on rights and freedoms.
53
 Supported by the EU, the AKP 
government assumed that it would gain political support and popular consent 
simply because the initiative, primarily designed to resolve the Kurdish question, 
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would signify the end of the decades-old low-intensity war between the Turkish 
military and the PKK.
54
 Yet, such a consensus was not achieved, because the CHP 
and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) 
strongly opposed the initiative on the basis that it risked the national unity and 
territorial integrity of Turkey. Accusations of the initiative lacking a conclusive 
strategy and being hypocritical were also expressed by the opposition.
55
 The CHP’s 
strict refusal to accept a pro-Kurdish democratic opening demonstrated that it did 
not recognise the attempt (or the right) of the AKP to set national pluralism as a 
new ‘normal’ in Turkey’s political life in accordance with EU standards. The 
contest over legitimacy between the two parties invoked their conflicting agendas 
and entailed power relations,
56
 which confronted the EU with the reality that in 
Turkey’s dynamic political environment, the principles of ‘normative power 
Europe’ might not be a magnet. 
 
The CHP strategy of comprehensive challenge against the legitimacy of AKP 
human rights reforms continued with the referendum on constitutional changes of 
12 September 2010. The new package of amendments suggested by the AKP 
primarily focused on restructuring the judiciary, with which it had clashed in the 
past, and gave less emphasis to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the 
area of human rights, the draft constitution introduced new provisions (and 
expanded previous ones) on children’s rights, gender equality, and labour rights. It 
also envisaged the establishment of a human rights Ombudsman. Similarly to the 
2008 draft constitution, the AKP was the sole party supporting the amendments. 
Following combative and mutually demeaning debates in Parliament between the 
government and the opposition,
57
 the three parliamentary opposition parties (CHP, 
MHP, and the Democratic Left Party) voted against the amendments while the AKP 
majority voted in favour. President Abdullah Gül then signed the amendments and 
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presented them to a referendum, which saw a clear majority (58%) endorse the new 
constitution. During the campaign period, the CHP, backed by the armed forces and 
the higher judiciary,
58
 attempted to convince the electorate to reject the proposed 
changes.
59
  The new leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, explained in a public 
letter to Brussels that the CHP’s primary reason for opposing the constitution was 
‘the AKP government’s efforts to create a dictatorship of the majority on the basis 
of its majority in Parliament, and by holding the whole society under coercion’.60  
 
Although the strategy of opposing the legitimacy of the AKP’s 
democratisation initiatives continued with the 2010 Constitution, it is worth noting 
that the new leadership of the CHP conducted a clear reversal of the party’s earlier 
position of norm rejection. It abandoned the previous populist anti-democratisation 
strategy based on ‘defensive nationalism’ and stringent Kemalist orthodoxy.61  The 
new CHP leadership has adopted a pro-EU attitude and engaged in a reformist pro-
democratic discourse, arguing that the AKP was liable for human rights violations 
and national disunity.
62
 Upon becoming the new leader of the CHP, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu attempted a programmatic renewal of Kemalist orthodoxy that would 
reconcile secularism and nationalism with pluralist democracy. Thus, after the old 
CHP leadership attempted to convince the Turkish electorate that the AKP had 
infringed standards of legitimacy in compliance to the EU, the new CHP leadership 
now criticised the AKP for authoritarian tendencies and failure to promote 
sustainable human rights reform for all citizens of Turkey.
63
 For instance, the CHP 
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representation to the EU describes the party’s vision for EU-related human rights 
reform as one asking for ‘better fulfilment of the EU’s Copenhagen political 
criteria by Turkey’.64 Kılıçdaroğlu invoked his party’s attempt to end the AKP’s 
challenge against the EU standard of legitimacy in a recent article in the Wall 
Street Journal, where he claimed that ‘freedoms of speech, of assembly and of the 
press no longer apply in Turkey... My CHP is committed to working towards the 
restoration of genuine democracy and fundamental freedoms in Turkey’.65 Since 
2010, the CHP has gradually come to accept the EU human rights norms and 
democratic principles as a standard of legitimacy for party behaviour and demands. 
 
Why did the CHP originally challenge the legitimacy of EU-induced human 
rights reform (post-1999 and 2004 European Councils), and what precipitated the 
reversal of its position? Facing the need to establish itself as the representative of 
the pro-Kemalist electorate and the bearer of the official state ideology, an 
intransigent opposition to human rights reform seemed like a safe option. The 
acceptance of EU norms and values as a standard of legitimacy would have risked 
the CHP’s relationship with the armed forces and the higher judiciary, which have 
traditionally been a firm source of power and opportunity structures for the party 
(with the exception of the 1980 military coup’s ban against the CHP). If the CHP 
reformulated its normative framework according to human rights, it would be 
endorsing the AKP’s pro-Islamic credentials and its attempt to curb the powers of 
the military and judiciary. Nevertheless, after the AKP’s constitutional reforms 
limited the power of the judiciary, and following the firm stance against the 
military during the Ergenekon trial, the bureaucratic state elite has lost power to an 
extent that in the twentieth century would be unfathomable. With the Kemalist 
legitimacy framework being put seriously into question, the CHP turned towards 
the EU and began to utilise EU human rights and democratic norms to challenge 
the overarching power of the AKP over politics, religion, and social life in Turkey. 
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The fact that at present CHP representatives view EU human rights 
promotion in more universalist lines does not mean that they do not display 
scepticism regarding other dimensions of policy, such as the EU’s perceived 
inconsistency and unfairness towards Turkey. The EU has been judged as an unfair 
and inconsistent actor because it does not appear firmly committed to Turkey’s 
membership perspective, and the alternative outcomes (additional conditionality, 
veto against negotiation chapters) are not considered rightful.
66
 In parallel, 
however, the oscillating political attitudes of the CHP and AKP have similarly 
filtered perceptions of ‘Turkish inconsistency’ to the EU level. As an EU official 
asserted in an interview,  
In certain aspects we are closer to the CHP than we are to the AKP, 
but then the CHP is close to the army and we have doubts about their 
approach to democracy. So… we are not totally confident in this 
situation because we don’t know with whom we have to negotiate. 
There is not one Turkey; there are many Turkeys and this presents a 
problem’.67  
  
3.  Human rights NGOs: European shared values? 
 
 This section will argue that an analysis of non-governmental human rights 
organisations conveys a different narrative of the normative power of Europe as 
being subject to political conflicts between state and civil society in Turkey. As 
with the analysis of the two major political parties, the AKP and the CHP, this 
section aims to contribute to an analysis of norm diffusion in Turkey through a 
bottom-up approach to discussing the influence of EU human rights promotion in 
the country. In the literature on normative power and European governance, ‘civil 
society’ and ‘norm diffusion’ have been analysed as a method by which the EU 
enriches the democratic character of the state by strengthening NGOs, which in 
turn supports the democratic process.
68
 However, this top-down approach 
misrepresents the complex realities of NGOs in Turkey and their relationship with 
the wider political context within which they operate. The case of Turkish non-
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governmental human rights organisations suggests that the change processes 
induced by the EU might be strongly determined by the interest agenda of the 
NGOs themselves, the advantages they have (or not) in the political system of 
Turkey, and their preparedness to accept modifications of their action programme 
imposed by EU norms. Therefore, human rights NGOs might confront the standard 
of legitimacy on which EU human rights promotion is based as either a positive 
external resource or an external constraint. 
 
This section presents brief case-studies from four major human rights NGOs 
that received funding from the European Commission from 2003 to 2012, and 
jointly discusses their perceptions of legitimacy regarding EU human rights 
promotion to Turkey. The organisations selected included both secular and faith-
based organisations, such as the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye 
İnsan Hakları Derneği), the Human Rights Association of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan 
Hakları Vakfı), the Association of Liberal Thinking (Liberal Düsünçe Derneği) and 
Mazlumder, the latter a concrete example of a faith-based organisation.
69
 These 
organisations were selected on the basis that they are the largest and most active 
domestic human rights groups in Turkey. In addition, their closeness to the EU and 
the economic and symbolic capital it provides them with enables these NGOs to 
undertake human rights projects, yet simultaneously circumscribes and restricts 
their agenda. The funding information on these organisations was available on the 
European Commission’s EIDHR Turkey programme, which relates directly to 
providing financial assistance for macro- and micro-projects organised by the 
NGOs themselves on a variety of human rights issues. To compensate for 
inconsistencies in data availability (such as limited data accessibility on the 
EuropeAid website and lack of consolidation of the programme-year documents 
into compilations of the programme over time) interviews were conducted with the 
directors and/or staff of the NGOs concerned, and the following analysis primarily 
draws on their reflections. 
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The aforementioned human rights NGOs require a distinct normative 
framework for evaluating what they consider legitimate behaviour and legitimate 
demands in EU human rights promotion. Their participation in EU-Turkey human 
rights consultations provides a reference framework for legitimacy that is different 
to NGOs with no direct involvement in the policy. These organisations interact with 
EU institutions through formalised human rights consultations and EU financial 
assistance through the EIDHR. Their participation in human rights consultations 
also includes the provision of information on Turkey’s human rights record, which 
is subsequently included in the European Commission’s annual progress reports. 
This procedural involvement entails that the NGOs in question do not simply 
observe EU policy; they are involved in it as consultation parties and agents of 
domestic reform. NGOs that participate in EU human rights promotion and have 
been systematically disadvantaged domestically have a strong incentive to embrace 
the policy’s legitimacy once three preconditions are fulfilled: European norms must 
be compatible with the NGOs’ human rights notions and local goals; EU procedural 
means should deliver efficiently what is needed on a basis of transparent objectives 
and clear communication of information to NGOs; and the EU must offer them an 
advantage towards making a real contribution in the human rights areas that are 
contentious for Turkey, or must be perceived to be doing so. 
 
Turkey’s major non-governmental human right organisations emerged from 
the experiences of political repression, military coups, human rights violations, 
corruption, and economic mismanagement of the 1970s and 1980s. Their main 
purpose is to promote human rights in Turkey in accordance with universal 
standards enshrined in international human rights instruments. For this very reason, 
the durability of EU norm endorsement by these NGOs is generally secure. They 
take a relatively open and proactive stance in tackling obstacles to sustainable 
human rights protection in Turkey, subject to governmental limitations on their 
function and financial resources. Against a background of growing doubts and 
uncertainty regarding EU membership, they stand out as consistent supporters of 
their country’s EU aspirations. The compatibility of their human rights agenda with 
accepted EU norms can be regarded as a powerful resource, because commitment 
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to European norms attracts financial and technical assistance from the EU. 
Attraction of international funding, primarily from EU sources, is an important 
strategy for survival and sustainability, given domestic limitations on fundraising. 
Despite constituting Turkey’s main non-governmental ‘voice’, these organisations 
operate under significant limitations by the state and enjoy only limited public 
support, due mainly to lack of information on their work. 
 
The Human Rights Association (HRA) was founded in 1986 by a group of 98 
left-wing lawyers, academics, journalists, doctors, and former political prisoners, 
who had been persecuted for their activism following the 1980 coup (including 
imprisonment and torture).
70
 Following its establishment, HRA members drafted a 
declaration outlining the organisation’s main objectives. In the declaration the 
members – mostly dedicated lawyers and academics – declared that human rights 
NGOs were already operating in many Western countries and the time had come to 
establish such an organisation in Turkey.
71
 In the absence of proper human rights 
laws and institutions in Turkey, the founding members thought it necessary to 
establish an NGO which would contribute to creating an atmosphere of tolerance, 
public awareness of human rights, and opposition to all forms of human rights 
violations.
72
 Until 1990, the HRA was the sole human rights NGO in Turkey 
(sporadic grassroots groups not included) and was responsible for carrying the 
‘rights banner’ in the country. 
 
At present, the HRA has succeeded in developing 34 branches across Turkey 
and includes approximately 17,000 members.
73
 Its ability to expand was aided by 
the financial assistance of international human rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Euro-Mediterranean Human 
Rights Network.
74
 The HRA is active across a wide area of human rights issues 
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included in the EU requirements (freedom of expression, children’s rights, 
women’s rights, and police brutality, among others)75 and divides its activities 
among three areas: legal assistance, education, and public outreach and 
information. In 2013 it commenced a project on minority rights in cooperation with 
the European Commission.
76
 Previous EU-related projects included women’s rights 
(2010), children’s rights (2010), elimination of land-mines in South-East Turkey 
(2007), rights of people with disabilities (2006), and eradication of torture and ill-
treatment (2004). Nevertheless, the main issue currently underlying its activism is 
challenging the AKP’s political stance on the Kurdish issue and promoting Kurdish 
minority rights.
77
 In 2013, for example, the HRA was campaigning against political 
discrimination against Kurdish MPs.
78
 Sections of its website are written entirely in 
Kurdish.
79
 Notwithstanding its significant work, the HRA has been subjected to 
state persecution on numerous occasions, which has limited the scope of its mode 
of action.
80
 Approximately 400 court cases were filed against HRA between 1986 
and 2001.
81
 In 2009, Muharrem Erbey and Vetha Aydın, chairs of the Diyarbakır 
and Siirt branches of the HRA respectively, were prosecuted for alleged 
membership in an illegal organisation.
82
 At the time of writing they have spent 
approximately 1500 days in detention without trial.  
 
  The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) and the HRA are closely 
linked, with the former being created in 1990 as an extension to the latter. The 
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HRFT claims broad-based involvement with human rights, though in practice it 
tends to be quite issue-based, focusing on the prevention of torture and inhumane 
treatment. The HRFT action on prevention of torture is quite pioneering in Turkey, 
and its rehabilitation activities for victims of torture arguably carry more weight 
than those of the Turkish government. Its ‘Five Cities Project’ established 
rehabilitation centres across Turkey (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and 
Diyarbakır) to provide physical and psychological treatment to people subjected to 
torture in detention places and prisons.
83
 Until the year 2011, 12,452 victims of 
torture had been provided with treatment and rehabilitation services by the HRFT 
in those five centres.
84
 In an interview to the author, one of the founders of the 
HRFT described torture in Turkey as a ‘public epidemic’, and declared that the 
organisations’ medical teams could detect signs of torture up to 12 years after the 
event.
85
 Another important contribution of the HRFT to human rights protection in 
Turkey has been its publication of annual and considerably substantial human 
rights reports (up to 400 pages) since 1993. These reports were used as points of 
reference by the EU in the compilation of its annual progress reports on Turkey, but 
the HRFT discontinued them in 2009 due to lack of funds.
86
 The HRFT is currently 
conducting an EU-funded project on ‘Effective Protection of the Rights of 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Other Persons in Need of International 
Protection’.87 The organisation’s main funding sources are individual member 
donations and financial support by Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, 
the International Red Cross and the United Nations.
88
 It is based in Ankara with 
branches across major cities in Turkey. 
 
Mazlumder, also known as the Organisation for Human Rights and Solidarity 
for Oppressed People, was established in 1991 by a group of lawyers, journalists, 
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authors and businesspeople. Mazlumder was listed as having 4,000 members in 
2008 and is based in Ankara.
89
 It was initially established to work against religious 
discrimination, such as problems arising from the wearing of the headscarf by 
women in public service, or measures against military personnel with alleged pro-
Islamic ties.
90
 Mazlumder has since broadened its scope of activities to promote the 
human rights of other categories of oppressed people, such as Syrian refugees to 
Turkey
91
 and Kurdish MPs who have had their political rights curtailed.
92
 The chair 
of Mazlumder claimed in an interview to the author that the organisation has been 
criticised for exclusively promoting the rights of religious individuals and 
‘headscarf freedom’, a criticism which he rejected: ‘whoever the tyrant is, we are 
on the side of the oppressed’.93 The organisation was also accused by the State 
Security Court in 2003 of being linked to armed Islamist groups, but charges 
against its members were eventually dropped.
94
 Mazlumder has been a beneficiary 
of EIDHR funds with projects conducted in 2005 and 2007 on the protection of 
women and children refugees in Turkey, and on the training of Muslim 
functionaries (imams) on international human rights standards. It has also 
participated in several EU-funded projects run by the HRA. Mazlumder criticises 
the EU for failing to demand more religious freedoms for the Muslim majority, but 
declares that it embraces the EU’s standard of legitimacy as the most appropriate 
framework for tolerance and national unity in Turkey.
95
 
 
The Association for Liberal Thinking (ALT) engages in the dissemination of 
research and information on human rights in Turkish politics, EU-Turkey relations, 
and Turkey’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria. It was established in 1992 by a 
group of academics from Turkey and is based in Ankara. The ALT’s main 
contribution is openly discussing sensitive political issues and their long-term 
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effect on human rights in Turkey. For instance, in November 2013 it hosted an 
international conference in Istanbul to discuss how issues of Turkish national 
security affect the struggle for a liberal society.
96
 The ALT’s advocacy and policy 
research is organised according to five areas: Freedom of Religion, Human Rights, 
Economic Freedom, Environmental Policies, and Education Policies. Within these 
centres a range of activities occur, such as student essay competitions on topics 
related to democracy and human rights, and the publication of a quarterly journal 
(Liberal Thought).
97
 The ALT has been a recipient of EU financial assistance and 
its most recent completed project was entitled ‘Interreligious Affairs: Investigating 
the Opportunities for Peaceful Secular and Democratic Co-Existence’. Another 
major EU-funded ALT project was a nation-wide survey on human rights and 
freedom of expression in Turkey in 2003, which examined public perceptions on 
human rights, the level of public recognition of human rights NGOs, attitudes on 
the content and limits of specific rights, attitudes towards the EU, and attitudes 
towards the Turkish judiciary.
98
 Overall, the ALT acts as an association of public 
information and education on liberal democracy and human rights, but does not 
actively campaign for specific rights, unlike the HRA, HRFT, and Mazlumder. 
 
Interviews with the HRA, HRFT, the ALT and Mazlumder demonstrated that 
these organisations consider the EU’s normative framework to be generally 
compatible with their human rights agenda. However, compatibility with accepted 
norms does not exclude the possibility that the EU might overestimate the ability of 
these organisations to be a bastion of individual freedoms for all people in Turkey. 
The above organisations appear to have internalised European norms even prior to 
the EU’s involvement in Turkey’s human rights protection, through accepting 
universal human rights standards as a self-evident means towards human dignity 
and national reconciliation. For this very reason, their recognition of the EU’s 
standard of legitimacy appears secure and, unlike the major political parties, it is 
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not subjected to strategic cost-benefit calculations. This was indicated in an 
interview with Yavuz Önen,
99
 one of the founders of the HRA, who stated that: ‘the 
EU is now less committed to Turkey’s membership and its reforms. However, we 
will always continue struggling [for human rights in Turkey] and we will never 
give up’.  
 
Nevertheless, the interviews revealed that the standard of legitimacy 
promoted by the EU does not resonate with all groups claiming to defend human 
rights in Turkey. The interviewees confirmed the idea (discussed in Chapter Three) 
that civil society in Turkey continues to be divided across ideological lines that 
subscribe to different conceptions of human rights. Thus, organisations that do not 
adhere to the EU’s liberal democratic framework will only regard it as legitimate if 
it does not infringe the Kemalist, nationalist, conservative, or religious principles 
that they may advocate. Although there is no a priori reason to associate such 
organisations with opposition to human rights protection, this study has previously 
shown that societal and political actors in Turkey have adopted their particular 
attitudes towards human rights in accordance with the predominant narratives of 
Turkish nationalism and secularism. In other words, the attitudes of NGOs towards 
human rights reform are likely to be a function of their perception of Turkish 
national interest. The convergence of many NGOs in Turkey with state doctrine can 
make support for EU-related human rights reform lose significant ground. For 
example, an interviewee from the HRFT stated that when the EU is conducting 
human rights consultations with civil society representatives, NGOs that are 
affiliated to the state establishment sometimes contradict the statements made by 
the HRFT, claiming to the panel of EU representatives that the violations reported 
by the HRFT never actually occurred.
100
  
 
In contrast, the organisations interviewed appeared to consider EU human 
rights promotion as contextually relevant and consonant with their aspirations for 
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human rights protection in Turkey. Through having goals that are independent from 
the government, these human rights NGOs have evolved towards alignment with 
the EU’s universalist rights approach. They have come to focus not on the 
essentialist discourses of national identity that characterise some segments of civil 
society in Turkey, but on diverse principles for all dimensions of society: women, 
children, environmentalists, Kurds, LGBT, refugees, prisoners, religious 
minorities.
101
 Additionally, it is worth noting that the NGOs examined here are 
selected by the EU for financial assistance on the basis of congruence between their 
goals and the EU’s idea of what human rights protection ought to look like. Since 
the organisations interviewed generally have harmonious goals for Turkey with 
those of the EU, they tend to regard the EU normative framework as generally 
considerate of the social context in which it is applied, at least at the level of 
general principles. Simply put, the EU feeds directly into their core activities. This 
generates a positive reaction that enhances their acceptance of the legitimacy of EU 
human rights promotion.   
 
Another area that is revealing for the construction of legitimacy for EU 
human rights promotion by the NGOs in question is EU financial assistance. 
Although other civil society organisations in Turkey consciously steer clear from 
EU funding, due to having their own normative framework about legitimate human 
rights demands,
102
 the organisations interviewed have consciously sought EU 
funding on several occasions. The choice on seeking funding is partly based on 
what the NGO perceives its own sources of legitimacy to be, and whether EU 
assistance would enhance or undermine them.  For the associations discussed, EU 
funding programmes are perceived to support the values they uphold as 
organisations, and to enhance their agenda with external resources. Another reason 
for requesting EU financial assistance is that, since the relevant NGOs support a 
conception of human rights not traditionally pertaining to Kemalist orthodoxy, they 
could not secure funding sources domestically. In contrast, state-affiliated NGOs 
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have been weary towards EU funding and have claimed that EU-induced human 
rights reform could only have a diffuse impact on Turkey, as opposed to home-
grown nationalist or conservative ideals that could more effectively elevate Turkey 
‘beyond contemporary civilisation’.103 In general, acceptance or refusal of EU 
financial assistance depends on the importance that EU-related human rights 
reform has on the agenda of NGOs. Either EU human rights promotion is 
conceived as an ‘anchor’ for activism in their specific issue areas, or EU-funded 
projects might simply be too distant to the organisations’ mission to pursue.  
 
 Although the NGOs interviewed have displayed commitment to EU-related 
reform in recent years, they do challenge the EU on particular limitations regarding 
its proper functioning and ‘being good at what it does’. The criticism is most acute 
in the area of policy relevance, arguing that some proposed ideas do not properly 
correspond to local experience. Interviews with the ALT revealed that the 
organisation considers the EU strategy of funding civil society as an avenue for 
active participation in policy-making to misconstrue the realities of Turkish civil 
society, and that it is important to recognise these limitations for any policy 
outcomes. The logic employed by the ALT is that the Turkish state, since the 1980 
coup, has functioned as a ‘paternalistic centre that has frequently employed a 
totalising ideology to dominate the citizenry’.104 Given this factor, ALT 
interviewees argued that NGOs should not be encouraged to co-produce human 
rights reform, but rather to influence the opinions of policy-makers by introducing 
them to liberal solutions to problems. According to an ALT member, co-
formulation of reform would result in expanding the state, rather than changing it, 
and this would perpetuate rather than mitigate the mutual mistrust between policy-
makers and NGOs on human rights issues. In short, the ALT purported that EU 
human rights policy and its funding programmes in particular may have difficulties 
relating to aspects of civil society that are not consistent with the EU’s own 
standard of legitimacy. 
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In addition to the ALT, members of the Human Rights Association also 
challenged EU policy relevance in their interviews. Their area of contestation was 
that EU requirements are often made in an abstract sense, articulated as principles 
that ought to be adhered to rather than specifically applied. According to the HRA, 
EU human rights policy falls short of resonating with the local context because it 
places human rights ‘at the heart of the accession process’ only in theory. There is a 
key omission and contradiction: the EU does not detail specific behavioural 
changes or benchmarks to encourage these changes. Although the value of this 
abstraction for ‘local ownership’ is understood by the HRA, the chair of the 
organisation argued in the interviews that lack of strength and clarity shows that 
human rights are lower on the EU’s agenda than demonstrated by its rhetoric. To 
support the idea of lack of EU effort, he employed the Cyprus issue as evidence. 
The EU’s blocking of negotiations on several chapters of the acquis until Turkey 
opens its ports and airspace to Cyprus detracts attention, time, and resources from 
human rights in Turkey in a way that signals that rights are of limited importance to 
European leaders. In the words of the chairman: 
 
We understand the political dimension of Cyprus... but people there 
are not dying. In Turkey, however, many human rights problems 
remain unchallenged... We expect more from the EU, but in the end 
we are realistic. They are not a human rights organisation, they do 
politics.
105
 
 
 
Faith-based NGO Mazlumder welcomes EU membership but is not 
responsive to all areas of the human rights policy. It argues that EU policy is 
framed in a way that does not fully engage all civil society actors with the planned 
change processes. Specifically, interviews with Mazlumder revealed that the 
organisation blames the EU for promoting the freedoms of religious minorities, 
while at the same time it remained conspicuously silent on the secular state’s 
limitations on the religious expression of the Muslim majority. In an interview with 
the author, the director of Mazlumder condemned Europe's ‘pro-minority’ and 
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‘anti-majority’ attitude towards freedom of religion in Turkey.106 He challenged the 
EU’s official stance on Turkey’s headscarf issue, a stance which consisted of 
refusal to acknowledge the matter by claiming that there is no common European 
legislation on the headscarf as a political symbol (especially following the support 
to the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision to reinstate the headscarf ban in 
2008). Mazlumder accused the EU of bias in favour of an interpretation of human 
rights that does not take into account cultural and religious diversity, but borders on 
cultural imperialism. Thus, it challenged the legitimacy of EU human rights 
support by asserting that its policy goals remain external to the social context 
where they intend to have an impact: ‘99% of Turkish people are Muslim’.107 
 
 Another important source determining the legitimacy of EU human rights 
promotion through civil society stems from the procedural characteristics of the 
cooperation in terms of transparency, coherence, coordination, and effective 
communication. All NGOs interviewed agreed that EU funding had been a positive 
experience. The application for EU financial assistance and the completion of their 
projects had generated improvement to their managerial capacity, in other words to 
their organisational ability to ‘get things done’. In addition, EU funding was a 
valuable financial contribution to their organisational budget, as access to domestic 
funding sources in Turkey is limited. EU financial assistance also encouraged 
NGOs to become active in diverse geographical areas of Turkey.
108
 The HRA and 
Mazlumder, for example, conducted a joint project in South-Eastern Turkey in 
2010 on the protection of children who had taken part in pro-Kurdish 
demonstrations and were being tried in Turkish courts as adults.
109
 Moreover, EU 
funding facilitated dialogue and communication with counterpart grassroots 
organisations in peripheral areas of the country. According to the Third Sector 
Foundation of Turkey, ‘the rise in support networks and funds (especially from the 
European Union) is creating more opportunities for grassroots organisations and 
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increasing the involvement of women, minorities and the poor’.110 The experience 
of engaging in constructive dialogue with other civil society actors, especially 
grassroots organisations, helps improve domestic perceptions about their activism. 
As explained in Chapter Three, for many among the Turkish public, civic activism 
continues to evoke images of troublemaking caused by marginal societal elements, 
rather than attempts to precipitate positive change through constructive dialogue 
with the government. EU financial assistance, however, can counter broader 
scepticism and improve the public image of human rights NGOs by conveying the 
message that their advocacy is internationally legitimate and socially valuable. 
These positive effects of EU-funded projects illustrate how EU policy can generate 
a positive response in civil society towards its goals, methods, and appropriation. 
 
The analysis of perceptions of legitimacy held by major human rights 
organisations in Turkey reveal several traces of lack of confidence in the policy’s 
performance and in ‘Europe’, such as claims that the EU does not represent their 
needs and values, and criticisms against the policy’s performance and its capacity 
to deliver the goods. Although the EU has made significant efforts to ensure a 
comprehensive process of inclusion of NGO activities in human rights promotion, 
as explained in Chapter Four, it is fair to say that it has not been able to instil 
sufficient confidence in Turkey’s major human rights organisations.  Human rights 
promotion to Turkey, characterised by procedural shortcomings and dilemmas of 
implementation, could be improved by more closely matching its competences with 
those that civil society actors consider appropriate,
111
 by empowering recipients 
instead of functioning merely as an efficient service provider,
112
 and by offering a 
close and certain EU membership perspective.
113
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 CIVICUS and Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV) ‘Civil Society in Turkey: at a 
Turning Point’. TÜSEV Publications no: 51 (Ankara: 28 March 2011) p.114. 
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Society Organisations’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.49 no: 6 (2011) p.1358 (1339-1361) 
112Warleigh, A. ‘Europeanising Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialisation’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol.39 no: 4 (2001) p.623 (619-639) 
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Kelley, J. ‘International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and 
Socialization by International Institutions’. International Organisation, vol.58 no: 3 (2004) p.431 
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The EU human rights policy to Turkey must take the initial commitment of 
civil society actors and harness it by encouraging and developing their will and 
ability to effectively represent a plurality of vulnerable groups/minorities. This is 
an area where EU human rights policy can do well, due to the prior socialisation of 
human rights NGOs (demonstrated by their support to universal human rights) and 
the lesser degree of political polarisation and fragmentation within Turkey’s civil 
society than in previous decades. Additionally, the EU will achieve its stated goal 
of civil society development by more rigorously pursuing funding mechanisms that 
offer clear and consistent information, are non-preferential, and stress the 
importance of cooperation. Moreover, the EU can become more compatible with 
Turkey’s local human rights experience by focusing more explicitly not only on 
human rights promotion but also on protection: by pressuring for real protection to 
peoples threatened by repression, by analysing the underlying causes of repression, 
and by not shunning politically sensitive issues. Thus, NGOs will not merely 
respond to EU, they will adopt the EU agenda as their own.  
 
 The contribution of human rights organisations to the legitimacy of EU 
human rights promotion is thus to perceive it as breaking down undesirable traits 
and structures in Turkey that subordinated civil society to the state. In particular, 
they perceived European norms as generally supportive and complementary to their 
own human rights agenda; they offered then an advantage in the policy-making 
system of the state; and the EU practice of providing financial and technical 
assistance to civil society organisations increased their organisational capacity and 
their ability to pursue their human rights objectives.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the recognition of the legitimacy of 
EU human rights promotion by Turkey’s major political parties and human rights 
organisations. This analysis brought us back to the definition of Nicolaidis. 
Discussed in Chapter Two, that recognition by the ‘other’ is a key aspect of 
normative power. Such recognition entails that the EU be perceived not as an 
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enforcer of orders, nor as a distinct ‘outside’ actor to be used for strategic interests, 
but as an actor that engages its partners in shared practices and frames their human 
rights responses. The empirical analysis of this chapter explored the extent to 
which this domestic understanding underpins the diffusion of EU norms in 
Turkey’s political life. 
 
 
Drawing on the political reform agendas of the AKP and CHP and on 
interviews with human rights activists, the analysis sought to demonstrate that 
domestic understandings of European human rights norms reflect a sense of both 
opportunity and risk as part of the country’s pre-accession process. Political parties 
showed that EU human rights norms were open to emulation not as universal 
patterns, but as articulators of party interests. Thus, they were changeable over time 
and their adoption was not secure. Human rights NGOs revealed that the ability of 
EU civil society development to shape the ‘normal’ from below depends on the 
recognition of this ability by NGOs that might hold conflicting agendas, and on its 
performative and procedural qualities. The dilemmas discussed in this chapter were 
a) the perception of political parties that EU-induced reform both strengthens and 
erodes their political interests and their dominant standard of legitimacy, and b) the 
perception of human rights NGOs that EU human rights promotion greatly 
increases their performance, financial capacity, and outreach, while at the same 
time eroding their independence and applying human rights as a straightjacket, 
irrespective of local political and societal context. The above dilemmas frame 
Turkey’s receptivity to the arguments of the EU as a human rights promoter and 
affect the domestic diffusion of EU human rights norms negatively.  
 
The conclusion, thereby, is that legitimacy becomes an important permissive 
context for the EU’s normative power within enlargement. The emphasis on 
legitimacy-in-context draws attention to the necessity for the EU to construct a 
community of shared practices and we-feeling with Turkey, and to enhance its 
performative abilities so as to communicate and advance human rights through 
inclusive norm-building practices. 
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                                              Conclusion 
 
The introductory chapter of this thesis formulated the overall research 
question guiding the study as follows: how should the European Union promote 
human rights to Turkey, if the country’s reform progress is to be understood not 
simply as a result of domestic dynamics, but as dependent on the legitimacy of EU 
human rights promotion?  The rationale behind this thesis has been to explore ideas 
and practices that can contribute to improving the EU policy of human rights 
promotion to Turkey. Although the scholarly literature abounds with analyses of 
EU-Turkey relations, reviewing these texts revealed that legitimacy, as the 
normative justification of EU human rights policy, has not been a core concern of 
previous studies. In an overall perspective, therefore, this thesis makes 
contributions both to the theory and to the practice of EU human rights promotion. 
It does so by shedding new light on the prospects and prerequisites for positive 
human rights outcomes in Turkey, as well as by suggesting a re-thought approach 
to the study, evaluation, and analysis of EU normative power. The conclusion will 
summarise the main theoretical and empirical findings, will discuss the value and 
applicability of the suggested analytical framework, will draw broader conclusions 
about the European Union’s human rights promotion within enlargement, and will 
make some suggestions about further avenues of research that can be opened by the 
thesis’ analysis. 
 
1. Theoretical and empirical conclusions 
 
To its essence, the central theoretical finding has been, firstly, that many 
studies focusing on Turkey’s relations with Europe in the area of human rights 
have fallen short of capturing the impact of legitimacy on policy outcomes. In the 
literature on NPE, a strikingly low number of scholarly works has placed at centre 
stage the interplay between the EU’s established human rights norms and the 
values and beliefs prevalent in the socio-political sphere of the recipient country 
(domestic ‘standards of legitimacy’). Instead, there are explanations to policy 
241 
 
 
success and failure that focus on the details of the policy process at 
intergovernmental level and on the top-down execution of reforms. Thus, the focus 
is on whether the EU is doing ‘things’, rather than the ‘right thing’. Secondly, when 
considering those studies examining NPE in consideration of domestic socio-
political contexts, there is ambiguity surrounding its precise meaning in situations 
where the EU is involved in an asymmetrical relationship with a powerful country 
– a country such as Turkey, which possesses its own normative framework that 
arguably also ‘predisposes’ it to acting in a certain way. Normative power Europe 
is a multidimensional concept applied to describe an abundance of EU relations, 
policies, and situations. However, if it means everything concerning the EU’s 
international action, then it means nothing. Studying it empirically and applying it 
as a variable in relations with other potential ‘normative actors’ can lead us to more 
interesting conclusions regarding the role of norms in EU foreign policy. 
  
For these purposes, Chapter One began the exploration of the research topic 
by discussing and clarifying the progressive development of human rights into the 
EU’s dominant standard of legitimacy in external relations. It argued that the EU 
did not begin as a normative power per se. It developed into a self-identified 
‘Union of values’ following the deepening of European integration and the 
leverage of enlargement and other external policies. Chapter One strengthened the 
analytical and explanatory power of the thesis by arguing that normative power is 
not entirely an intrinsic property of the EU, but was constructed in a temporal and 
spatial fashion. Another conclusion of Chapter One concerns the realisation that 
Turkey’s case might not be essentially ‘different’ from previous candidate states 
when they, too, had to face the magnitude of their accession to the EEC/EU. 
 
Chapter Two, which reviewed and elaborated different ideas surrounding 
normative power and legitimacy, argued that legitimacy should be a central part of 
any study attempting to explain the external actions of EU normative power and 
human rights promotion in particular. It began by building on existing works on 
normative power and legitimacy in order to construct a conceptual framework for 
application to the case of Turkey. It proceeded to conceptualise specific 
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requirements for legitimate EU human rights promotion based on standards of 
procedural legitimacy (policy relevance, participation, and effectiveness) and on 
legitimacy as recognition by the non-European ‘other’. The main conclusions of 
Chapter Two are primarily conceptual in nature. These relate to the role of 
legitimacy in the conduction of normative power analyses, especially in relation to 
human rights promotion. A study of legitimacy within EU normative power 
analysis helps to acknowledge that being ‘normative’ and ‘shaping conceptions of 
the normal’ are not essential properties of the EU. Instead, EU normative power 
has been constructed in a spatial and temporal fashion, and its underlying norms 
reflect the power structures of the Western political communities. Thus, it is 
essential to study normative power as a power in-context. This entails examining 
how the methods and instruments of EU human rights promotion function within 
the rubric of Turkey’s specific human rights problems, and how local political and 
societal actors frame their responses in relation to EU norms. At bottom, the 
chapter concluded that EU normative power is one that is recognised as such 
through its interaction with its non-European recipients. 
 
Following from Chapter Two, Chapter Three investigated human rights 
protection in Turkey in relation to its home-grown standard of legitimacy, which 
gyrates around the notion of Kemalist orthodoxy. It argued that human rights have 
been and remain an important area of contestation in Turkey. Chapter Three 
advanced the aims of the thesis by deepening its understanding of the character of 
those legitimacy issues facing EU human rights promotion to Turkey. Its 
interpretive contextual analysis provided insights into how the degree of legitimacy 
and thereby sustainable human rights change can be furthered and improved. The 
main conclusion stemming from Chapter Three was that Turkey’s political system 
possesses foundations for acceptance of the EU’s standard of legitimacy that are 
entrenched in the country’s modernisation and westernisation process. 
Nevertheless, these have been limited in their operation due to the nature of the 
exercise of Kemalist orthodoxy. 
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The empirical study of legitimacy presented not a single but two distinct 
issues, addressed in Chapters Four and Five. When applying human rights policies 
through enlargement, legitimacy influences the prospects and prerequisites for 
policy success and affects performance both in the short-term and the long-term. 
Human rights policies that are lacking in legitimacy are unable to properly address 
actual human rights issues on the ground, and cannot sufficiently improve the 
conditions of the disadvantaged groups they set out to benefit. Thus, they can be 
expected to be increasingly vulnerable to the long-term volatile workings of 
Turkish politics. To address this possibility, Chapter Four argued that the policy 
content of the EU human rights promotion should be improved according to the 
procedural requirements of policy relevance, participation, and effectiveness. This 
particular set of criteria was provided by the conceptual tools of legitimacy as 
studied in international human rights promotion and normative power Europe.  
 
Apart from the risk of unsuccessful implementation of human rights 
instruments due to procedural legitimacy deficits, EU policymakers also need to 
consider the political counterpart of procedural legitimacy: the legitimacy of 
human rights promotion in the real world of politics, as perceived by political and 
non-governmental actors in Turkey. From a normative perspective, Chapter Five 
concluded that implementation amounts to a correspondence between the value 
systems of the EU and the target government and opposition. Political actors thus 
tend to make decisions that align with a number of politically established values 
and beliefs. It was argued that the compatibility between the EU standard of 
legitimacy and that of the major political parties in Turkey is important for the 
effective implementation of EU human rights policy. The policy’s implementation 
is shaped by the desires and preferences held by the actors participating in the 
process of human rights reform, and the outputs of the process can be perceived as 
a political necessity (or not) according their system of norms and interests and their 
views on the EU as a legitimate actor in Turkish politics.  
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2. Towards an alternative thinking for EU human rights promotion to 
Turkey 
 
The overarching aspiration guiding the thesis was to determine how the 
legitimacy of EU human rights promotion should be understood, and what main 
challenges it faces in its application to Turkey. At this point, it is possible to 
summarise the broad theoretically-oriented findings of the thesis. 
 
 Firstly, normative power denotes the ability of the EU to shape 
international policymaking in accordance with its internally-developed ‘standard of 
legitimacy’, in other words liberal governance based on human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law. Normative power should therefore be treated as an issue 
separate from its recognition by its partner countries, which may or may not share 
in the EU’s definition of the ‘normal’. Thus, what was problematised in the present 
study was the counter-productive idea that the quality and appropriateness of EU 
policy and its techniques are guaranteed, and any reform obstacles in Turkey can 
be attributed entirely to the country’s very conduct. Although the view held by 
several EU officials – that implementation lies within the responsibility of Turkey’s 
policymakers and their repertoire of policy tools – retains its validity, focusing on 
Turkey’s task to the neglect of EU role risks exacerbating slow reform progress.  
 
A second finding was that legitimacy does not cause the implementation of 
human rights in Turkey. Rather, it is a permissive condition, and other factors need 
to be present for short- and long-term implementation to occur. The supporting 
factors for Turkey were mentioned in the introductory chapter, but their analysis 
exceeded the scope of this thesis. In addition, legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing 
affair, but a matter of degree. Procedural legitimacy can exist in varying degrees in 
different dimensions of the policy process (e.g. policy relevance was low for IPA, 
but high for the EIDHR). Also, the socio-political principles and beliefs that 
comprise legitimacy are changeable and can either maintain it or erode it. For 
example, the AKP assumed office as a pro-reform and pro-EU party and was 
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challenged by a Eurosceptic CHP, yet at present the AKP is showing less 
commitment to human rights and the rule of law and the pro-reform agenda has 
been transferred to the CHP. Accordingly, studying the legitimacy of human rights 
promotion requires a three-tiered study, where EU human rights instruments, the 
target government/opposition parties, and human rights NGOs are compared and 
contrasted with the EU human rights system itself and with each other. It thus 
requires analytical tools that explore both policy content (e.g. official policy 
documents, instruments of financial and technical assistance) and beliefs held by 
individuals. 
 
A third finding was that when discussing the normative power of the EU 
vis-à-vis the ‘other’, most analysts note the dependence of partner countries on the 
EU and their perception of the organisation as a magnet. Owing to the 
asymmetrical power relations between the EU and its candidate states, whereby the 
EU is the ‘norm-maker’ and the candidate the ‘norm-taker’, the EU’s normative 
power has been treated largely as coterminous with a unique aspirational goal or 
partner states. This study revealed, however, that Turkey does not perceive the EU 
as a magnet. Instead, it confirmed that the ability of EU normative power to affect 
human rights norms in Turkey is limited. This distinct point brings into focus the 
need for NPE studies to conceptualise ‘normative power Europe’ in the EU’s 
relations with countries that could be considered emerging ‘normative powers’ on 
their own accord. Turkey’s position as a former empire and emerging economic 
power, its leadership in the Middle East, its distinct (to Europe) religion and 
culture, and its demand for equality and respect in its foreign policy interactions, 
construct a country with strong international agency. Arguably, Turkey’s external 
outlook is steeped in its own normative values to the same extent that might be the 
case with China and the US.  
 
Yet, academic studies on EU-Turkey relations and policymakers alike have 
overlooked the fact that Turkey is not simply a country in orbit around Europe. It is 
a state that conceives itself as a reliable international player that has shaped, and 
continues to shape, Western political institutions, and one that offers a viable 
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alternative to the models promoted to the Middle East by Western actors. Despite 
this, EU policy has not adjusted its normative objectives to fit Turkey’s distinct 
political setting. Instead, it maintains the position of ‘asymmetry’ and ‘hierarchy’, 
which may be useful for protecting the non-negotiable character of EU law, but 
may not go a long way in persuading Turkish political actors to reframe their 
policy choices according to EU norms. Stemming from these observations, an 
important finding of the thesis is that a major progression is required in the 
literature on human rights in EU-Turkey relations. The literature on conditionality 
and asymmetrical power relations is no longer adequate, because it treats Turkey’s 
political actors as weak partners that uncritically accept the EU as a magnet. NPE 
literature, on the other hand, predominantly explores Europe’s interaction with 
countries and regions that lack a dominant international presence (e.g. Northern 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, or the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy). 
Its engagement with EU relations vis-à-vis countries that are nascent normative 
powers on their own accord is limited. Consequently, a fresh conceptual approach 
should be set forth that studies EU-Turkey relations according to the perspective 
outlined above. 
   
The foregoing findings raise two broad empirical conclusions. First, it 
needs to be recognised that EU human rights promotion within enlargement may 
not be the ‘golden goose’ it seems to be for the EU. We need to be more finely 
attuned to the hidden political and economic visions within the broad moral sphere 
of the European Union’s human rights promotion. EU policy rhetoric tends to 
accentuate human needs and represent them as its primary value within its role as a 
provider of international peace and stability. Despite claims by EU policy-makers 
regarding ‘rigorous conditionality’, and the promotion of human rights system 
being ‘at the heart of EU external action’, this thesis did not discover the positive 
picture the EU projects.
1
 Apart from generating a momentum for legislative 
change, the EU refrains from discussing solutions to problems that would take 
                                                          
1
 Europa – RAPID press release, ‘Consolidation, Conditionality, Communication – the Strategy of 
the Enlargement Policy’ (Brussels: 9 November 2005) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1392> (accessed 23 September 
2011); Füle, S. ‘Turkey and the EU: a Multi-faceted Relationship’. Speech at the Bosphorus 
Conference Plenary Debate (Istanbul: 23 October 2010) 
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historical, political, economic, social, and other special aspects into account. 
Rather, EU policymakers appear to view the process of human rights 
implementation as a largely administrative exercise. In the words of Grabbe, ‘the 
whole accession process has an executive bias’.2 This approach gives priority to 
efficiency over sustainable reform and directs Turkey – an exceptionally intricate 
case in the area of human rights – on redrawing its political and moral geography 
without sufficient cooperation and negotiation of ingrained problems.  
 
The second conclusion relates to the empirical literature on EU-Turkey 
relations. Notwithstanding the important inroads that approaches emphasising 
current affairs over theoretical insights make to EU-Turkey relations, much 
essentialist thinking remains and maintains its grip over writings in both Europe 
and Turkey. Such approaches conceive EU human rights promotion in an 
objectivist manner, overlooking the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
role of Turkey and the European Union in achieving sustainable human rights 
protection. The legitimacy approach adopted by this thesis offers a fuller and more 
adequate picture of the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations in the area of human 
rights, and reveals how EU practices and principles can be complicit in the hesitant 
pace of reform in Turkey. Reform impasse in Turkey has been informed by the way 
in which EU policy instruments construct human rights as a neutral label, and the 
way in which potential Turkish membership is presented in ambiguous terms. 
These have been exemplary of the argument that EU practices do not leave Turkey 
‘unaffected’. 
 
Moreover, these theoretically- and empirically-derived conclusions show 
that human rights promotion within enlargement has not received sustained 
attention in the literature on the EU as a normative power on the international 
scene. Whereas a number of studies have tackled the issue of legitimacy in 
enlargement and EU conditionality, and have suggested that a legitimate policy for 
the EU is one that is coherent and consistent with internal EU standards, analysts of 
                                                          
2
 Grabbe, H. ‘How does Europeanization affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.8 no: 6 (2001) p.1029 (1013-1031) 
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EU normative power have remained somewhat silent on human rights promotion 
within enlargement.
3
 The applicability of ‘normative power Europe’ terminology to 
enlargement has been scarce. This might be partly attributed to the fact that the EU 
enlargement policy is considered its most successful external policy of norm 
diffusion, thus encouraging researchers to focus more extensively on human rights 
and democracy promotion in external relations.
4
 This study sought to develop a 
perspective to study EU human rights promotion to candidate states as part and 
parcel of its internal and external human rights policy. This perspective was 
operationalised in the case of Turkey, selected due to its perceived ‘differing 
identity’, its role as a powerful regional actor, its intricate human rights situation, 
and the temporality of its EU candidacy. 
 
The implication of these conclusions for empirical practice is that becoming 
aware of the ‘conditions underpinning the application of human rights conditions’ 
helps reveal the role the EU has played as an agent of human rights in the past, and 
could play in the future. Hence the need for a critical perspective that emphasises 
the need for the EU to think alternatively about promoting a vision of human rights 
support that not is sensitive to candidate states’ multiple human rights problems 
and how they think they should be solved.  
 
3. Avenues for further research 
 
This section identifies avenues for further research that emerged from the 
analysis, yet at the same time were beyond the scope of the research topic. It also 
suggests new political questions that might be amenable to the development of a 
                                                          
3Eriksen, ‘Cosmopolitan Polity?’ p.253. 
4Kok, W. ‘Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges’. Report to the European 
Commission (Florence: European University Institute, 19 March 2003); Smith, K.E. ‘Enlargement 
and European Order’. In International Relations and the European Union, ed. by C. Hill and 
M.Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.271 (270-291); Ferocci, F.N. ‘EU Enlargement 
Policy: from Success to Fatigue’. In Frontiers of Europe: a Transatlantic Problem? ed. by F. Bindi 
and I. Angelescu  (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2011) p.25 (25-34) 
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more legitimate system of human rights promotion. Specifically, it is possible to 
recommend two possible lines of further research. 
 
Firstly, future research could investigate EU human rights promotion 
through a ‘standard of civilisation’, rather than a standard of legitimacy. 
Specifically, it could explore how the promotion of human rights through 
asymmetric dialogue and strategic use of norms can be reconciled with ideas of the 
so-called EU ‘civilising process’.5 Their interest would lie in the way in which the 
recipient country’s political and economic institutions are expected to incorporate a 
European ‘standard of civilisation’ in the construction and application of their 
domestic policies.
6 
EU human rights conditionality is neither abstract nor 
theoretical, but leaves room for tensions and contradictions between the prevailing 
norms of the applicator and recipient of conditionality. This, in turn, can lead to 
different understandings about solutions to problems, each of which can make 
different legitimacy claims based on the same norms. At its most extreme, human 
rights conditionality can be considered an instrument of ‘imperialism’, especially 
by countries whose officials advocate moral relativism.  
 
In this perspective, it would be useful for future research to achieve a more 
profound understanding of the civilisation-human rights nexus in the international 
use of EU human rights policy. Within enlargement, human rights conditionality 
should aim to relate to a reciprocal collaborative effort between EU and candidate 
state. Such an approach is likely to promote a moral and political ‘overlapping 
consensus’ between local norms and international human rights standards.7 This 
means that EU human rights promotion could be described as more likely to be 
understood as legitimate when it is underpinned by a ‘we’ feeling, which makes 
                                                          
5Soderbaum, F. ‘African Regionalism and EU-African Interregionalism’. In European Union and 
New Regionalism, ed. by M. Telo (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) p.199 (185-201) 
6 Donnelly, J. ‘Human Rights: a New Standard of Civilization?’ International Affairs vol.74, no: 1 
(1998) p.1-23; Bowden, B. and Seabrooke, L. Global Standards of Market Civilization (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006); Hobson, C. ‘Democracy as Civilisation’. Global Society, vol.22 no: 1 (2008) 
p.75-95; Towns, A. ‘The Status of Women as a Standard of Civilization’. European Journal of 
International Relations vol.15 no: 4 (2009) p.681-706. 
7
 Monshipouri, M. Constructing Human Rights in the Age of Globalization (Armonk NY: M.E. 
Sharpe Publications, 2003) p.259. 
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candidate states more likely to feel that it is them who are willing to adhere to the 
validity of the rules and norms that are bestowed on them, rather than ‘they’ who 
are imposing unwanted policies.
8
    
  
Secondly, there is a rich avenue of work to be pursued on how a human 
rights promotion within enlargement can be related analytically and empirically to 
internal EU human rights protection. The issue of internal-external coherence 
raised in Chapter One needs to be further researched. The European Union has 
been increasingly reflecting on the quality and appropriateness of its fundamental 
rights governance in the light of recent challenges that impact on the sustainability 
of European integration (financial crisis, unemployment and migration, countries 
considering to exit the EU). The debate on the improvement of fundamental rights 
and active citizenship has not been limited to internal policies, but has extended to 
the EU’s international role as a promoter of human rights and good governance.9  
However, the enlargement policies have been absent from this debate, despite their 
potentially important implications and opportunities for shaping future patterns of 
the Union’s prosperity and sustainability in a changing world. Therefore, future 
research could be directed towards evaluating how its enlargement policies and 
their mode of application can contribute to sustainable human rights protection 
within an enlarged European Union. Such an examination would capture the 
challenge for the EU to systematically assess its short-term actions of human rights 
support within enlargement against the long-term integration goal.  
 
Any of these research avenues could lead to a more profound understanding 
of the EU as an agent of human rights promotion in an increasingly globalised 
world. Such insights would further advance the existing knowledge in both theory 
and practice about the usage of human rights conditionality in terms of legitimacy 
                                                          
8
 Lord, C. ‘Accountable and Legitimate? The European Union’s International Role’. In 
International Relations and the European Union, ed. by Hill, C. and Smith, M. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) p.119 (113-133). 
9
 See, for example, European Parliament, ‘Democracy Building in External Relations’. OJ C 265 
E/3 (30 September 2010) p.4. For a scholarly perspective, see Thomassen, J. ‘Legitimacy of the EU 
after Enlargement’. In The Legitimacy of the European Union after Enlargement, ed. by J. 
Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.1-20. 
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and the question of complementarity between external human rights requirements 
and the internal practices of its promoter. Ultimately, these would contribute to 
answering the question of how the protection of the individual not as a mere 
recipient of positive or negative protection, but as a subject of rights with the 
capacity to act for their protection. This can present not simply optimistic thinking, 
but a pragmatic view of the future.  
 
252 
 
    Bibliography 
 
 
Abelshauer, W. ‘Integration à la Carte: The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration 
of Western Europe in the 1950s’. In The Construction of Europe, ed. by S. Martin 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers, 1994) p.1-18. 
 
Act of Accession for the Hellenic Republic to the European Economic Community. OJ L 
291/79 (19 November 1979) 
 
Aggestam, L. ‘Ethical Power Europe’. International Affairs, vol.84 no: 1 (2008) p.1-11. 
 
Agne, H. ‘European Union Conditionality: Coercion or Voluntary Adaptation?’ Alternatives, 
vol.8 no: 1 (2009) p.1-18. 
 
Ahmad, F. Turkey: the Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003) 
 
Akcapar, B. Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership 
(Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007)  
 
Akdoğan, Y. ‘Muhafazakar Demokrasi’ (‘Conservative Democracy’) AK Parti Yayınları 
(Ankara: 2003) 
 
Aksın, S. Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic (London: Hurst Publishers, 2007)  
 
Albi, A. ‘Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and 
Post-Accession Conundrums’. European Law Journal, vol.15 no: 1 (2009) p.46-69. 
 
Alessandri, E. ‘Turkey’s New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations’. The 
International Spectator, vol.45 no: 3 (2010) p.85-100.  
 
Alfredsson G., Grimheden,J., Ramcharom, B.G. and De Zayas, A. (eds) International Human 
Rights Monitoring Mechanisms (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 
 
Allott, P. ‘Globalization from Above: Actualizing the Ideal through Law’. In How Might We 
Live: Global Ethics in the New Century, ed. by K. Booth, T. Dunne and M. Cox (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.61-80. 
 
Alston, P. and Weiler, J. ‘An Ever-Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights’. In The EU and Human Rights, ed. by P. Alston 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.3-66. 
 
Alston, P. and Crawford J.(eds) The Future of the Unites Nations’ Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
 
Altünişik, M.B. and Tür, O. Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (London: 
Routledge, 2005)  
 
253 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Human Rights Denied’ (April 1988) 
<http://ob.nubati.net/w/images/3/36/Camp8805.png> (accessed 20 October 2013) 
Amnesty International, Turkey: Brutal and Systematic Abuse of Human Rights (New York: 
Amnesty International, 1989) 
 
Amnesty International, Turkey: No Security without Human Rights (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1996) 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey Human Rights Defender Imprisoned’ (1 December 2003) 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/027/2003/en/a3b0ac9e-d65d-11dd-ab95-
a13b602c0642/eur440272003en.html> (accessed 9 August 2009) 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Memorandum on AI’s recommendations to the government 
to address human rights violations’ (31 July 2005) 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/027/2005/en/f6af2e9c-d4c3-11dd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/eur440272005en.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2010) 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Article 301: How the Law on ‘Denigrating Turkishness’ is 
an Insult to Free Expression’ (March 2006) 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/003/2006/en/1a24fcc9-d44b-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur440032006en.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2011) 
 
Amnesty International. Turkey - Amnesty International Report 2007 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey/report-2007> (accessed 24 June 2010) 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Memorandum to the Turkish Government’ (14 January 2008)  
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/001/2008/en/9931be70-c37b-11dc-bfb4-
39d1733bc710/eur440012008eng.pdf > (accessed 30 March 2011) 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey- Annual Report 2011’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey/report-2011> (accessed 15 August 2011) 
 
An- Na’im, A.A. ‘Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of 
Human Rights’. In Human Rights: an Anthropological Reader, ed. by M. Goodale (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2009) p.68-102. 
 
Andreassen, B.A. and Sano, H. ‘What’s the Goal? What's the Purpose? Observations on 
Human Rights Impact Assessment’. International Journal of Human Rights, vol.11 no: 3 
(2007) p.275-292. 
 
Arabacı, A. ‘Explaining Transformation of Turkish Civil Society in the EU Accession 
Process’. Insight Turkey, vol.10 no: 2 (2008) p.77-93. 
 
Arat, Y. ‘Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond’. In Political Leaders and 
Democracy in Turkey, ed. by M.Heper and S.Sayari (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2002) 
p.87-106. 
 
Arat, Y. ‘Religion, Politics, and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic 
Paradox?’ Third World Quarterly, vol.31 no: 6 (2010) p.869-884. 
 
254 
 
Arat, Y. ‘Gender and Citizenship in Turkey’. In Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, 
ed. by S. Joseph (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000) p.275-286. 
 
Arıkan, H. ‘A Lost Opportunity? A Critique of the European Union’s Human Rights Policy 
towards Turkey’. Mediterranean Politics, vol.7 no: 1 (2002) p.19-50. 
 
Arıkan, H. Turkey and the EU: an Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006) 
 
Arter, D. The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century. (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1993) 
 
Arts, K. Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: the Case of the Lome 
Convention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 
 
Ashcroft B., Griffiths G., and Tiffin H. Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies (London: 
Routledge, 1998) 
 
Aslan-Akman, C. ‘The 2011 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey and Challenges Ahead for 
Democratic Reform Under a Dominant Party System’. Mediterranean Politics, vol.17 no: 1 
(2012) p.77-95. 
 
Association of Protestant Churches-Turkey, Report on Human Rights Violations of 2009 
(Izmir: January 2010) 
 
Association of Liberal Thinking, Turkey < http://www.liberal.org.tr/index.php> 
 
Association for Liberal Thinking, ‘Human Rights and Freedom of Expression in Turkey’ 
(Ankara: July 2003) 
 
Association of Liberal Thinking, ‘Essay Contest’ 
<http://www.liberal.org.tr/ldt_details.php?kategori=MTY=&id=NTE2>  (accessed 2 August 
2011) 
 
Association of Liberal Thinking, ‘Round table Conference on Struggling for an Open Society 
Coping with Issues of National Security and Sovereignty’ (21 November 2013) 
<http://www.liberal.org.tr/details.php?id=MTAwOQ==> (accessed 30 November 2013)  
 
Avcı, G. ‘The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing 
Environment’. South European Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 3 (2011) p.409-421. 
 
Avineri, S. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974)  
 
Aydın, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey (London: Pluto Press, 2005)  
 
Aydın, Z. ‘The State, Civil Society and Environmentalism’. In Environmentalism in Turkey: 
between Democracy and Development?, ed. by F. Adaman and M. Arsel (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2005) p.57 (53-70) 
 
255 
 
Aydın, S. and Çakır, R. ‘Political Islam in Turkey’. In Political Islam and European Foreign 
Policy: Perspectives of Muslim Democrats from the Mediterranean, ed. by M. Emerson and 
R. Youngs (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007) p.113-134. 
 
Aydınlı, E. ‘The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Late 
Ottoman Era to the 1930s’. Middle Eastern Studies, vol.40 no: 3 (2004) p.102-133. 
 
Aydınlı, E. ‘Governments vs States: Decoding Dual Governance in the Developing World’. 
Third World Quarterly, vol.31 no: 5 (2010) p.693-707. 
 
Babarinde, O. ‘The European Union's Relations with the South: a Commitment to 
Development?’. In The European Union in the World Community, ed. by C. Rhodes 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2008) p.127-146. 
 
Baker, G. ‘The Taming of the Idea of Civil Society’. Democratization, vol.6 no: 3 (1997) p. 
1-29. 
 
Bal, I. Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era (Florida: Universal Publishers, 2004) 
 
Bal, I. and Laçıner, S. ‘The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish 
Democracy 1960-1980’. Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 13 no: 4 (2010) 
p.102 (90-115) 
 
Balducci, G. ‘The Limits of Normative Power Europe in Asia: The Case of Human Rights in 
China’. East Asia, vol.27 no:1 (2010) p.35-55. 
 
Balfour, S. ‘Principles of Democracy and Human Rights’. In Values and Principles in EU 
Foreign Policy, ed. by S. Lucarelli (London: Routledge, 2006) p.114-129. 
 
Banchoff, T. and Smith, M.P. (eds) Legitimacy and the European Union: the contested polity 
(London: Routledge, 1999) 
 
Barbé, E. and Johansson-Nogués, E. ‘The EU as a Modest Force for Good: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’. International Affairs, vol.84 no: 1 (2008) p.81-96. 
 
Barker, R. Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 
 
Barkey, H. J. ‘The Struggles of a Strong State’. Journal of International Affairs, vol.54 no: 1 
(2000) p.87-105. 
 
Barlas, D. Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an 
Uncertain World, 1929-1939 (Leiden: Brill Publications, 1998)  
 
Barroso, J.M. Speech at the Signature Ceremony for the Lisbon Treaty in Poland (10 October 
2009) <http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9081_en.htm> (accessed 30 
November 2010) 
 
Barroso, J.M. ‘Post-Crisis: A Leading Global Role for Europe’. Speech at Columbia 
University (New York: 21 September 2010)  
256 
 
 
Bartels, L. Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005)  
 
Başkan, F. and Gumrukçu, S.B. ‘Positions of Turkish Political Parties on European 
Integration’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.12 no: 1 (2012) p.22-44. 
 
Baudner, L. ‘The Politics of Norm Diffusion and Turkish European Union Accession 
Negotiations’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.50 no: 6 (2012) p.922-938. 
 
Baun, M. A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of EU Enlargement (Lanham MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000)  
 
Baykal, S. ‘Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political 
Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate 
Test Case’. Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/05 (New York: University School of Law, 2005) 
 
Beetham D. The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) 
 
Beetham D. and Lord C. Legitimacy and the European Union (Harlow: Longman, 1998) 
 
Beetham, D. Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 
 
Beetham, D. Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: a Guide to Good 
Practice (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2006)  
 
Beierle T.C. and Cayford J. Democracy in Practice: Public Participation in Environmental 
Decisions (Washington DC: Resources for the Future Press, 2002) 
 
Beiner, R. Liberalism, Nationalism and Citizenship: Essays on the Problems of Political 
Community (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003)  
 
Bell, E. Research for Health Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
 
Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, A. Citizenship and Governance in the European Union (London: 
Continuum, 2001) 
 
Béné, C. and Neiland, A. From Participation to Governance: a Critical Review of the 
Concepts of Governance, Co-Management and Participation (Penang: Penang Publications, 
2006) 
 
Bennet, J. and Gibbs, S. NGO Funding Strategies: an Introduction for Southern and Eastern 
Non-Governmental Organisations (Oxford: INTRAC Publications, 1996) 
 
Berkes, N. and Ahmad, F. The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst 
Publishers, 1998)  
 
Berstein, S. ‘The Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: Three Conceptions’. 
Institute of Globalisation and the Human Condition Working Paper 04/2 (2004) p.1-30. 
 
257 
 
Bicchi, F. ‘Our size fits all’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.286-303. 
 
Bicchi, F. ‘Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean’. 
Democratization, vol.17 no: 5 (2010) p.976-996. 
 
Bickerton, C. ‘Legitimacy through Norms: The Political Limits to Europe’s Normative 
Power’. In Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. by R.G. 
Whitman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) p.25-45. 
 
Bilgen, A. ‘Are Excuses of Reluctance Convincing and Realistic in a Democratisation 
Process?’  EU-Turkey Civic Commission (2008) 
<http://www.eutcc.org/articles/8/16/books_and_articles.ehtml> (accessed 15 March 2011) 
 
Bilgic, A. ‘Security through Trust-Building in the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation: Two 
Perspectives for Partnership’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.10 no: 4 (2010) 
p.457-473. 
 
Bilgin, P. ‘A Return to ‘Civilisational Geopolitics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing 
Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era’. 
Geopolitics vol.9 no: 2 (2004) p.269-291. 
 
Bilgin, P. and Bilgic, A. ‘Turkey and Europe: Discourses of ‘Inspiration’ and ‘Anxiety’ in 
Turkish Foreign Policy’ Review of European Studies (forthcoming) 
 
Bilgin, P. ‘Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: the Challenge of Globalisation’. 
European Journal of Political Research, vol.44 no: 1 (2005) p.175–201. 
 
Bilgin, P. and Bilgic, A. ‘Turkey's ‘New’ Foreign Policy towards Eurasia’. Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, vol.52 no: 2 (2011) p.173-195. 
 
Binmore, K. ‘A Utilitarian Theory of Legitimacy’. In Economics, Values, and Organization, 
ed. by Adner B. and Putterman L.G. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.101–
132. 
 
Birchfield, V. ‘A Normative Power Europe Framework for Transnational Policy Formation’. 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol.20 no: 6 (2013) p.907-922. 
 
Birkelbach, W. Report on the Political and Institutional Aspects of Accession to or 
Association with the Community (19 December 1961) 
<http://www.ena.lu/report_willi_birkelbach_political_institutional_aspects_accession_associ
ation_with_community_december_1961-020006013.html>  (accessed 1 December 2008) 
 
Birmingham, D. A Concise History of Portugal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) 
 
Bjola, C. ‘Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Bridging the Analytical-Normative Divide’. 
Review of   International Studies, vol.34 no: 4 (2008) p.627-644. 
 
258 
 
Bodansky, D. ‘Legitimacy of International Governance: a Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law’. American Journal Of International Law, vol.93 no: 2 (1999) p.596-624. 
 
Bolleyer, N. and Reh, C. ‘EU Legitimacy revisited; the Normative Foundations of a Multi-
level Polity’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.19 no: 4 (2012) p.472-490. 
 
Booth, K. ‘Three Tyrannies’. In Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. by T. Dunne and N. 
Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.31-70. 
 
Borovali, M. and Turan O. ‘A Legitimate Restriction of Freedom? The Headscarf Issue in 
Turkey’. In Remaking Turkey, ed. by E.F. Keyman (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2007) 
p.137-152. 
 
Bourguignon, R. ‘The History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC’. 
In Turkey and the European Community, ed. by Evin, A. and Denton, G (Leske and Buldrich: 
Opladen, 1990) p.51-63. 
 
Bowden, B. and Seabrooke, L. Global Standards of Market Civilization (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006) 
 
Bradley, K.S. ‘Human Rights and the European Parliament’. In The EU and Human Rights, 
ed. by P. Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.839-858. 
 
Brandtner, B. and Rosas, A. ‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European 
Community: an Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’. European Journal of International Law, 
vol.9 no: 3 (1998) p.468-490. 
 
Brighouse, H. ‘Civil Education and Liberal Legitimacy’. Ethics, vol.108 no: 4 (1998) p.719-
745. 
 
Borovali, M. and Turan O. ‘A Legitimate Restriction of Freedom? The Headscarf Issue in 
Turkey’. In Remaking Turkey, ed. by E.F. Keyman (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2007) 
p.137-152. 
 
Boyle, K. ‘Human Rights and Political Resolution in Northern Ireland’. Yale Journal of 
World Public Order, vol.9 no: 1 (1982) p.156-177. 
 
Bozarslan, H. ‘Human Rights and the Kurdish issue in Turkey: 1984-1999’. Human Rights 
Review, vol.3 no: 1 (2001) p.45-54. 
 
Breitmeier, H. The Legitimacy of International Regimes (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008) 
 
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 
1999) 
 
Broude, T. ‘The Rule(s) of Trade and Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional 
and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO’. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol.45 
no: 1 (2006) p.221-261. 
 
259 
 
Brown, N. and McBride, J. ‘Observations on the Proposed Accession by the European 
Community to the European Convention of Human Rights’. American Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol.29 no: 4 (1981) p.691-705. 
 
Bryman, A. Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)  
 
Buchanan, A. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 
 
Buchanan, A. and Keohane, R. O. ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’. 
Ethics and International Affairs, vol.20 no: 4 (2006) p.405-437.  
 
Buchanan, A. ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of International Legitimacy’. 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics vol.10  no: 1 (2011) p.5-19. 
 
Buergenthal, T. ‘Proceedings against Greece under the European Convention of Human 
Rights’. American Journal of International Law, vol. 62 no: 2 (1968) p.441-450. 
 
Buller, J. and Gamble, A. ‘Conceptualising Europeanisation’, Public Policy and 
Administration, vol.17 no: 2 (2002) p.4-24. 
 
Buzan, B. and Diez, T. ‘The European Union and Turkey’. Survival, vol.41 no: 1 (1999) 
p.41-57. 
 
Caha, O. ‘The Ideological Transformation of the Public Sphere: the Case of Turkey’. 
Alternatives, vol.4 no: 1&2 (2005) p.11-30. 
 
Çakır, A.E. Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011)  
 
Canefe N. and Bora, T. ‘Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: 
The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism’. Turkish Studies, vol.4 no: 1 (2003) p.127-148. 
 
Camporesi, F. ‘The European Parliament and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’. In The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: from Declaration to Binding Instrument, ed. by G. 
Federico (London: Springer, 2011) p.77-94. 
 
Cardwell, P.J. ‘EU External Relations and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era’. In EU External 
Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, ed. by P.J. Cardwell (The Hague: Asser 
Press, 2012) p.1-16. 
 
Çarkoğlu, A. ‘Turkish Parliamentarians’ Perspectives on Turkey’s Relations with the 
European Union’. In Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic 
Integration, and International Dynamics, ed. by A. Çarkoğlu and B. Rubin (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003) p.184-206. 
 
Çarkoğlu, A. ‘Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for 
EU Membership.’ Turkish Studies, vol.4 no: 1 (2003) p. 171 -194. 
 
260 
 
Caron, D.D. ‘The Legitimacy and Collective Authority of the Security Council’. American 
Journal of International Law, vol.87 no: 4 (1993) p.552-588. 
 
Carrera, S. In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, 
Immigration and Nationality in the EU (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers, 2009)  
 
Carver, R. Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions (International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000) 
 
Casanova, J. ‘The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the 
Dilemmas of European Civilization’. Constellations, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.234-247. 
 
Cassier, M. ‘Contesting the ‘Truth’ of Turkey’s Human Rights Situation: State-Association 
Interactions in and outside the Southeast’. European Journal of Turkish Studies, vol.10 
(2009) p.1-18. 
 
Case, C. ‘The Relative Autonomy of the EU Human Rights Standard’. European 
Constitutional Law Review, vol.4 no: 1 (2008) p.199-204. 
 
Castle, S.  ‘Turkey attacks EU over human rights 'double standards'. The Independent (10 
December 2002) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-attacks-eu-over-
human-rights-double-standards-610479.html> (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
Çelenk, A. ‘Promoting Democracy in Algeria: the EU Factor and the Preferences of the 
Political Elite’. Democratization, vol.16 no: 1 (2009) p.176-192. 
 
Çelep, Ö. ‘The Republican People's Party and Turkey's EU Membership’.South European 
Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 3 (2011) p.423-434. 
 
Çelik, Y.  Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999) 
 
Çelik, A.B. ‘Transnationalization of Human Rights Norms and Its Impact on Internally 
Displaced Kurds’. Human Rights Quarterly, vol.27 no: 3 (2005) p.969-997. 
 
Cem, I. ‘Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a 
New Millennium’. Turkish Foreign Policy Quarterly, vol.1 no: 1 (2002) p.7-15. 
 
Cengiz, O.K. Turkey and the World Around It from a Democracy and Human Rights 
Perspective (Ankara: Liberté Publishing, 2008) 
 
Cengiz, F. and Hoffmann, L. ‘Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey’s European Union 
Accession and the Kurdish Question’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.51 no: 3 
(2013) p.416-432. 
 
Çevik, I. ‘Commentaries’. Hurriyet Daily News (2 January 2001)  
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=commentaries-2001-01-02> (accessed 22 
February 2011) 
 
Chandhoke, N. ‘The ‘Civil’ and the ‘Political’ in Civil Society’ In Civil Society in 
Democratization, ed. by P. Burnell and P. Calvert (London: Frank Cass, 2004) p.143-166. 
261 
 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. OJ C 364/1 (Brussels: 18 December 
2000) 
 
Checkel, J.T. ‘Social Construction and Integration’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.6 
no: 4 (1999) p.545-560. 
 
Checkel, J.T. ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’. International 
Organization, vol.55, no: 3 (2001) p.553-588. 
 
CHP, ‘CHP President Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is Letter Explaining his No Vote’, CHP EU 
Representation (2010) <http://avrupabirligihaberleri.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/chp-
bulletin-kilicdaroglu-on-referandum-august-10.pdf>  (accessed 30 December 2012) 
 
CHP, ‘The CHP’s Vision for EU Membership’. CHP EU Representation (2012) 
<http://chpbrussels.org/2012/09/27/chps-vision-for-the-eu-membership/> (accessed 21 
December 2013) 
 
Ciddi, S. ‘The Republican People’s Party and the 2007 General Elections: Politics of 
Perpetual Decline?’ Turkish Studies, vol.9 no: 3 (2008) p.437-455. 
 
Çınar, M. ‘Turkey’s Transformation under the AKP Rule’, Muslim World, vol: 96 no. 3 (2006) 
p.469–486. 
 
Cıngı, A. ‘CHP: a Party on the Road to Social Democracy’.  International Policy Analysis 
(June 2011) 
 
CIVICUS and Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) ‘Civil Society in Turkey: at a 
Turning Point’. TUSEV Publications no: 51 (Ankara: 28 March 2011) 
<http://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/analytical%20country%20report%20f
or%20turkey.pdf> (accessed 31 March 2011)  
 
Çizre-Sakallioğlu, Ü. ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy’. 
Comparative Politics, vol.29 no: 2 (1997) p.157 (151-166) 
 
Çizre, Ü. and Yeldan, E. ‘Politics, Society and Financial Liberalisation: Turkey in the 1990s’. 
Development and Change, vol. 31 no: 2 (2000) p.481-508. 
 
Çizre, Ü. ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity, and Hegemony’. In Right-sizing the 
State: the Politics of Moving Borders, ed. by B. O’Leary, I.S. Lustick and T. Callaghy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.222-252. 
 
Çizre, Ü. ‘Problems of Democratic Governance in Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and 
the European Union Enlargement Zone’. European Journal of Political Research, vol.43 no: 
1 (2004) p.107-125. 
 
Çizre, Ü. and Walker, J. ‘Conceiving the New Turkey after Ergenekon’. International 
Spectator, vol.45 no: 1 (2010) p.89-98. 
 
262 
 
Clapham, A. Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 
 
Clark, I. ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’. Review of International Studies, vol.29 no: 1 (2003) 
p. 75-95. 
 
Clark, I. Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
 
Cochran, M. Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
 
Coicaud J-M. ‘Reflections on International Organisations and International Legitimacy: 
Constraints, Pathologies, and Possibilities’. International Social Science Journal, vol.53 no: 4 
(2001) p.523-536. 
 
Colas, A. International Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) 
 
Comité des Sages, ‘Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities’ (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2010)  
 
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘2013 Prison Census’ (1 December 2013) 
<http://cpj.org/imprisoned/2013.php>  (accessed 1 December 2013) 
 
Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Article 2 (1961) 
<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2010)  
 
Cook, S.A. Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, 
Algeria and Turkey. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2007) 
 
Coşar, S. and Yeğenoğlu, M. ‘New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the 
Age of AKP’. South European Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 4 (2011) p.555-573. 
 
Coufoudakis, V. ‘The EEC and the Freezing of the Greek Association, 1967-1974’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, vol.16 no: 2 (1977) p.114-131. 
 
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Article 9 (Rome, 4 November 1950) 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm> (accessed 20 June 2011) 
 
Council of Europe, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 2 (Paris, 20 March 1952) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf > (accessed 20 June 2011) 
 
Council of Europe,  ‘Interim report of the Turkish Government in response to the report of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) on its visit to Turkey form 5 to 17 October 1997’ (Ankara: 3 February 
1999)  <http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/tur/1999-03-inf-eng.htm> (accessed 8 July 2010) 
 
263 
 
 
Council of the European Communities, ‘Joint Statement on the Situation in Turkey’ (15 
September 1980) <http://aei.pitt.edu/5582/1/002280_1.pdf> (accessed 29 September 2011) 
Council of the European Communities, Regulation 3906/89, OJ L 375 (23 December 1989) 
 
Council of the European Union, Regulation 622/1998, OJ  L 85/1 (16 March 1998) 
 
Council of the European Union, Regulation  975/1999. OJ L 120/1 (8 May 1999) 
 
Council of the European Union, Regulation 976/1999. OJ L  120/8 (8 May 1999) 
 
Council of the European Union, ‘Council Regulation concerning Pre-Accession Financial 
Assistance to Turkey’ OJ L 342/1 (Brussels: 17 December 2001) 
 
Council of the European Union, European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues (13 
December 2001) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/14469EN_HR.pdf> 
(accessed 31 January 2011) 
 
Council of the European Union, Ensuring Protection: EU Guidelines on Human Rights 
Defenders (June 2004) p.2 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf> (accessed 29 
January 2011) 
 
Council of the European Union and European Parliament, Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006  on 
Establishing a Financing Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights 
Worldwide. OJ L 386/1 (29 December 2006) 
 
Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2008/157/EC on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey’ (18 
February 2008) 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/e40111_en.htm> 
(accessed 15 January 2011)  
  
Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement and 
Stabilisation/Association Process’ (Brussels, 14 December 2010) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118487.pdf> 
(accessed 9 May 2011)  
 
Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision amending Decision 2010/232/CFSP 
Renewing Restrictive Measures against Burma/Myanmar’. OJ L 115/25 (Brussels: 27 April 
2012); European Union @ United Nations, ‘Burma/Myanmar: EU Actions Suspended’. 
<http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_12180_fr.htm > (accessed 5 July 2012) 
 
Craig, P. and De Burca, G. EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 
   
Curtis, M. Western European Integration (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) 
 
264 
 
Dağı, I. ‘Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy’. 
Middle Eastern Studies, vol.32 no: 2 (1996) p.124-141. 
 
Dağı, I. ‘Turkey’s AKP in Power’, Journal of Democracy, vol: 19 no. 3, (2008) p. 25–30. 
 
Dale, C. ‘Women’s Participation in Grassroots Initiatives in Ireland’. In Democratization and 
Women’s Grassroots Movements, ed. by J.M. Bystydzienski and J. Sekhon (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999) p.284-304. 
 
Danforth, N. ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the 
AKP.’ Turkish Policy Quarterly vol.7 no: 3 (2008) p.83-95. 
 
Davutoğlu, A. ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: an Assessment of 2007’. Insight Turkey, vol: 
10 no: 1 (2008) p.77-96. 
 
De Burca, G. and Weiler, J. The European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 
 
Dedeoğlu, S. Women Workers in Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008) 
 
Dedeoğlu, S. and Elveren, A.Y. Gender and Society in Turkey: the Impact of Neoliberal 
Policies, Political Islam, and EU Accession (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012) 
 
Dedeoğlu, S. ‘Equality, Protection, or Discrimination: Gender Equality Policies in Turkey’. 
Social Politics, vol.19 no: 2 (2012) p.269-290. 
 
Dedman, M. Origins and Development of the European Union: 1945-1995 (London: 
Routledge, 1996)  
 
Dehousse, R. The European Court of Justice: the Politics of Judicial Integration 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) 
 
Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, ‘Democrasi ve İnsan Haklaıi için Avrupa Araci- 
Tamamlanmış Projeler’. <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/ab-ve-sivil-toplum/demokrasi-ve-
insan-haklari-icin-avrupa-araci-dihaa/desteklenen-projeler/tamamlanmis-projeler.html>  
(accessed 6 June 2013) 
 
Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, ‘Democrasi ve Insan Haklari icin Avrupa 
Araci- Devam Eden Projeler’. <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/ab-ve-sivil-toplum/demokrasi-ve-
insan-haklari-icin-avrupa-araci-dihaa/desteklenen-projeler/ongoing-projeccts.html> (accessed 
6 June 2013) 
 
Delibas, K. ‘The Collapse of the Turkish Party System and its Effects on Citizenship and the 
Legitimacy of Governance’. In Citizenship and the Legitimacy of Governance, ed. by I. Pardo 
and G.B. Prato (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011) p.171-190. 
 
Demir, Ö., Acar, M. and Toprak., M. ‘Anatolian Tigers or Islamic capital: Prospects and 
Challenges’. Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40 no: 6 (2004) p.166-188. 
 
265 
 
Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C., and Nolke, A. ‘Legitimacy under Pressure: the European Web 
of Counter-Terrorism Networks’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.46 no: 1 (2008) 
p.101-124. 
 
Denli, O. ‘Freedom of Religion: Secularist Policies and Islamic Challenges’. In Human 
Rights in Turkey, ed. by Z. Kabakasal Arat (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007) p.87-101. 
 
Denton, J. ‘Negotiating Turkey Accession’. In Evin, A. and Denton, G. Turkey and the 
European Community (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1990) p.183-194. 
 
De Burca, G. ‘Beyond the Chapter: How Enlargement has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy 
of the European Union’. Fordham International Law Journal, vol.27 no: 2 (2003) p.679-714. 
 
De Burca, G. and Aschenbrenner, A. ‘European Constitutionalism and the Charter’. In The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, ed, by S. Peers and A.Ward (Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2004) p.3-34. 
 
De Burca, G. ‘The Road Not Taken: the European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’. 
American Journal of International Law, vol.105 no: 2 (2011) p.649-693. 
 
De Ridder, E., Schrijvers, A. and Vos, A. ‘Civilian Power Europe and Eastern Enlargement: 
the More the Merrier?’ in Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the EU (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008) p. 239-259. 
 
Deroose, S., Hodson, D., and Kuhlmann, J. ‘The Legitimation of the EMU: Lessons of the 
Early Days of the Euro’. Review of International Political Economy, vol.14 no: 5 (2007) 
p.800-819. 
 
Derviş, K., Emerson, M., Gros, D. and Ulgen, S. The European Transformation of Modern 
Turkey (Istanbul: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004) 
 
De Witte, B. ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, ed. by P. 
Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.859-897. 
 
De Zuter, E. ‘Normative Power Spotting: an Ontological and Methodological Appraisal’. 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol.17 no: 8 (2010) p.1106-1127. 
 
Diamond, L. ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’. Journal of 
Democracy, vol.5 no: 3 (1994) p.4-17. 
 
Diez, T. ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’. Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol.17 no: 2 (2004) p.319-335. 
 
Diez, T. ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others’. Millennium- Journal of International 
Studies, vol.33 no: 3 (2005) p.613-636. 
 
Diez, T. and Manners, I. ‘Reflecting on Normative Power Europe’. In Power in World 
Politics, ed. by Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M.J. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p.173-188. 
 
266 
 
Diez, T. ‘Ethical Dimension: Promises, Obligations, Impatience and Delay: Reflections on 
the Ethical Aspects of EU-Turkey Relations’. In Fifty years of EU-Turkey Relations: a 
Sisyphean Story, ed. by A. Cakir (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) p.158-175. 
 
Diez, T. ‘Normative Power as Hegemony’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) 
p.194-210. 
 
Dinan, D. Europe Recast: a History of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004) 
 
Dimitrova, A. and Pridham, G. ‘International Actors and Democracy promotion in Central 
and Eastern Europe: the Integration Model and its Limits’. Democratization, vol.11 no: 5 
(2004) p.91-112. 
 
Dodd, C. H. ‘The Development of Turkish Democracy’ British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol.19 no: 1(1992) p.16-30. 
 
Dogan, Y. ‘The Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice’. Ankara 
Law Review, vol.6 no: 1 (2009) p.53-81. 
 
Dornbush, S.M. and Scott, W.R. Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority (San Fransisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1975) 
 
Dompere, K.K. and Ejaz, M. Epistemics of Development Economics (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1995) 
 
Donnelly, J. ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’. World Politics, vol.34 no: 4 (1982) p.575 
(574-595) 
 
Donnelly, J. ‘Human Rights: a New Standard of Civilization?’ International Affairs vol.74, 
no: 1 (1998) p.1-23. 
 
Donnelly, J. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2003) 
 
Doornbos, M. ‘Good Governance: the Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?’ In Public 
Governance vol.4, ed. by M. Bevir (London: Sage Publications, 2007) p.27-41. 
 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Political Community (1953) 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/991/01/political_union_draft_treaty_1.pdf> (accessed November 1 2008) 
 
Döşemeci, M. Debating Turkish Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
Drorian, S. ‘Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times’. European Security, 
vol.14 no: 2 (2005) p.255-275. 
 
Duchêne, F. ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’. In Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look 
Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972) p.32-47. 
 
Dunn, W.N. Public Policy Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994)  
267 
 
 
Dunne, T. and Wheeler, N.J. ‘We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human 
Rights Theory and Practice. International Relations, vol.18 no: 9 (2004) p.9-23. 
 
Dunne, T. ‘Good Citizen Europe’. International Affairs, vol.84 no: 1 (2008) p.13-28. 
 
Duran, B. ‘The Justice and Development Party’s ‘New Politics’. In Secular and Islamic 
Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, ed. by Ü. Çizre 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) p. 80–106. 
 
Duquette, E.S. ‘Human Rights in the European Union: Internal vs. External Objectives’. 
Cornell International Law Journal, vol.34 no: 2 (2001) p.363-395. 
 
Düzgit, S.A. ‘Seeking Kant in EU’s Relations with Turkey’ (Istanbul: TESEV Publications: 
2006) 
 
Ecevit, Y. ‘Women’s Rights, Women’s Organisations, and the State’. In Human Rights in 
Turkey, ed. by Z. F. Kabakasal Arat (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) 
p.187-201. 
 
EC Bulletin 12/1967. 
 
EC Bulletin 7-8/75. 
 
EC Bulletin Suppl. 2/76. 
 
EC Bulletin 3/78. 
 
EC Bulletin Suppl. 3/1981. 
 
EC Bulletin 4/1993. 
 
EC Bulletin 7-8/1993. 
 
Economist, ‘The Secularists Fight Back’ (3 April 2008) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/10960090> (accessed 11 March 2011) 
 
Economist, ‘Press Freedom in Turkey: Don’t cross Erdoğan’ (30 September 2010) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/17155758> (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
Edwards, G. ‘The Pattern of the EU's Global Activity’. In C. Hill and M. Smith (eds), 
International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
p.39-64. 
 
Eeckhout, P. ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’. Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 39 no: 4 (2002) p.945-994. 
 
Eisenstadt, S.N, and Roniger, L. Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and 
the Structure of Trust in Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)  
 
268 
 
Eising, R. and Kohler-Koch, B. ‘Governance in the European Union: a Comparative 
Assessment’. In The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, ed. by R. Eising 
and B. Kohler-Koch (London: Routledge, 1999) p.267-285. 
 
Elgström, O. ‘Outsiders’ Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade 
Negotiations.’  Journal of Common Market Studies vol.4, no: 4 (2007) p.949-967. 
 
Eligür, B. The Mobilisation of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 
 
Elver, H. ‘Gender Equality from a Constitutional Perspective: the Case of Turkey’. In The 
Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence, ed, by B. Baines and R. Rubio-Marin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 278-305. 
 
Erdoğan, R.T. Speech at USAK: ‘The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of 
Turkey’ (29 July 2010) <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/341/the-changing-balances-
and-the-rising-importance-of-turkey.html> (accessed 29 July 2010) 
 
Ergil,D. ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkey’. Journal of Democracy, vol. 11 no: 3 (2000) 
p.122-135. 
 
Ergil, D. ‘Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey’. Journal of International Affairs, 
vol.54 no: 1 (2000) p.43-62. 
 
Eriksen. E.O. and Fossum. J.E. ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation 
Assessed’. International Political Science Review, vol.25 no: 4 (2004) p.435-459. 
 
Eriksen, E. ‘The EU - a Cosmopolitan Polity? Journal of European Public Policy. vol.13 no: 
2 (2006) p. 252-269. 
 
Erickson, J.L. ‘Market Imperative Meets Normative Power: Human Rights and European 
Arms Transfer Policy’. European Journal of International Relations, vol.19 no: 2 (2011) 
p.209-234. 
 
Erman, E. Human Rights and Democracy: Discourse Theory and Global Rights Institutions 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 
 
Ersanlı B. and Özdoğan G.G. ‘Obstacles and Opportunities: Recent Kurdish Struggles for 
Political Representation and Participation in Turkey’. Southeastern Europe, vol.35 no: 1 
(2011) p.62-94. 
 
Ertugal, E. Regional Governance in Turkey on the Road to EU Membership (Saarbrucken: 
Verlag Publications, 2009) 
 
EU Business, ‘Turkey says EU Cyprus demands unfair’ (9 December 2009)  
<http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/turkey-enlarge.1ur > (accessed 23 March 2011) 
 
Eur-Lex: Access to European Union Law. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm> 
 
269 
 
Euractiv, ‘La Démocratisation de la Turquie et l'Union Européenne’ (17 June 2003) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/fr/elargissement/dmocratisation-turquie-union-europenne/article-
126456> (accessed 29 September 2011) 
 
 
Euractiv, ‘Rehn dismisses 'privileged partnership' for Turkey’ (6 October 2006) 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/rehn-dismisses-privileged-partnership-
turkey/article-158513 (accessed 5 September 2011) 
 
Euractiv, ‘EU criticises Turkey’s court ban of Kurdish party’ (15 December 2009) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-criticises-turkey-court-ban-kurdish-
party/article-188334> (accessed  31 March 2011)  
 
Euractiv, ‘Turkey referendum campaign takes nasty turn’ (19 August 2010) 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-referendum-campaign-takes-nasty-turn-
news-496981 (accessed 19 March 2011) 
 
Euractiv, ‘Turkey accuses EU of bigotry’ (2 January 2013) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/turkey-accuses-eu-bigotry-news-516832> (accessed 
10 January 2013) 
Euronews, Interview with Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (30 January 2010) 
<http://www.euronews.net/2010/01/30/erdogan-deflects-reform-criticism-questions-eu-
honesty/> (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
 
Europa – RAPID press release, ‘Consolidation, Conditionality, Communication – the 
Strategy of the Enlargement Policy’ (Brussels: 9 November 2005) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1392> (accessed 23 
September 2011) 
 
Europa- RAPID press release, ‘Statement by Commissioner Stefan Füle on the result of the 
referendum in Turkey’ (13 September 2010) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/402&type=HTML> 
(accessed 4 September 2011)  
 
Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)’ 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/enlargement/e50020_en.htm> (accessed 
17 January 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘How does a country join the EU?’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_count
ry_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm > (accessed 20 February 2009) 
 
European Commission, ‘Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation in the EU’s 
External Relations’.   <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/index_en.htm> 
(accessed 28 January 2010) 
 
270 
 
European Commission, ‘Opinion on the Accession to the European Communities of 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and United Kingdom’ OJ L 73/4 (27 March 1972) 
 
European Commission, ‘Opinion on Greek Application for Membership’ EC Bulletin Suppl. 
2/76. 
 
European Commission, ‘Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership’. EC Bulletin 
Suppl. 5/78. 
 
European Commission, ‘Opinion on Spanish Application for Membership’. EC Bulletin 
Suppl. 9/78. 
 
European Commission, ‘Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community’ (20 
December 1989) 
<www.ena.lu/commission_opinion_turkey_request_accession_community_20_december_19
89-020005676.html> (accessed 1 January 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the EC and 
their Member States, and the Republic of Poland’. OJ L 348/2 (3 December 1993)  
 
European Commission, ‘Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the EC and 
their Member States, and the Republic of Romania’. OJ L 357/2 (31 December 1994)  
 
European Commission, ‘Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles 
and human rights in agreements between the Community and Third Countries’. COM 216 
(95) final (Brussels: 23 May 1995) 
 
European Commission, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ (Brussels: 
October 1998) 
 
European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ 
(Brussels: 13 October 1999) 
 
European Commission-ACP, ‘Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of 
Lomé’. Article 5 (Brussels, 27 October 1999) 
 
European Commission-ACP, ‘Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of 
Lomé’. Article 366a (Brussels, 27 October 1999) 
 
European Commission, ‘2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ 
(Brussels: 8 November 2000) 
 
European Commission, ‘European Governance: a White Paper’. COM (2001) 428 final 
(Brussels: 25 July 2001) 
 
European Commission, ‘Communication on the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human 
Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries’. COM (2001) 252 final (Brussels: 8 May 
2001) 
 
271 
 
European Commission, European Governance: Preparatory Work for the White Paper 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002)  
 
European Commission, ‘2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’. 
COM(2002) 700 final (Brussels: 9 November 2002) 
 
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer  61 (Spring 2004) p.185. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf> (accessed 22 March 
2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘Recommendation on Turkey's Progress towards Accession’. COM 
(2004) 656 final (Brussels: 6 October 2004) 
 
European Commission, ‘2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’. SEC 
(2004) 1201 (Brussels: 6 October 2004) 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2005 Progress Report’ COM(2005) 561 final (Brussels: 9 
November 2005) 
 
European Commission, ‘Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Community’ 
(2005) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf> (accessed 16 
July 2009)  
 
European Commission, ‘Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries’. 
COM(2005) 290 final (Brussels: 29 June 2005) 
 
European Commission, ‘Round Table: a Sustainable Project for Tomorrow’s Europe’ 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005) 
 
European Commission, ‘Equal Rights vs. Special Rights? Minority Protection and the 
Prohibition of Discrimination’ (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2007) 
 
European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
Strategy Paper 2007-2010’ <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/documents/eidhr_strategy_paper_2007-2010_en.pdf> (accessed 16 February 2010) 
 
European Commission, ‘Furthering Human Rights and Democracy across the Globe’ 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007)  
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2008 Progress Report’ SEC(2008) 2699 (Brussels: 5 
November 2008) 
 
European Commission Delegation to Turkey, ‘EIDHR Turkey Programme’ (January 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/turkey_eidhr_projects_en.pdf > 
(accessed 19 April 2009) 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2009 Progress Report’. SEC (2009) 1334 (Brussels: 14 
October 2009)  
 
272 
 
European Commission, ‘Value for Citizens: A Vision of Public Governance in 2020’ 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009) 
 
European Commission, ‘Respecting Fundamental Rights while Ensuring Security and Justice 
in the European Union’. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/rights/fsj_rights_intro_en.htm (accessed 31 March 2009). 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey Multi-Annual Planning Indicative Document 2007-2009’ 
<http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/TeknikMevzuatDb/MIPD.pdf > (accessed 23 
February 2010) 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey – Financial Assistance’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/financial-
assistance/index_en.htm> (accessed 25 September 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multi-annual 
Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2011-2013 – Turkey’ 
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42164&l=1> (accessed 25 September 2011) 
 
European Commission Delegation to Ankara, ‘Projects Funded’. 
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD,D.hag.html?pageindex=3> (accessed 15 February 2010)  
 
European Delegation to Croatia, ‘The Call for Proposals under EIDHR will be launched on 6 
July 2009’. <http://delhrv.ec.europa.eu/?lang=en&content=1907&keyword=eidhr> (accessed 
6 March 2010) 
 
European Commission, ‘Commission asked to prepare opinion on Icelandic membership 
application’ (3 September 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/newsletter/090902_en.htm> (accessed 28 
January 2010) 
 
European Commission Delegation to Turkey. ‘EIDHR Turkey Programme – Restricted Call 
for Proposals 2009’. <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/Guidelines_EIDHR_2009---
FINAL.doc> (accessed 13th February 2010) 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2010 Progress Report’. SEC (2010) 1327 (Brussels: 9 
November 2010)  
 
European Commission – EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, ‘European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm> (accessed 22 January 2010) 
 
European Commission, ‘European Commission adopts 2010 enlargement package’. RAPID 
Press Release (Brussels: 9 November 2010) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1485&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed 22 November 2010) 
 
European Commission Delegation to Turkey, ‘The European Instrument of Democracy and 
Human Rights’ (15 October 2010) <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD,Dihag_Revised.html> 
(accessed 28 January 2011) 
273 
 
 
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 74 (November 2010) p.35. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_publ_fr.pdf> (accessed 22 March 
2011). 
 
European Commission Delegation to Ankara, ‘EIDHR Turkey Programme’. 
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD,D.hag.html?pageindex=2> (accessed 14 February 2010) 
  
European Commission,  ’Guiding Principles for EC Support of the Development of Civil 
Society in Turkey 2011-2015’ 
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/CSD/Guiding_Principles_for_EC.pdf> (accessed 6 
September 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences’. COM (2011) 241 final (Brussels: 10 May 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘European Union Local Strategy to Support and Defend Human 
Rights Defenders in Turkey’ (Brussels: November 2011) 
 
European Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014’. COM 
(2013) 700 final (Brussels: 16 October 2013) 
 
European Commission, ‘From Lomé I to IV’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/lome-convention/lomeitoiv_en.htm> 
(accessed 2 July 2012) 
 
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2013 Progress Report’. COM(2013) 700 final (Brussels: 16 
October 2013)  
 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Report to the Turkish Government on 
the Visit to Turkey Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
from 21 to 28 June 2012’ (Strasbourg: 10 October 2013) 
<http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/tur/2013-27-inf-eng.htm> (accessed 20 October 2013) 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Copenhagen: 21-22 June 1993) 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Luxembourg: 12-13 December 1997) 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Berlin: 24-25 March 1999) 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Cologne: 3-4 June 1999)  
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Helsinki: 10-11 December 1999) 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Nice: 7-10 December 2000) 
 
European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (Brussels: 12 December 2003) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>  (accessed 19 October 
2012) 
274 
 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Brussels: 16-17 December 2004) 
 
European Court of Justice, Lothar Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkühlkost, case 
93/78 (22 November 1978) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numd
oc=61978J0093> (accessed 14 May 2011)  
 
European Court of Human Rights, Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey (Strasbourg, 10 November 2005) 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=t
urkey&sessionid=72486530&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 20 June 2011) 
 
European Court of Human Rights, Affaire Dink c. Turquie , application no: 2668/07(14 
September 2010) 
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
turkey%20|%20%222668/07%20|%206102/08%20|%2030079/08%20|%207072/09%20|%20
7124/09%22&sessionid=65687398&skin=hudoc-en> (accessed 27 January 2011)   
 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Report 2010’ (Strasbourg: June 2011)  
 
European Court of Justice, Opinion 2/96 (28 March 1996) 
 
European Navigator, ‘The Accession of Greece’ 
<www.ena.lu/accession_greece_portugal_spain_european_communities_1981_1986-
020600078.html> (accessed 3 December 2010) 
 
European Parliament, European Council and European Commission, ‘Joint Declaration’. OJ 
C  103 (27 April 1977) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Events in Turkey’. OJ C 265 (13 October 1980)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Military Junta in Turkey’ OJ C 101 (4 May 1981)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Political Situation in Turkey’. OJ C 238 (13 
September 1982)  
 
 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Respect for Human Rights in Turkey’ OJ C 172 (2 July 
1984)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Ruthless Violation of Human Rights and the Bloody 
Reign of Terror in Turkey’ OJ C 122 (20 May 1985)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Relations between the EEC and Turkey’ OJ C 7 (12 
January 1987)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution embodying Parliament’s opinion on the proposal 
for a Council Decision laying down the procedure for adopting the Community's position in 
the Customs Union Joint Committee set up by Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council on the implementation of the final phase of the Customs Union’. OJ C 
261 (9 September 1996) 
275 
 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on EU-Turkey Relations’ (3 December 1998) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee’ 
(Brussels: June 2004)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Information Note on the Work of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (June 2004)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/jpc/turk/history2004_turkey_en.pdf > 
(accessed 3 February 2011) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Minutes of the 56th Meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (Ankara: 3-5 May 2006)  
 
 European Parliament, ‘Minutes of the 57th Meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (Brussels: 27-28 November 2006)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Minutes of the 64th Meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (Istanbul: 25-26 May 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Minutes of the 68th Meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (Istanbul: 23-24 February 2012) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Minutes of the 69th Meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee’ (Strasbourg: 14-15 June 2012) 
European Parliament, ‘Turkey: Human Rights’ (Brussels: 2006) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’. OJ C 306 (15 
December 2006)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Functioning of the Human Rights Dialogues and 
Consultations on Human Rights with Third Countries’  (6 September 2007) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0381+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (accessed 2 February 2011)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Evaluation of EU Sanctions as a Part of the EU’s 
Actions and Policies in the Area of Human Rights’. OJ C 295 E/15 (Brussels: 4 September 
2008) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Turkey’ (10 
December 2009)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2009-
0245&format=XML&language=EN> (accessed 15 January 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution on Breaking off the Accession Negotiations 
with Turkey’ (10 December 2009) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2009-
0244&format=XML&language=EN> (accessed 1 August 2010)  
 
 
276 
 
European Parliament, ‘Human Rights in the World in 2009 and EU Policy on the Matter’. 
OJC 169 E/81 (16 December 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Turkey’ (10 
December 2009)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2009-
0245&format=XML&language=EN> (accessed 15 January 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Human rights in Turkey: still a long way to go to meet accession 
criteria’. Press release (27 October 2010)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20101025IPR90072&format=XML&language=EN > (accessed 20 
January 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Democracy Building in External Relations’. OJ C 265 E/3 (30 
September 2010)  
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Human Rights and Social and Environmental Standards 
in International Trade Agreements’. 2009/2219 INI (Brussels: 25 November 2010) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Human Rights in the World in 2009 and EU Policy on 
the Matter’. OJ C 169 E/81 (16 December 2010)  
European Parliament Committees – Human Rights 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/droi/home.html#menuzone> (accessed 24 
October 2012) 
 
European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World 2011 and the European Union's Policy on the Matter’ (Brussels: 4 
September 2012) 
 
European Union External Action Service, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. 
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm> (accessed 10 July 2012)  
 
European Voice, ‘Approaching the Finishing Line’ (4 November 2010) 
<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/approaching-the-finish-line/69339.aspx> 
(accessed 9 February 2011) 
 
Europolitics, ‘EU-Turkey: Union ‘too lenient’ on Ankara, says Conference Paper’ (20 
September 2005)  <http://www.europolitics.info/eu-turkey-union-too-lenient-on-ankara-says-
conference-paper-artr174912-44.html > (accessed 17 January 2011) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Human Rights Conditionality in Development Policy’ (Brussels: 11 
October 2011) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Press Release: Turkey’s Uphill Route to the EU’ (Brussels: 10 
February 2011) 
 
European Parliament, ‘Interparliamentary Committee Meeting with National Parliaments’ (25 
September 2013) 
 
277 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Situation in Turkey (Gezi Protests)’ (Brussels: 11 
June 2013) 
 
Evans, T. The Politics of Human Rights: a Global Perspective (London: Pluto Press, 2001) 
 
Falk, R. ‘Foreword’. In Human Rights in Turkey, ed. by Z. Kabakasal Arat (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) p.xi-xviii. 
 
Falkner, R. ‘The Political Economy of Normative Power Europe: EU Environmental 
Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation’. Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol.14 no: 4 (2007) p.507-526. 
 
Faucompret, E. Turkish Accession to the EU: Satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008) 
 
Ferocci, F.N. ‘EU Enlargement Policy: from Success to Fatigue’. In Frontiers of Europe: a 
Transatlantic Problem? ed. by F. Bindi and I. Angelescu (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2011) p.25-34. 
 
Ficchi, L. ‘Candidate Countries Facing a Binding Charter of Fundamental Rights: What's 
New?’. In The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding 
Instrument, ed. by G. Di Federico (London: Springer, 2011) p.109-124. 
 
Fierke, K. and Wiener, A. ‘Constructing Institutional Interest: EU and NATO Enlargement’. 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol.6, no: 3 (1999) p. 721–742. 
 
 
Fierro, E. The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 
 
Fioramonti, L. ‘Promoting Human Rights and Democracy: a New Paradigm for the European 
Union’. In The European Union and the Arab Spring, ed. by J. Peters (Plymouth: Lexington 
Books, 2012) p.17-32. 
 
Fisher Onar, N. ‘Constructing Turkey Inc: the Discursive Anatomy of a Domestic and 
Foreign Policy Agenda’. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol.19 no: 4 (2011) 
p.463-473. 
 
Fishman, L. ‘The Twitterisation of the Gezi Park Protests’. Today’s Zaman (4 July 2013) 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-319990-the-twitterization-of-the-gezi-park-protests-by-
louis-fishman-.html> (accessed 4 July 2013) 
 
Flockhart, T. ‘Socialization and Democratization: a Tenuous but Intriguing Link’. In 
Socializing Democratic Norms, ed. by T. Flockhart (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
p.1-20. 
 
Flockhart, T. ‘Europeanisation or EU-isation? The Transfer of European Norms across Time 
and Space’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.48 no: 4 (2010) p.787-810. 
 
278 
 
Follesdal, A. ‘Legitimacy Theories of the European Union’.ARENA Working Papers, WP 
04/15 (Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2004) 
 
Follesdal, A. ‘EU Legitimacy and Normative Political Theory’. In Palgrave Advances in 
European Studies. ed. by M. Cini and A. Bourne (London: Palgrave, 2006) p.151-173) 
 
Franck, T.M. ‘Legitimacy in the International System’. American Journal of International 
Law, vol.82 no: 4 (1988) p.705-759. 
 
Franck, T.M. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990) 
 
Franck, T.M. Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
 
Freedom House, ‘The Ergenekon Case and Turkey’s Democratic Aspirations’ (7 February 
2012) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/ergenekon-case-and-turkey%E2%80%99s-
democratic-aspirations> (accessed 9 March 2012) 
 
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2013 – Turkey’. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/turkey> (accessed 20 
October 2013) 
 
Freudenstein R. ‘Poland, Germany and the EU’. International Affairs, vol.74 no: 1 (1998) 
p.41-54. 
 
Friedlander, R.A. ‘Human Rights Theory and NGO Practice: Where Do We Go From Here?’ 
In Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies, ed. 
by V.P.Nanda, J.R Scarritt and G.W. Shepherd (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981) p.219-227. 
 
Friedrich, C. Man and his Government: an Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: 
MacGraw-Hill, 1963) 
 
Friis L. and Murphy, A. ‘And Never the Twain Shall Meet? The European Union’s Quest for 
Legitimacy and Enlargement’. In International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
European Integration, ed. by M.C. Williams and M. Kelstrup (London: Routledge, 2000) 
p.226-249. 
Füle, S. ‘Human rights dimension increasingly important in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy’ Speech at the 37th International Federation of Human Rights Congress, Erevan (6 
April 2010).  <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/144> 
(accessed 15 September 2010) 
 
Füle, S. ‘Turkey and the EU: a Multi-faceted Relationship’. Speech at the Bosphorus 
Conference Plenary Debate (Istanbul: 23 October 2010) 
 
Galtung, J. The European Community: a Superpower in the Making (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1973) 
 
Galtung, J. Human Rights in another Key (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) 
 
279 
 
Gardner Feldman, L. ‘Reconciliation and Legitimacy: Foreign Relations and Enlargement of 
the European Union’. In Legitimacy and the European Union: the Contested Polity, ed. by T. 
Banchoff and M.P.Smith (London: Routledge, 1999) p.66-86. 
 
Garreton, M.A. ‘Human Rights in Democratization Processes’. In Constructing Democracy: 
Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America, ed. by E. Jelin and E.Hershberg 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) p. 39-56. 
 
Gates, A. ‘Mixed Messages and Mixed Results: The European Union’s Promotion of Human 
Rights in Turkey’. European Law Journal, vol.13 no: 3 (2009) p.401-411. 
 
Genel, A. and Karaosmanoğlu, K. ‘A New Islamic Individualism in Turkey: Headscarved 
Women in the City’. Turkish Studies, vol. 7 no: 3 (2006) p.473-488. 
 
George, A. ‘Foreword’. In Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations 
Theory, ed.by M. Nincic and J. Lepgold (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000) 
 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013’ 
(December 2013) 
 
Ghinter, K. ‘Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the 21st Century’. In Human Rights 
and Democracy for the 21
st
 Century, ed. by K. Koufa (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications, 
2000)  
 
Gialdino, C. ‘Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire’. Common Market Law 
Review, vol.32 no: 5 (1995) p.1089-1121. 
 
Gibson, J.L. ‘Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and 
Political Tolerance’. Law and Society Review, vol.23 no: 3 (1989) p.469-496. 
 
Gill, G.J. The Nature and Development of the Modern State (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003)  
 
Ginsberg, R.H. The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001)  
 
 
Ginsberg R.H. and Smith M.E. ‘Understanding the EU as a Global Political Actor: Theory, 
Practice and Impact’. In Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at 
Fifty, ed. by S. Meunier  and K. MacNamara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)  
 
Ginsberg, R.H. ‘The Impact of Enlargement on the European Union’s Role in the World’. In 
The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, and Future, ed. by J. Redmond and G. 
Rosenthal (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997) 
 
Glyptis, L. ‘Which Side of the Fence? Turkey’s Uncertain Place in the European Union’, 
Alternatives, vol.4 no: 3 (2005) p.108-136. 
 
280 
 
Gök, F. and Ilgaz, D. ‘The Right to Education’. In Human Rights in Turkey, ed. by Z.F. 
Kabakasal Arat (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) p.123—136. 
 
Göktepe, C. ‘The Menderes Period’. Journal of Turkish Weekly 
<http://www.turkishweekly.net.print.asp?type=2&id=60> (accessed 5 December 2012) 
 
Göl, A. ‘Imagining the Turkish Nation through Othering Armenians’. Nations and 
Nationalism, vol.11 no: 1 (2005) p.121-139. 
 
Göl, A. ‘The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 30 no: 4 
(2009) p. 795–811. 
 
Göle, N. ‘Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites’. 
Middle East Journal, vol.51 no: 1 (1997) p.46-58. 
 
Göle, N. ‘The Civilizational, Spatial and Sexual Powers of the Secular’. In Varieties of 
Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. by M. Warner, J. Vanantwerpen, and C. Calhoun 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) p.243-264. 
 
Gönenç, L. ‘The 2001 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey’. Ankara Law 
Review, vol.1 no: 1 (2004) p.89-109. 
 
Gönenç, L. ‘Recent Developments in the Field of Freedom of Expression in 
Turkey’. European Public Law,  vol.11 no: 2 (2005) p.241-259. 
 
Gould, A. ‘The Erosion of the Welfare State: Swedish Social Policy and the EU’. Journal of 
European Social Policy, vol.9 no: 1 (1999) p.165-174. 
 
Grabbe, H. ‘How does Europeanization affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion 
and Diversity’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.8 no: 6 (2001) p.1013-1031. 
 
Grabbe, H. ‘European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire’. International 
Political Science Review vol.23 no: 3 (2002) p.257 (249-268) 
 
Grabbe, H. The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)  
 
 
Grabbe, H. ‘What Hope for Solidarity in the Enlarged Union?’ In Conditions of European 
Solidarity: What Holds Europe Together? ed. by K. Michalski (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2006) p.42-53. 
 
Graham, G. ‘The Moral Basis of Democracy’. In The Ethics of Liberal Democracy, ed. by 
R.P. Churchill (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994) p.19-30. 
 
Grannel, F. ‘The European Union's Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.33 no: 1 (1995) p.117-141. 
 
Gready, P. Fighting for Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004)  
281 
 
 
Greco L., Landri P., Tomassini M. and Wickham J. ‘The Development of Policy Relevance 
in European Social Research’. In Building the European Research Area: Socio-economic 
Research in Practice, ed. by M. Kuhn and S. Remoe (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
2005) p.177-237. 
 
Grigoriadis, I.N., and Kamaras, A. ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey: Historical 
Constraints and the AKP Success Story’. Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 44 no: 1 (2008) p.53-
68. 
 
Griffin, J. On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)  
 
Griffiths, R. ‘A Dismal Decade? European Integration in the 1970s’.  In Origins and 
Evolution of the European Union, ed. by D. Dinan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
p.169-190. 
 
Guilhot, N. The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 
 
Gültekin, N.B. and Yılmaz, K. ‘The Turkish Economy before the EU Accession Talks’. In 
The EU and Turkey: a Glittering Prize or a Millstone?, ed. by M. Lake (London: Federal 
Trust, 2005) p.61-75. 
Güneş-Ayata, A. ‘The Republican People’s Party’. In Political Parties in Turkey, ed. by B.M. 
Rubin and M. Heper (London: Routledge, 2002) p.112 (102-121) 
Guney, A. ‘The People’s Democracy Party’. In Political Parties in Turkey, ed. by B.M. 
Rubin and M. Heper (London: Routledge, 2002) p.122-137. 
 
Gülmez, S.B. ‘The EU Policy of the Republican People’s Party under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: A 
New Wine in an Old Wine Cellar’. Turkish Studies, vol.14 no: 2, (2013) p.311-328. 
 
Haas, P.  ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’. 
International Organization, vol.46 no: 1 (1992) p.1-35. 
 
Habermas, J. Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976) 
 
Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998) 
 
Hale, W. Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994)  
 
Hale, W. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000)   
 
Hale, W. and Avcı, G. ‘Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership’. In 
Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. by Rubin, B. and Kirisci, K. 
(Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) p.31-47. 
 
Hale, W. ‘Human Rights and Turkey’s EU Accession Process: Internal and External 
Dynamics, 2005-2010’. South European Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 2 (2011) p.323-333. 
 
282 
 
Halpern, S.M. ‘The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy’. West European 
Politics, vol.9 no: 2 (1986) p.181-197. 
 
Hammarberg, T. ‘The prohibition of torture is absolute and must be enforced at all times and 
in all circumstances’. Presentation to the Council of Europe (30 October 2010) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1697999> (accessed 17 March 2011) 
 
Handley, D.H. ‘Public Opinion and European Integration: The Crisis of the 1970s’ European 
Journal of Political Research, vol.9 no: 4 (1981) p.335-364. 
 
Hansen, L. and Williams, M.C. ‘The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 
Crisis of the EU’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.37 no: 2 (1999) p.233-249. 
 
Harmel, P. Speech on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom 
to the EEC (Luxembourg: 30 June 1970) 
<http://www.ena.lu/report_pierre_harmel_luxembourg_30_june_1970-020002689.htm>l 
(French version only. Accessed 13 November 2008) 
 
Harıkan, A. Turkey and the EU: an Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006) 
 
Harpaz, G. ‘Normative Power Europe and the Problem of a Legitimacy Deficit: an Israeli 
Perspective’. European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.12 no: 1 (2007) p.89-109. 
 
Harpaz, G. and Harmis, A. ‘Normative Power Europe and the State of Israel: an Illegitimate 
EUtopia’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.48 no: 3 (2010) p.579-616.  
 
Hawkesworth, M.E. Theoretical issues in Policy Analysis (Albany: State University of New 
York, 1988) 
 
Hayward, K. and Wiener, A. ‘The Influence of the EU towards Conflict Transformation on 
the Island of Ireland’. In The European Union and Border Conflicts: the Power of Integration 
and Association, ed. by T. Diez, M. Albert and S. Stetter (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) p.33-63. 
 
Helsinki Watch Committee, State of Flux: Human Rights in Turkey (1987)  
 
Heper, M. The State Tradition in Turkey (Beverley: Eothen Press, 1985) 
 
Heper, M. and Keyman, E.F. ‘Double-faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation 
of Democracy in Turkey’. Middle Eastern Studies, vo.34 no: 4 (1998) p.259-277. 
 
Heper, M. ‘The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy’. South European 
Society and Politics vol.10 no: 1 (2005) p.33–44. 
 
Heritier, A. Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape from Deadlock (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999)  
 
283 
 
Herrero, S. ‘A Decade of Democracy Promotion through the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights’. EPD Working Paper Series on Democracy Support, 1/2009. 
 
Hershlag, Z.Y. Contemporary Turkish Economy (Abingdon: Routledge, 1988) 
 
Herzog, M. ‘Analysing Turkey’s 2010 Constitutional Referendum’. Foreign Policy Centre, 
<http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1269.pdf> (accessed 30 December 2012) 
 
Heywood, Andrew. Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Hillion, C. ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’. In EU Enlargement: a Legal 
Approach, ed. by C. Hillion (Portland:  Hart Publishing, 2004) p.1-22. 
 
Hilson, C. ‘Legitimacy and Rights in the EU: Questions of Identity’. Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol.14 no: 4 (2007) p.527-543 
 
Hirst, P. ‘Democracy and Governance’. In Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and 
Democracy, ed. by J. Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.13-35. 
 
History Foundation of Turkey, ‘Contributing to the NGO movement’ 
<http://www.tarihvakfi.org.tr/english/ngomovement.asp> (accessed 2 July 2010) 
 
Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005)  
 
Hobson, C. ‘Democracy as Civilisation’. Global Society, vol.22 no: 1 (2008) p.75-95. 
 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. ‘Multi-level Governance in the European Union’. In The European 
Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, ed. by B. F. Nelsen 
and A. Stubb (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p.281-311. 
 
Holbraad, C. Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)  
 
Hosgör, E. ‘Islamic Capital/Anatolian Tigers: Past and Present’. Middle Eastern Studies, 
vol.47 no: 2 (2011) p.343-360. 
 
House of Commons, ‘Human Rights in the EU: the Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 
Research Paper  00/32 (20 March 2000)  
 
House of Commons, ‘The Human Rights Clause in the EU's External Agreements’. Research 
Paper 04/33 (16 April 2004)  
 
Hudson, V.M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 
 
 
Hughes, J., Sasse, G. and Gordon, C.  Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s 
Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)  
284 
 
 
Human Rights Agenda Association, ‘Turkey: Defend Human Rights Defenders’ (Ankara: 
2008) 
 
Human Rights Agenda Association, ‘Türkiye İnsan Hakları Hareketi’.(Ankara: November 
2008) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘1993 Human Rights Report’ (Ankara: 1994)  
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘1995 Human Rights Report’ (Ankara: 1996) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘1998 Human Rights Report’ (Ankara: 1999) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘Submission for the 8th Session’ (August 2010). 
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/TR/HRFT_UPR_TUR_S08_2010
_TheHumanRightsFoundationofTurkey.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2010)  
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘Torture and Rehabilitation Centres’ 
<http://www.tihv.org.tr/index.php?treatment-and-rehabilitation-centres > (accessed 7 June 
2013) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers Report 2010’ 
(Ankara: June 2011) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, ‘Effective Protection of the Rights of Refugees, 
Asylum Seekers, and Other Persons in Need of International Protection’ 
<http://arsiv1.tihv.org/index.php?id=95,751,0,0,1,0> (accessed 7 June 2013) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Headscarf Ruling Denies Women Education and Career’ (15 
November 2005) <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/11/15/turkey-headscarf-ruling-denies-
women-education-and-career> (accessed 20 June 2011) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Statement to the Human Rights Council on Turkey’ (22 September 
2010) <www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/22/statement-human-rights-council-turkey> 
(accessed 17 March 2011) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2000 – Turkey’ <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Eca-
20.htm> (accessed 25 June 2010) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2001: the Events of 2000’ (London: Human Rights 
Watch, 2001) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2011 – Turkey’ (New York, Human Rights Watch, 
2011) 
 
Human Rights Watch. ‘He Loves You, He Beats You: Family Violence in Turkey and Access 
to Protection’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011) 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: End Impunity for State Killings, Disappearances’ (3 
September 2012) 
285 
 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘The Turkish Trial that Fell Far Short’ (6 August 2013) 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/06/turkish-trial-fell-far-short>  (accessed 6 August 2013) 
 
Hurd, I. ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’. International Organization, 
vol.53 no: 2 (1999) p.379-408. 
 
Hurd, I. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
 
Hurrell, A. ‘Power, Principles, and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply Divided 
World’. In Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. by K. Booth and T. Dunne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.277-302. 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘From the Papers’ (6 January 2001) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=from-the-papers-2001-01-06> (accessed 22 
February 2011) 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘General Kivrikoglu Blasts Erdogan’ (25 April 2002) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=gen.-kivrikoglu-blasts-erdogan-2002-04-
25> (accessed 3 June 2011). 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Turkey's EU membership process stamps election manifestos’ (10 
October 2002) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turkeys-eu-membership-
process-stamps-election-manifestos-2002-10-10> (accessed 3 September 2011) 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘From the Columns’ (30 April 2005) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=from-the-columns-2005-04-30> (accessed 
30 April 2005) 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Cicek: Double standards from the EU’ (20 December 2005) 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=cicek-double-standards-from-the-eu-2005-
12-20 (accessed 23 March 2011) 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Government complains of European 'hypocrisy' (11 December 2007) 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=government-complains-of-european-
hypocrisy-2007-12-11 (accessed 23 March 2011) 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Turkish PM Erdoğan rebuffs criticism over press freedom’ (13 April 
2011) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=erdogan8217s-speech-at-the-pace-2011-
04-13> (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Double standards cut public support for EU in Turkey’ (27 July 2011) 
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/9053668.asp?gid=231&sz=70597> (accessed 4 
September 2011) 
 
286 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Turkey prepares its own progress report for the first time’ (10 January 
2013) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-prepares-its-own-eu-progress-report-for-
first-time-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=38023> (accessed 10 January 2013) 
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘Normative Power Europe: a Realist Critique’. Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p. 217–234. 
 
Hyde-Price, A. ‘A Tragic Actor? A Realist Perspective on Ethical Power Europe’. 
International Affairs, vol.84 no: 1 (2008) p.29-44. 
 
Hyden, G. ‘Sovereignty, Responsibility and Accountability’. In African Reckoning: a Quest 
for Good Governance, ed. by F.M. Deng and T. Lyons (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1998) p.37-66. 
 
İbrahim S.E. ‘Civil Society and Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World’. In Civil 
Society in the Middle East vol.I, ed. by A.R. Norton (Leiden: Brill Publications, 1995) 
 
İçduygu, A. ‘Interacting Actors: the EU and Civil Society in Turkey’. South European Society 
and Politics, vol.16 no: 3 (2011) p.381-394. 
İdiz, S. ‘Erdoğan's Ankara Criteria’. Hurriyet Daily News (30 October 2012) 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-ankara-criteria.aspx?pageID=238&nid=33492 
(accessed 30 October 2012)  
 
Ignatieff, M. Gutmann A. and Appiah K.A. Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 
 
İHD (HRA), ‘Kürt Siyasetine ve Kürt Milletvekillerine Yönellik Ayrımcılık’(17 December 
2013) <http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php/baslamalarinmenu-77/genel-merkez/2746-kurt-
siyasetine-ve-kurt-milletvekillerine-yonelik-ayrimcilik.html> (accessed 17 December 2013) 
 
İHD (HRA), ‘Rêziknameya Komeleya Mafên Mirovan’ <http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php/d-
hakk-mainmenu-65.html> (accessed 1 December 2013) 
 
İlkkaracan, İ. ‘Why so few Women in the Labour Market in Turkey?’ Feminist Economics, 
vol.18 no: 1 (2012) p.1-37. 
 
Ilkin, S. ‘A History of Turkey’s Association with the EEC’. In Turkey and the European 
Community ed. by A. Evin and G. Denton, (Leske and Budrich: Opladen, 1990) p.35-47. 
 
İnçe, B. Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: from Atatürk’s Republic to the Present Day 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2012) 
 
International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey and Europe – the Decisive Year Ahead’ (15 December 
2008) 
 
IPA , ‘Women’s Shelters for Combating Domestic Violence – Turkey’. Standard Summary 
Project Fiché – IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2009) 
287 
 
IPA, ‘Implementation Capacity of Turkish Police to Prevent Disproportionate Use of Force’. 
Standard Summary Project Fiché – IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2009) 
IPA, Prevention of Domestic Violence against Women – Turkey’. Standard Summary Project 
Fiché – IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2010) 
 
IPA, ‘Fight against Violence towards Children – Turkey’. Standard Summary Project Fiché – 
IPA Decentralised National Programmes (2010) 
 
Ivanov, K. ‘Legitimate Conditionality? The European Union and Nuclear Power Safety in 
Central and Eastern Europe’. International Politics, vol.45 no: 1 (2008) p. 146-167. 
 
Jacoby, T. ‘Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in Turkey’. 
Development and Change vol.36 no: 4 (2005) p.641–665. 
 
Jacoby, T. ‘Identity Politics, Turkey, and the European Union’. Mediterranean Politics, 
vol.15 no: 1 (2010) p.109-119. 
 
Jenkins, G. ‘Context and Circumstance: the Turkish Military and Politics’. The International 
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Adelphi Paper no: 337 (2001) 
 
Johansson-Nogués, E. ‘The (Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy’. European Political Economy Review no: 7 (2007)  p.181-194.  
 
Johansson-Nogués, E. and Johansson, A. ‘Turkey, its Changing National Identity and EU 
Accession: Explaining the Ups and Downs in the Turkish Democratization Reforms’. Journal 
of Contemporary European Studies, vol.19  no: 1 (2011) p.113-132. 
 
Johnson, J.B. and Reynolds, H.T. Political Science Research Methods (Washington DC: CQ 
Press, 2005)  
 
Kadioğlu, A. ‘Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: a Study of Three Islamic Non-
Governmental Organisations’. Muslim World, vol.95 no:  1 (2005) p. 23-41. 
 
Kagan, R. Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 
Knopf, 2003) 
 
Kahraman, S. E. ‘Rethinking Turkey-EU Relations in the Light of Enlargement’. Turkish 
Studies , vol.1 no: 1 (2000) p.1-20. 
 
Kahraman, H. B. (2005). ‘The Cultural and Historical Foundation of Turkish Citizenship: 
Modernity as Westernization’. In Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and 
Turkish Experiences, ed. by E. F. Keyman and A. Icduygu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) 
p.70-86. 
 
Kalaycioğlu, E. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005)  
 
Kalaycioğlu, E. ‘The Mystery of the Turban: Participation or Revolt?’ In Religion and 
Politics in Turkey, ed. by A. Carkoglu and B. Rubin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006)  
288 
 
 
Kalaycıoğlu, E. ‘The Turkish-EU Odyssey and Political Regime Change in Turkey’. South 
European Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 2 (2011) p.265-278. 
 
Kalaycıoğlu, E. ‘Kulturkampf in Turkey: the Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 
2010’. South European Society and Politics, vol.17 no: 1 (2012) p.1-22. 
 
Kanbolat, H. ‘Relations of think tanks to public and private sector and the media in Turkey’. 
Today’s Zaman (4 August 2009)  <www.todayszaman.com/columnist-182925-relations-of-
think-tanks-to-public-and-private-sector-and-the-media-in-turkey.html> (accessed 19 March 
2011)   
 
Karaman M. L. and Aras, B. ‘The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey’. Journal of Economic 
and Social Research, vol.2 no: 2 (2000) p.39-58. 
 
Kahraman, S.E. ‘Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement’. 
Turkish Studies, vol.1 no: 1 (2000) p. 1-20. 
 
Karaman M. L. and Araş, B. ‘The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey’. Journal of Economic 
and Social Research, vol.2 no: 2 (2000) p. 39-58. 
 
Karaosmanoğlu, A.L. ‘The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in 
Turkey’. Journal of International Affairs, vol.54 no: 1 (2000) p.199-216. 
 
Karpat, K. H.‘The Republican People’s Party, 1923-1945’. In Political Parties and 
Democracy in Turkey, ed. by M.Heper and J.M. Landau (London: IB Tauris, 1991) p.42-64. 
 
Karpat, K.H. Studies on Turkish Politics and Society (Leiden: Brill Publications, 2004) 
 
Kavalski, E. ‘The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe 
and Normative Power China in Context’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) 
p.247-267. 
 
Keene, E. ‘Social Status, Social Closure, and the Idea of Europe as a Normative Power’. 
European Journal of International Relations, vol.19 no: 4 (2012) p.939-956.  
 
Keller, H. ‘Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: the Question of Legitimacy’. In 
Legitimacy in International Law, ed. by R. Wolfrum and R. Volker (New York: Springer 
Publishers, 2008) p.219-297. 
 
Kelley, J. ‘International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and 
Socialisation by International Institutions’. International Organisation, vol.58 no: 3(2004) 
p.425-457. 
 
Kenner, J. ‘Economic and Social Rights in the EU Legal Order’. In Economic and Social 
Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Legal Perspective, ed. by T.K. 
Hervey and J.Kenner (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) p.1-26. 
 
289 
 
Kepel, G. ‘Turkey’s European Problem’. Open Democracy (14 December 2004) 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/article_2264.jsp> (accessed 
4 September 2011)  
 
Ketola, M. ‘EU Democracy Promotion in Turkey: Funding NGOs, Funding Conflict?’ 
International Journal of Human Rights, vol.15 no: 6 (2011) p.787-800. 
 
Keukeleire, S. ‘The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional, and 
Structural Diplomacy’. Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14 no: 3 (2003) p.31-56. 
 
Keukeleire, S. ‘Lecture on EU Foreign Policy beyond Lisbon : The Quest for Relevance’ 
(Bruges: 9 March 2011) 
 
Keyder, C. State and Class in Turkey (London: Verso Publications, 1987)  
 
Keyder, C. ‘Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s’. In Rethinking 
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, ed. by S. Bozdogan and R. Kasaba (Washington 
D.C.: University of Washington Press, 1997) p.37-49. 
 
Keyman, E. F. and ˙İçduygu, A. ‘Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship’, Citizenship 
Studies, vol.7 no: 2 (2003) p. 219–235. 
 
Keyman E.F. and Koyuncu B., ‘Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political 
Economy of Turkey’. Review of International Political Economy, vol.12 no: 1 (2005) p.105-
128.  
 
Keyman, E.F. and Düzgit, S.A. ‘Europeanization, Democratization and Human Rights in 
Turkey’. In Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, ed. by E. 
LaGro and K.E. Jorgensen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p.69-89. 
 
Keyman, E. F. ‘The CHP and the Democratic Opening: Reaction to AK Party’s Electoral 
Hegemony’. Insight Turkey, vol.12 no: 2 (2010) p.91-108. 
 
Khilnani, S. ‘The Development of Civil Society’. In Civil Society: History and Possibilities, 
ed. by S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.11-32. 
 
Kılıçdaroğlu, K. Speech to the European Policy Centre (Brussels: 16 September 2010) 
http://kadersevinc.blogactiv.eu/2010/10/01/the-speech-of-kemal-kilicdaroglu-european-
policy-center-16-september-2010/ (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
Kılıçdaroğlu, K. Speech to the European Policy Centre (Brussels: 16 September 2010) 
http://kadersevinc.blogactiv.eu/2010/10/01/the-speech-of-kemal-kilicdaroglu-european-
policy-center-16-september-2010/ (accessed 4 September 2011) 
 
Kılıçdaroğlu, K. Speech to Socialist International (Paris, 15 November 2010) 
<http://www.socialistinternational.org/images/dynamicImages/file/KilicdarogluSpeech.pdf> 
(accessed 5 September 2011) 
 
290 
 
Kılıçdaroğlu, K. ‘The Threat to Turkish Freedom’. Wall Street Journal (2 December 2013) 
<http://chpbrussels.org/2013/12/02/chp-president-kemal-kilicdaroglu-the-threat-to-turkish-
freedom-the-wall-street-journal/> (accessed 21 December 2013) 
 
King, N. ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’. In Qualitative Methods in Organisational 
Research, ed, by C. Cassell and G. Symon (London: Sage Publications, 1994) p.14-36. 
 
King, T. ‘Human Rights in European Foreign Policy’. European Journal of International 
Law, vol.10 no: 2 (1999) p.313-337. 
 
Kirişci, K. and Winrow, G.M. The Kurdish Question and Turkey: an Example of a Trans-
state Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997)  
 
Kirişci, K. ‘The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is It an Historic 
Turning Point?’ The Middle East, vol.8 no: 4 (2004) p.87-94. 
 
Kirişci, K. ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of European Union Reform’. South 
European Society and Politics, vol.16 no: 2 (2011) p.335-349. 
 
Kirişçi, K. and Kaptanoğlu, N. ‘The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy’. Middle 
Eastern Studies vol. 47 no: 5 (2011) p.705-724.  
 
Klintman, M. and Kronsell, A. ‘Challenges to Legitimacy in Food safety Governance? The 
Case of the European Food Safety Authority’. Journal of European Integration, vol.32 no: 3 
(2010) p.309-327. 
 
Kochenov, D. EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer, 2008)  
 
Koh, H.H. ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ Indiana Law Journal, vol.74 
(1999) p.1397-1417. 
 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Bittberger, B. Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 
 
Kok, W. ‘Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges’. Report to the 
European Commission (Florence: European University Institute, 19 March 2003) 
 
Koller, P. ‘International Law and Global Justice’. In Legitimacy, Justice, and Public 
International Law, ed. by L.H. Meyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
p.186-206. 
 
Kotsovilis, S. ‘Between Fedora and Fez: Modern Turkey’s Troubled Road to Democratic 
Consolidation and the Pluralising Role of Erdogan’s Pro-Islam Government’. In Turkey and 
the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges, ed. by J. Joseph 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.42-70. 
 
Kramer M.H., Simmonds N.E. and Steiner H. A Debate over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
 
291 
 
Krasner, S.D. ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’. 
Comparative Politics, vol.16 no: 2 (1984) p.223-246. 
 
Kratochwill, F. ‘On Legitimacy’. International Relations, vol.20 no: 3 (2006) p.302-308. 
 
Kretschmer, H. ‘Editorial’. EU Turkey Review – a Periodical of the Delegation of the 
European Commission to Turkey, issue 5 (2006) 
 
Kubicek, P. ‘The European Union and Political Cleavages in Turkey’. Insight Turkey, vol.11 
no: 3 (2009) p.109-126. 
 
Küçükcan, T. ‘State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey’. Brigham Young 
University Law Review, (2003) p.475-506. 
 
Kumar, K. ‘Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term’. British 
Journal of Sociology, vol.44 no: 3 (1993) p.375-395. 
 
Kurki, M. ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: the EIDHR and the Construction 
of Democratic Civil Societies’.  International Political Sociology, vol.5  no: 2 (2011) p.349-
366. 
 
Kushner, D. ‘Turkey and Europe: a Relationship of Passion and Pain’. History of European 
Ideas, vol.18 no: 5 (1994) p.683-695. 
 
Kvist, J. ‘Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among EU 
Member States in Social Policy’. Journal of European Social Policy, vol.14 no: 3 (2004) 
p.301-318. 
 
Lagendijk, J. ‘The right to remain silent’. Hurriyet Daily News (22 July 2010) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-right-to-remain-silent-2010-08-22> 
(accessed 18 March 2011) 
 
Landau, J.M. Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: Brill Publications, 1974) 
 
Langan, M. ‘Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa-EU Ties’. New 
Political Economy, vol.17 no: 3 (2012) p.243-270.  
 
Landman, T. ‘The Political Science of Human Rights’. British Journal of Political Science, 
vol.35 no: 3 (2005) p.549-572. 
 
Larrabee. F.S. and Lesser, I.O. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa 
Monica CA:  RAND, 2003)  
 
Larrabee, F.S. and Töl, G. ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Challenge’. Survival, vol.53 no: 4 (2011) p.143-
152. 
 
Lazowski, A. ‘And Then There Were Twenty-Seven... a Legal Appraisal of the Sixth 
Accession Treaty’. Common Market Law Review, vol.44 no: 2 (2007) p.401-430. 
 
292 
 
Le Figaro, ‘Spain: Application for Accession to the EEC on 28 July’ (20 July 1977) 
<www.ena.lu/spain-application-accession-eec-28-july-figaro-20-july-1977-030203917.html> 
(accessed 19 May 2011) 
 
Le Monde, ‘M. Erdogan: Ce que la Turquie apporte à la famille Européene’ (22 October 
2004) 
<http://www.cvce.eu/obj/mr_erdogan_what_turkey_brings_to_the_european_family_from_le
_monde_22_october_2004-en-3eb53843-7529-43d5-ad28-f524b08f7f72.html> (accessed 12 
December 2013) 
 
Leino, P. ‘The Journey towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and Common 
Values as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law’. In EU Foreign Relations Law: 
Constitutional Fundamentals, ed. by M. Cremona and B. de Witte (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2008) 
 
Lendvai, N. ‘The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-
Communist Social Policy’ Journal of European Social Policy, vol.14 no: 3 (2004) p.319-333. 
 
Lerch. M. and Schwellnus, G. ‘Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the 
EU’s External Human Rights Policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) 
p.304-321. 
 
Lerch, M, and Guido S. ‘Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the EU's 
External Human Rights Policy.’ Journal of European Public Policy vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.304-
321. 
 
Levy, D. and Sznaider, N. ‘Sovereignty Transformed: a Sociology of Human Rights’. British 
Journal of Sociology, vol.57 no: 4 (2006) p.657-676. 
 
Lenz, T. ‘EU Normative Power and Regionalism: Ideational Diffusion and its Limits’. 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) p.211-228. 
 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, ‘EU Human Rights Dialogues: Current 
Situation, Outstanding Issues, and Resources’. Policy Brief no: 1 (July 2007) 
 
Lindseth, P.L. Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) 
 
Linklater, A. The Transformation of the Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) 
 
Linklater, A. ‘A European Civilising Process’? In International Relations and the European 
Union, ed. by C. Hill and M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.367-387. 
 
Lord, C. ‘Accountable and Legitimate? The EU’s International Role’. In International 
Relations and the European Union, ed. by C. Hill and M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) p.113-133. 
 
293 
 
Lucarelli, S. ‘EU Foreign Policy between Telos and Identity’. Paper presented at the Second 
Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, ‘Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, 
Institutions and Diversity’(Bologna: 24–26 June 2004) 
 
Lucarelli, S. and Manners, I. (eds) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 
 
Lucarelli, S. ‘Which Venus? A Normative Reading of the Transatlantic Divide’. In The 
Transatlantic Divide: Foreign and Security Policies in the Atlantic Alliance from Kosovo to 
Iraq, ed. by O. Croci and A. Verdun (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) p.36-
48. 
 
Ludlow, N.P. ‘British Agriculture and the Brussels Negotiations: a Problem of Trust’. In 
Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-63, ed. by G. Wilkes (London: 
Frank Cass, 1997) p.108-119. 
 
Ludlow, N.P. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s (London: Taylor and 
Francis, 2007) 
 
Luigi, N. and Tocci, N. ‘Running around in Circles? The Cyclical Relationship between 
Turkey and the European Union’. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol.9 no: 3 
(2007) p.233-245. 
 
Lustick, I.S. ‘Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism’. World Politics, vol. 50 no: 1 ( 1997) 
p.88-117. 
 
Maas, W. Creating European Citizens (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 
 
Macleod, I., Hendry I.D. and Hyett S. The External Relations of the European Communities. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)  
 
Mahoney, C. and Beckstrand, M.J. ‘Following the Money: European Union Funding of Civil 
Society Organisations’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.49 no: 6 (2011) p.1339-
1361. 
 
Maier, A. ‘Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance: Learning from Experience?’. 
In D. Mahncke and S. Gstohl (eds.) Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the 
EU's Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008) p.69-93. 
 
Majone, G. ‘The European Community between Social Policy and Social Regulation’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 31:2 (1993), p.153-170. 
 
Mango, A. The Turks Today (New York: Overlook Press, 2004) 
 
Maniokas, K. ‘Methodology of the EU Enlargement: a Critical Appraisal’ 
<http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2000-5/Maniokas.pdf> (accessed 12 November 2008)  
 
Manners, I. ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.40 no: 2 (2002) p.235-258. 
 
294 
 
Manners, I. ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’. International Affairs, vol.84 no: 1 
(2008) p.45-60. 
 
Manners, I. ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’.  Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.182-199. 
 
Manners, I. ‘Assessing the Decennial, Reassessing the Global: Understanding European 
Union Normative Power in Global Politics’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) 
p.304-329. 
 
Marchetti, R. and Tocci, N. ‘Redefining EU Engagement with Conflict Society’. SHUR 
Working Paper Series 04/09 (July 2009) 
 
Maresceau, M. ‘On Association, Partnership, Pre-accession and Accession’. In Enlarging the 
EU: Relations between the EU and CEE, ed. by Maresceau M. (New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 1997) p. 3-22. 
 
Marshall, J. ‘Freedom of Religious Expression and Gender Equality: Sahin vs. Turkey’. 
Modern Law Review, vol.69 no: 3 (2006) p.452-461. 
 
Mason A. ‘Political Community, Liberal Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation’. Ethics, 
vol.109 no: 2 (1999) p.261-286. 
 
Matlary, J.H. ‘Much Ado about Little: the EU and Human Security’. International Affairs, 
vol.84 no: 1 (2008) p.131-143. 
 
Mayer, F.C. and Palmowski, J. ‘European Identities and the EU – The Ties that Bind the 
Peoples of Europe’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.42 no: 3 (2004) p.573-598.  
 
Mayer, H. ‘Is it still Called Chinese Whispers? The EU’s Rhetoric and Action as a 
Responsible Global Institution’. International Affairs, vol. 84 no: 1 (2008) p.62-79. 
 
Mazlumder, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: the Istanbul Sample’ (Ankara: 12 September 2013) 
 
McCormick, J. European Union Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
  
McGarry M., O’Leary B. and Simeon R. ‘Integration or accommodation? The Enduring 
Debate in Conflict Regulation’. In Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, ed. by S. 
Choudhry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p.41-88. 
 
McIntosh Sundstrom, L. Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development 
in Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 
 
McKay, D. ‘Policy Legitimacy and Institutional Design: Comparative Lessons from the 
European Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.38 no: 1 (2000) p. 25-44. 
 
McLaren, L. ‘Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU’. European Union 
Politics, vol.8 no: 2 (2007) p.251-278. 
 
295 
 
Meckled-Garcia S. and Cali B. ‘Human Rights Legalized – Defining, Interpreting and 
Implementing an Ideal’ In The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives 
on Human Rights and Human Rights Law, ed. by Meckled-Garcia S. and Cali B. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006)  p.1-8. 
 
Menendez, A.J. ‘Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.40 no: 
3 (2002) p.471-490. 
 
Menendez, A.G. ‘Human Rights: the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’. In 
Contemporary European Foreign Policy, ed. by W.Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White 
(London: Sage Publications, 2004) p.239-251. 
 
Menon, A. and Weatherill, S. ‘Transnational Legitimacy in a Globalised World’. West 
European Politics, vol.31 no: 3 (2008) p.397-416. 
 
Mental Disability Rights International, ‘Behind Closed Doors: Human Rights Abuses in the 
Psychiatric Facilities, Orphanages, and Rehabilitation Centres of Turkey’ (Istanbul: 28 
September 2005) 
 
Mercer, C. ‘NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratisation: a Critical Review of the Literature’. 
Progress in Development Studies, vol.2 no: 5 (2002) p.5-22. 
 
Merlingen, M. ‘Everything is Dangerous: a Critique of Normative Power Europe’. Security 
Dialogue, vol.38 no: 4 (2007) p.435-453. 
 
Meunier, S. and Nicolaidis, K. ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’. Journal 
of European Public Policy, vol.13 no: 6 (2006) p.906-925. 
 
Mercer, C. ‘NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratization: a Critical Review of the Literature’. 
Progress in Development Studies, vol.2 no: 5 (2002) p.5-22. 
 
Miles, L. ‘The Nordic countries and the Fourth EU Enlargement’. In The European Union 
and the Nordic Countries, ed. by L. Miles (London: Routledge, 1996) p.63-80. 
 
Miller, G. ‘Contextualising Texts: Studying Organisational Texts’. In Context and Method in 
Qualitative Research, ed, by G. Miller and R. Dingwall (London: Sage Publications, 1997) 
p.77-91. 
 
Mommsen, J.W. The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989) 
 
Monshipouri, M. Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998)  
 
Monshipouri, M. Constructing Human Rights in the Age of Globalization (Armonk NY: M.E. 
Sharpe Publications, 2003)  
 
Montpetit, E. ‘Policy Design for Legitimacy’. Public Administration, vol.86 no: 1 (2008) 
p.259-277. 
296 
 
 
Moravcsik, A.  ‘Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Co-operation’. Working Paper Series 52 (Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University, 1994) 
 
Moravcsik, A. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (London: University College London, 1998)  
 
Moxon-Browne, E. ‘From Isolation to Involvement: Ireland’. In EU Enlargement: a 
Comparative History ed. by W. Kaiser and J. Elvert (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004)  
 
Moumoutzis, K. ‘Still Fashionable yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the 
Europeanisation of EU Foreign Policy’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.49 no: 3 
(2011) p.607-629. 
 
Mouritsen, P. ‘Four Models of Republican Liberty and Self-Government’. In Republicanism 
in Theory and Practice, ed. by I. Honohan and J. Jennings (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 
p.217-237. 
 
Mousseau, D.Y. ‘Is Turkey Democratising with EU Reforms?’ South European and Black 
Sea Studies, vol.12 no: 1 (2012) p.63-80. 
 
Müftüler-Baç,M. Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997) 
 
Müftüler-Baç, M. ‘Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe’. Turkish Studies, vol.1 no: 
1 (2000) p.21-35. 
 
Mulligan, S. ‘Questioning the Question of Legitimacy in IR’. European Journal of 
International Relations, vol.10 no: 3 (2004) p.475-484. 
 
Mulligan, S. ‘The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations’. Millennium- Journal of 
International Studies, vol.34 no.2 (2006) p.349-375. 
 
Mulligan, S. ‘Legitimacy and the Practice of Political Judgement’. In Legitimacy in the Age 
of Global Politics, ed. by A. Hurrelmann, S. Schneider and J. Steffek (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007) p.75-89.  
 
Nanzer, C. and Chammari, K. ‘Independent Civil Society versus Servile Society’. In Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network, ‘Freedom of Association in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Region: 2009 Monitoring Report’ p.108-130. 
 
Nau, H.R. ‘Conservative Internationalism’. Hoover Institution Policy Review no: 150 
(Stanford University, 30 July 2008) <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-
review/article/5799> (accessed 8 March 2011)  
 
Navaro-Yashin, Y. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002)  
 
297 
 
Neumann, I.B. and Welsh, J. ‘The Other in European Self-Definition: an Addendum to the 
Literature on International Society’. Review of International Studies, vol.17 no: 4 (1991) 
p.327-348. 
 
Neunreither, K. ‘The European Parliament and Enlargement: 1973-2000’. In The Expanding 
European Union: Past, Present, Future, ed. by Redmond J. and Rosenthal G.G. (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998)  p.65-86. 
 
Neumann, I.B. Uses of the Other: the ‘East’ in European Identity Formation (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) 
 
Neyer, J. ‘Justice, Not Democracy: Legitimacy in the European Union’. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.48 no: 4 (2010) p.903-921. 
 
Neyer, J. ‘Europe’s Justice Deficit: Justification and Legitimacy in the European Union’. In 
Political Theory and the European Union, ed. by J. Neyer and A.Wiener (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) p.169-185. 
 
Nicholson, F. From the Six to the Twelve: the Enlargement of the European Communities 
(Harlow: Longman, 1987). 
 
Nicolaides, P. ‘Preparing for Accession to the EU: How to Establish Capacity for Effective 
and Credible Application of EU Rules’. In The Enlargement of the European Union, ed. by 
Cremona M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.43-78. 
 
Nicolaidis, K.and Howse, R. ‘This is my EUtopia: Narrative as Power’. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.40 no: 4 (2002) p.767-792. 
  
Nicolaidis K. and Nicolaidis D. ‘The EuroMed beyond Civilisational Paradigms’. In The 
Convergence of Civilisations, ed. By E. Adler, B. Crawford, F. Bicchi and R.D. Sarto 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 
 
Nicolaidis, K. ‘The Clash of Universalisms - Or Why Europe Needs a Post-Colonial 
Ethos’. Paper presented at the ISA 49th Annual Convention, ‘Bridging Multiple Divides’ 
(San Francisco: 26 March 2008) 
 
Nicolaidis, K. ‘Sustainable Integration: Towards EU 2.0?’ Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol.40 no: 4 (2010) p.21-54. 
 
Nicolaidis, K. ‘Europe 2.0? Towards Sustainable Integration’. Open Democracy (12 July 
2010)  <http://www.opendemocracy.net/kalypso-nicola%C3%AFdis/project-europe-2030-
towards-sustainable-integration> (accessed 13 October 2010) 
 
Nicolaidis, K. and Whitman, R.G. ‘Preface’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) 
p.167-170. 
 
Nicolaidis, K. and Fisher-Onar, N. ‘The Decentering Agenda: Europe as a Postcolonial 
Power’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) p.283-303. 
 
298 
 
Niemann, A. and Bretherton, C. ‘EU External Policy at the Crossroads: the Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness’. International Relations, vol.27 no: 3 (2013) p.261-275. 
 
Nogueras, D. and Martinez, L. ‘Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the 
European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems’. Columbia Journal of European Law, 
vol.7 no: 3 (2001) p.307-336. 
 
Noutcheva, G. ‘Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: the Limits of the EU’s Normative 
Power in the Western Balkans’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.16 no: 7 (2009) 
p.1065-1084.  
 
Nugent, N. ‘The EU’s Response to Turkey's Membership Application: Not Just a Weighing 
of Costs and Benefits’. Journal of European Integration, vol.29 no: 4 (2007) p.481-502. 
 
Nye, J. Soft Power (Cambridge MA: Public Affairs Press, 2004)  
 
O’Brennan, J. The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006)  
 
Oguzlu, H.T. ‘The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey's Membership in the 
European Union’. International Journal, vol.57 no: 4 (2002) p.579-603. 
 
Öktem, N. ‘Religion in Turkey’. Brigham Young University Law Review (2002) p.371-404. 
 
O’Neil, M.L. ‘Linguistic Human Rights and the Rights of the Kurds’. In Human Rights in 
Turkey, ed. by Z.F. Kabakasal Arat (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) 
p.72-86. 
 
Onanç, G. ‘Kurdish Issue needs more Empathy from Civil Society’. Interview to Today’s 
Zaman (10 October 2009) <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/mobile.do?load=wapDetay&link=188923> (accessed 29 June 2010) 
 
Onbaşı, F.G. Civil Society Debate in Turkey (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 
2010)  
 
Öner, S. Turkey and the European Union: the Question of European Identity (Plymouth: 
Lexington Books, 2011) 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare 
Party in Perspective’. Third World Quarterly, vol.18 no: 4 (1997) p.743-766. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare 
Party in Perspective’. Third World Quarterly, vol.18 no: 4 (1997) p. 743-766. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey’. Comparative Politics, 
vol.34 no: 4 (2002) p.439-456. 
Öniş, Z. and Türem, U. ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey’. Comparative 
Politics, vol.34 no: 4 (2002) p.439-456. 
Öniş, Z. ‘Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey–
EU Relations’. Government and Opposition, vol.35 no: 4 (2003) p.463-483. 
299 
 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union Membership: Poland and Turkey 
in Comparative Perspective’. East European Politics and Societies, vol.18 no: 3 (2004) p.481-
512. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Conservative Globalists vs. Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes 
of Europeanisation in Turkey’. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol.9 no: 3 
(2007) p.247-262. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and 
the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey’. Mediterranean Politics, vol.14 no: 
1 (2009) p.21-40. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Domestic Politics, Identity, Conflicts, and the Controversy over EU Membership in 
Turkey’ Istanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Working Paper no: 2 (2009) p.1-24. 
 
Öniş, Z. and Yilmaz, S. ‘Between Europeanisation and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy 
Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era’. Turkish Studies, vol.10 no: 1 (2009) p.7-24. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era’. 
Turkish Studies, vol.13 no. 2 (2012) p.135-152. 
 
Öniş, Z. ‘Sharing Power: Turkey’s Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP 
Hegemony’. Insight Turkey, vol. 15, no: 2 (2013) p. 103-122. 
 
Open Democracy, ‘File: Turkish Dawn’ <http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-
tags/turkish-dawn-0> (accessed 10 June 2013) 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,’Guidelines for the Use of 
Indicators in Country Performance Assessment’.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/36/33670318.pdf> (accessed 30 December 2012) 
 
Owen, D. Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of 
Reason (London: Routledge, 1994) 
 
Özbudun, E. ‘Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey’. In Civil Society, 
Democracy, and the Muslim World, ed. by E. Ozdalga and S. Persson (Istanbul: Swedish 
Research Institute, 1997) p.85-92. 
 
Özbudun, E. Contemporary Turkish Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 
 
Özbudun, E. ‘From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: the Case of the Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey’. South European Society and Politics, vol.11 no: 3 (2006) 
p.543-557. 
 
Özbudun, E. ‘Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004’. Turkish Studies, vol.8 no: 2 
(2007) p.179-196. 
 
Özbudun, E. and Gençkaya, Ö.F. Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in 
Turkey (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009) 
300 
 
 
Özbudun, E. and Hale, W. Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the 
AKP (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010)  
 
Özbudun, E. ‘Turkey’s Search for a New Constitution’. Insight Turkey, vol.14 no: 1 (2012) 
p.39-50. 
 
Özcan, M. Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008) 
 
Özer, S. ‘Democratisation, Conflict Transformation and Women’s Organisations’. In Turkey 
and Human Security, ed. by A. Özerdem and F. Özerdem (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) p.87-
104. 
 
Özler, S.I. ‘Politics of the Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in 
National Elections’. Turkish Studies, vol.1 no: 2 (2000) p.39-58. 
 
Paasch, A. ‘Human Rights in EU Trade Policy: Between Ambition and Reality’. Ecofair 
Trade Dialogue Discussion Paper (Berlin: December 2011) 
 
Pace, M. ‘Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?’ 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.20  no: 4 (2007) p.659-675. 
 
Pace, M. ‘Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: 
the Limits of EU Normative Power’. Democratization, vol.16 no: 1 (2009) p.40 (39-58) 
 
Pace, M. (ed.) Europe, the USA and Political Islam: Strategies for Engagement (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
 
Paloni, A. and M. Zanardi. ‘Development Policy Lending, Conditionality and Ownership: a 
Political Economy Model’. CREDIT Research Paper, no 05/10 (2010) 
 
Paolini, A.J., Elliott A., Moran A. (eds) Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and 
International Relations (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 
 
Papadimitriou, D. and Gateva, E. ‘Between Enlargement-led Europeanisation and Balkan 
Exceptionalism’. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol.10 no: 2 (2009) p.152-
166. 
 
Pardo, I. Morals of Legitimacy: between Agency and System (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2000) 
 
Pardo I. and Prato G.B. ‘Introduction: Disconnected Governance and the Crisis of 
Legitimacy’. In Citizenship and the Legitimacy of Governance, ed. by I. Pardo (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2011) p.1-24. 
 
Pardo, R.P. ‘Normal Power Europe: Non-Proliferation and the Normalisation of EU Foreign 
Policy’. European Integration, vol.34 no: 1 (2012) p.1-18. 
 
301 
 
Parekh, B. ‘Non-ethnocentric Universalism’. In Human Rights in Global Politics, edited by 
Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.128-
159. 
 
Parekh, B. A New Politics of Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)  
 
Parla, T. The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gokalp, 1876-1924 (Leiden: Brill 
Publications, 1985)  
 
Parr, H. Britain’s Policy towards the European Community (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 
 
Parry, G. ‘The Idea of Political Participation’. In Participation in Politics, ed. by G.Parry and 
B. Anderson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972) p.1-38. 
 
Party of European Socialists (PES), ‘PES Delegation to Turkey meets Peace and Democracy 
Party leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Gültan Kisanak’ (29 January 2011) 
<http://www.pes.org/en/news/pes-delegation-turkey-meets-peace-and-democracy-party-
leaders-selahattin-demirtas-and-gueltan-k> (accessed 11 March 2011) 
 
Patton, M.J. ‘AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU Process?’ 
Mediterranean Politics, vol.12 no: 3 (2007) p.339-358. 
 
Pavey, Ş. ‘Who will put you in the next Olympics ad?’ Speech in Turkey’s Grand National 
Assembly (1 November 2013) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/who-will-you-put-in-the-
next-olympics-ad.aspx?pageID=449&nID=57225&NewsCatID=396> (accessed 2 November 
2013) 
 
Pentland, C. International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber Publishing, 
1973) 
 
Perry M.J. Toward a Theory of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 
 
Peter, F. Democratic Legitimacy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008)   
 
Peters, B.G.  ‘Politics and Institutions in the EC’. In Euro-Politics: Institutions and 
Policymaking in the New European Community, ed. by A. Sbragia (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1992) p.75-122. 
 
Peters, G. ‘Agenda-setting in the European Union’. In European Union: Power and Policy-
making, ed. by J. Richardson (London: Routledge, 1996) p.61-76. 
 
Petersmann, E.-U. ‘Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of International 
Markets’. Los Angeles Law Review, vol.37 no: 2 (2003) p.407-460. 
 
Petrov, R. ‘Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of Third Countries’. 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.13 no: 1 (2008) p. 33-52. 
 
Pevehouse, J.C. Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
302 
 
 
Phinnemore, D. ‘Beyond 25 – the Changing Face of EU Enlargement: Commitment, 
Conditionality, and the Constitutional Treaty’. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 
vol.8 no: 1 (2006) p.7-26. 
 
Phinnemore, D. ‘From Negotiations to Accession: Lessons from the 2007 Enlargement’. 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol.10 no: 2 (2009) p.240-252. 
 
Pichler, F. ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’. European Societies, vol.11 no: 1 (2009) p.3-24. 
 
Pierre, J. and Pierce, B.G. Governance, Politics and the State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000)  
 
Pierson, C. The Modern State (London: Routledge, 1996)  
 
Pikalo, J. ‘Economic Globalisation, Globalist Stories of the State, and Human Rights’. In 
Economic Globalisation and Human Rights, ed. by W. Benedek, K. Feyter, and F. Marella 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.17-37. 
 
Pinder, J. ‘From Closed Doors to European Democracy: Beyond the Intergovernmental 
Conferences’. In The European Union Beyond Amsterdam: New Concepts of European 
Integration, ed. by M. Westlake (London: Routledge, 1998) p.43-54.  
 
Piskinsut, S. ‘Turkey’s Problems related to Human Rights, Democracy and the European 
Union’. In Human Rights Education and Practice in Turkey in the Process of Candidacy to 
the EU, ed. by M. Dartan and C.Munevver (Istanbul: Marmara University, 2002) p.257-267. 
 
Pohjolainen, A.-E. The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions: the Role of the 
United Nations. The Danish Institute for Human Rights (2006) 
 
Powel, B.T. ‘A Clash of Norms: Normative Power and EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia’. 
Democratization, vol.16 no: 1 (2009) p.193-214. 
 
Presidency of the European Council, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action’ (10 December 2003) <http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_3126_en.htm> (accessed 26 June 2010)  
 
Preston, C. ‘Obstacles to EU Enlargement: the Classical Community Method and the 
Prospects for a Wider Europe’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.33 no:3 (1995) 
p.451-463. 
 
Preston, C. Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1997)  
 
Pridham, G. ‘The European Union’s Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in 
Slovakia’. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54 no: 2 (2002) p.203-227. 
 
Pridham, G. ‘Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, 
Approach, and Priorities’. Democratization, vol.14 no: 3 (2007) p.446-471. 
 
303 
 
Pridham, G. ‘The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality: Romania’s Accession to 
the European Union’. Comparative European Politics, vol.5 no: 2 (2007) p.347-376. 
 
Pridham, G. ‘Unfinished Business: European Political Conditionality after Eastern 
Enlargement’. In The European Union and Democracy Promotion: a Global Critical 
Assessment, ed. by R. Youngs  (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010) p.16-37. 
 
Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey. European Union Strategy for  Turkey’s Accession 
Process: 2010-2011 Action Plan (Ankara: 15 March 2010)  
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/2010_2011_action_plan.pdf >(accessed 22 June 2010) 
 
Prodi, R. Europe as I See It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000)  
 
Rack, R. and Lausseger, S. ‘The Role of the European Parliament: Past and Future’. In The 
EU and Human Rights, ed. by P. Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p.801-838. 
 
Radaelli, C.M. ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a 
Source of Legitimacy’. Governance, vol.13 no: 1 (2000) p.25-43. 
 
Rajan, N. Secularism, Democracy, Justice (London: Sage Publications, 1998)  
 
Redmond, A. and Strong, M. Turkey and the European Community: a Forum Europe 
Conference (Brussels: 30-31 October 1991)  
 
Renda, A. Impact Assessment in the EU: The State of the Art and the Art of the State 
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006) 
 
Republic of Turkey – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Turkey, at the Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe’ (Strasbourg: 6 October 2004) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-
recep-tayyip-erdogan_-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of-turkey_-at-the-plenary-session-of-
the-parliamentary-assembly.en.mfa> (accessed 12 March 2011) 
 
Rhodes, C. ‘The Identity of the European Union in International Affairs’. In The European 
Union in the World Community, ed. by C. Rhodes (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008) p.1-18. 
 
Rich, P.  ‘European Identity and the Myth of Islam: a Reassessment’. Review of International 
Studies, vol.25 no: 3 (1999) p.435-451. 
 
Richardson, J. ‘Policy-making in the EU: Interests, Ideas and Garbage Cans of Primeval 
Soup’. In European Union: Power and Policy-Making, ed. by J. Richardson (London: 
Routledge, 1996) p.3-23. 
 
Richardson, J. ‘Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change’. Political Studies, vol.48 
no: 4 (2000) p.1006-1025. 
 
Risse, T. ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicating Behaviour 
in the Human Rights Area’. Politics and Society, vol.27 no: 4 (1999) p.529-559. 
 
304 
 
Risse, T. and Sikkink, R. ‘The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into 
Practices: Introduction’. In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, ed. by T.Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) p.1-38. 
 
Risse, T. ‘Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’. International Organisation, 
vol.54 no: 1 (2000) p.1-33. 
 
Risse, T. and Kleine, M. ‘Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.45 no: 1 (2007) p.69-80. 
 
Rodley N.S. and Weissbrodt D. ‘UN Non-Treaty Procedures for Dealing with Human Rights 
Violations’. In Guide to International Human Rights Practice, ed. by H. Hannum (Ardsley 
NY: Transnational Publishers, 2004) p.65-88. 
 
Romano, D. ‘The Kurds and EU Enlargement: In Search of Restraints on State Power’. In 
Divided Nations and European Integration, ed. by T.J. Mabry (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013) p.190-210. 
 
Ronzoni, M. ‘The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent 
Account’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.37 no: 3 (2009) p.229-256. 
 
Rosato, S. Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011)  
 
Rosecrance, R. ‘The European Union: a New Type of International Actor’. In Paradoxes of 
European Foreign Policy, ed. by J. Zielonka (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 
15–23. 
 
Rothschild, J. ‘Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe’. Political 
Science Quarterly, vol.92 no: 3 (1977) p.487-501. 
 
Rouleau, E. ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’. Foreign Affairs, vol. 79 no: 6 (2000) p.100-
114. 
 
Royo, S. and Manuel,P.C. Spain and Portugal in the European Union: the First Fifteen Years 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2003)  
 
Rumelili, B. ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s 
Mode of Differentiation’. Review of International Studies, vol.30 no: 1 (2004) p. 27-47. 
 
Rumelili, B. ‘Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialisation in a Post-Enlargement 
Europe’. Journal of European Integration, vol.33 no: 2 (2011) p.235-249. 
 
Rumford, C. ‘Human  Rights  and  Democratization  in Turkey  in  the  Context  of  EU  
Candidature’. Journal of European Area Studies, vol.9 no: 1 (2001) p.93-105. 
 
Rumford, C. ‘Failing the EU Test? Turkey’s National Programme, EU Candidature and the 
Complexities of Democratic Reform’. Mediterranean Politics, vo.7 no: 1 (2002) p.51-68. 
 
305 
 
Saatcioğlu, B. ‘Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle: the Case of Turkey’s AKP under EU 
Conditionality’. KFG Working Papers, Free University Berlin (2011)  
 
Sadeh, T. Jones, E. Verdun, A. ‘Legitimacy and Efficiency: Revitalising EMU ahead of 
Enlargement’. Review of International Political Economy, vol.14 no: 5 (2007) p.739-745. 
 
Sadurski, W. ‘The Role of the EU Charter of Rights in the Process of Enlargement’. In Law 
and Governance in an Enlarged European Union, ed. by G.A. Bermann and K. Pistor 
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) p.61-96 
 
Sanderson, I. ‘Making Sense of What Works: Evidence Based Policy Making as Instrumental 
Rationality?’ Public Policy and Administration, vol.17 no: 3 (2002) p.61-75. 
 
Sarigil, Z. ‘Bargaining in Institutionalized Settings: The Case of Turkish reforms’. European 
Journal of International Relations, vol.16 no: 3 (2010) p.463-483. 
 
Sasse, G. ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into 
Policy’. European University Institute Working Paper 2005/16 (2005) 
 
Sasse, G. ‘The Politics of EU Conditionality: the Norm of Minority Protection during and 
beyond EU Accession’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.15 no: 6 (2008) p.842-860. 
 
Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. ‘Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 45, no: 2 (2007) p.435-457. 
  
Schmitt,H. and Thomassen, J. ‘Introduction’. In Political Representation and Legitimacy in 
the European Union, ed. by H.Schmitt and J. Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) p.3-23. 
 
Schwarz, N.L. ‘Communitarian Citizenship: Marx and Weber on the City’. In Karl Marx’s 
Social and Political Thought, ed. by B. Jessop and R. Wheatley (London: Routledge, 1999) 
p.276-292. 
 
Seeberg, Peter. ‘The EU as a Realist Actor in Normative Clothes: EU Democracy Promotion 
in Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy’. Democratization, vol.16: no. 1 (2009) 
p.81-99. 
 
Shakman Hurd, E. The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008)  
 
Shaw, J. ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy’. European 
Law Journal, vol.4 no:1 (1998) p.63-86. 
 
Scharpf, F. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 
 
Scheuer, A. How Europeans See Europe: Structure and Dynamics of European Legitimacy 
Beliefs (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005) 
 
306 
 
Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., and Knobel, H. ‘Costs, Commitment, and Compliance: the 
Impact of EU Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey’. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol.41 no: 3 (2003) p.495-518. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to 
the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol.11 no: 4 (2004) p.661-679. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds), The Politics of European Union Enlargement: 
Theoretical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2005) 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialisation’. International 
Organisation, vol.59 no: 4 (2005) p.827-860. 
 
Schimmelfennig F., Engert S. and Knobel H.  International Socialization in Europe: 
European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)  
 
Schimmelfennig, F. ‘EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: 
Consistency and Effectiveness’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.15 no: 6 (2008) 
p.918-937. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. ‘Entrapped again: The Way to EU Membership Negotiations with 
Turkey’. International Politics, vol.46 no: 4 (2009) p.413-431. 
 
Schneider S.,Nullmeier F. and Hurrelmann A. ‘Exploring the Communicative Dimension of 
Legitimacy: Text Analytical Approaches’. In Legitimacy in the Age of Global Politics, ed. by 
Hurrelmann A., Schneider S. and Steffek, J. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.126-
155. 
 
Schmitt, C. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985)  
 
Schmitt,H. and Thomassen, J. ‘Introduction’. In Political Representation and Legitimacy in 
the European Union, edited by H.Schmitt and J. Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) p.3-23. 
 
Schmidt, V.A. ‘Re-envisioning the European Union’. The JCMS Review of the European 
Union in 2008 (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2009) p.17-42. 
 
Schuman, R. Speech to the Council of Europe (Strasbourg: 10 December 1951) 
<www.ena.lu/speech_robert_schuman_council_europe_strasbourg_10_december_1951-
020004764.html> (accessed 30 November 2010) 
 
SETAV (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) ‘Principles of Turkish 
Foreign Policy – Address by Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu’ (Washington 
D.C.: 8 December 2009) 
 
Sebenius, J.K. ‘Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: 
Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities’. International Organization, 
vol.46 no: 1 (1992) p.323-365. 
307 
 
 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs – Turkey,  ‘Programme for Alignment with the Acquis 
2007-2013’ http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Muktesebat_Uyum_Programi/En/Chapter_23.pdf 
(accessed 9 February 2011) 
 
Sedelmeier, U. ‘The EU's Role as a Promoter of Human Rights and Democracy’. In The 
European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, ed. by O. Elstrom 
and M. Smith (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) p.118-135. 
 
Selingman, A. The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)  
Shaw, J. ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy’. European 
Law Journal, vol.4 no: 1 (1998) p.63-86. 
 
Shakman-Hurd, E.  ‘Negotiating Europe: the Politics of Religion and the Prospects for 
Turkish Accession’. Review of International Studies, vol.32 no: 3 (2006) p.401-418. 
 
Sheth, D.L. ‘Grass-roots Initiatives in India’. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 19, no. 6 
(1984) p.259-262. 
 
Shove E. and Redclift M. ‘Stearing Research towards Policy’. In Knowledge, Power and 
Participation in Environmental Policy Analysis, ed. by M. Hisschemoller, R. Hoppe, 
W.N.Dunn and J.R. Ravetz (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001) p.371-390. 
 
Şimşek, S. ‘Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The 
Semiology of AKP’s Political Identity’. Turkish Studies, vol.14 no. 3 (2013) p.429-446. 
 
Sivil Toplum Portları, ‘İnsan Hakları Derneği’ 
<http://www.siviltoplum.com.tr/?ynt=icerikdetay&icerik=49&id=494> (accessed 6 June 
2013) 
 
Sjursen, H. ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s 
Enlargement Policy’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.40 no: 3 (2002) p.491-513. 
 
Sjursen, H. ‘What Kind of Power?’ Journal of European Public Policy vol.13 no: 2 (2006) 
p.169-181. 
 
Sjursen. H. ‘The EU as a Normative Power: How can this Be?’ Journal of European Public 
Policy. vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.235-251. 
 
Simmons, J. A. ‘Justification and Legitimacy’. Ethics, vol.104 no: 4 (1999) p.739-771. 
 
Skach, C. ‘We, the Peoples? Constitutionalizing the European Union’. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.43 no: 1 (2005) p.149-170. 
 
Smismans, S. ‘The European Union’s Fundamental Rights Myth’. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.48 no: 1 (2010) p.62 (45-66) 
 
Smith, K.E. ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: 
How Effective?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.3 no: 2 (1998) p.253-274. 
 
308 
 
Smith, K.E. ‘The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries’. In Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, ed. by Smith, K.E. and Light, M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) p.185-203.  
 
Smith, K.E. ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’. In Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe vol.2, ed. by J. Zielonka and A. Pravda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) p.31-57. 
 
Smith, K. E. ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in The 
Enlargement of the European Union, ed. by Cremona M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) p.105-139. 
Smith, K.E. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003)  
 
Smith, K.E. ‘The European Parliament and Human Rights: Norm Enterpreneur or Ineffective 
Talking Shop?’ Dossier El Parlamento Europeoen la Politica Exterior, no: 11 (2004)  
 
Smith, K.E. ‘Enlargement and European Order’. In International Relations and the European 
Union, ed. by C. Hill and M.Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.270-291. 
 
Smith, M. ‘Crossroads or cul-de-sac? Reassessing European Foreign Policy’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol.13 no: 2 (2006) p.322-327. 
 
Smith, M. ‘Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals’. Politics, vol.28 no: 
3 (2008) p.177-187. 
 
Smith, M. ‘Between ‘Soft Power’ and a Hard Place: European Union Foreign and Security 
Policy between the Islamic World and the United States’. International Politics vol.46 no: 5 
(2009) p.596-615. 
 
Smith, M. ‘Developing Administrative Principles in the EU: a Foundational Model of 
Legitimacy’, European Law Review, vol.18 no: 2 (2012) p.269-288. 
 
Soderbaum, F. ‘African Regionalism and EU-African Interregionalism’. In European Union 
and New Regionalism, ed. by M. Telo (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) p.185-201. 
 
Soner, A. B. ‘The Justice and Development Party’s Policies towards non-Muslim Minorities 
in Turkey.’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies vol.12 no: 1 (2010) p.23-40. 
 
Sözen, S. and Shaw, I. ‘Turkey and the European Union: Modernizing a Traditional State?’ 
Social Policy and Administration, vol.37 no: 2 (2003) p.108-120. 
 
Speech by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘Turkey to Refocus on EU 
Reforms’ (Strasbourg: 21 May 2008) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-
257_en.htm > (accessed 20 July 2008) 
 
Spiegel, Interview with Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (16 April 2007) 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,477448,00.html> (accessed 4 September 
2011) 
309 
 
 
Staab, A. The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2008)  
 
Steffek, J. ‘Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen 
Consensus’. In Legitimacy in the Age of Global Politics, ed. by Hurrelmann A., Schneider S. 
and Steffek J. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.175-192. 
 
Stillman, P.G. ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’. Polity, vol.7 no: 1 (1974) p.32-56. 
 
Stokke, O. ‘Core Issues and State of Art’. In Aid and Political Conditionality, (London: 
Frank Cass, 1995) 
 
Stone, D. ‘Clinical Authority in the Construction of Citizenship’. In Public Policy for 
Democracy, ed. by Ingram, H. and Rathgeb Smith, S. (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1993) p.45-67. 
 
Suchman, M.C. ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’. Academy of 
Management Review, vol.20 no:3 (1995) p.571-610. 
 
Sullivan, M.P. ‘The Question of Policy Relevance in Foreign Policy Studies’. Western 
Political Quarterly, vol.26 no: 2 (1973) p.314-324. 
 
Susen, S. ‘Bourdieu and Adorno on the Transformation of Culture in Modern Society’. In 
The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays, ed. by S. Susen and B.S. Turner (London: 
Anthem Press, 2011) p.173-202. 
 
Symonides, J.(ed) Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 
 
Tachau, F. and Heper, M. ‘The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey’. Comparative 
Politics, vol.16 no: 1 (1983) p.17-33. 
 
Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. ‘Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems’. In Pan-
European Perspectives in Party Politics, ed. by P.G. Lewis and P.D. Webb (Leiden: Brill 
Publications, 2003) p.207-226. 
 
 Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1993) 
  
Tank, P. ‘Political Islam in Turkey: a State of Controlled Secularity’. Turkish Studies, vol.6 
No: 1 (2005) p.3-19. 
 
Tank, P. ‘Turkey’s Ambiguous Identity: The Symbolic Significance of EU Membership’. In 
Are We Captives of History? Historical Essays on Turkey and Europe, ed. by E. Benum, A. 
Johansson, J. Smilden and A. Storrud (Oslo: Oslo Academic Press, 2007) 
 
Tannam, E. ‘The European Commission's Evolving Role in Conflict Resolution: the Case of 
Northern Ireland 1989-2005’. Cooperation and Conflict, vol.42 no: 3 (2007) p.337-356. 
 
Tatham, A.F. Enlargement of the European Union (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009)  
310 
 
 
Taşpınar, O. ‘The Old Turks’ Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy’. 
Foreign Affairs, vol.86 no: 6 (2007) p.114-130. 
 
Taylor, C. A Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) 
 
Taylor, D. and Balloch S. ‘The Politics of Evaluation: an Overview’. In The Politics of 
Evaluation: Participation and Policy Implementation, ed. by D.Taylor and S.Balloch 
(Bristol:  Policy Press, 2006) p.1-17. 
 
Tekin, B.C. Representations and Othering in Discourse: the Construction of Turkey in the 
EU Context (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010) 
 
Tekin, A. ‘Modernist Responses to Post-Modern Demands? Differential Treatment in 
Europeanising Turkey’. In Diversity in Europe, ed. by G. Calder and E. Ceva (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011) p.99-110. 
 
Telò M. (ed.) The European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global 
Governance (London: Ashgate, 2001) 
 
Tepe, S. ‘Turkey’s AKP: A Model Muslim-Democratic Party?’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 
16 no: 3 (2005) p.69-82. 
 
Terzi, O. The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2010) 
 
Tessuto, G. ‘Ambiguity and Vagueness in Human Rights Discourse’. In Vagueness in 
Normative Texts, ed. by V. Bhatia, J. Engberg, M.Gotti, and D. Heller (Bern: Peter Lang, 
2005) p.287-312. 
 
Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV), ‘Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition’ 
(Ankara: TÜSEV Publications, 2006)  
 
Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV), ‘Civil Society in Turkey: at a Turning Point’ 
(Ankara: TÜSEV Publications, 2011) 
 
Thomas, D.C. ‘Constitutionalisation through Enlargement: the Contested Origins of the EU's 
Democratic Identity’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol.13 no: 8 (2007) p.1190-1210. 
  
Thomassen, J. ‘Legitimacy of the EU after Enlargement’. In The Legitimacy of the European 
Union after Enlargement, ed. by J. Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.1-
20. 
 
Thomson, J.E. ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between 
Theory and Empirical Research’. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39 no: 2 (1995) p.213–
34. 
 
Timur, Ş. ‘Turkey Advancing towards Civilian Despotism’. Hurriyet Daily News (14 
February 2010) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=8216turkey-goes-towards-civil-
authoritarian-rule8217-2010-02-14> (accessed 14 February 2010) 
311 
 
 
Today’s Zaman, ‘Turkey to Establish Human Rights Watchdog’ (5 February 2010) 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=200663> (accessed 5 
February 2010) 
 
Today’s Zaman, ‘Devlet Bahçeli makes three constitutional change proposals’ (20 January 
2010) 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=D0EEF7F907C9
8EB7D33F2752E1E15B37?load=detay&link=199091&newsId=198990> (accessed 13 
March 2011) 
 
Today’s Zaman, ‘Stronger Civil Society Forces Turkey to Democratise’ (7 July 2010) 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203586-stronger-civil-society-forces-turkey-to-
democratize-html> (accessed 7 July 2010) 
 
Today’s Zaman, ‘TUSIAD has no political stance on referendum, chairwoman says’ (15 July 
2010) 
<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=3D62B909DD8
702326066D79EAAAADC97?newsId=216118> (accessed 19 March 2011) 
 
Today’s Zaman, ‘Erdogan makes emotional appeal for unity on Kurdish initiative’ (20 July 
2010) http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-183728-erdogan-makes-emotional-appeal-
for-unity-on-kurdish-initiative.html (accessed 29 July 2010) 
 
Tombuş, H.E. ‘Reluctant Democratisation: the Case of the Justice and Development Party in 
Turkey’. Constellations, vol.20 no: 2 (2013) p.312-327. 
 
Toprak, B. ‘Civil Society in Turkey’. In Civil Society in the Middle East, vol.2, ed. by A.R. 
Norton (Leiden: Brill Publications, 1996) p.87-119. 
 
Toprak, B. ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’. In Religion and Politics in Turkey, ed. by A. 
Carkoglu and B. Rubin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) p.25-44. 
 
Torres Perez, A. Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: a Theory of Supranational 
Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
Towns, A. ‘The Status of Women as a Standard of Civilization’. European Journal of 
International Relations vol.15 no: 4 (2009) p.681-706. 
 
Türkmen, F. and Öktem, E. ‘Foreign Policy as a Determinant in the Fate of Turkey’s Non-
Muslim Minorities: A Dialectical Analysis.’ Turkish Studies, vol.14 no: 3 (2013) p.463-482. 
TÜSIAD, ‘Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’ <http://www.tusiad.org/issues/democratic-
standards/fundamental-rights-and-freedoms/> (accessed 12 January 2013) 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (24 July 1952) 
<http://www.vojvodina-cess.org/download/Sumanov%20plan.pdf> (accessed 28 October 
2008) 
Treaty between the Member States of the EEC and Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United 
Kingdom OJ L 73/4 (27 March 1972) 
312 
 
 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (consolidated text) OJC 325/33 
(2002) 
 
Treaty establishing the European Union and the European Community (consolidated text) OJ 
C 321 (2006) 
 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union, Preamble OJ C 306/01 (2007) 
 
Tsalicoglou, I.S. Negotiating for Entry: the Accession of Greece to the European Community 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995)  
 
Tuck, R. Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) 
 
Turan, I. ‘The Turkish Political System: Instability and Hurdles’. In Turkey: the Road Ahead? 
ed. by B. Duner (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002) p.5-22. 
 
Turan, I. ‘Unstable Stability: Turkish Politics at Crossroads?’ International Affairs, vol.83 
no: 2 (2007) p.319-338. 
 
Turkish Weekly, ‘Identity Crisis: Turkey's MHP Asks 'Who Are We?’ (9 December 2010) 
<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/110068/identity-crisis-turkey-39-s-mhp-asks-39-who-
are-we-39-.html> (accessed 30 March 2011) 
 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish National Parliament) 22
nd
 term (19 February 2006) 
 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish National Parliament) 22
nd
 term (18 May 2007) 
Turner, B.S. ‘Outline of a Theory of Human Rights’. Sociology, vol.27 no: 3 (1993) p.489-
512. 
 
Turunç, H. ‘Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP’s Search for Identity in Turkish Politics’. 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol.15 no: 1 (2007) p.79-91. 
Uğur, M. The European Union and Turkey: an Anchor/Credibility Dilemma (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1999) 
 
Uğur, M. and  Canefe, N. (eds.) Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and 
Issues (London: Routledge, 2004)  
 
Uğur, M. ‘Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the 
Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession Negotiations’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol.48 no: 4 (2010) p.967-991. 
 
Uhlin, A. ‘Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Actors: Mapping Out the Conceptual 
Terrain’. In Legitimacy beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of 
Transnational Actors, ed. by E. Erman and A. Uhlin (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005) p.16-37. 
313 
 
Ulusoy, K. ‘The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in 
Turkey’. International Political Science Review, vol.30 no: 4 (2009) p.363-384. 
 
Ulusoy, K. ‘The Democratic Opening in Turkey: a Historical/Comparative Perspective’. 
Insight Turkey, Vol.12 no: 2 (2010) p.71-90. 
 
Ulusoy, K. ‘The European Impact on State–Religion Relations in Turkey: Political Islam, 
Alevis and Non-Muslim Minorities.’ Australian Journal of Political Science vol.46 no: 3 
(2011) p.407-423. 
 
United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 1948) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18> (accessed 16 April 2009) 
 
United Nations, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, Article 18 (23 March 
1976) <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> (accessed 6 July 2011) 
 
United Nations, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of human rights (20 
December 1993) <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r134.htm> (accessed 21 June 
2010) 
 
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Democratic Governance’ 
<http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&catid=10&s
id=7> (accessed 27 May 2011)  
 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Definition of Basic Concepts and 
Terminologies in Governance and Public Administration’. (New York, 5 January 2006) 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf > (accessed 2 
January 2011) 
 
Uri, P. Memorandum to Robert Schuman (9 July 1952) 
<www.ena.lu/memorandum_pierre_uri_robert_schuman_juillet_1952-010401655.html> 
(accessed 30 November 2010) 
 
Usul, A.R. Democracy in Turkey: the Impact of EU Political Conditionality (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011) 
 
Uvin, P. ‘Scaling up the Grass Roots and Scaling down the Summit: The Relations between 
Third World Nongovernmental Organisations and the United Nations’. Third World 
Quarterly, vol.13 no: 3 (1995) p. 495-512. 
 
Van Elsuwege, P. From Soviet Republics to EU Member States: a Legal and Political 
Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession to the EU (Leiden: Brill Publications, 2008) 
 
Verney, S. ‘Justifying the Second Enlargement’. In Questioning EU Enlargement, ed. by 
Sjursen, H. (London: Routledge, 2006) p.19-41. 
 
Verney, S. ‘National Identity and Political Change on Turkey’s Road to EU 
Membership’. In Turkey’s Road to European Union Membership: National Identity 
314 
 
and Political Change, ed. by S. Verney and K.Ifantis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 
p.1-22. 
Vincent, R.J. ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’. In Human Rights and Foreign Policy: 
Principles and Practice, ed. by Hill, D. (London: Macmillan, 1989) 
 
Von Bogdandy, A. ‘The EU as a Supranational Federation: a Conceptual Attempt in the Light 
of the Amsterdam Treaty’. Columbia Journal of European Law, vol.6 no: 1 (2000) p.27-54. 
 
Von Hagen, J. ‘Through Crises to EMU: Perspectives for Fiscal Union and Political Union. 
In Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945-2005, ed. by L. 
Kuhnhardt (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011) p.61-78. 
 
Walker, N. ‘Central Europe’s Second Constitutional Transition: The EU Accession Phase’. In 
Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism, ed. by W. Sadurski (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 2005) p.341-370. 
 
Walter, C. ‘History and Development of European Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’. In European Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ed. by D. Ehlers 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007) p.1-24. 
 
 
Ward, A. ‘Frameworks for Cooperation between the EU and Third States: a Viable Matrix for 
Uniform Human Rights Standards’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.3 no: 4 (1997) 
p.505-536. 
 
Ward, A. ‘Access to Justice’. In The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, ed. by S. Peers and 
A. Ward (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) p.123-140. 
 
Warleigh, A. ‘Europeanising Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialisation’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.39 no: 4 (2001) p.619-639. 
 
Weber, M. ‘Relations Between the State and Civil Society in Turkey: Does the EU Make a 
Difference?’ In Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External 
Challenges, ed. by J. Joseph (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.83-95. 
 
Weidenfeld, W. and Wessels, W. Europe from A to Z: Guide to European Integration 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997)  
 
Weiker, W.F. Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey (Leiden: Brill Publications, 1973) 
 
Weiler, J. ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: on Standards and Values in the 
Protection of Human Rights’. In The European Union and Human Rights, ed. by N. Neuwahl 
and A. Rosas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) p.51-76.  
 
Wells, P. ‘Talking Turkey at the EU’. Economist, vol.117 no: 41 (11-18 December 2004)  
 
Wetzel, J.R. 'Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union'. Fordham 
Law Review, vol.71 no:  6 (2003) p.2823-2862. 
315 
 
 
Whitman, R. From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the 
European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) 
 
Whitman, R. ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.42 no: 2 (2004) p.415-435. 
 
Whitman, R. ‘The Neo-Normative Turn in Theorising the EU's International Presence’. 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol.48 no: 2 (2013) p.171-193. 
 
Wiessala, G. Re-Orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EU-
Asia Relations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 
 
Birkelbach, W. Report on the Political and Institutional Aspects of Accession to or 
Association with the Community (19 December 1961) 
<http://www.ena.lu/report_willi_birkelbach_political_institutional_aspects_accession_associ
ation_with_community_december_1961-020006013.html>  (accessed 1 December 2008) 
 
Williams, A. ‘Enlargement of the European Union and Human Rights Conditionality: a 
Policy of Distinction?’. European Law Review, vol.25 no: 3 (2000) p.601-640. 
 
Williams, A. ‘Mapping Human Rights, Reading the European Union’. European Law 
Journal, vol.9 no: 5 (2003) p.659-676. 
 
Williams, A. ‘The (Im)possibility of the European Union as a Global Human Rights Regime’. 
In Global Governance and the Quest for Justice: Human Rights, ed. by R. Brownsword  
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) p.69-88. 
 
Williams, A. EU Human Rights Policies: a Study in Irony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005)  
 
Wilson, R. Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992)  
 
Wilson, R.(ed) Human Rights, Culture and Context: an Anthropological Perspective 
(London: Pluto Press, 1997) 
 
Wolf, K.D. ‘The New Raison d’État as a Problem for Democracy in World Society’. 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 5 no: 2 (1999) p. 333–63. 
 
 
Wood, S. and Quaisser, W. ‘Turkey’s Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context 
and Implications for Europe’. European Foreign Affairs Review, vol.10 no: 1 (2005) p.147-
173. 
 
Wolff, S. ‘The New EU Internal Security Architecture Implementation Challenges’. In The 
EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation, ed. by F. Laurssen (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2012) p.63-80. 
 
316 
 
World Bank, ‘Facts and Figures from World Development Indicators 2009’ 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/regional-
backgrounders.pdf> (accessed 6 March 2010) 
 
World Bulletin, ‘Turkish PM Accuses Kurdish Party of being PKK Spokesman’ (3 March 
2011) <http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=70574> (accessed 11 March 
2011) 
 
World Bulletin, ‘Turkey's Kurdish party calls for civil disobedience’ (23 March 2011) 
<http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haberYazdir&ArticleID=71567&tip=>(accessed 31 
March 2011) 
 
Wurth, A. and Seidensticker, F.L. ‘Indices, Benchmarks, and Indicators: Planning and 
Evaluating Human Rights Dialogues’. German Institute for Human Rights (Berlin: November 
2005) 
 
Yankaya, D. ‘The Europeanisation of MÜSIAD: Political Opportunism, Economic 
Europeanisation, and Islamic Euroscepticism’. European Journal of Turkish Studies, vol.9 
(2009) p.1-18. 
 
Yavuz, M.H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 
 
Yavuz, E. ‘Education in Kurdish seems unlikely as major parties oppose demands’ Today’s 
Zaman (11 March 2011) <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-237841-education-in-kurdish-
seems-unlikely-as-major-parties-oppose-demands.html> (accessed 11 March 2011) 
 
Yıldız, K. and McDermott, J. Torture in Turkey: the Ongoing Practice of Torture and Ill-
treatment (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2004) 
 
Yıldız, K. and Muller, M. The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and 
the Kurds (London: Pluto Press, 2008)  
 
Yin, R.K. Case Study research: Design and Methods (London: Sage Publications, 2003)  
 
Young, I. Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)  
 
Young, O.R. ‘The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources 
and the Environment’. International Organization, vol.43 no: 3 (1989) p.349-375. 
 
Ypi, L. ‘Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and the Ethics of EU Foreign Policy’. European 
Journal of Political Theory, vol.7 no: 3 (2008) p.349-364. 
 
Youngs, R. The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediterranean 
and Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
 
Zielonka, J. ‘How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol.39 no: 3 (2001) p.507-536. 
 
317 
 
Zielonka, J. ‘Challenges of Enlargement’. Journal of Democracy, vol.15 no: 1 (2004) p.22-
35. 
Zielonka, J. ‘Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?’ International Affairs, vol.84 
no: 3 (2008) p.471-484. 
 
Zihnioğlu, Ö. The ‘Civil Society Policy’ of the European Union for Promoting Democracy in 
Turkey: Golden Goose or Dead Duck?, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.13 
no: 3 (2013)  p. 381-400. 
 
Zubaida, S. ‘Civil Society, Community and Democracy in the Middle East’. In Civil Society: 
History and Possibilities, ed. by S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) p.232-249. 
 
Zurcher, E.J. Turkey: a Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007)   
 
318 
 
Appendix 1: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
1. Questions asked in European Commission interviews 
 
EU human rights promotion 
 
1. What are the main instruments of human rights promotion within the EU’s 
enlargement strategy? 
2. Why does the European Union use the term ‘fundamental rights’ internally and 
‘human rights’ externally? Is there a differentiation between these two terms? 
3. What is the position of minority rights within EU conditionality? 
4. How deeply does the EU look into the human rights situation of a candidate 
country? 
5. Does any candidate country have the ‘right’ to join the EU? 
6. What are ‘European’ human rights standards? Not all member states have the 
same standards, and several of them are less advanced than what conditionality 
would require. 
7. How are the EU’s annual progress reports compiled? 
8. How impartial is the European Commission in its assessments? 
9. How do you respond to criticism about double standards or inconsistencies in the 
application of EU human rights policy? 
10. Do you agree with the idea that if HR were really at the heart of Union activity, 
EU law would need to be rewritten from a human rights perspective? 
11. What is the role of the European Parliament in EU human rights promotion within 
enlargement? 
12. How does the IPA function in practice and what are its main components? 
13. Who is the main point of contact between the EU and Turkey concerning pre-
accession assistance? Who does the Commission primarily negotiate with? 
14. How does the EIDHR work in practice within enlargement? 
15. The EIDHR began as a human rights instrument within external relations. How 
did it become included in enlargement? 
16. If the EIDHR funding is confidential, how do you advertise it to the NGOs of the 
country? 
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17. How do human rights consultations work in practice? 
18. Do human rights consultations include representatives of civil society 
organisations? 
 
 
Human rights promotion to Turkey 
 
 
1. What particular policies do you use to apply human rights to Turkey? 
2. In which human rights areas has Turkey achieved the most progress? 
3. There is not much debate in the academic literature about the social issues Turkey 
faces. Are civil and political reforms prioritised over social reforms by the EU? 
4. What is the reason that less IPA money is being channeled into Turkey? 
5. Does Turkey ever complain about the lesser amount of financial assistance? 
6. Does the European public have the power to impede Turkey’s accession, even if 
the country implements all the criteria? 
7. The EU is a proponent of Kurdish rights in Turkey. Is there a specific benchmark 
that it has set? 
8. Which are the most serious human rights concerns the EU faces in Turkey? 
9. Are you concerned that Turkey has stalled in its reform process? 
10. Do different actors in Turkey, such as political parties or civil society, have 
different expectations of the EU in terms of human rights promotion? 
11. Do you believe that the AKP government recognises the moral validity of human 
rights norms, or is its aim to fulfill them just to achieve EU membership (their 
state interest)? Or both? 
 
 
2. Questions asked in interviews with human rights organisations in Turkey 
 
 
1. Is contemporary human rights reform in Turkey a result of instrumental calculation 
of the benefits of EU accession, or of recognition of the normative validity of human 
rights? 
2. Do you believe/trust in the liberal pro-reform statements of the AKP government? 
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3. What is the central understanding of human rights in Turkey? May it be different to 
Europe’s understanding? 
4. What is the main human rights philosophy of this organisation? 
5. What would you respond to the strands of politics and civil society that suggest that 
Turkey’s political identity is ‘different’ and cannot accommodate human rights 
protection as required by the EU? 
6. Why is there currently absence of a strong political debate on human rights in 
Turkey? 
7. Do perceptions of EU ‘unfairness’ affect the implementation of human rights in 
Turkey? 
8. Do you agree with the claim that Turkish society is not ‘ready’ for reforms? 
9. Do you agree with the claim that civil society in Turkey is weak? 
10. Do human rights NGOs in Turkey encounter state interference in their activities, and 
how does this manifest? 
11. What do you consider the most serious contemporary human rights problems in this 
country? 
12. What kind of cooperation do you have with the government? Are you invited to 
consultations, for example? 
13. What kind of cooperation do you have with other major human rights organisations 
in Turkey? 
14. How would you evaluate your experience with EU funding and your EIDHR 
projects in particular? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interviewees 
 
European Commission (Brussels, November 2009) 
 
 
Directorate-General Position Unit 
DG Enlargement International Relations 
Officer 
Turkey Unit 
DG Enlargement Policy Officer Western Balkans Unit 
DG Enlargement Policy coordinator Enlargement Strategy Unit 
DG Enlargement Public Relations Officer Information and Communication 
DG Enlargement Adviser on Inter-Institutional 
Relations 
Turkey Unit 
DG External Relations Policy Officer Human Rights Unit 
EU Delegation in 
Ankara 
Policy Officer Political Criteria Unit 
EU Delegation in 
Ankara 
Policy Officer Political Criteria unit 
 
 
Human rights organisations (Ankara, November 2010) 
 
 
Organisation Organisation (in Turkish) Position 
Human Rights Foundation İnsan Hakları Vakfı Director 
Human Rights Foundation                       ʺ Administrator 
Human Rights Association İnsan Hakları Derneği Director 
Human Rights Association                      ʺ Administrator 
Mazlumder Mazlumder Director 
Association for Liberal 
Thinking 
Liberal Düsünce Derneği Director 
Association for Liberal 
Thinking 
                    ʺ Deputy Director 
Association for Liberal 
Thinking 
                   ʺ Trainee 
Association for Prevention of 
Torture (phone interview) 
 Europe and Central Asia 
Programme Officer 
 
 
Academia 
 
University Position 
Bilkent University, Ankara Assistant Professor in International Relations 
 
